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Abstract 
 
Since 1966, Lourinhã’s urban landscape has transformed as Portugal 
democratized. From a rural town with little infrastructure and few institutions in 
1966, Lourinhã emerged by 2001 as an ostensibly modern European town. This 
work highlights key areas of economic and urban development and argues that 
Lourinhã’s political culture became more institutionalized leaving less room for, 
and withering expectation of, citizen participation in local development as 
Portugal transitioned from dictatorship to democracy.  
This dissertation examines Portugal’s transition from the Estado Novo 
dictatorship (1933-1974) to European social democracy by focusing on 
Lourinhã’s – a town of 22,000 people, north of Lisbon – urbanization since 1966. 
Lourinhã’s urbanization involved, and indeed required, a shift in its institutional 
and political culture. In the 1960s and 1970s people were expected to participate 
in development at a cultural, political and financial level, acting as substitutes for 
non-existent state mechanisms of development. However, by the late 1980s, the 
momentum had shifted as regional, national, and European institutions 
participated in developmental programs, marking a dramatic change in how 
citizens engaged with the state and the Portuguese nation. 
From this shift has emerged a debate about the nature of Portugal’s 
transition to democracy. With the Carnation Revolution of 1974 – the military 
coup that toppled the Estado Novo – at the center of analysis, academics and 
pundits ask whether that event represented “evolution or revolution” for Portugal. 
Was Portugal on the path towards democracy before 1974? And, given 
contemporary problems, was the rapid shift to European social democracy the 
blessing it appeared to be by the 1990s? Did democratization disenfranchise the 
Portuguese in important ways? Are commentators like Jorge Silva Melo, a Lisbon 
playwright who began his career in the Estado Novo years, correct in asserting 
that, “under the dictatorship there was hope … that was in ‘72/’73. Nowadays 
[2011], its exactly the opposite: there is no hope”? This dissertation uses 
Lourinhã's development as an example of a Portuguese experience to argue that 
the Carnation Revolution, although a watershed in Portugal's politico-cultural 
evolution, should not be understood as the moment when democracy came to 
Portugal. 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
 
 On April 24, 1974 readers of Republicá, one of Portugal's national 
newspapers, read a seemingly innocuous note in the paper's review section. The 
anonymous letter explained that Radio Renascença's program Limite, a late-
night show on the popular Catholic radio station, "had been improving for some 
weeks. The quality of its news items and its choice of music make Limite 
obligatory listening."1 The program's host, José Vasconcelos, had been waiting to 
read this particular review of his show. It was a signal that told him to recite the 
lyrics of José (Zeca) Afonso's popular, and censored, protest song, Grândola, 
Vila Morena, on Limite shortly after midnight on April 25. Junior officers in the 
clandestine Armed Forces Movement (MFA) heard the song's lyrics at 00:25, 
which spoke of a town where fraternity, equality and the people ruled, on 
Vasconcelo's show. They had agreed to mobilize and occupy government offices 
upon hearing this song, in a coup to overthrow Portugal's dictatorship and 
democratize, develop and decolonize Portugal.2 By late morning the MFA had 
                                                
1 Quoted from: Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 58. 
2 Democratization, Development, and Decolonization were the guiding principles behind the 
founding of the MFA in September 1973. As the events that followed in Portugal between 1974 
and 1976 demonstrate, the "3 D's" program was only an ideological link between many of the 
officers in the MFA. As Diego Palacios Cerezales and others have established, the MFA fractured 
in the aftermath of April 1974 and its members engaged in a battle to define the specifics of the 
three D's. Diego Palacios Cerezales, Portugal à Coronhada: Protesto Popular e Ordem Pública 
nos Séculos XIX e XX, Ricardo Noronha, trans. (Lisboa, PT: Tinta-da-China, 2011), 333-335. For 
a sample of work that discusses the MFA and its "3 D's" program, see: António Reis, "A 
Revolucão de 25 de Abril de 1974, o MFA e o Processo de Democratização," in António Reis, ed, 
Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 6 (Lisboa, PT: Publicações Alfa, 1993); Maria Inácia Rezola, Os 
Militares no Revolução de Abril: O Conselho da Revolução e a Transição Para a Democracia em 
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occupied important sites in Lisbon and ended Marcelo Caetano's dictatorship 
(1968-1974).3 In what must have seemed like an instant, forty-eight years of 
military dictatorship (1926-74), forty-one of which under António Oliveira 
Salazar's Estado Novo (1933-1974), had passed. Portugal became a democracy 
and the country was ostensibly set on a path that, many hoped, would see 
Portugal emerge as a modern Western European country.  
 25 de Abril, or the Carnation Revolution, that toppled the Estado Novo has 
been celebrated as a rupture in both Portuguese and world history. In some 
interpretations of the spread of democracy throughout the world, the Carnation 
Revolution began a wave of democratization that would see dictatorship end in 
other Southern and Eastern European, Asian, African and South American 
countries.4 Similarly, 25 de Abril has been celebrated in Portugal, both 
academically and popularly, as the break with dictatorship and a triumph of social 
democracy over neo-dictatorial and communist forces that tried to establish their 
                                                                                                                                            
Portugal (1974-76). (Lisboa, PT: Campo da Comunicação, 2006); Paul Christopher Manuel. 
Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy. (Washington, DC: 
University Press of America, 1995), xi; Tom Gallagher. Portugal: A Twentieth-Century 
Interpretation. (Manchester, Great Britain: Manchester University Press, 1983), 186-88; Patrick 
Chabal, “Review: Portuguese Decolonization,” The Journal of African History, 39:1 (1998), 161-
162; Douglas Porch, The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution. (London, Great Britain: 
Croom Helm, 1977); and, Maxwell, 96-103. 
3 For further descriptions of that morning, see: Maxwell, 57-59; Gil Green, Portugal's Revolution 
(New York, NY: International Publishers, 1975), 7-12; Walter C. Opello, Jr., Portugal: From 
Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 84-87; and, Gallagher, 
Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation, 188. 
4 For discussions of Portugal's 25 de Abril as the start of a wave of democratizations see: Samuel 
P. Huntington, “The Third Wave”, Journal of Democracy, 2:2 (Spring 1991), 12-34; Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Oklahoma City, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and, Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason M. Lakin. The 
Democratic Century. (Oklahoma City, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).  
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own regimes in the aftermath of 25 de Abril.5  
However, such interpretations overlook Portugal's political, economic, 
social and cultural development in the years prior to 1974.6 Portugal’s 
modernization – this term refers to an economic and political process in the 
discussion that follows, which both motivated and was influenced by social and 
cultural changes – saw the small Iberian country on Europe’s extreme western 
fringe change fundamentally in countless ways. In order to explore the myriad of 
changes in Portugal, the discussion that follows will focus on two larger 
processes and their interrelation in order to flesh out an understanding of how 
Portuguese society has changed from a country whose dictatorial government 
and economic backwardness were tolerated in the Cold War, to a Western social 
democracy with a respectable standard of living.  
                                                
5 For examples of works that celebrate 1974 as a rupture in Portuguese history see: Josep 
Sánchez Cervelló, A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua Influência na Transição Espanhola. (Lisbon, 
PT: Assírio & Alvim, 1993); and, Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy; Reis, "A 
Revolução de 25 de Abril"; António José Telo, História Contemporânea de Portugal, vol. 1 
(Lisboa, PT: Editorial Presença, 2007); Rezola, Os Militares; and, Maria Inácia Rezola, Mitos de 
uma Revolução. (Lisboa, PT: A Esfera dos Livros, 2007).  
6 My argument vis-à-vis the contextualization of 25 de Abril lands this dissertation in a Portuguese 
history war. Beyond debates between those from the left and right rehabilitating and giving credit 
to those in their political parties for key developments during the Revolution, a debate has 
emerged between those who contextualize 25 de Abril and those who call it the key event in 
Portugal's democratization. More will be said later in this chapter. However, it is important to say, 
at this point, how toxic some arguments in this debate can be. In some ways, contemporary 
polemics originated with the celebrations for the thirtieth anniversary of 25 de Abril, which saw the 
Portuguese government celebrate the revolution under the theme, "Abril é evolução". Those who 
do not see the revolution as evolution, but instead, a definitive break, lashed out, placing these 
celebrations somewhere between amnesia and lies. Such a celebration forgot, so the argument 
went, that Portuguese democracy was born in 1974 and was not the continuation of certain 
liberalizing reforms in the last years of the dictatorship. It was a lie because the "promises and 
hopes" of the revolution were appropriated by a process of "evolution" or "progress" that claimed 
the successes of the revolution as their own. See, Maria Manuela Cruzeiro, ‘‘Revolução’ e 
Revisionismo Historiográfico: O 25 de Abril Visto da História’, in Martins, Rui Cunha, ed. Portugal, 
1974: Transição Politíca em Perspectiva Histórica. (Coimbra, PT: Imprensa da Universidade de 
Coimbra, 2011), note 184. The contribution this work makes is to refocus the debate by providing 
evidence and discussion not based in Lisbon's halls of power. 
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First, Portugal became a European social democracy in 1974, cementing 
the democratization of Portuguese government and its institutions. Before 1974, 
Portugal was governed by a conservative, Catholic, and repressive dictatorship 
known as the Estado Novo under Salazar until 1968 and Caetano in its final 
years. The regime fell overnight on April 25, 1974. However, as this dissertation 
argues, when certain practices and norms in Portugal’s modernization are 
considered, this seemingly sudden democratization was not actually so sudden. 
In important ways, the Estado Novo had already introduced its subjects to 
democratic practices as it mobilized support for various developmental projects in 
the 1960s, thereby continuing a modest democratization before 1974.  
The second area upon which my argument focuses considers the changes 
in Portugal’s physical and economic infrastructure that occurred concurrently with 
its democratization in the last half of the twentieth century. At the macro level, 
Portugal’s economy shifted since the late 1950s, causing a revolution in the 
country’s infrastructure. Indeed, Portugal's economy has turned from reliance 
upon its empire to European markets and investment in economic policy. In 
addition Portugal's economy has come to rely upon the tertiary sector as the 
largest contributor to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).7 Welcoming new 
investment and relying upon the service sector has meant that Portugal’s 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, running water and service points) has had to 
                                                
7 In 2012, for example, Portugal’s service sector contributed seventy-five percent of GDP. See: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/po.html (accessed December 19, 
2013). 
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improve exponentially since the 1960s. It has also meant that government 
support for traditional economic activities, like agriculture, needed to be 
supplemented by new methods and techniques in the private sector. Indeed, 
infrastructure and struggling farmers occasionaly required developmental support 
in ways that the Eatado Novo's bureaucracy could not provide. This left a 
vacuum in civic responsibility which Portugal’s population filled with the support 
of various levels of government encouragement until administrative services 
were advanced enough to tackle development without citizen involvement.  
In investigating the relationship between changes in Portugal's politics and 
urban landscape there are, necessarily, certain debates with which any 
discussion must engage. The three most pertinent will be presented to introduce 
the dissertation that follows. First, urban, economic, and political changes over 
the last half-century in Portugal, have been part-in-parcel of a process of 
modernization. Modernization and modernization theory, along with its meanings 
and consequences, have been maddeningly difficult for scholars to pin down. 
This work will contribute to our understanding of this process by reinforcing some 
interpretations and offering a list of societal elements that must be renovated in 
order for modernization to occur. Specifically, the two elements of modernization 
that this dissertation considers are the renovation of urban and economic 
infrastructure, and a society's politics. The second debate, therefore, concerns 
the relative influence of changes in Portugal and Lourinhã's landscapes on the 
power dynamics in the civic sphere. Indeed, as Lourinhã's landscape necessarily 
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developed as Portugal modernized, the relationship between public and private 
actors fundamentally shifted. Finally, important shifts in civic relations underlay 
Portugal's democratization, calling into question some interpretations of 
democratization and the role of 'ordinary citizens' along with the importance of 
Portugal's 1974 revolution in the fall of the Estado Novo.  
In order to engage in these debates, the following discussion explores 
how Portugal’s development in infrastructure and key economic sectors 
contributed to the democratization of society by focusing on the fundamental 
transformation of a single Portuguese town since 1966. On the Atlantic Coast, 
roughly seventy kilometers north of Lisbon, we find Lourinhã. The town provides 
us with an example in which to consider the relative effects of Portugal's 
modernization and democratization on local political culture and development. 
Indeed, Lourinhã is a municipality that has experienced no major political 
upheaval either in support of, or against, any particular government in the 
twentieth century. In fact, since citizens have been given the chance to vote in 
open elections, they have consistently swept the Socialist Party (PS) to power at 
all levels. Further, Lourinhã has not faced demographic pressure to change, nor 
has it experienced unusual economic crises. Yet Lourinhã's physical landscape 
has undergone a dramatic renovation since 1966. Not only has Lourinhã's 
municipal government completely remade the landscape of the town's center, but 
also basic infrastructure like roads, water and electricity have been introduced 
and expanded in a relatively short period. This development has occupied the 
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center of politico-cultural debate in Lourinhã since 1966, mobilizing private 
participation in civic affairs under both the dictatorship and the democratic 
regime. Lourinhã becomes a site for enquiry into how processes like 
modernization can influence and change local political culture at an incremental 
pace. Historical change, for the most part, does not occur in extraordinary 
circumstances. Lourinhã's experience demonstrates how governments and 
private actors can work together to drive meaningful change without major 
rupture or disruption in peoples' lives.  
 
Figure 1: Map of Portugal's Concelhos. The Concelho da Lourinhã is highlighted. Lisbon 
lies roughly seventy kilometers to the south. http://tinyurl.com/lsrzpcn (accessed June 15, 
2014)  
 
 Relative stability in Lourinhã's demographic, administrative and economic 
profile further highlights the influence of continuity as Lourinhã changed. The 
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town's transformation coincided with a varied and inconsistent demographic 
evolution: although the population of Lourinhã has not grown in gross numbers 
between 1966 and today, it has undergone a significant replacement. Lourinhã is 
a town of a little over 22,000 residents in 2014. In 1981, the municipality’s 
population was 21,245 people, while in 1994 the population was listed as 
marginally higher at 21,680 people.8 Lourinhã’s population grew steadily between 
1869 and 1960 from 7,500 to 22,500. However, after 1960 the population dipped 
dramatically, falling to around 17,500 by the late 1960s. It then climbed to 21,000 
by the late 1970s, leveling out from there.9 The decline in the 1960s totaled 
around 12,000 inhabitants who were largely replaced by internal migration and 
white, European returnees from the empire. In addition, the mortality rate 
outstripped the birthrate in this period further proving the importance of migration 
in Lourinhã’s population profile.10 The immigrants were primarily Portuguese from 
other parts of the country, meaning that the town remains largely racially 
homogenous. Indeed, there are no significant groups of visible minorities in 
Lourinhã. 
                                                
8 Mário Bairrada et al, Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã. (Lisboa, PT: 
Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional, Ministério para a Qualificação e o Emprego, 
1997). 21. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 21-22. 
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Table 1: Lourinhã's gross population between 1860 and today. The dip in the 1960s and 
1970s coincides with periods of mass migration due to both economic hardship in 
Portugal and the colonial wars in Africa: military conscription encouraged many 
Portuguese to send their sons out of Portugal before reaching military service age. See: 
Mário Bairrada et al, Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã. (Lisboa, 
PT: Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional, Ministério para a Qualificação e o 
Emprego, 1997). 21. 
  
By the late 1990s, residents of the Concelho (municipality) of Lourinhã 
lived in eleven freguesias (parishes):11 Reguengo Grande, Vimeiro, Moita dos 
Ferreiros, Moledo, Ribamar, Marteleira, São Bartolomeu dos Galegos, Santa 
Bárbara, Miragaia, Atalaia, and Lourinhã. The work of the Lourinhanense has 
consistently been in, or related to, agriculture. Indeed, Lourinhã’s economy was 
shaped by its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean: the agricultural sector benefitted 
                                                
11 A Concelho refers both to a municipal area and a municipal government. This level of 
government is below a Distrito. Just as several Concelhos make up a Distrito, several 
Freguesias, local parishes or villages, make up a Concelho. Just as Concelhos have a council 
with an executive and councilors, Freguesias also have a local administration: a Junta da 
Freguesia. For the most part, each level of government relies on the level above it for the majority 
of its funding.  
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from the effects of the coast, while the local economy was supplemented by 
tourism revenue as visitors were attracted to Lourinhã's beaches.12 In 1993, 
sixty-five percent of the 147km2 in the Concelho was used for agriculture while 
twenty-eight percent was forested. Only four percent was used for residential 
buildings and an even more telling one percent was industrial land.13 As 
Portugal’s economy continued to transition to the service sector in the 1980s, 
Lourinhã’s agricultural industry remained obstinately large, even in the face of the 
town’s robust tourism sector. In 1991, almost forty-four percent of the population 
found themselves in agriculture or the processing of agricultural products, 
nineteen percent were in the secondary and manufacturing sector, while thirty-
seven percent were service based workers.14  
                                                
12 Bairrada et al, Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã, 17. 
13 Ibid, 18-19. 
14 Ibid, 36. 
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Figure 2: Freguesias (parishes) of Lourinhã, c. 2014.	  http://tinyurl.com/l5rynnm (accessed 
June 15, 2014) 
 
Within the farming sector itself, Lourinhã’s agricultural production has 
become increasingly specialized since the 1960s and, by the late 1980s, was 
focused upon just a few products. Over one quarter of the sector was devoted to 
growing potatoes, twenty percent of the resources were for grape production 
devoted to the wine industry, seventeen percent of products were fresh fruit, 
fifteen percent were cereals, thirteen were flowers and horticultural products, with 
forestry seedlings, animal feed, and various products making up the rest of the 
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agricultural catalogue.15 Even today, agriculture remains important. As late as 
1997, the ministry of labour insisted that in order to improve the standard of living 
and further develop Lourinhã, local industry had to specialize even more and 
focus on agriculture, the food industry and tourism. By coordinating its activities 
with various existing organizations and through the formation of a local 
development corporation, so the argument went, Lourinhã’s farmers could secure 
their future.16  
Little incentive for development is found in the demographic and industrial 
history of Lourinhã. Population growth was not pressuring infrastructure, nor 
were new economic projects demanding an upgraded workforce, land or 
facilities. Nonetheless, Lourinhã today, like the rest of Portugal, would in many 
ways be unrecognizable to the resident of the 1960s. Thanks to the four-lane A8 
toll highway installed in the late 1990s, along with the rest of Portugal’s national 
inventory of A-series highways, for example, Lourinhã’s residents are less than 
an hour’s car ride to the country’s capital. Before this, residents of Lourinhã could 
expect a car ride of over two hours to travel from the center of their town to 
Lisbon.17 Upgrading Portugal’s national roadways has shrunk the already small 
country’s space, allowing a new freedom of mobility that had not been enjoyed 
before the 1990s. Indeed, as recently as the 1960s it was not uncommon for 
Lourinhanense never to have seen Lisbon. Not only was the trip inconvenient 
                                                
15 Ibid, 53. 
16 Ibid, 8-10. 
17 “Governo Anuncia mais Quilómetros de Estradas para o Oeste”, Alvorada (May 25, 1997), 20.  
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and uncomfortable – taken on what we today would consider back or rural roads 
– but many had not the means (access to a car) nor any particular reason to 
leave Lourinhã, where most lived as near subsistence farmers who could either 
grow or find most everything they needed within the municipality’s bounds. 
 
** 
 
 The changes that came with national highways were nothing short of 
revolutionary, altering Portugal’s landscape and space. Yet highway 
infrastructure is just one of the most recent in a series of developments that 
should be linked with Portugal's modernization. Taken together, the development 
of Portugal's infrastructure has changed places like Lourinhã in the last half 
century. The obvious question is what, then, was involved in Lourinhã's and 
Portugal's modernization, and how does that square with what scholars have 
deemed as necessary components of modernization? 
In many ways, the seeds of modern Lourinhã, as read through its 
landscape, should be traced to the 1870s. Local historian Rui Marques Cipriano 
points to the nineteenth century, and specifically the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, as the starting point in Lourinhã’s modernization. This is the period when 
Lourinhã’s modern administrative structure came into being to administer 
institutions and implement infrastructure programs. In the wake of the Janeirinha 
uprising of 1868 – led by merchants protesting new sales taxes – Lourinhã was 
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granted its own court to deal with their local rebels (the court would be taken 
away by the military dictatorship in 1927).18 Additionally, the town’s modern 
market system with its monthly fair and weekly (later daily) market came into 
being to offer local farmers and merchants a venue to sell their goods.19 Cipriano 
argues that until this period, when economics and Lourinhã’s culture began to 
change, the town was a small, isolated and closed village that relied upon 
subsistence farming.20 The fathers of modern Lourinhã, for Cipriano, were the 
members of the municipal administration appointed in 1875: the Viscount Palma 
de Almeida, Dr. José Henrique Palma de Almeida; municipal medical doctor, 
Joaquim de Jesus Lopes; and the administrative secretary of the Câmara, José 
de Rosário e Silva. Led by this group, Lourinhã began to build roads to connect 
its parishes and install the first sewers.21 Under their watch the N-8 roadway, 
connecting Torres Vedras and Peniche would be built through Lourinhã near the 
Quinta Santa Catarina, making the town more accessible to regional economies 
and networks and offering a starting point in connecting the various parishes of 
the Concelho.22 In 1877, a post and telegraph office was placed in Lourinhã, and 
a municipal slaughterhouse was opened in 1883.23 Furthermore, 1879 saw the 
first public lamps lit in Lourinhã. They were simple gas lamps until 1928 when a 
                                                
18 Rui Marques Cipriano, Vamos Falar da Lourinhã. (Torres Vedras, PT: Sogratol/Câmara 
Municipal da Lourinhã, 2001), 114. 
19 Ibid, 89-107. 
20 Ibid, 109. 
21 Ibid, 109. 
22 Ibid, 109-112. 
23 Ibid, 111. 
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“petromaxe” advanced gas lamp system was installed on iron lampstands.24 It 
was not until 1932 that the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the District 
of Lisbon installed an electrical substation and power lines. At this time they also 
installed a limited domestic water distribution network.25  
 Together, the modest gains made by 1875’s municipal administration, 
taken with the installations that followed, were a loose series of projects whose 
connections to Lourinhã’s contemporary landscape are distant, yet very real. 
Unquestionably, they are the forbearers of today's infrastructure: the N-8 is still in 
use, although in a different configuration; although petromaxe lamps have long 
since been replaced, a public lighting system grew from them; and while 
Lourinhã’s water works would be unrecognizable to even the members of 1875’s 
administration, they represent the modest beginnings of today's infrastructure.  
A more recognizable starting point in tracing the development of 
Lourinhã’s contemporary infrastructure, and the one used in this dissertation is 
1966. In that year Portugal’s dictatorship celebrated the fortieth anniversary of its 
founding moment, in May 1926, with the opening of the famed and recognizable 
Ponte Salazar across the Tagus River in Lisbon. This project was the headliner 
for a series of infrastructure investments across the country. In Lourinhã, 1966 
saw the inauguration of the town’s post office – then on the periphery of 
downtown Lourinhã and today an anchor on Lourinhã’s central square – and a 
campground at the beach to supplement the town’s budding tourism industry. 
                                                
24 Ibid, 111. 
25 Ibid, 115. 
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The anniversary was an opportunity for the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã 
(CML)26 to solicit the national government for support in a long-term improvement 
plan. The CML argued that the anniversary of the dictatorship’s founding moment 
was an opportunity to invest in “fundamental” upgrades to Lourinhã’s institutions 
and facilities: the water and electricity networks were to be improved and 
expanded; the sewer network and treatment facilities needed to be upgraded; a 
new hotel was to be built at Praia da Areia Branca (PAB) with a Pousada27 at the 
fort at Paimogo; a new courthouse would lure a tribunal administration and, along 
with a new city hall, sit on a new central square; a cinema and regional bus 
station would open a new commercial district along the N-8 towards the Quinta 
Santa Catarina district; and new primary, secondary and agricultural schools 
would educate the population and help it to advance.28  
 
                                                
26 The Câmara Municipal was, and remains, the municipal government in Portugal's 
governmental hierarchy. 
27 These were a chain of government owned and operated, high-end hotels in historic and cultural 
sites. Opened in the 1950s, Pousadas include a facility at the national palace at Queluz, the 
castle's keep in Óbidos, and a number of other locations around Portugal. Although in operation 
today, they were privatized shortly after the turn of the twenty-first century. This phenomenon was 
not unique to Portugal. Primo de Rivera's Spanish dictatorship of the 1920s, for example 
established the paradores y albergues nacionales. Like the Pousadas, they offer an interesting 
example of how government propaganda bled into tourism development and married political 
priorities with socio-economic realities. See: M.T. Newton, “Tourism and Public Administration in 
Spain”, in M. Barke, J. Towner, and M.T. Newton eds., Tourism in Spain: Critical Issues 
(Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 138-140. 
28 “Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional”, 
Governo Civil do Distrito de Lisboa: Comemorações do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional de 
28 de Maio: Proc. D-13/3 (1966), Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966 (Arquivo Municpal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
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Figure 3: Celebrating the Ponte Salazar. Ponte Salazar, "Comemoração de Duas Datas", 
Boletim de Informações (August 7, 1966), Plano Comemorativo para 1966, Proc. O-12/3 
(1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.  
 
Many of the institutions and infrastructure highlighted in 1966 were 
completed over the following forty years. The cumulative affect of these projects 
was to reorient and remake Lourinhã. Beyond the proliferation of roads, electrical 
and water services since 1966, Lourinhã’s landscape was transformed as the 
new central town square called for in 1966 was developed in the 1980s and 
1990s. The Praça da República became the Praça José Maxímo da Costa – 
named for the town’s first elected post-revolution mayor – in 2001 when the new 
town hall was opened. This shifted the administrative and cultural center of the 
town from the Praça Marques Pombal. However, Lourinhanense had already 
been accessing services on the Praça José Maxímo da Costa for over twenty 
years: the post office on the Praça José Maxímo da Costa had begun operation 
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in 1966, the courthouse had opened alongside the post office in 1982, the market 
hall opened in 1989, and a music school opened with the town hall. Joining these 
institutions on the town’s square, were the seventeenth century convent and 
church and the fire hall dating to the 1920s. In other words, Lourinhã's 
reorientation was a gradual process. 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of Lourinhã in 1979 with the proposed area for development outlined. The 
contrast in the two landscapes is clear in terms of topographical layout, size, and space. 
CML, Plano de Pormenor da Zona Central: Extracto do Plano Aprovado, 1979’, Plano Geral 
de Urbanização da Lourinhã’, 1984. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
 
A number of non-governmental associations also emerged in Lourinhã 
around the turn of the twentieth-century: a recreation and cultural association; a 
musical band; and an historical association (GEAL).29 After 1910, the 
associational landscape in Lourinhã expanded further with the founding of a civic 
                                                
29 Cipriano, Vamos Falar da Lourinhã, 111-112. 
 19 
association named the Centro Democrático, which was replaced by the 
Associação de Instrução Militar in 1912, and a agricultural credit union, the Caixa 
de Crédito Agrícola Mûtuo da Lourinhã in the same year.30 1923 saw the 
founding of the Sporting Clube da Lourinhã, dedicated to soccer. Then in 1928, a 
commercial and industrial association was founded. Local notables António 
Gentil Horta, Carlos de Almeida Oliveira and António de Conceição Bento 
founded Lourinhã’s association of volunteer firefighters in that same year.31 An 
agricultural guild (Grémio da Lavoura) replaced the agricultural syndicate as part 
of the Estado Novo's corporative structure in 1939. The guild became Louricoop 
after 1974.32 The wine cooperative, Adega Cooperativa, was created in 1957, 
again with national direction.33 In 1954 the Alvorada, Lourinhã's local newspaper, 
was established under its original title, Redes e Moinhos, taking its contemporary 
name only in November 1960.34  
This discussion makes sense of these advancements in Lourinhã's 
landscape, institutional and political structures, by considering them as part of the 
town's modernization. Certainly, despite some difficulty in agreement over 
precise definition, Lourinhã's experience would fall into many understandings of 
development labeled as modernization. Modernization, with its affiliates, 
modernity and modern, is a politically, socially and culturally loaded and 
contestable concept. As Susan Friedman points out, various scholars have 
                                                
30 Ibid, 113. 
31 Ibid, 113-114. 
32 Ibid, 115. 
33 Ibid, 115. 
34 Ibid, 115-116. 
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attributed a variety of processes and characteristics as elements of modernity 
and modernization depending on the context in which they are used. For 
example, between the 1960s and 1990s, modernity moved from having 
revolutionary connotations to being affiliated with establishment thinking. Further, 
cultural critics would look at modernity as a break with the past, tradition, and 
order, whereas a social scientist would suggest that it was a centralized system 
that adhered to the Enlightenment’s ethos: “Progress – Science – Reason – 
Truth.”35 Others, like Robert Wohl, have complained that the definition of 
modernity “remains maddeningly elusive and unstable.”36  
 Nevertheless, some agreement exists amongst scholars over the requisite 
components of a modern society and the process by which it emerges. Most 
agree that intellectually, modernity and modernization’s heritage includes 
Modernism; the turn of the twentieth century artistic movement of the early 1900s 
that was part of a radical transformation in Europe’s “traditional institutions, social 
structures, and belief systems.”37 Indeed, transformation and change was at the 
heart of the modernist mentality. In the European context, Adolf Hitler’s Germany 
and Benito Mussolini’s Italy stand, for some prominent historians, as examples of 
those whose desire to reshape society and create a "new man", made them 
                                                
35 Susan Friedman. “Definitional Excursions: the Meanings of Modern/Modernity/Modernism”, 
Modernism/Modernity, 8:3 (2001) 493-494. 
36 Robert Wohl. “Heart of Darkness: Modernism and Its Historians”, The Journal of Modern 
History 74:3 (September, 2002) 574.  
37 Roger Griffin. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler. 
(London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 54. See also: Lawrence Rainey and Robert von 
Hallberg. “Editorial/Introduction”, Modernism/Modernity, 1:1 (1994), 1. 
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modernists.38 As scholars like Roger Griffin explain, modernization is a process 
that establishes a new social base for society and introduces an entirely new 
socio-political order.39  
 In terms of modernity’s features, a much more conservative view 
emerges. From this perspective, the process is not celebrated. Instead definitions 
rely upon a seemingly narrow set of results. Social Science theory in the early 
1980s designated modernization as a process of social and economic change 
that led to, and maintained, secularization, rationalization in political and 
economic life, industrialization, accelerated urbanization and increased levels of 
popular participation in public affairs.40 Modernity encompassed the economic, 
political, social and cultural in society and once it was achieved, the revolutionary 
aspects of the process were discarded. For example, historians have come to 
look for high levels of literacy, low levels of substance or alcohol consumption, 
low mortality and disease rates, a developed and active civil society, equal rights 
for women and minorities and the use of advanced technology in industry and 
                                                
38 Roger Griffin argues that Fascism was a variant of modernism: with its revolutionary and total 
projects to remake society, it could have only emerged “in the first decades of the twentieth 
century in a society permeated with modernist metanarratives of cultural renewal.” Similarly, 
Eksteins asserts that despite many interpretations of Nazism, “which tend to view it as a 
reactionary movement … intent on turning Germany into a pastoral folk community … the general 
thrust of the movement, despite archaisms, was futuristic.” As evidence, Eksteins invokes Hitler 
himself, who saw Nazism as more than a political movement. To him, “it was more than a faith; it 
was a desire to create mankind anew.” In many ways, these historians build on the work of others 
like George Mosse, who pointed out that Fascism and Nazism were also revolutionary because 
they sought to create a "new man". See: Roger Griffin. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a 
Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler. (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 6; Modris 
Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age. (Toronto, Canada: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 303; and, George Mosse, The Image of Man: the Creation of Modern 
Masculinity, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 8. 
39 Griffin, 54-55. 
40 Harry Ritter. Dictionary of Concepts in History. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1986), 273.  
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other economic activities to identify a modern society.41 Politically speaking, 
dissent and protest, when highlighted, occur on the periphery of modern 
societies, as challenges to core values and achievements are rarely evident. 
 
** 
 
 As this discussion unfolds, it will be Lourinhã's experience with 
modernization through increased urbanization and popular participation in public 
affairs that will be explored. The development of Lourinhã's infrastructure 
coincided with the development of Portugal's infrastructure, changing public 
space in the country as the dictatorship sought to improve Portugal's economy. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, Portugal’s dictatorship went to work on a number of 
infrastructure projects across the country aimed in part at improving Portugal's 
international image and preparing Lisbon for growth.42 The opening of Lisbon’s 
international airport and the establishment of new neighborhoods like Cidade 
Universitaria and Alvalade were key accomplishments of the dictatorship’s 
programme.43 Improvements continued into the 1960s and were supplemented 
                                                
41 See: Yanni Kotsonis. Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian 
Question in Russia, 1861-1914. (London, Great Britain: Palgrave MacMillan, 1999), 4-5. 
42 For a discussion of the Estado Novo’s concern for its international image see: Raphael Costa, 
“The “Great Façade of Nationality”: Some Considerations on the Multiple Meanings of Estado 
Novo Portugal in Travel Literature”, The Journal of Tourism History, 5:1 (Spring 2013), 50-72. 
43 See: A Urbanização e o Problema Habitacional da Região de Lisboa, #39 - “Plano de 
Expansão de Lisboa”, 1959. Arquivo Salazar AOS/CO/CR-4 pt.4. (Arquivos Naçional do Torre do 
Tombo, PT). For a discussion of the importance of urban environments for 'national education' in 
Salazar's thinking see: Daniel Melo, Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58). (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 
2001), 44-46. Others, like Carlos Nunes Silva and Stephen Syrett have highlighted the 
importance of control of urban space in the Estado Novo when they argue that the state had 
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with investments commemorating the aforementioned fortieth anniversary of the 
founding of the military dictatorship in 1926 that would evolve into the Estado 
Novo. The opening of the Ponte Salazar (today the Ponte 25 de Abril) across the 
Tagus River in Lisbon was, as mentioned, the marquee infrastructure project in a 
series of improvements that put a punctuation mark on the 1966 celebrations.44 
Less spectacular investments made that year would help to bring electricity, 
running water and improved roads to various parts of Portugal by the 1970s. In 
the late 1970s, Portugal’s infrastructure enjoyed another wave of investment as 
the newly founded democratic government reaffirmed the Portuguese 
government’s goal of tying their polity to Western Europe by entering into 
agreements to join the European Economic Community (EEC). When Portugal 
became a full EEC member in 1986, the country’s infrastructure was developing 
with the first waves in a flood of foreign investment that would help to build the 
country’s contemporary landscape. 
 The transformation of Portugal’s infrastructure had a profound effect on 
                                                                                                                                            
shifted from manager of urban space under the dictatorship to a "regulator, coordinator and 
enabler" as a democratic government. See: Carlos Nunes Silva and Stephen Syrett. “Governing 
Lisbon: Evolving Forms of City Governance”, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 30:1 (March 2006), 99. 
44 For discussions of the various projects related to the 1966 commemorations see: 
"Comemoração de Duas Datas", Boletim de Informações (August 7, 1966), Plano Comemorativo 
para 1966, Proc. O-12/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de 
Correspondência, 1966; "Efectivamente Inaugurada a Ponte Salazar Sobre o Tejo ao Serviço da 
Nação", Alvorada (August 28, 1966), 1; "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 
Aniversário da Revolução Nacional", Governo Civil do Distrito de Lisboa: Comemorações do 40 
Aniversário da Revolução Nacional de 28 de Maio: Proc. D-13/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do 
Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966; "Inauguração do Novo Edifício dos 
C.T.T na Lourinhã", Alvorada (November 13, 1966) 1, 6; “Reunião 11/10/61: Anteprojecto do 
edifício dos correios, telégrafos e telefones da Lourinhã", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã, No. 23. (1961-1963), 41. 
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the lives of the country’s population. António Barreto has noted that the late 
1970s and 1980s in Portugal was a period of infrastructure development that 
provided running water, electricity, sewers and sanitation facilities in much of the 
country. This led, Barreto continued, to an invasion of modern household 
appliances into the Portuguese home. The years between 1987 and 1994, for 
example, saw the number of household telephones rise from 33% to 74%; 
electric washing machines from 44% to 74%; and, the number of households 
with video viewers rose from 15% to 40%.45 Indeed, Portugal’s institutions 
pointed to infrastructure advancement as important evidence of their country’s 
progress. The spread and growth of electrical consumption, Portugal’s National 
Statistics Institute (INE) argued in 1985, was evidence of positive evolution: the 
use of electricity, it boasted, was forty-three times higher in 1982 than it had been 
in 1935. Electrical production grew exponentially along with consumption 
between 1960 and 1980. In millions of KwH, Portugal produced 3.263 units in 
1960, 7.379 in 1970, and 15.264 in 1980, practically doubling every ten years.46 
Not surprisingly, domestic electricity, running water, and washrooms and 
kitchens came to be considered staples of basic comfort in the late 1980s. By 
1987, ninety-six percent of Portugal’s homes had a kitchen, ninety-seven percent 
had electricity, eighty-six percent had running water and almost seventy percent 
of homes had a fixed bath or shower. In towns or cities of more than 10,000 
                                                
45 António Barreto, Tempo de Mudança. (Lisbon, PT: Antropos, 1996), 76-77. 
46 Instituto Nacional da Estatística, “Portugal 1935-1985: 50 Anos” 
(http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/viewImage.do?me=view&key=supcod%3D1%26sercodg
%3D1%26iddoc%3D5396%26pagini%3D1%26pags%3D82%26pos%3D1, accessed October 22, 
2013), 54-55. 
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residents, these numbers were all “very close” to one hundred percent. 
Conversely, in towns and villages with populations of less than 10,000, the 
numbers were worse: four percent of houses lacked electricity, almost nineteen 
percent did not have running water, and only sixty-two percent of homes had a 
bathtub or shower.47  
 Lourinhã’s infrastructure statistics matched the national numbers. Being a 
town of over 10,000, by the early 1990s the entire population of Lourinhã was 
served by domestic water while ninety-five-percent of the population had direct 
access to sewage draining infrastructure (as opposed to septic tank waste 
storage) and domestic electricity.48 Such high levels are a testament to how far 
Lourinhã’s infrastructure had come in the preceding century. Truly, roads, 
electricity and running water have become, and were always considered, 
important elements of Lourinhã’s modern landscape. 
 The changes that occurred in Portugal’s infrastructure in the last fifty years 
did not occur in a linear or uncontested fashion. Certainly, subjects of the 
dictatorship and democratic citizens alike reacted to various projects with 
resistance and support, and, at times, even mobilized to initiate such projects. In 
many ways then, Portugal’s modernization through infrastructure was a political 
process in which various agents organized in support of their interests. Historians 
have long recognized the role that the built environment and its contestability 
                                                
47 Instituto Nacional das Estatísticas, “Indicadores de Confroto das Familias”, População e 
Condições Socais: Condições de Vida das Famílias, 1987. 
(http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/search.do, accessed October 22, 2013), 5-6. 
48 Mário Bairrada et al, Perspectivas para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã, 28. 
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have played in various aspects of our past, including the promotion of political 
activity.49 As theorized by Jurgen Habermas, the public sphere emerged in 
eighteenth century Europe as an intermediate space between absolute rulers 
and private individuals.50 In this sense, the public sphere’s emergence should be 
understood as the opening of a space for people to access resources and 
political influence beyond their station.51 However, the emergence of public 
space and the public sphere was not an uncontested democratization of access 
                                                
49 For examples of work dealing with space and gender, space and consumption, and space and 
race relations, see: Brian Cowan, “What was Masculine about the Public Sphere? Gender and 
the Coffeehouse milieu in Post-Restoration England,” History Workshop Journal, 51 (Spring 
2001), 127-157; Karen Harvey, “Gender, Space and Modernity in Eighteenth-Century England: A 
Place Called Sex,” History Workshop Journal, 51 (Spring 2001), 158-179; David Nasaw, Going 
Out: the Rise and Fall of Public Amusements. (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993); 
Scott Nelson, “Livestock, Boundaries, and Public Space in Spartanburg: African American Men, 
Elite White Women and the Spectacle of Conjugal Relations,” in M. Hodes, ed. Sex, Love, Race: 
Crossing Boundaries in North American History. (New York: NYU Press, 1999); Kathy Peiss, 
Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York. 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986); Erika Diane Rappaport, Shopping For 
Pleasure: Women in the Making of London’s West End. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000); Judith R. Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-
Victorian London. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and, Rosalind Williams, 
Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France. (Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press, 1982). For discussions of space and its relationship to political 
participation, see: Susan G Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theater in Nineteenth-Century 
Philadelphia. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986); James Epstein, “Spatial 
Practices/Democratic Vistas,” Social History, 24:3 (October, 1999), 294-310; Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan trans. (New York, NY: Pantheon 
Books, 1977); Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between 
Classes in Victorian Society. (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1971); and, Jonathon 
Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis. (Ann Arbor, MI: Yale University Press, 1999). 
50 Quoted in: Brian Cowan, “What was Masculine about the Public Sphere? Gender and the 
Coffeehouse milieu in Post-Restoration England,” History Workshop Journal, 51 (Spring 2001), 
129. See also: Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry 
into a category of Bourgeois Society, T. Burger and F. Lawrence eds (Cambridge, MASS: MIT 
Press, 1989), 181-235 in which the author discusses changes in the public sphere's political 
functions through the emergence of mass media in eighteenth century Europe as the press 
shifted from conveying the news to including editorial content. For broader explanations of 
Habermas' bosu of work on the public sphere, see: Pauline Johnson, Habermas: Rescuing the 
Public Sphere (London, UK: Routledge, 2006); and Luke Goode, Jurgen Habermas: Democracy 
and the Pubic Sphere (Ann Arbour, MI: Pluto Press, 2005). 
51 Karen Harvey, “Gender, Space and Modernity in Eighteenth-Century England: A Place Called 
Sex,” History Workshop Journal, 51 (Spring 2001), 159. 
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to various facets of power for private individuals. In one of his many seminal 
works, Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault was among the first to draw 
scholarly attention to the role space could play in power relations and to the 
connection between space and politics. Foucault described the Western World’s 
shift from public punishment to private discipline between the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries and its implications for the way space was organized.52 In 
Foucault’s estimation, space, or organized space, became an instrument of 
power, with prisons, army camps, and schools in the modern world being 
constructed so as to maintain discipline through constant supervision and 
routine.53 As such, governments developed "political technologies" devised to 
create "a governable space of calculability."54 
 Assessing the influence that built space had on political culture involves 
both looking at the negotiations among the various actors responsible for building 
and navigating that setting, and reading that setting itself as a document: space 
becomes a place to be read. Michel de Certeau was the first to develop such a 
methodology and consider its implications.55 To distinguish between 
                                                
52 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 7-8. 
53 See: Ibid, 170-172. 
54 See: Reuben Rose-Redwood and Anton Tanter, 'Introduction: Governmentality, House 
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understanding space and place, de Certeau likens the act of reading place to 
watching the streets from a skyscraper above, seeing the layout and overall plan 
of the setting below. Meanwhile, that place turns into a fluid space when the 
same onlooker descends to the streets, navigating them as their nature changes 
with the time of day, weather, who travels them, etc.56 Space and place are 
necessarily torn apart. As Anthony Gidden argues, “the advent of modernity tears 
space away from place by fostering relations between absent ‘others’ … In the 
nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of print culture, the telegraph, railway, 
steamship, systems of exchange and trust all worked to ‘lift out’ social relations 
from local contexts.”57 Indeed, a place’s purpose and its relationship to the 
people that occupy it go much further in defining space than do the particulars 
about a site’s physical make up. 
 The chapters that follow reflect upon Lourinhã as a place whose spaces 
shifted as residents and governments negotiated various developments: under 
consideration is its physical composition, how its space was developed and how 
Lourinhanense interacted with each other and their institutions in that space. As I 
argue, the relationship that developed between citizens and state in order to 
cultivate Lourinhã's urban environment helped make Portugal's transition to 
democracy all the easier. Indeed, some of the political practices that 
Lourinhanense were called upon to undertake after 1974, although newly 
                                                
56 See: Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, S. Rendall trans (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1984), 92-97. 
57 Quoted in: Epstein, 309. 
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formalized, must have seemed unremarkable given their use as locals 
participated in civic affairs before 1974. 
 Historians of Portugal have undertaken some serious enquiries into the 
relationship between space and politics. The dictatorship and its manipulation of 
certain landscapes has offered scholars, like David Corkill and José Carlos Pina 
Almeida, a fruitful if under-appreciated avenue for exploration in the Estado 
Novo’s arsenal of coercive techniques. Corkill and Almeida expose the ways in 
which the dictatorship deployed spatial organization in the Mundo Português 
Expo of 1940 in support of its ideological goals.58 Salazar’s government 
emphasized the rural milieu as the space in which Portuguese identity was 
fostered. Beyond Corkill and Almeida’s description of the 1940 expo and the 
recreation of rural space in Lisbon,59 historians like Daniel Melo have explored 
the link between the rural setting and the dictatorship’s brand of Portuguese 
identity.60 The connection between rural space and political culture opened a 
venue for Portuguese dictatorship subjects to engage in politics and historians 
have followed this line of investigation. Led today by Pedro Ramos Pinto and 
Diego Palacios Cerezales, who build on Charles Downs' groundbreaking work on 
the neighbourhood commissions that emerged during the Carnation Revolution 
to organize residents in defense of urban rights, academics have explored the 
consequences of linking identity to space. Given the importance of the home and 
                                                
58 See: David Corkill and José Carlos Pina Almeida, “Commemorations and Propaganda in 
Salazar’s Portugal: The Mundo Português Exposition of 1940”, Journal of Contemporary History, 
44:3 (2009), 381-399. 
59 See: Ibid, 381-399. 
60 Daniel Melo, Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58). (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2001), 44. 
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neighborhood in Estado Novo propaganda, for example, it is not surprising that 
investigators have found that the defense of community and housing rights 
became sites of political organization and action before, during and the after the 
1974 revolution.61 
 Despite the inherent importance of space in enquiries into Portuguese 
political culture and community organization, space as an agent is not the focus 
of such studies. In the investigation that follows, space as an agent is also not 
the focus. Like other studies on community and political culture in Portugal, the 
development of place and the manipulation of space emerge as processes where 
there existed negotiation, organization and political engagement, both under 
Portugal’s repressive dictatorship and its democratic government after 1974-76. 
Put more specifically, the change in the relationship between individual, 
community and polity, as both a consequence of, and motivating factor in 
Portugal’s modernization, is analyzed by exploring how subjects and citizens 
interacted with their community’s development and, in Portugal’s case, its 
modernization. 
 
** 
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 As Portugal and Lourinhã's landscape modernized, so to did their politics 
and political institutions. A key consequence, most agree, of modernization is 
increased public participation and advanced institutions to both facilitate and 
monitor new participation. Unquestionably, a relationship emerged between 
democratization and urban development, calling into question how each process 
affected the other. The reorientation of Lourinhã’s landscape and the proliferation 
of services contributed to, and were shaped by, two processes that this 
dissertation considers. First, projects required the CML, other governmental 
institutions, and local private organizations to mature both to develop projects 
and then to control the services that were the projects’ outcomes. Second, and 
as this dissertation argues, the proliferation of urban infrastructure and the 
institutional development that resulted altered the relationship among the 
individual residents of Lourinhã, the community, with their governmental and 
private representatives, and with their political institutions. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, residents were more active, if limited in fields of action, in civic society 
and developmental processes as subjects of the dictatorship than they were as 
democratic citizens. In other words, the development of governmental 
organizations and institutions after 1974 coincided with a popular withdrawal from 
civic society. After the revolution, government and other organizations 
increasingly became able to take on the responsibilities that residents had been 
asked to fulfill, especially under the Estado Novo, whose own policies 
discouraged the development of government institutions like municipal 
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governments, which could become independent from Lisbon. As democratic 
government emerged and strengthened regional and local governments, citizens 
found less space to operate in a crowded civic sphere. 
The coincidence of the maturation of civic and governmental organizations 
and mechanisms, and the proliferation of urban infrastructure is evidence of the 
political nature of urban development in Portugal in general, and Lourinhã in 
particular. These processes were, in fact, part of a major and profound shift in 
Portuguese politics between the 1960s and today as the country democratized. 
Although Portugal had some experience with democratic practices and 
institutions in the nineteenth century and under the short-lived Republic of 1910-
1926, the origins of Portugal’s contemporary democracy are to be found in the 
1960s and two major initiatives undertaken by the Estado Novo. First, in an effort 
to diversify its trade portfolio, the regime opened its economy to foreign 
investment, shifting emphasis from its colonies to Western Europe and North 
America. The Western ideas that inevitably followed undermined the 
dictatorship’s cultural and political legitimacy.62 New investment fuelled the 
‘economic miracle’ in Portugal in the 1960s, providing investment for, among 
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other things, improvements in Portugal’s infrastructure and the standard of living 
for the Portuguese.  
Second, and more directly linked to the fall of the dictatorship and 
democratization, the Estado Novo engaged in a thirteen-year counter-insurgency 
(1961-1974) in its African colonies: Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. 
When the conflict broke out in Angola in the winter of 1961, Salazar’s 
government responded in kind, dug in, and sowed the seeds of its own demise. 
As costs and casualty rates rose, junior officers in the Portuguese Armed Forces 
organized and created the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), a clandestine group 
advocating Portugal’s development, democratization and decolonization that 
would carry out the coup that ended the Estado Novo on April 25, 1974.63  
25 de Abril has become the marquee event, both popularly and 
academically, in narratives of Portugal’s democratization and modernization. The 
revolution toppled the dictatorship’s governmental institutions and the 
revolutionary period, 1974-76, proved to be traumatic for Portugal. By way of 
example, Portuguese identity under the dictatorship was linked to its role as the 
center of an empire that was lost in an instant. As commentators point out, to 
lose it all, essentially overnight, was jarring to say the least. Indeed, the vacuum 
left by the empire was quickly filled by a psychological shift to Europe that 
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matched the ongoing economic policy shift from the end of WWII.64 Domestically, 
1974-76 proved to be an unstable time in Lisbon as unrest threatened civil war, 
which demonstrated that successive revolutionary governments, some of which 
flirted with the extreme Left, could not provide steady administration.65 However, 
the end result was a stable social democratic system that emerged with the 
election of Mário Soares' and the PS in April 1976.  
Undeniably, however, and as this dissertation argues, 25 de Abril must be 
contextualized and understood as a part of a longer process. In many ways, the 
democratic gains of 25 de Abril were secured with Portugal’s accession to the 
EEC in the late 1970s and 1980s, a process that irrevocably tied Portugal to a 
democratic future anchored to the future European Union (EU).66 Similarly, 
democratic Portugal's origins are in the years and decades before 1974. 
Nonetheless, the Carnation Revolution’s place in Portugal’s 
democratization is at the center of discussions about the country’s development. 
The dominant trend in the historiography is to celebrate 1974 as a break from 
dictatorship and a victory for Mário Soares, democratic socialism and 
parliamentary democracy over Alvaro Cunhal, radical elements of the MFA and 
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communist representative democracy.67 However, historians have begun to 
challenge the understanding of 25 de Abril as a complete break from the past by 
considering it in the longue durée.68 Thinking of 1974 as evolution, as opposed to 
revolution, has inspired the reassessment of 25 de Abril’s accomplishments as 
many argue that democratization and modernization in Portugal were well 
underway before 1974.69 In this outline, after the Second World War, economic 
development emerges as a key contributor to the democratization process. 
Economic development necessarily required Portugal to embrace Western 
Europe and its investment dollars, and eventually, democracy, as association 
with the continent and its values became synonymous with future prosperity. By 
considering 25 de Abril in this context, the revolution becomes just one part – an 
important one, to be sure – of a process leading to democracy that spans the 
supposed revolutionary rupture of 1974. Indeed, the discussion that follows 
respects and recognizes 1974 as a watershed moment in Portugal's history when 
fundamental changes crystalized. However, to suggest that 25 de Abril was a 
moment when these changes began or were founded betrays the 
accomplishments of the Portuguese before and after 1974. 
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Contextualizing 25 de Abril as an event in the course of Portugal’s 
democratization, limited here to the years after WWII, reveals an ongoing shift in 
a variety of institutional relationships between the 1960s and the 1980s. Under 
the dictatorship, Portugal was governed by coercion and, at best, tacit support. 
Coercion was achieved both through intimidation via the secret police, the Polícia 
Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) between 1945 and 1969, its 
forbearer, the Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado (PVDE) between 1933 
and 1945, and via constitutional centralization after 1933.70 Salazar’s 1933 
constitution, which founded the Estado Novo and replaced the seven-year-old 
military dictatorship, which he himself had led since 1928, centralized power in 
the military president. Articles 81 and 82 of the constitution clearly placed all 
civilian bureaucrats, including Salazar, under the military head of state. In 
practice, this meant that the president’s prime minister, Salazar, was at the 
center of daily state business.71 In addition to legal and police mechanisms, the 
Estado Novo also employed ideological and social instruments of control like its 
bureaucracy, it's corporative structure, its schools, its propaganda, and the 
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Church to intervene in everything from culture to the economy.72 The goal was to 
control the “desynchronizing developmental variables” of economic and social 
development in order to maintain the status quo. Between the 1930s and 1950s 
as part of “a model of programmed stagnation” Portugal had the lowest rates of 
urbanization, literacy, industrialization and economic development of any 
European country.73 Such policies and structures meant that institutional 
development had to come from the central state. Indeed, the antecedents of 
many of the social security advances of the late 1970s – healthcare, education 
and social security – can be found in “Marcelismo”, an attempted liberalization of 
politics by Caetano. The health care of the late 1970s, for example, benefitted 
from the vaccination programs implemented by Salazar's successor.75 However, 
it was not until the late 1970s, when state administration in terms of economic 
coordination, municipal governments and a central bureaucracy had developed 
enough to coordinate programs in all corners of Portugal, were the 
advancements of Marcelismo fully realized.76 
 In this discussion, the most important change between dictatorship and 
democracy in terms of governmental institutions was in the increasing ability of 
                                                
72 António Costa Pinto, Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation. 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 205. 
73 Ibid, 52. See also: Philippe Schmitter, “Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the 
Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal”, Armed Forces and Society, 2:1 (November 1975), 5-
33. Costa Pinto, Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism, 68. See also: Manuel Villaverde 
Cabral, “Sobre o Fascismo e o Seu Advento em Portugal: Ensaio de Interpretação a Pretexto de 
Alguns Livres Recentes”, Análise Social, XII:48 (1976), 895; and, Alfredo Marques, Política, 
Económica e Desenvolvimento Económica em Portugal (1926-1959). (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 1988), 
24. 
75 António Barreto, Tempo de Mudança, 25. 
76 Ibid, 26. 
 38 
municipal governments to independently meet citizen demands. The Estado 
Novo had eliminated local autonomy by making local government, and its agents, 
appointees of the central government. Mayors were directly appointed by the 
national government and tended to be non-university educated, wealthy land or 
factory owners whose interests aligned with the Estado Novo’s. The only locally 
elected bodies, the Juntas do Freguesias (parish councils), were, in the end, 
reliant on the Câmaras Municipais for funding, and therefore subject to their 
whims. It is important to note that under the Estado Novo, no local or regional 
political structure or institution had any leverage over institutions above theirs, 
especially those at the national level. This began to change after 1974 as 
municipal officials became elected – the first elections were held in 1977 – and 
municipalities were given some financial autonomy in 1979.77 Yet, scholars like 
Walter Opello concluded that, since into the early 1980s municipalities were 
dependent on the national and regional governments for upwards of sixty-five 
percent of their funding, local officials remained representatives of Lisbon in 
practice.78  
 However, when we consider specific examples, the supposedly powerless 
municipal political sphere can emerges as lively and a site for meaningful 
participation. This is indeed the case when we consider changes in Lourinhã’s 
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politics and political culture between 1960 and the 1990s. Lourinhã was not the 
site of any major political actions like strikes, protests, or violent purges, nor was 
it the center of any oppositional, or supportive for that matter, forces for either the 
dictatorship or the democracy: politics evolved at times with, and at times 
seemingly in spite, of national machinations and intrigues.  
 By considering Portugal’s democratization in the longue durée, we can 
also consider the relationship between economic modernization and political 
development. In many ways, modern society has, since the Second World War, 
come to be equated with Western European and North American Democratic 
society. In fact the most prominent marker of a modern society has come to be 
the existence of a democratic system of governance. Modernization theory, 
which gained prominence in the 1950s and 1960s, contended that political and 
economic development were intimately linked: economic development would, 
inevitably, lead to democracy.79 More precisely, the effects of economic 
development – urbanization, increased education, and the diffusion of wealth and 
skills amongst the population – would lead to democratization as actors with 
new-found power would demand a greater say in political decision-making. By 
the 1970s, however, modernization theory’s homogenized view of development’s 
end point left it open to criticism. Still for some, developments in the 1980s, with 
the emergence of democratic capitalist regimes in new places and the fall of the 
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Berlin Wall reaffirmed modernization theory and its link with a democratic 
outcome.80 Democracy is the system that the international order in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has striven to implement across the 
globe as the best way to safeguard those high levels of literacy and education, 
low mortality rates, advanced capitalist economies, etc. that make a modern 
society. Democracy and its spread, moreover, has been identified as the defining 
feature of the twentieth century by some, including 1998’s Nobel Laureate in 
Economic Sciences, Amartya Sen.81 Based on numbers alone, many would 
agree with Sen. By the end of the twentieth century, 120 countries – sixty three 
percent of states with almost forty percent of the world’s population – were 
democratic. This, Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin note, is the highest level of 
“experimentation” with democracy in the world’s history.82  
 Thinking about Portugal’s democratization over a longer period also calls 
into question one classic account of the western world’s march towards 
democratic government that breaks the history of democratic emergence into 
three waves. The first wave was limited to the nineteenth century, spilling into the 
early twentieth, and largely occurred in the United States and Western Europe. 
The second wave came after 1945, lasting into the early 1960s in much of 
Southern and Eastern Europe as well as Latin America and Asia. However, many 
of the gains made in this wave were lost in resurgent dictatorships in the 1960s. 
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Finally, the third wave began with Portugal’s revolution in 1974 and spread to 
other parts of Southern Europe, Asia, Africa and to Eastern Europe in 1989: 
Portuguese democratization was a leader and prime example of the third wave.83 
Still underway in the decade after the turn of the millennium according to 
scholars like Lipset and Lakin, this was the most dramatic and successful wave 
of the three, encompassing the most intense proliferation of democracy in world 
history and occurring in a fraction of the time of the first wave of 
democratization.84  
 Homogenizing various transitions to democracy is problematic, to say the 
least. Cataloguing the emergence of democracies and lumping various national 
experiences into 'waves', papers over significant and evident differences in 
specific contexts separated by time and space. Indeed, third wave democracies 
have been labeled as domestic systems that emerged in spite of low economic 
indicators and political and cultural backwardness. They lacked, so the argument 
goes, industry, infrastructure, high levels of education and other variables that 
allowed civil society to develop to the point where democracy emerged out of 
popular movements. Instead democracy emerged because of elite leaders who 
would drag their backwards societies into the modern democratic world.85 
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 This model has since been challenged as scholars have begun to dissect 
third wave democratizations, pointing out that civil society did in fact exist and 
contribute to democratization in several contexts where Huntington et al had 
insisted that elites drove political change. Especially in Southern and Eastern 
Europe cases, the existence and contributions of a nascent civil society and civic 
participation to democratization has begun to come to light.86 Even under 
repressive regimes like Salazar’s Estado Novo and Franco’s Nationalist 
dictatorship, so-called ordinary people found room to contribute to “broader 
processes of political change” in the “contested terrain between the state and the 
private realm.” Here, individuals were able to organize and pursue collective 
goals in the public sphere.87 Such relationships would spawn social and 
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economic organizations in areas considered politically non-threatening to 
dictatorial governments like libraries, economic cooperatives, and volunteer fire 
departments that made later political organization much easier via participation 
and citizen training in democratic practices.88 Those who suggest that civil 
society is the cradle of democratic transitions (as opposed to elite leadership or 
international intervention, for example) argue that that the moment when elites 
begin to make decisions about a transition to democracy should be viewed not as 
the beginning of the transition, but as the beginning of the end of that process.89  
 That some look to elite involvement while others look to civil society as the 
drivers of democratization demonstrates, in part, the range of understandings of 
democracy. If we consider the democratic system – Democracy – then it makes 
sense to look to elite action and the implementation of that system when seeking 
to assess democratization. If, on the other hand, we accept that the success of 
Democracy rests upon popular acceptance of that system, then a number of 
social, economic and cultural considerations outside of the corridors of power 
should be considered when assessing democratization. Civil society and its 
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context should be studied in a broader discussion about democratic culture.90  
 The debate surrounding the role of elites and civil society in 
democratization, and the definition of democracy itself, hinges upon the 
chronological scope one applies. If an investigator is narrowly focused upon the 
events immediately adjacent to the formalization of democracy, elite contributions 
are likely to stand out as the significant factor. If, on the other hand, we consider 
a democratic transition in its historical context, the slow emergence of a 
democratic culture that contributes, but does not necessarily predetermine a 
democratic transition, is bound to draw attention.  
 
** 
 
 Without doubt, into the 1960s, Lourinhã’s political landscape was 
changing at the same time as its physical, manmade landscape. It is the 
relationship between these two spheres that I am interested in. As has been 
outlined, the four decades between the 1960s and today saw fundamental 
changes to Lourinhã’s and Portugal’s politics and infrastructure. The 
democratization of Portugal’s politics followed a democratization of access to 
infrastructure and the ability to shape the landscape. Focusing on a specific 
locale, Lourinhã in this case, allows us to flesh out the relationship between 
changing space and political culture and assess the relative influence of 
                                                
90 For a discussion of the variants in defining democracy see: Lipset and Lakin. The Democratic 
Century, 10-11, 19-20. 
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international and national processes like modernization and its components, like 
democratization, on a local micro scale.91 
 A focus on the conjuncture between politics, infrastructure and 
development in Lourinhã reflects the local nature of the discussion that follows. 
Infrastructure and economic development were two of the areas that most 
concerned the municipal government in Lourinhã in the period discussed. The 
state of Lourinhã’s municipal archives reflect the importance of the town’s built 
                                                
91 In the strictest sense, what follows is not a microhistorical discussion. A microhistory looks at a 
specific event that should be considered out of the ordinary, dissects that event, contextualizes it, 
and in so doing, argues as to how that event could have taken place in its specific historical 
setting. Instead, the dissertation is a local study that uses a specific place over a period of time to 
assess the relative influence of big trends on a micro scale. For examples and discussions of 
microhistorical work see: Judith C. Brown. Immodest Acts: The Life of a Lesbian Nun in 
Renaissance Italy. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986); Richard D. Brown, 
“Microhistory and the Post-Modern Challenge,” Journal of the Early Republic, 23:1 (Spring 2003) 
1-20; Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History. 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1984); Robert Finlay, “The Refashioning of Martin Guerre,” The 
American Historical Review, 93:3 (June, 1988) 553-571; Carlo Ginzburg. The Cheese and the 
Worms: The Cosmos if a Sixteenth- Century Miller, J. and A. Tedeschi, trans. (Baltimore, MD: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1992); Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni. “The Name and the 
Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historiographic Marketplace,” in E. Muir and G. Ruggiero eds., 
Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
1991); Jill Lepore, “Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography,” 
The Journal of American History, 88:1 (June 2001) 129-144; Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory”, in 
Peter Burke, ed., New Perspectives on Historical Writing, 2nd ed. (Great Britain: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2001); Keith Luria and Romulo Gandolfo. “Carlo Ginzburg: an Interview,” 
Radical History Review, 35 (1986), 89-111; Laura Putnam, “To Study the Fragments/Whole: 
Microhistory and the Atlantic World,” Journal of Social History, 39:3 (Spring 2006) 615-630; 
Helmut Walser Smith, The Butcher’s Tale: Murder and Anti-Semitism in a German Town. (New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002); Natalie Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre. 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983); and, Natalie Zemon Davis, “AHR Forum: 
The Return of Martin Guerre ‘On the Lame’,” American Historical Review, 93:3 (June, 1988) 572-
603. For examples of works that use a micro scale in the sense that this work does, see: William 
Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power: the Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-
1945, revised ed. (Danbury, CT: Franklin Watts, 1984); Brian Juan O’Neill, Social Inequality in a 
Portuguese Hamlet: Land, Late Marriage, and Bastardy, 1870-1978. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984); José Cutileiro, A Portuguese Rural Society. (Gloucestershire, UK: 
Clarendon, 1971); Mercedes Garcia-Arenal and Gerard Weigers, A Man of Three Worlds: Samuel 
Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe, M. Beagles trans. (Baltimore, MD: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 2003); Steven Ozment, Three Behaim Boys: Growing up in 
Early Modern Germany. (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1990); and David Warren 
Sabean, Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870. (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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environment. Today in capable hands, the archives fell into disrepair in the early 
1980s when files suddenly became disorganized and incomplete. The majority of 
the documents consulted here, although preserved, are not catalogued and are 
stored as they were created. Although this provides a challenge to the 
investigator, it also offers a rare look into what the CML prioritized and how they 
tackled issues. Under the dictatorship, and in the early democratic years, the 
CML’s organs preserved each case file with all supporting documentation in 
thematic folders by subject. What clearly emerges, in part due to the sheer 
volume of material, is the importance and contestability of issues of infrastructure 
and economic development. 
  Most works on pre and post 1974 Portugal deal with: the national 
government and its agencies; organizations that were at an arms length from the 
Estado Novo; opposition movements like political parties; and certain nascent 
civil society groups.92 In addition, these studies often focus on Lisbon or other 
larger population centers in Portugal. Small and middling municipalities and their 
institutions deserve greater attention. To that end, the following chapters 
continue to focus on Lourinhã and its municipal government’s relations with its 
public and their institutions in building the contemporary infrastructure, landscape 
and socio-economic profile we find today. Thus, this dissertation makes two 
broad, but related arguments about democratization and its relationship to 
                                                
92 See, for examples: Gorjão, Mulheres em Tempos Sombrios: Oposição Feminina ao Estado 
Novo; Ricardo Marchi, Império, Nação, Revolução: As Direitas Radicais Portuguesas no Fim do 
Estado Novo (1959-1974). (Alfragide, PT: Texto, 2009); and, Raquel Varela, A História do PCP 
na Revolução dos Cravos. (Lisbon, PT: Bertrand, 2011). 
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infrastructure development and the politics of space in late twentieth-century 
Europe. Indeed, these arguments reveal the nature of how Portugal's space 
changed.  
First, municipal governments and institutions played an important role in 
supporting democratization in Portugal. After 1966, the Portuguese government 
and its municipal agents refocused investment and development in infrastructure 
for a variety of reasons. In order to accomplish their goals, they invited and 
encouraged local residents to contribute to development in a range of roles. The 
relationship between municipal government and local resident did not change 
significantly despite the democratic mechanisms introduced between 1974 and 
1976. Indeed, in Lourinhã, an unintended consequence of the dictatorship CML’s 
encouragement of public participation in infrastructure expansion was the 
practice of democratic activities by residents, which eased and promoted a later 
transition to democracy. The fact that the relationship remained paternal after 
1974 made it all the easier for institutions like the CML to reduce its reliance on 
public participation in development into the 1980s as its institutions developed to 
complete the work that individuals often performed in the 1960s. In other words, 
a discourse emerged that valued private participation in development when 
governmental institutions alone could not achieve urban and infrastructure goals. 
This discourse shifted over time, increasingly discouraging private participation 
and celebrating the contributions of the CML. 
Second, the availability of basic infrastructure like electricity, running water 
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and roads, along with other socio-economic services like municipal markets, 
agricultural cooperatives, and tourist infrastructure and services became vessels 
of modernity – the requisite markers of a European country. The context in which 
such services became important was set with the rapid proliferation of western, 
modern ideas that flooded into Portugal between the 1960s and 1980s via 
migration, tourism and the introduction of the EEC and its investment money. 
With these tools in hand, built partly with tacit and explicit support from private 
actors, governmental institutions in Portugal and Lourinhã increasingly organized 
space in the country, limiting both the freedom of use and manipulation of the 
landscape by private actors. Thus, as Portugal democratized, citizens found an 
increasingly narrow field of action in terms of their contributions and influence on 
their landscape. 
 One will note two things about the chapters that follow. First, they are 
centered upon the CML and even when discussions arise about private action, it 
is often recorded via contact with the CML or the local newspaper (and 
government collaborator), the Church run Alvorada, which remains a holdover 
from the Estado Novo years. This reflects both the sources available and my 
desire to showcase the role of local government and its institutions in Portugal’s 
modernization and democratization. Second, although the dissertation is 
thematically, and loosely chronologically, organized, the chosen topics of 
discussion are the economy and infrastructure. Again, this reflects the priorities 
of the CML between 1966 and today.  
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 The discussion will start, in a historical materialist vein, with a 
conversation of the agricultural sector as the base of Lourinhanense society, how 
it can be used to glean a general understanding of what it meant to be modern, 
and what means were employed in order to modernize. Agriculture remains the 
primary economic sector in Lourinhã and initiatives were undertaken to defend 
that sector’s prominence in the town. Between the 1960s and 1980s, 
Lourinhanense farmers were encouraged to modernize through education, the 
application of new techniques and technologies to their work, and through 
seeking help from other individuals and organizations. These methods remained 
constant priorities throughout the period in spite of economic and political 
changes in Portugal. Modernization and modernity in Lourinhã were deployed as 
conservative forces in an attempt to preserve the local economy and the 
individual farmer. Also to be observed is the fact that the CML and other 
government institutions, although driving the discourse, required local farmers to 
act as partners in modernization. Modernity could be encouraged, but 
Lourinhanense needed to engage with their peers and institutions to achieve 
their goals, introducing them, in earnest, to the civic sphere. 
 The second chapter turns to the CML’s efforts before 1974 to develop the 
town’s tourism industry in order to take advantage of the tourist dollars that were 
flooding Portugal in the 1960s. Buoyed by new national investments in 
infrastructure in the mid 1960s, the CML turned to its tourism infrastructure by 
opening a campground at its beach, PAB, in 1966 and reorganizing its Junta do 
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Turismo in 1970. These major initiatives were supplemented by an ever-
increasing effort to lay new infrastructure like water and electricity networks, 
especially in PAB, which would be needed to offer tourists a comfortable stay. 
Here again, modernization in an economic activity (tourism) helped to drive 
modernization in politics. Indeed, the CML encouraged public participation in 
welcoming tourists and developing the necessary infrastructure like the 
previously mentioned water and electricity networks, and also hotels and 
restaurants. As was the case with development in agriculture, the delegation of 
responsibility to locals in tourism did help to advance the industry. However, a 
secondary consequence was the invitation of dictatorship subjects into the civic 
sphere. 
 The following chapter deviates slightly from the previous two in that it 
deals specifically with how groups of farmers organized cooperatives between 
the 1960s and 1980s. Although cooperativism enjoyed the support of both the 
dictatorship and the democratic government, co-operatives acted under both 
regimes as largely independent organizations. The three Lourinhã cooperatives 
highlighted, the Adega Cooperativa, Lourifruta, and Louricoop, all had varying 
degrees of government support in their founding and their operations. It is no 
surprise then that despite their arm’s length status from the CML, they operated 
within the dominant discourse that sought to defend individual farmers and their 
private property by modernizing. Nonetheless, co-operatives represent the most 
important and successful attempts at civic organization and the practice of 
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association amongst Lourinhanense between the 1960s and 1980s. Coop 
members engaged in voting, debates and development allowing citizens from 
various levels of socio-economic standards to engage directly with their local 
politics, economy and landscape.  
 The fourth chapter highlights the height of issue-based organization and 
participation in the civic sphere by Lourinhanense who banded together in groups 
of varying size and complexity to lobby the CML for basic infrastructure 
throughout the 1970s. Focusing on the CML’s initiatives in the 1970s that were 
aimed at spreading the town’s electricity and water works reveals that locals 
were not passive agents in the modernization of the landscape. Instead, their 
interests aligned with the goals of the CML: they too wanted electricity and water 
infrastructure. Indeed, the CML and local individuals and groups worked as 
financial and political partners to install this infrastructure as both provided 
political and financial capital to various projects. In fact, the development of the 
landscape in the 1970s demonstrates that both the CML and locals proved savvy 
manipulators of the changing political landscape in Portugal. The course taken in 
the development of Lourinhã’s basic infrastructure illustrates the power of the 
ongoing processes of modernization in Portugal between the 1960s and 1980s 
along with the citizenry’s prowess in engaging with their local government in an 
ever shifting political culture. 
 Finally, the development of Lourinhã’s contemporary landscape exposes 
just how tenuous the strength of citizen participation in development was. By the 
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1980s, the CML and other government organizations had grown to the point 
where they could drive their agenda in ways their dictatorial predecessors could 
not. Thus, public participation took a back seat to government-driven 
development as the CML reoriented and renovated Lourinhã’s town center with 
the opening of a new market hall as a key step in this process in 1989. This 
development was strengthened by the fact that development priorities shifted 
away from projects (water and electricity) that would directly improve private 
property. Labeled the European Lourinhã in 1989, the town as seen today has 
taken advantage of the various developments in infrastructure and the economy 
that will be explored in this dissertation. In many ways, however, the 
development, which required public participation that introduced locals to the 
civic sphere in the 1960s and 1970s, resulted in an enhanced supervisory regime 
in the 1980s that could not only control the discourse in Lourinhã, but also the 
landscape. In this sense, the 1980s were marked by an ostensible pull back from 
public participation. Yet, as will be discussed, locals found new and innovative 
ways to manipulate their landscape despite the growing control imposed by the 
CML. 
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2. Lourinhã's Agricultural Sector in Changing Times 
 
In 1986, Portugal became a member of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). This was the culmination of a series of agreements, 
beginning with Portugal’s signing on to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 
1959, which reoriented Portugal’s economic policy in order to develop and 
strengthen ties with Europe. At the same time, Lourinhã’s mayor awarded the 
town’s Diploma da Medalho de Ouro da Vila da Lourinhã to individuals and 
institutions who, not surprisingly, conducted business in the town's dominant 
economic sector: agriculture. The award winners were recognized for their work 
in the development of the local economy and its integration into national and 
international markets. Amongst those recognized were: the local volunteer 
firefighters and their musical band; the locally developed fruit and vegetable 
farmers' cooperative, Lourifruta; Lourinhã's agricultural buying cooperative, 
Louricoop, which had emerged from the remnants of the Estado Novo’s Grémio 
da Lavoura [farmers’ guild]; and the wine producing cooperative, the Adega 
Cooperativa. Leading the group of the individuals acknowledged in 1986 were 
António José dos Santos and José António dos Santos who were awarded the 
gold medal for their work in the cattle and poultry industries in Lourinhã. They 
were recognized for “motivating and dynamizing the local poultry sector and 
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Lourinhã’s poultry raising infrastructure.”1 Lourinhanense, as mayor José Manuel 
dias Custódio explained to the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML), knew the 
dos Santos for their work in developing new commercial networks while 
industrializing both milk production and the packaging of meat. Indeed, the dos 
Santos were heralded as part of the “bed-rock” of the local, regional, and national 
economy. They were men with a “modern economic vision” who were “at the 
forefront of the Europe of the EEC.”2 They had not waited for Portugal to enter 
the EEC but had foreseen what local farmers needed in order to take advantage 
of the European market and had sold in the EEC before Portugal’s entrance into 
the community. Not to be forgotten, but discussed almost as an afterthought, the 
dos Santos were good humanitarians who had donated to the building of 
Lourinhã's old age homes.3  
 By rewarding the century-old volunteer firefighter’s band and those who 
organized and modernized agriculture while respecting traditional humanitarian 
acts like donations to the elderly, local elites established politico-cultural priorities 
in the age of European integration. As it turns out, citizens who were recognized 
in late 1960s Lourinhã engaged in similar activities: they donated their time to 
activities and organizations rooted in Lourinhã’s tradition and humanitarianism 
while working to modernize the town and its economy. By way of example, a 
tribute to Lourinhã’s António Gentil Horta was printed in the local newspaper, the 
                                                
1 "motivação e dinamização do sector agro-pecuário ... [and] nos campos avícola". See: "Reunião 
18/Jun//86: Propostas E Intervenções Dos Membros da Câmara Municipal - Do Senhor 
Presidente", Livro da Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, no. 41, pp. 68-69. 
2 "mais adiantados da Europa das Comunidades". See: ibid. 
3 Ibid, pp. 68-69. 
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Alvorada, upon his death at the age of seventy-four in January 1968. Sr. Horta 
had earned recognition, the Alvorada argued, for the projects and improvements 
that he directed in service of Lourinhã. He had revived and reorganized the 
Associação Comercial [Commercial Association], which was a nineteenth century 
business development association that had become defunct because of a lack of 
local interest. He also helped to run the Associação dos Bombeiros Voluntários 
[Volunteer Firefighters' Association], having been its first leader, conductor and 
an instructor for new recruits. Later in life, Sr. Horta managed a high school in 
Lourinhã in partnership with Sr. Dr. Pisana. Together, they used the school as a 
platform to advocate for the construction of a permanent high school. Further, Sr. 
Horta was an advocate for the rural freguesias, authoring a petition delivered to 
the Administração Geral dos CTT [the General Administration of the Mail, 
Telephone and Telegraph office – Portugal's national post] calling for the 
distribution of mail in rural neighborhoods.4  
Both Horta and the dos Santos were motivated by a desire to modernize 
Lourinhã. However, their contexts made their respective goals markedly different 
in scale. The dos Santos' scope, due entirely to context, was much broader than 
Horta's: access to European markets would not have been as easily available to 
Lourinhanense in the 1940s and 50s, primarily due to factors like technology and 
government policy. Such disparity serves as a primary illustration of the 
difference thirty years of development in the economy can have on local industry 
                                                
4 "António Gentil Horta", Alvorada (January 14, 1968) pp. 1, 6. 
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and culture.  
In Lourinhã, Portugal's economic development between the 1960s and 
1980s served to fundamentally alter the methods and organization of local 
farmers and their networks without radically altering their basic desire to operate 
within a free-market system and defend their private property. In the late 1960s, 
Lourinhã’s agricultural sector, dominated by farmers who operated as small-
landholders, was fractured. Farmers operated individually and were isolated. 
Although they were being encouraged to organize and act collectively, there 
were few avenues for collective action. Indeed, organizations that practiced 
collective production and commerce were limited to the farmers’ guild and the 
Adega Cooeprativa, the wine-producing cooperative founded in December 1957 
that, although it survived, struggled in the 1960s. In addition, cooperation 
amongst farmers was impeded by the small land-holding system, poor 
infrastructure and limited access to both modern equipment and foreign markets.  
Supplementing impediments to cooperation was the fact that farmers, 
although being encouraged by elites and the Estado Novo to cooperate and 
organize, were, paradoxically, being told to do so in order to preserve the 
individual farmer and his way of life. A major reorganization of rural society along 
socialist lines was not remotely what was being suggested – not even during the 
Revolution did Lourinhanense farmers experiment with collectivization or land 
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occupations like their colleagues in the Alentejo did.5 Farmers in the 1980s 
continued to be encouraged to preserve individual landholdings; however, in 
contrast to the 1960s, collective action had opened access to resources, 
equipment, and markets beyond the reach of small landholding farmers that had 
become available thanks to Portugal's economic agreements with Europe.  
The scale and areas of development also differed between the 1960s and 
1980s. In the 1960s, Sr. Horta and his contemporaries were working on 
education and basic infrastructure and communications. In the 1980s, as 
Portugal tied itself to European markets, the goal became to adapt to 
international commerce. In both cases, farmers were encouraged to work to 
preserve small-landholding agriculture as the center of their lives. Collectivized 
farms were never suggested, common ownership of land and resources was not 
a viable option in Lourinhã, and modernization meant adapting to an ever-
globalizing horizon by taking advantage of new technology and methods without 
compromising local structures and practices. 
 Between the 1960s and the 1980s, Sr. Horta's and the dos Santos’ 
accomplishments that were celebrated remained remarkably similar in spirit. This 
continuity suggests that in fundamental ways both development, as an important 
goal in Lourinhanense discourse, and its meaning were unchanged in this period. 
                                                
5 See: Nancy Bermeo, The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers’ Control in Rural Portugal 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). One major contributing factor here is 
Lourinhã’s small land holding pattern, which stands in contrast to the Alentejo’s large quinta land-
owning pattern. With most farmers being landowners to varying degrees in Lourinhã, there was 
not the motivation to collectivize or occupy as there was in the Alentejo where workers were 
employed by large farmers who monopolized production. 
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In other words, developmental activities that were valued as ways to modernize 
Lourinhã remained consistent. This chapter argues that modernization in 
Lourinhã between the 1960s and 1980s was to be achieved through education, 
the use of technology and science, mechanization, and civic engagement that 
was meant to create an increased awareness of new methods and how those 
methods could be employed in one’s own interests. In addition, the continuing 
emphasis on the agricultural sector reflected the ongoing concern in Lourinhã 
with the defense of traditional rural values. This continuity stands as evidence of 
the power in the belief amongst Lourinhanense that as Portugal transitioned from 
dictatorship to democracy, “if we want things to stay as they are, things will have 
to change.”6 Certainly, development in agriculture through education, technology, 
mechanization, and civic engagement was called for time and again to help the 
local economy meet new political and economic challenges posed by Portugal’s 
transition from an insular dictatorship to a European social democracy. In turn, 
meeting such challenges motivated agricultural modernization in Lourinhã.  
After first outlining some of the major political, economic and cultural 
considerations that stimulated modernization and development in Portugal, this 
chapter moves chronologically through the Estado Novo, the revolutionary years, 
and, finally, the democratic government of the 1980s. It pays particular attention 
to the efforts and ideologies of important contributors to Lourinhã’s discourse 
surrounding agricultural development, including the CML, the national 
                                                
6 Taken from Giuseppe di Lampedusa's novel The Leopard. Quoted from: Robert O. Paxton, “The 
Five Stages of Fascism”, The Journal of Modern History, 70:1 (March 1998), 7-8. 
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government, local pundits and politicians, and, later in the period, regional 
organizations that emerged to help local farming. 
 
** 
 
 This chapter sets for itself the ambitious task of discussing the meanings 
of agricultural modernization in Lourinhã between the mid 1960s and the mid 
1980s. The context under which this modernization took place was marked by 
both Europeanization and democratization. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, Portugal’s politics and economy were undergoing renovation. After the 
Second World War, the foreign policies of the Estado Novo made Portugal what 
Nicolau Andresen-Leitão has called a “Reluctant European” in need of Western 
money and markets, but suspicious of political and cultural intervention.7 As a 
founding member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1947-48, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1959 
and as a signatory of various agreements with the European Economic 
Community (EEC) throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Salazar’s Estado Novo 
continued a pragmatic approach towards its Western allies that aimed to 
guarantee economic development while safeguarding social stability and the 
                                                
7 See: Nicolau Andresen-Leitão, “The Reluctant European: A Survey of the Literature on Portugal 
and European Integration 1947-1974”, e-JPH, 3:1 (Summer 2005).  
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dictatorship.8 Europeanization continued with the fall of the Estado Novo in 1974 
and the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. As António Goucho 
Soares notes, African colonial independence allowed Portugal to focus its foreign 
policy efforts on Europe. The seven-year negotiation and preparation period 
(1978-1985) for Portugal’s entry into the EEC ended with Mário Soares’ 
government signing the Treaty of Portuguese Integration into the European 
Community that saw Portugal take on full membership on January 1, 1986.9  
 Portugal’s Europeanization went hand-in-hand with its democratization. As 
the economy opened to Europe in the 1960s, Western European ideas made 
their way to Portugal along with investment and products.10 As historians like 
David Birmingham have noted, not only was foreign investment and tourism a 
way to raise capital for Portugal, but it also brought “material aspirations to the 
‘docile’ workers who had formerly been so ‘easy to govern’.”11 Similarly, António 
Barreto has argued that although formal democratization did not come to 
Portugal until after the Estado Novo fell on 25 de Abril in 1974, European input in 
Portugal had been changing Portuguese economic and social customs beginning 
in the post-WWII period, encouraged by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
                                                
8 Nicolau Andresen-Leitão, Estado Novo, Democracia e Europa 1947-1974 (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 
2007), 21-22. See also: Leitão, “A Flight of Fantasy? Portugal and the First Attempt to Enlarge 
the European Community, 1961-63”, Contemporary European History, 16:1 (2007), 71-87. 
9 See: António Goucho Soares, “The Place of Portugal in the European Union” in R. Herr, ed. The 
New Portugal: Democracy and Europe. (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1992), 49-50.  
10 Sasha Pack has discussed this phenomenon in Spain where Western European tourists 
undertook a “peaceful invasion of Spain” in the 1950s and 1960s armed with “money, time and 
ideas” that challenged Francisco Franco’s Catholic Authoritarian dictatorship. See Sasha Pack, 
Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain. (New York, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 1-15. 
11 David Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 180. 
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Organization (NATO) in 1949.12 Barreto, for his part, cites the opening of Europe 
for Portuguese trade and commerce as the catalyst for economic and 
technological innovations as well as the emergence of the "European option" in 
the early 1960s. Political opponents of the regime – Humberto Delgado, Mário 
Soares, Arlindo Vicente, and others – looked increasingly, after 1960, to 
European democracy as a model for Portugal. Indeed, political oppositionists and 
intellectuals alike rallied to European inspired initiatives like the Progama para a 
Democratização da República in the early 1960s. Barreto correctly associates 
the "European option" in the 1960s with political "moderns and liberals", whereas 
regime supporters were "Africanists and, eventually Atlanticists."13 Portuguese 
emigrants to France, Germany and other European countries, who planned, 
unlike their fellow emigrants who went to South or North America, to make their 
stays abroad temporary, also played a role in Portugal's Europeanization. Along 
with tourists, returning emigrants brought European ideas through music, 
literature, fashion, etc. into Portugal.14 
                                                
12 Barreto has made this argument in several papers and articles. For one example see: António 
Barreto, “Portugal, a Europa e a Democracia”, Análise Social, XXIX (129): 5 (1994), 1051-1069. 
See also his anthology of publications: António Barreto, Tempo de Mudança, 3rd ed. (Lisbon, PT: 
Relógio D’Agua, 1999).  
13 Barreto, “Portugal, a Europa e a Democracia”, 1053. 
14 See: Ibid, 1052. In some ways, however, scholars like Barreto are careful to note that 
emigrants also helped to impede Portuguese modernization. Emigrant remittances, for example, 
supplemented the income of farmers, helping them to finance their livelihoods and remain on the 
farm. Or, as Maria Baganha points out, emigration, since it largely consisted of redundant 
workers, served to relieve domestic pressure on the regime. See: Maria Baganha, “From Closed 
to Open Doors: Portuguese Emigration under the Corporatist Regime”, Electronic Journal of 
Portuguese History, 1:1 (Summer 2003), 1-16. For further reading on how Portuguese emigration 
and the networks developed between emigrants and Portugal affected the homeland in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, see: Maria Baganha, "As Correntes Emigratórias Portuguesas no Século XX e o 
seu Impacto na Economia Nacional," Análise Social, vol. XXIX: 128, (1994), 959-980; Maria 
Baganha, "Portuguese Emigration After World War II", in António Costa Pinto, ed., Modern 
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The more distinguishable and oft used marker for those looking to 
bookend the democratic era in Portugal, in comparison to economic and 
migratory contributors in the 1960s, is the revolution that overthrew Portugal’s 
longstanding dictatorship on April 25, 1974. 25 de Abril is often cited as the 
moment when democratization came to Portugal. Although this is an assertion 
that, as discussed, this dissertation seeks to qualify, the Revolution stands as an 
important political watershed and thus deserves note as an event that helped 
shape the backdrop against which Lourinhã's farmers modernized. 
 Accompanying these political changes, Portugal’s economic policy, 
investments and success also shifted and altered the context in which Lourinhã's 
agriculture would progress.15 Between 1935 and 1999, Portuguese governments 
engaged in guided economic investment plans. Five have been chosen as 
                                                                                                                                            
Portugal, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Victor Pereira, “Emigração e 
Desenvolvimento da Previdência Social em Portugal”, in Análise Social, vol. XLIV:192, (2009), 
471-510; Helen Graham, "Money and Migration in Modern Portugal: An Economist's View", in 
David Higgs, ed., Portuguese Migration in Global Perspective (Toronto, ON: MHSO, 1990); 
Caroline B. Brettel, We Have Already Cried Many Tears: Portuguese Women and Migration 
(Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1982); Jim Lewis and Alan Williams, "Portugal: the Decade of 
Return", Geography, 70:2 (April 1985), 178-182; Eugene L. Mendonsa, "Benefits of Migration as 
a Personal Strategy in Nazaré, Portugal", International Migration Review, 16:3 (Autumn, 1982), 
635-645; and, Joel Serrão, "Notas Sobre Emigração e Mudança Social no Portugal 
Contemporâneo", Análise Social, XXI: 87-89 (1985), 995-1004). 
15 One early, and prominent, thesis in Portuguese economic history postulated that the economy 
under the later Estado Novo was stagnant. The so-called Stagnation Thesis has long since been 
disproven with authors from a variety of disciplines demonstrating the overwhelming growth that 
Portugal's economy experienced in eh 1960s and 1970s. For the bases of the Stagnation thesis 
see: Mark Hudson, Portugal to 1993: Investing in a European Future. (London, UK: the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report no. 1157, 1989); and, Employment and Basic Needs 
in Portugal (Geneva, CH: International Labour Organization, 1979), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/portugue/region/eurpro/lisbon/pdf/79b09_903_en.pdf (accessed April 22, 
2014). Eric N. Baklanoff has been a prime example of an academic who has shown the dynamic 
growth that the Portuguese economy experienced between 1959 and 1974. For Baklanoff's 
discussions of the thesis' faults see: Eric N. Baklanoff, The Economic Transformation of Spain 
and Portugal (London, UK: Praeger Publishers, 1978); Eric N. Baklanoff, "The Political Economy 
of Portugal's Later 'Estado Novo': A Critique of the Stagnation Thesis", Luso-Brazilian Review, 
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examples here: four under the Estado Novo and one under the social democratic 
government. In each, foreign and private investment increased while government 
investment in agriculture fell as money was funneled to infrastructure projects 
that would provide education, roads and electricity. The first plan, the Lei de 
Reconstituição (1935-1950), saw the Portuguese government provide one 
hundred percent of the money invested in production and infrastructure. Between 
1935 and 1950, of the thirty-two percent devoted to the “productive sector”, thirty 
percent went to agriculture, while the remaining two percent was devoted to 
industry. Most of the remaining sixty-eight percent for infrastructure went to 
transport, communications, and housing, with only one and a half percent going 
towards energy production, reflecting the minimal state of electrical service in 
Portugal. The total invested equaled approximately 4,4 million contos.16  
                                                
16 See table 6.1 in: Pedro Lains. Os Progressos do Atraso: Uma Nova História Económica de 
Portugal. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003), 175. One conto was one thousand escudos. Thus, 4,4 million 
contos is 4,400,000,000$00 escudos. 
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Table 2: Contributions by the Government, Foreign and Private sectors in Government 
development plans in the twentieth century. See: Pedro Lains. Os Progressos do Atraso: 
Uma Nova História Económica de Portugal. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003), 175. 
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Table 3: Investment in various sectors and services in the Portuguese Government's 
development plans of the twentieth-century. Of note is the sharp initial decline in 
investment in agriculture and increase in industrial investment. In addition, investment in 
electrical energy saw a rapid influx of resources in the 1950s and 1960s as Portugal 
electrified its landscape. See: Pedro Lains. Os Progressos do Atraso: Uma Nova História 
Económica de Portugal. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003), 175. 
 
The I Plano de Fomento (1953-1959) saw government investment fall to 
fifty-one percent with the private sector contributing thirty-nine percent of 
investment and foreign capital making up the remaining ten percent. Investment 
in agriculture fell to seventeen percent while industrial development received 
almost twelve percent of expenditures. Infrastructure investment remained 
around seventy percent, with the energy sector receiving the lion’s share of 
money at thirty-five percent. In these five years, a total of eight million contos was 
invested, almost double the amount spent in the fifteen years between 1935 and 
1950, not accounting for inflation. In contrast to the LRE, education and health 
received funding although it was a meager two percent.17 
 The II Plano de Fomento (1959-1964), which coincided with Portugal’s 
entry into the EFTA and the opening of the economy to Europe, saw government 
investment fall again in favour of foreign investment. Foreign investment matched 
government investment at twenty-three percent with the private sector providing 
fifty-four percent of the twenty-one million contos invested over the length of the 
plan. In this plan, investment in the “production sectors” increased from thirty to 
forty-five percent, with investment in agriculture remaining unchanged at about 
seventeen percent. This meant that industry received the lion’s share, up from 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
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twelve to twenty-eight percent. Infrastructure fell to fifty-five percent, with roads 
and communications investment remaining at about thirty-percent and energy 
investment falling to twenty-one percent. Education was given about three and a 
half percent.18   
 The III Plano de Fomento (1968-1973) saw the private sector contribute 
the lion's share of investment at fifty-seven percent while the percentage of 
foreign investment fell to thirteen percent.19 The government contributed thirty 
percent of total investment. Agricultural investment fell again to thirteen percent 
while industry received twenty-five percent of spending. Tourism received, for the 
first time, funding of nine percent while energy investment remained around 
fifteen percent and transport and communications fell to twenty-four percent. 
Education received about six percent. In this period, investment ballooned to one 
hundred and twenty-two million contos.20 The fact that tourism and service 
development received public funds for the first time is significant. Indeed, by the 
late 1960s, the Portuguese tourist industry had been booming for almost a 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
19 The drop in the percentage contributed to the development plan by foreign investment, is not, 
as some might assume, related to the protracted colonial war in which the Estado Novo was 
stubbornly engaged in its colonies, Angola, Mozambique and Guniea-Bissau. Indeed, Western 
powers like the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies were tolerant 
of the Estado Novo's colonial adventure in the Cold War context, which pitted Portugal against 
Soviet and Chinese backed African nationals. In fact, Salazar utilized NATO aid as France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) provided war material and the United States granted a 
significant loan in 1972. Further, the drop in foreign investment will seem even more surprising 
given the shift discussed in this dissertation, and elsewhere, towards European investment to 
develop Portugal's economy in the 1960s in order to weather the problems faced because of the 
colonial wars. See: Thomas C. Bruneau, "Out of Africa and Into Europe: Towards and Analysis of 
Portuguese Foreign Policy", International Journal, 32:2, European Foreign Policies (Spring 1977), 
292; and, Walter C. Opello, Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1991), 128. 
20 See table 6.1 in: Lains. Os Progressos do Atraso, 175. 
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decade, contributing large sums of money to Portugal's balance sheet.21 
 Finally, the democratic government engaged in 'Regional Development 
Plans', like the Plano de Desenvolvimento Regional (1994-1999), which, for 
example, was mainly funded (fifty-three percent) by foreign investment.22 The 
remaining forty seven percent of the 6,560 million contos spent, was provided by 
the government and domestic private sector: twelve and a half and thirty-five 
percent respectively. Agricultural spending remained at about sixteen percent 
with industry receiving twenty-four percent. Energy development was down to 
less than one percent, reflecting the advanced state of Portugal’s electrical 
network, while roads and communications still received about twenty-five percent 
of funding with education and health receiving twenty-five percent, up from six 
percent in 1968-1973.23 
After the Second World War, these initiatives, coupled with Portugal’s 
membership in the European Free trade Area (EFTA) in 1959, the nationalization 
of certain sectors and services in 1975 and Portugal’s entry to the EEC in 1986, 
reflect the fact that the state has played an important role in Portugal’s economic 
development in the twentieth century.24 Generally speaking, historians have 
given most of their attention to the role of “economic politics” in promoting 
                                                
21 See chapter 2 of this work, which focuses on Lourinhã's tourism industry in the 1960s and 
1970s for a fuller explanation of the growing importance of tourism in Portugal. 
22 Beginning in 1986, with Portugal's entrance into the EEC, the government engaged in regional 
development plans (1986-89, 1989-93, etc) aimed, in part, at decentralizing economic decision-
making. For a brief description of these plans, see: Programas de Desenvolvimento Regional 
(Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional do Centro, February 26, 2010). 
http://www.ccdrc.pt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=331&Itemid=229&lang=pt 
(accessed April 22, 2014). 
23 See: Lains. Os Progressos do Atraso, 175. 
24 See: Ibid, 169-170. 
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economic development in Portugal.25 They have focused on two state priorities: 
first, “agrarian reform” which changed the parameters of agricultural development 
in Portugal; and second, “industrial conditioning”, to promote the industrialization 
of Portugal.26  
The dual thrust in Portuguese economic development since the 1930s 
reflects the concern of critics who warned that industrial development could not 
be done at the expense of the development of agriculture. In other words, 
agricultural growth had to be considered while pushing for industrialization to 
achieve the government’s goals of reducing dependence on manufactured 
imports and investing in chemical manufacturing, iron production, cement and 
industrial equipment production, and the production of energy.27  
 However important the economic motivations for investing in agriculture 
along with industrialization, these priorities seem secondary to the Estado Novo’s 
politico-cultural goals for the rural world, which continued to form the bases of 
much of Portugal’s culture even after the fall of the dictatorship. Salazar’s political 
discourse, aimed at “recreating rural nostalgia”, focused on promoting 
development in a number of areas that would reaffirm the viability and 
advantages of rural life in Portugal. The rural landscape was to be enhanced 
through public works like schools, bridges, roads, fountains and electrical 
                                                
25 See: Ibid, 28-29, 160-170 and Ch. 6. Lains himself notes this is a shortcoming in the literature 
and devotes his book to applying quantitative evidence in support of general politico-economic 
beliefs in the economic history of the dictatorship. Economic historians of Portugal have tended to 
judge the success of economic policy on the achievement of political goals, as opposed to 
quantitatively testable economic indicators.  
26 “reforma agrária” and “condicionamento industrial”. See: Ibid, 28-29 and Ch. 6. 
27 Ibid, 174. 
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infrastructure. Cultural and social life in the rural setting was to be preserved in 
sanctioned neighborhood social organizations and official institutions like the 
Casas do Povo. These would help to reinforce the formation of identity based on 
family, tradition, nation [a pátria] and Catholicism, all elements to be preserved 
and fortified by the state.28  
Lending his cultural power as dictator to the nostalgia for ‘Portuguese 
origins’, Salazar personally identified with the rural world. In his Discursos e 
Notas published in 1951, the dictator identified himself with “the rural spirit of 
which I am – in roots, in blood, in temperament – attached to the land, source of 
contentment and the improvement of men.”29 Not coincidentally, Salazar 
degraded life in the urban setting: the city was a sad alternative to the 
countryside. Salazar lamented, for example, being away from the “murmur of 
water and the sound of the trees” whilst amongst the people of Lisbon who 
passed their days “sadly on the streets [without] a large park, without the luxury 
of the fresh grass and the cover of trees, where one could play … run, take the 
pure air and intimately commune with nature.”30 The city robbed the individual of 
their “destiny”. The cure was to conserve or restore the “ancient order, and 
historical mentality” that had been uprooted by the politics of the Portuguese 
state in the period before the Estado Novo, especially, the First Republic (1910-
1926). Such attacks on the Republic included a devaluation of liberalism as 
                                                
28 Daniel Melo. Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-1958). (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 2001), 44. 
29 “No espírito do rural que eu sou – de raiz, de sangue, de tempermento –, apegado à terra, 
fonte de alegria, e do alimento ods homens”. Quoted from: Ibid, 44-45. 
30 Quoted from: Ibid, 45. 
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well.31 
For Salazar, Portuguese culture was based in history, tradition and the 
collective psychology of the people. Thus, the people had to be taught what 
Daniel Melo calls a “peculiar form of popular history”. Salazar’s popular history 
would work to legitimize “action” while also justifying the limited political options 
available to the Portuguese. Tradition became historicized, a tool for ideology 
that both legitimized and transformed reality.32 These cultural politics thus 
became the base of economic policy as well. Action, limited political choice, and 
tradition shaped how the Estado Novo, and indeed the post-1974 democratic 
regime, would have Lourinhanense respond to agricultural crises and modernize.  
 
** 
 
 The social, cultural and economic importance of agriculture in Lourinhã 
during the final decade and a half of the Estado Novo cannot be overstated. 
Locals, like those who led a workshop on agricultural development in Lourinhã in 
1966, argued that the town was naturally advantaged in terms of agriculture and 
economic promise. From the sea, Lourinhã fished and its beaches provided the 
town with tourism dollars. Lourinhã's wine was of excellent quality. The rich soil 
yielded fruit, vegetables, flowers, and other products. Not to be overlooked, 
Lourinhã’s proximity to Lisbon allowed the sale of these products in the 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, 46-47. 
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metropolis with little logistical effort.33 As for agriculture’s cultural importance, the 
Alvorada also argued that farming was a primary concern of local citizens. Given 
that the Alvorada’s self-stated reason for existence was to reflect the common 
mood in order to assist in the “renovation of the habits and ideas of the 
population, aiming to create greater hope for the future,” it could not ignore the 
agricultural problems of the Concelho. In the Alvorada's view, agriculture 
preoccupied the minds of most of its readers, and farming’s future was the 
source of many of the citizen’s doubts and worries.34   
 Many of these doubts and worries stemmed from the perception that 
agriculture was a sector undergoing profound change in the decades leading up 
to 1960. This change, along with adjustments in other sectors, was altering 
habits in agricultural society in Portugal. The Alvorada warned that whether this 
change was wanted or not, “like revolution it is without doubt a certainty in the 
agrarian life of Portugal and its effects, simultaneously devastating and 
rejuvenating, had already been felt.” Lourinhanense were further warned that 
ignoring the “tremendous” transformation in agriculture caused by “progress in 
science, technology, economics, and society” would be a shame as new ideas 
and methods would pass one by.35  
Local elites expressed their concerns over the future of farming in 
Lourinhã at an early 1966 roundtable held at a local school, the Externato D. 
                                                
33 "Sessão Sobre Cooperativismo Agrícola na Moita dos Ferreiros", Alvorada (October 8, 1966) 
pp. 1, 4.  
34 "Agricultura Nova", Alvorada, ano 1 (November 5, 1960) p. 1-2. 
35 Ibid. 
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Lourenço.36 Those present at the meetings included such important local figures 
as the Mayor and the Secretary of the town hall, officers of the civil registry, 
delegates from the municipal health offices, the President and Office Manager of 
the Adega Cooperativa, officials from the Concelho's Treasury, Lourinhã's 
Secretary of Finance, representatives from the Grémio do Comércio, directors 
from the Hospital, the Clube Recreativo, the Liga Agrária Católica, and the 
Lavradores [farmers] de Moita de Ferreiros (João José da Silva, José do 
Nascimento and José Maria Pedro). Also in attendance were the primary school 
teacher and representatives from social institutions like day cares.37 In the 1960s, 
roundtables like these were primarily concerned with a perceived and ongoing 
crisis in Lourinhã – a hallmark of the period is that there was always public 
discussion of crises in agriculture, the family, culture, etc., and the challenges 
associated with them. In part, this reflected the fact that between 1960 and 1986, 
the agricultural sector was contributing an ever-decreasing percentage of 
Portugal’s national production. In 1960, agriculture contributed twenty-four 
percent of Portugal’s production, yet by 1986, that percentage had fallen to just 
above ten.38 As early as 1962, local pundits were writing about their fears in the 
Alvorada. Contributors explained that Lourinhã, an essentially agriculture town, 
was confronted, along with other agricultural towns in Portugal, with a "great 
crisis of poverty" due in part to a lack of rain, but also to the “culture of the 
                                                
36 Dom Lourenço was a founder of Lourinhã in the middle ages. Many of the town's facilities, 
clubs, etc bear his name. 
37 "A Lourinhã Quer: a Sua Promoção; o Seu Desenvolvimento", Alvorada (March 13, 1966), pp. 
1, 5. 
38 See: Lains. Os Progressos do Atraso, appendix 6, chart A.2, p. 261. 
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countryside, which had caused a fall in productivity and a drop in the quantity and 
quality of the product produced.” This only made the imbalance between cost 
and the value of agricultural product worse. Further, the wages of farm labourers 
were “increasing alarmingly” due in large part to a shortage of labour caused by 
the “exodus to the developing industrial zones of Portugal.”39 
 Lourinhã’s wine industry offers an example of the problems farmers were 
facing in the 1960s. The Portuguese wine industry was facing a crisis in these 
years. As the Conselho Geral da Junta Nacional do Vinho warned in 1965, “the 
country faced the most extreme crisis of ‘super-production’ of all times: 
28,000,000 ‘hectalitros’ of wine produced in 1962 and 1963.” This output marked 
the best two years in Portuguese history; however, this “crisis of super-
production” caused storage and price problems for both local producers and the 
Junta Nacional.40 In response to the crisis, the Junta Nacional subsidized local 
Adega Cooperativas. Lourinhã's Adega called a meeting in response in which 
local producers agreed to measures that reduced the price of wine on the 
consumer market, reorganized its transportation and delivery system, and 
committed to selling the Adega's remaining inventory as quickly as possible.41 
Such measures were meant to address needs of farmers who lacked the support 
and facilities to take advantage of the kind of increased production they achieved 
                                                
39 "Algumas Apreciações de um Lourinhanense", Alvorada, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) p. 1, 
4. 
40 “O País enfrenta a maior crise de superprodução de todos os tempos: 28,000,000 de 
hectolitros de vinho produzidos em 1962 e 1963". "Comunicado do Conselho Geral da Junta 
Nacional do Vinho", Alvorada (February 14, 1965) p. 3. 
41 Ibid. 
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in 1962 and 1963.  
One editorial on ‘New Agriculture’ in 1960, argued that the modernizing 
measures and collective action that would later be taken in response to the crisis 
of 'super-production' were examples of a larger shift needed to improve the 
farmer’s lot in Lourinhã. As the editorial explained, people suffered with “hard and 
unappreciated work … with the hostile elements of nature … an uncomfortable 
life … [and were left with] economic difficulties and the uncertainties of the 
future.” A “new life in agriculture” would mean an easing of the work of farmers 
through mechanization that would provide bread for their home and leave them 
time for recreation. These advantages were the byproducts “offered” by a 
"modern" civilization.42  
The questions for Lourinhanense were how to modernize farming without 
upsetting the structure of their society. Or, more broadly, those concerned were 
faced with considering what the meaning of modernization was in the 1960s. 
Here, the term Desenvolvimento (loosely translated as development but referring 
to a process of improvement) became the vessel for the meaning of 
modernization in Lourinhã. It also had varied meanings across different contexts. 
At the abstract level, in the early 1960s, Portuguese academics – excerpts of 
whose works were often reprinted in the local newspaper – provided a starting 
point for understanding the concept. One leading economist, Dr. Manuela Maria 
Da Silva, contributed to the Associação Industrial Portuguesa’s series entitled, 
                                                
42 "Agricultura Nova", Alvorada, (November 5, 1960) p. 2. 
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Estudos de Economia Aplicada, and highlighted the difficulty in defining 
Desenvolvimento Comunitário. Indeed, she suggested that it covered “a wide 
range of experiences.”43 That said, it was her attempt to define it that the 
Alvorada printed in 1966.44  
For Da Silva, Desenvolvimento Comunitário needed to be a process that 
was driven at the local level by community actors supported by national 
bureaucracies and governments. Locals were to recognize the importance of the 
collective and its needs in order to come to "global solutions", thereby ending 
"society's traditional lethargy."45 As such, the participation of the population in 
Desenvolvimento Comunitário was essential and their sacrifice could be justified 
by the achievement, after time, of improved health and material benefits in the 
community.46 Such accomplishments would be guaranteed by national 
governments, whose services and bureaucracies would support local initiative. 
Any widespread action, Da Silva explained, required the technical know-how and 
personnel that the government could provide. Their expertise would be needed to 
help lift underdeveloped areas to the level of those areas in the country that were 
more developed. National bureaucracies could serve to provide standardized 
dialogues and cooperation across community lines.47 The collaboration of 
                                                
43 See: Manuela Maria Da Silva, “Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Uma Técnica de Progresso 
Social”, Estudos de Economia Aplicada, 16 (Lisboa: PT: Associação Industrial Portuguesa, 
1962). 
44 See: "Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Uma Técnica de Progresso Social", Alvorada (February 
1, 1966) pp. 1, 3, 8. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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government and locals in development initiatives, for Da Silva, should be used to 
introduce gradual change to society so that the population could adjust to, and 
create an, “equalized and harmonized society” allowing all to access educational, 
social and economic services.48 As such, a "new mentality" would be introduced 
to society, meaning, for Da Silva, that Desenvolvimento Comunitário would serve 
a certain political ideology: democracy. In short, Desenvolvimento Comunitário 
was to promote human liberty and value of the community through local and 
national cooperation in development.49  
 Da Silva’s then, was a call for the abandonment of traditional methods, for 
cooperation between the state and various organizations and citizens for social 
progress through education, and for the promotion of the community as a 
defender of human liberty. Such a discourse was adopted in Lourinhanense 
discussions about development in the 1960s. Although this discourse was 
pervasive in many discussions, Lourinhã's elites generally agreed that improving 
society started with modernizing Lourinhã's agriculture. Certainly, science and 
technology, improved production methods and the reorganization of production, a 
better understanding of market forces and how to exploit them, and education 
were key instruments in how to develop Lourinhã’s agriculture. At the center of 
this discussion was the insistence of those in control of the discourse that 
modernization in agriculture was a moral virtue and, indeed, an obligation.  
By way of example, the Alvorada described the modernization of 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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agriculture in 1960 as a “crusade” for the good of “the nation and the people”, 
which would be won by “sacrifice.”50 Similarly, readers were warned in 1961 that, 
"without a strong, prosperous, and modern industry, you could not have 
economic progress nor could you elevate the standard of living for people.” If 
agriculture did not modernize through “mechanization and motorization, improved 
land use, the selection of seeds, careful and thorough fertilization, etc.”, farmers 
would not progress nor produce the maximum possible, and thus raise their 
standard of living.51 
 The use of scientific methods and technology was key to Desenvolvimento 
in the final years of the Estado Novo. Leaders of the local wine cooperative 
lamented that a “working hand” would falter if it did not wield chemical products, 
which would improve farmers’ lives by reducing the cost of production.52 
Supporting this assertion, advertisers for agricultural equipment appealed to local 
interests in promoting advanced technology. By way of example, a September 
1966 half-page advertisement in the Alvorada announced that a tractor dealer 
from Lisbon would be in Lourinhã on the tenth of October. The ad called on 
farmers to "consult their interests, which was also the interest of the national 
economy, at the retailer's information session" about the equipment available for 
                                                
50 "Agricultura Nova", Alvorada, (November 5, 1960) p. 2. 
51 "Agricultura e Indústria", Alvorada, ano 1, no. 13 (May 30, 1961) pp. 1, 8. 
52 Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o 
Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico 
de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 
1965) pp. 1, 4. 
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purchase by local farmers.53  
Farmers were also encouraged to work scientific techniques into their 
daily routines. Throughout the 1960s the Alvorada’s section on agriculture 
featured articles on, for example, the importance of treating seeds before 
planting, on potassium’s virtues in growing tomatoes, on the price of producing 
salt, and on the defense of regional wines.54 Another example featured articles 
on new methods of choosing plants and seeds available to farmers, on storing 
seed and bulbs and on fertilizing and experimenting with new fertilizer blends.55 
Farmers were also reminded about the importance of consistent reevaluation of 
their land and its potential. This meant that individuals were encouraged to 
frequently test the fertility of their land and the composition of the soil. Farmers 
were reminded that knowing the potential in one’s property involved sending 
properly collected soil samples (a process that articles explained) to a 
laboratory.56  
Likewise, mechanization was an important tool in the modernization of 
agriculture as well. However, there were acknowledged drawbacks to the use of 
machines in farming. One Alvorada article on development, for example, walked 
a fine-line between levying an attack on non-mechanized farming and praising 
mechanized farming, being careful to suggest that both had their merits. A farmer 
with a tractor could do the work of "six or seven" labourers. That said, the farmer 
                                                
53 "Advertisement: Automóveis e Máquinas Agrícolas," Alvorada (September 11, 1966), p. 6.  
54 Alvorada (June 28, 1968), Secção Agrícola. 
55 Alvorada (March 24, 1968) Secção Agrícola. 
56 "Da Análise de Terras” Alvorada (March 24, 1968) Secção Agrícola. 
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with the tractor faced a problem: according to the article, he had a harder time 
adjusting his methods to conditions while working since a tractor moved so 
quickly. Farmers without a tractor could not move as quickly, but could evaluate 
their work at every step and were able to grow better quality produce in the short 
term. A farmer with a tractor certainly was capable of growing equal quality 
product. However, the mechanized farmer would have to wait, so the argument 
went, and evaluate and alter his methods at the end of each growing season. 
Thus, the farmer without the tractor could not produce as much, whereas the 
farmer with the tractor could, in the short term at least, produce more, but of 
lesser quality.57 Mechanization was clearly the way forward. However, there 
remained value, at least in the short-term, in smaller scale production.58 
 When technology and mechanization were not the most accessible 
avenues for modernization in agriculture, a greater understanding of market 
forces and their manipulation could contribute. Indeed, when technology alone 
could not improve the lot of those who used it, individual, regional and national 
actors were to turn to understanding and manipulating – but not challenging – the 
free market system in which Portuguese farmers operated. One article in the 
Alvorada’s section called Desenvolvimento was a self-described "reflection and 
rationalization of tariffs as an indispensible element in the development of 
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agriculture." Tariffs, if used properly, had value in a modern agricultural economy 
in order to subsidize farmers' shortfalls by protecting their markets.59  
 From the highest levels of government, farmers were also encouraged to 
find new products in order to exploit a larger customer base. In one example of 
national government interest in agricultural modernization, the minister of the 
economy, Correia de Oliveira, before heading to London for EFTA meetings in 
1967, met with the executive of the national agricultural fair. To be held in 
Santarém, the fair was to host Portugal's first national cattle competition in June 
1967. The competition would judge eighteen varieties of cattle that provided a 
variety of foodstuffs including milk and beef. The criteria were wide enough to 
include foreign and domestic breeds: anything that was in Portugal's "economic 
interest." This was done to promote cattle farming – a potential area for small 
farmers and a "precious source of human nourishment" – as a rival or 
supplement to the nation’s horse breeding industry. The fair "guaranteed an 
organization and atmosphere of interest [that was] certainly nothing inferior to the 
National Equine Competition, this year accented with brilliance."60 In order to 
supplement the cattle competition a colloquium on national cattle breeding was to 
be held under the patronage of the Secretary of State for Agriculture. This 
meeting would be most valuable if it allowed workers in the industry to "debate 
the complex problems in cattle breeding."61 To be held in conjunction with the 
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competition at the national fair, the events were to feature and promote new 
directions in farming. The National Fair had, "for all its years ... enriched and 
renovated," and the 1967 fair would follow suit and motivate Portuguese farmers 
to explore the cattle industry, an endeavor described as a "major national 
interest."62 
 The activities surrounding the cattle competition also highlight the final 
aspect of Desenvolvimento in Lourinhanense discourse during the Estado Novo: 
the need to be educated in new methods and techniques through public forums 
and organized events. In its first issue in fact, the Alvorada declared that a new 
mentality in farming was to be fostered by professional education that would 
teach farmers “new concepts in the agricultural market” along with techniques 
that would help farmers “specialize in acting harmoniously with the needs of the 
market.” This would be achieved by the use of technology, scientific methods and 
the application of “rational management to labour.” With these methods and the 
mechanization of agriculture, work would improve and production would become 
cheaper. Farmers were also encouraged to cooperate, abandoning individual 
action against the “devastating erosion” of their industry.63 Other organizations, 
like the Juventude de Agrária Católica [Catholic Agrarian Youth], a wing of Acção 
Católica [Catholic Action] founded in the 1930s, echoed these sentiments. As 
early as 1961, the organization was working towards creating an open mind 
amongst youth in agriculture about technical and developmental problems in their 
                                                
62 Ibid.  
63 "Agricultura Nova", Alvorada, ano 1 (November 5, 1960) p. 2. 
 83 
work. Their first Curso Nacional de Extensão Agricola Juvenil [National Meeting 
for the Extension of Young Farmers] held in Coimbra in April, 1961, for example, 
included visits to the cinema and agro-economical study centers while covering 
topics like the organization and mechanization of agriculture, agricultural 
engineering, and discussions from national bodies like the Direcção Geral dos 
Serviços Agricolas [General Directorship of Agricultural Services].64  
Despite a number of varied forums by a number of local and national 
organizations held throughout the 1960s, pundits of the early 1970s continued to 
insist that more was needed. As late as 1971, the Alvorada was complaining that 
the need for tecnicização [professionalization] in agriculture remained "notable 
and evident." As such, they called for a program that would "influence people." 
The paper argued that the "characteristics of modern man" would improve 
agricultural professionalization. Modern man was defined by: rapid technical 
progress; adherence to the concept of liberty; the psychological necessity of man 
to participate in the development of the whole; the need to specialize; the 
elevation of the cultural level of people; and, the "opening of the universal 
dimensions of man."65  
Advocates of development expressed frustration over the slow and 
uneven progress made in the 1960s with Desenvolvimento. Those with larger 
farms had been able to buy machinery by the mid 1960s and use it to grow more 
produce at a cheaper price. This opened a gap between farmers with, and 
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farmers without, the means necessary to meet pundit demands for 
modernization. As some complained, those farmers that started with more money 
were able to invest in land and machinery. Thus, they were then able to make 
more money. They had the advantage of producing with less cost by buying 
supplies in bulk. In contrast, the small farmer found it hard to buy a tractor or 
supplies at reduced prices.66 In addition, such small farmers found little support 
from the Estado Novo. In the 1960s, Portuguese industry and resources 
remained in the hands of a plutocratic group of some forty families. In agriculture, 
as in most industries, this meant a significant concentration of the means of 
production. Farmers with less than two and a half acres owned nearly forty 
percent of the farmland in Portugal. In contrast, one percent of agricultural 
producers held fifty-one percent of Portugal's cropland. This juxtaposition 
corresponded with a geographic divide, as small-land holding systems existed 
north of Lisbon while large quintas dominated the southern regions of Portugal. 
The Estado Novo thus proved unwilling in practical, monetary terms, to help 
small-farmers who faced the dual problem of small, scattered landholdings and 
government food subsidies, which kept prices low.67 
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** 
 
By 1974, with, or without the coming political revolution, Lourinhanense 
farmers faced a shifting economic landscape. Meanwhile, the politico-cultural 
importance of the small farmer remained central in motivating modernization. 
Farmers were being encouraged by various governmental bodies and media 
outlets to modernize the way they did business and grow their products. The 
need to educate themselves, reorganize how they worked, incorporate 
technology and new methods in their work and confront challenges was central 
to modernization. Certainly, the revolution did little to change the means and 
meaning of desenvolvimento. With 25 de Abril, however, Lourinhanense farmers 
also, at least ostensibly, faced a shifting politico-institutional landscape as well as 
a shifting economic landscape. Indeed, the revolution saw the replacement of 
local government officials. Still, the revolution changed little in terms of both the 
local politico-cultural message, which remained Catholic and anti-communist, 
and the continued importance of government involvement in the organization of 
agriculture. An Alvorada article one month after 25 de Abril explained that, 
despite the jubilation and their newfound political freedom, the Portuguese would 
still have to look to "Christ's message of equality" as the "best response" to 
ongoing challenges.68  
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 With the consolidation of social democracy and the election of Mario 
Soares’ Socialist Party in March 1976, new challenges to the agricultural order in 
Lourinhã would continue to emerge and demand ongoing modernization. In the 
post 1974-76 period, with Portugal’s impending entrance into the EEC, 
agriculture continued to receive politico-cultural encouragement to develop. 
Hanging over these discussions was the feeling, as the Alvorada complained in 
1982, that agriculture was marked by the "sadness of our times."69 Modernization 
continued to be driven by government and was focused upon the development 
and use of government services to intervene in farmers’ troubles, their education, 
and in their production. Government also contributed to the creation of local and 
regional industry bodies to coordinate the efforts of farmers who, for their part, 
had to familiarize themselves with the challenges facing their community. 
Percolating below this discourse was the fact that agriculture continued to be 
fundamental to Lourinhã and its future. 
 Furthermore, the challenges facing the agricultural sector remained a key 
concern for governments and government policy after the revolution. One such 
challenge in the farming sector that saw the government take an active role in 
national farming, lay in the tensions between landowning farmers and their 
workers; which emerged as a concern in the democratic discourse after 1974. 
1977 saw the Ministério dos Assuntos Sociais  [Ministry of Social Services] 
reassess the economic and "social situation of the rural worker." The minister 
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planned new legislation that would see the Secretaria de Estado da Segurança 
Social [Secretary of State for Social Security] become responsible for all workers, 
regardless of the sector in which they worked. This would put rural workers on 
equal footing with their counterparts in other industries and assess workers 
based on their socio-economic situation. The minister argued that land-owning 
farmers too often considered rural workers liabilities and drains on their business. 
The argument then followed that the relationship between landowners and their 
employees was permeated with mistrust and corrupted by suspicion. Such 
feelings could only be resolved, the Socialist government argued, if rural workers 
had the same protections as other workers, such as limits on their working hours, 
for example. Government protection would help to diffuse mistrust and give rural 
workers some freedom and "justice", which they deserved. Such an improvement 
in the relationship between farmer and employee would improve the agricultural 
industry: economic advantage would be gained by social progress in 
agriculture.70 
 This initiative betrayed the ongoing change in social relations in Portugal: 
whose origins are the unintended consequence of Estado Novo policies to 
improve health and education, for example, and open the economy to foreign 
influence in its final decade. Despite the revolution, the processes changing 
social relations remained the same: education and social development continued 
to carry cultural weight. In a front-page editorial printed in October of 1982, the 
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Alvorada asked in what state the agricultural industry found itself in the early 
1980s. Reflecting on its self-professed role as aid to Lourinhã's farmers since the 
1960s, the Alvorada explained that it had been working towards creating "a 
vigorous economy", matched by "desenvolvimento social." Hence, discussion 
since the 1960s focused on four areas: agriculture, schooling (“escola”, or 
school, was the word used, not “educação”, or education), family, and health. 
Along with the Church, the Alvorada prioritized these areas and featured its 
successes in them. These included its participation in various social services and 
the fact that it brought to light the problems of conflict between the generations 
over education, and the strides made in agricultural education.71 
 Schooling in agriculture was employed in formal ways for development 
after 1974 and was supported by local organizations, individuals and 
government. In 1985, the Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Rural 
[Portuguese Association for Rural Development] planned to open its first school 
for farmers in the Concelho da Lourinhã. Linking education to rural 
desenvolvimento, the explicit goal of the school was to give the farmer 
"professional training and human dignity" by giving value to the social and 
intellectual life of the rural world. The school's founding would involve the local 
Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo da Lourinhã [Savings Bank of Mutual 
Agricultural Credit of Lourinhã] and representatives from the CML, the 
Associação de Agricultores da Lourinhã [Farmers' Association of Lourinhã], and 
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other farmers’ organizations like the cooperatives: Lourifruta, Louricoop, and the 
Adega Cooperativa.72 Classes would be conducted in the Casa do Oeste in 
Ribamar and would be available to thirty students at a time. The parents of 
potential students contributed by participating in the founding meeting of the 
school, which was to start classes in September of 1985. The school was to be 
supported by the Labour Ministry who provided 150,000$00 escudos per year, 
leaving any remainder to be paid by the local associations and student tuition, 
which was set at 3,000$00 escudos (roughly the equivalent of what in 2014 
would be 15 Euros) monthly.73   
 The emergence of formal schooling gave agricultural youth, who were 
presented more and more as active agents in the sector, a more prominent 
position in the discourse as instruments of modernization in the years following 
the revolution. The Alvorada highlighted young farmers’ thoughts in a September 
1985 article. The story led with a complaint that older farmers, "the parents", had 
worked for too long without defining "agricultural politics". Quoting José 
Gutierrez, a national journalist who first reported on this worry amongst young 
farmers, the Alvorada noted that the agricultural politics of elders failed to win 
legislative support for youth and for farmers writ large. In the 1980s, so the 
argument went, legislation was the key to supporting the agricultural "class" and 
the industry. Costa Oliveira’s situation was highlighted as an example of the 
plight of Portugal’s young farmers. From the Lisbon district, Oliveira had, "without 
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credit or aid from government”, built a juice producing business. Instead of 
government subsidies, he had to rely on help from local associations and family 
for labour and support. Making matters worse was the fact that over half of the 
work force available to him was over fifty years of age. Young farmers did not 
want to "enter the game of politics." They simply wanted access to land.74 In this 
way, young farmers became examples of the plight of Portuguese farming in 
general. Indeed, the farming sector had become bogged down by older 
generations. In contrast, youth represented a modernizing and forward-looking 
agenda that would escape the problems created in, and by, the past. 
 This politicization of agriculture – which had been evident under the 
dictatorship, as discussed earlier – continued as Lourinhanense were reminded 
that moving past problems, such as the generational divide between farmers, via 
desenvolvimento was important for the nation. Sr. João Correia – described as a 
local pundit and farmer in Lourinhã – claimed that Portugal, an agricultural 
country, "sadly" needed to import food. He argued in the Alvorada that the 
mechanization of agriculture, "to its highest extent in each case," was needed for 
Portugal to realize its production potential. With this in mind, Correia applauded 
the international tractor fair to be held between March 26 and April 3, 1977 in the 
Palácio das Feiras de Saragoça. As he suggested, "all workers of the land who 
wanted to evolve and meet the demands of their country and humanity, who felt 
responsible for the development of agriculture" should attend the fair and take in 
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its technological expositions.75 
 This discourse around improvement and development suggests a political 
awareness amongst farmers and their leaders as to their responsibility to the 
nation, as well as their sector. In one of many events in Lourinhã throughout the 
1980s, a conference about the "Mercado de Frutos e Horticolas Frescos [the 
fresh fruit and horticultural market] and the ascension of Portugal to the EEC" 
was held on March 7, 1986 in the Casa-Escola Agrícola da Areia Branca. Over 
two hundred farmers attended and discussed "four fundamental pillars of the 
political community for fresh fruit and horticulture." First, the participants were 
taught about the "rigorous norms of quality" that should be observed if producers 
wanted to sell in the EEC. They were reminded that sale of sub-par produce 
would not be allowed in EEC countries. Second, farmers were told that 
"fundamental activity" was carried out by farmers' organizations. In fact, farmers’ 
aid and subsidies would be administered through such organizations. Third, the 
EEC guaranteed prices on certain products to ensure "a reasonable return" to 
farmers. Price guarantees would be anywhere from forty to sixty percent of 
market average, depending on the product. Finally, attendees learned about 
available funds and services designed to protect EEC farmers who sold products 
outside of the common European market.76  
 The sector’s self-awareness was not only motivated by internal desires 
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and encouragement for development, but was also spurred on by perceived 
external threats to agriculture. Even in the late 1970s, with citizens still learning 
to navigate Portugal’s new political mechanisms, locals were not shy about 
encouraging their leaders to defend the local industry from external competitors. 
The Alvorada reported in 1978 that one of the local town councilors, José Bento 
Gonçalves of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), had lobbied the II Governo 
Constitucional on behalf of the fishers of Ribamar. In his correspondence with the 
Presidente da Assembleia de República, [President of the Assembly of the 
Republic] Gonçalves described Ribamar as a port that Peniche's – a fishing and 
fish processing city just to the north of Lourinhã – fishing industry relied upon. 
Thirty fishing boats and five hundred fishers used it as their homeport to catch 
lobsters, fish, and produce artisanal products. It was an excellent natural port that 
needed help to transform it into an industrial fishing port. Gonçalves explained 
that Spanish competition along Portugal's coast had cut into local revenues. As 
such, he asked three questions. First, why had money not been allocated to 
improving facilities along Portugal's coast? Second, what was the government's 
plan to defend Portugal and Ribamar's fishers in the face of such losses? Finally, 
Gonçalves asked if projects existed, or had been considered, that would allow 
fishers in Ribamar to develop and use Porto Dinheiro to supplement their 
facilities?77 
 Of course, however, the external threat to local farmers that loomed 
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largest in the popular imagination was Portugal’s impending entrance into the 
European Common Market (later EEC) after Portugal signed its accession treaty 
in the late 1970s. As early as 1980, for example, locals were turning their 
attention to what the EEC would mean to Lourinhã. The theme for the local 
events marking the Dia do Agricultor Cristão [Day of the Christian Farmer], for 
example, celebrated on April 13, 1980 in Ribamar, Lourinhã, was the "entrance 
of Portugal into the common market." Attended by the regional director for 
agriculture in the Ribatejo and West, Manuel Figueiredo, along with two officials 
from the Gabinete para a Integração Europeia [Office for European Integration], 
the session offered an introduction to the history, principles and objectives and 
functioning of the EEC. This included discussions on the EEC's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), with specific attention to the mechanisms for prices 
and markets. Questions asked by attendees, the Alvorada reported, focused on 
how the EEC and its mechanisms could help farmers and the types of problems 
EEC membership had caused member states. Specific areas of interest included 
aid for retirement, access to the agricultural industry for young workers, and price 
guarantees for applicable products. Officials acknowledged that entrance in the 
EEC would lead to "profound transformations and great sacrifices", but that such 
changes would be good for the development of the farming industry in Portugal.78 
Local farmers also shared with their colleagues what challenges the EEC 
presented and the changes that needed to be made in order to prepare 
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Portuguese farmers. In the minds of farmers like João Perreira da Costa, 
Portugal was an essentially agricultural country. Further, Costa explained that the 
agricultural sector was, "as we all know ... for the most part, antiquated." Most 
farmers were older and thus not concerned with new methods of production, the 
analysis of the land, or in manipulating the land. For example, "ninety percent of 
Portugal's farmers did not know how to correctly apply insecticides." The lack of 
professional agricultural schools, in some pundits' views according to Costa, 
exacerbated the situation. The state was called upon to create these schools: as 
Costa complained, "we have to think quickly on this, [we only have] three years 
before we enter the EEC."79 Portugal's accession into the EEC presented these 
farmers and their industry with a new problem. Costa worried that Portugal's 
relatively small and unorganized agricultural sector would not be able to compete 
with their neighbors in a free market environment. Furthermore, the different 
nature of land ownership in the north, where small landholding farmers were the 
norm, and south, where large quintas were owned by few and worked by many, 
exacerbated the situation and made a Portugal-wide policy solution difficult.80 
Others pointed out that Portuguese farmers faced two "big problems." The first 
was the division of property and the second was how commercial networks were 
organized leaving farmers with no guarantee of work or production. The 
resolution to these problems required official intervention to be sure. However, 
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the Alvorada argued that those directly interested in the outcome of these 
solutions should also be involved. Lourinhã, it was reemphasized, had the ability 
to compete in the agricultural market. In order to compete though, evolution was 
needed. So, what was missing? The Alvorada suggested it was just "one simple 
thing:" everybody focusing their efforts to solve these problems together. This did 
not mean fighting against the EEC, but working to integrate Lourinhã into the 
common market. The EEC should be used, the paper argued, as a “motor to 
kick-start Portugal’s transformation.”81 
 Thus, Lourinhã’s farmers were told that although EEC membership would 
be a great challenge, it would also be a great opportunity. As the Alvorada 
explained, with full membership in the EEC in 1986, Lourinhanense entered a 
“new era” for Portugal.82 The EEC was a European conglomeration of countries 
with economic, social, and political objectives. The EEC was not a finished 
project, but one that was ever changing and which required active participation 
from member states and their citizens. The Alvorada argued that, “the defense of 
a reality based upon the community would also be the defense of the legitimate 
interests of the Portuguese.”83 All understood the “reality of Portugal’s agriculture 
– a backwards sector, in need of modernization.”84  
 The question was how best to prepare to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the EEC. The overwhelming answer in the 1980s was to 
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further organize in a variety of local and regional organizations. Local colloquia, 
for example, told farmers that organization in professional associations and the 
modernization of methods in agriculture, facilitated by organization, was the best 
way to prepare for common market membership.85 This led to events like 1983’s 
December 14-16, Associação Dinamizadora da Regionalização da Agricultura’s 
[Dynamizing Association of the Regionalization of Agriculture] (ADIRA) second 
national meeting about the regionalization of agriculture. At this meeting ADIRA 
was scheduled to release a report prepared over five years by a government 
office in charge of regional agriculture, which was meant to relay the "positive 
experiences, the practical examples and the motivating realizations" of the 
regionalization of agriculture by coordinating crop growth, having certain 
municipalities specialize in certain products, and allowing regional bodies to 
guide investment. The report would offer lessons for the specific conditions of 
each region. This fell in line with the meeting’s goal: to reflect on the work of the 
regional agricultural offices while promoting the augmentation of farmers’ profits 
through the "best use of the factors of production (fertilizers, seeds, water, 
pesticides, agricultural machinery, manual labour, etc.)."86  
The agricultural regions under ADIRA were: Beira Litoral, Beira Interior, 
Ribatejo e Oeste, Alentejo e Algarve, Trás-os-Montes and the Entre-Douro e 
Minho. Lourinhã was in the Ribatejo e Oeste, represented in 1983's national 
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meeting for the regionalization of agriculture by Eng. David Geraides. Each 
region was asked to present three specific areas on which it could focus that 
would help regionalization, and what areas they would need help in. For the 
Ribatejo e Oeste the wine industry, livestock, and grains were targeted as areas 
worthy of development. In the wine industry, it was argued that farmers were not 
paid well enough for quality grapes. In livestock, milk and meat production were 
missing the infrastructure needed to produce cheese, process milk. In addition, 
grazing land in the area was hard to find and maintain. The regional grain 
farmers faced problems with water supply for their fields and drainage. The 
regional emphasis on flower production and the continued division of the land 
through small-land holdings exacerbated these problems.87  
 Highlighting the importance of modernization through regional 
organization in order to defend traditional mores was the Catholic Church’s 
parallel and supportive involvement with developmental initiatives in the 1980s. 
Indeed, the Catholic approach to modernization, in terms of techniques, followed 
very closely the methods outlined above. However, the Catholic approach to 
modernization was done, not in the name of defending economies and economic 
activity, but in defending traditional rural family structures and providing 
charitable services: in maintaining the economic viability of rural life, the 
traditional rural world would be preserved. For example, the annual Assembleia 
Diocesana [Diocesan Assembly] in October 1980 was concerned with organizing 
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Portugal's farmers, both in preparation for entrance into the EEC, and for the 
protection of certain traditional values. Organized by the Acção Católica Rural 
(ACR) dos Adultos do Patriarcado do Lisboa, na Região do Oeste [Catholic Rural 
Action of the Adults in the Patriarchy of Lisbon, in the West Region], the meeting 
included representatives from the Movimentos do Juventude Agrária e Rural 
Católica (JARC) [Agrarian and Rural Catholic Youth Movement], from the Acção 
Católica dos mais Novos (ACN) [Catholic Action of the Younger], from the Liga 
Operária Católica (LOC) [Catholic Working League], and the President of the 
ACR. Sessions ranged in topic from the promotion of women in the agricultural 
sector, to professional training sessions for farmers, information sessions on 
EEC entrance, contemporary problems for families, relations between parents, 
children, and the school, on teaching faith ["educação da fé"], along with 
discussions on things like interfamily relations, aid for the poor, daycares, and aid 
for the elderly. Interestingly, the ACR also discussed voting and its role in 
"building society."88  
The ACR in 1980 identified three "fundamental problems" affecting rural 
people. First, the economic system and its "mechanisms and competition" 
challenged the Portuguese farmer. This led to an individualism that prevented the 
industry from specializing in certain products, something that would help 
maximize the sector's production. Second, the family faced generational conflicts 
as domestic patterns changed and children spent more time in school than they 
                                                
88 "Cristãos no Mundo Rural", Alvorada (December 1980).  
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had in earlier periods. Finally, the ACR suggested that farmers' deep belief in 
Christ led them to act without appropriate care. The ACR suggested, for 
example, that many Christian farmers applied pesticides and herbicides without 
proper protection for themselves or their consumers, endangering their mortal 
lives and thereby inadvertently ignoring the welfare of others.89 This led the ACR 
to develop specific programs. 1981's plan of action for the ACR in the Região 
Oeste focused upon: the promotion and creation of a mentality that followed the 
message of Jesus Christ; helping the family with its inter-generational problems 
by defending marriage, the value of schooling for children, and the importance of 
men and women living together with the elderly members of their families and 
youth; helping farmer's organizations to resolve their "many problems"; promoting 
an Escola Rural; encouraging farmers to think of their place in the world; 
educating farmers about the consequences of entering the EEC; and, 
repetitively, continuing to promote faith in Christ.90  
1984 would see the ACR host a meeting of five hundred delegates to 
discuss "jornadas socias" [social working days]. In addition to the delegates, the 
ACR also welcomed "other individuals" including the Programming Director of 
RTP (the Portuguese public broadcaster) and representatives from Catholic rural 
organizations in France and Spain. The meeting's goal was to reaffirm the 
importance of the evangelical role in the agricultural sector and of faith in rural 
culture. This meant that one was "to reveal and communicate to the rural people 
                                                
89 Ibid.  
90 "revelar a communicar aos rurais Jesus Cristo e o seu Evangelho". Ibid. 
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Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit."91 A series of conclusions about social work 
came from this meeting, highlighting the organization’s realization that the 
reorientation of the rural world after 1974 was threatening the 'traditional' way of 
life in Portugal. First, it acknowledged the "large transformations in the rural world 
in the past ten years (1974-1984)" and reaffirmed its belief that the protagonists 
of the struggles caused by this change were those that contributed to the "total 
desenvolvimento of each rural environment [and] solidarity with all rural people." 
The ACR also noted the transformation that was underway offered certain risks 
to the culture and identity of rural people. This meant that those engaged in 
social work in the rural world needed to "defend the identity of the rural man and 
preserve and promote his cultural value in the rural medium."92 Thus, the ACR 
rejected "urban activities.” Complaining of the "invasion of urban types of 
diversions", the ACR suggested that participants in the brand of social work that 
they advocated needed to teach rural people the activities of their "heritage: 
folklore, traditional games, pilgrimages, and other popular festivals."93   
 The ACR also recognized economic problems. Unemployment, 
underemployment, and low salaries were a key issue in 1984. It was a question 
of "dignity". The right to work was important for more than "winning bread", it also 
helped people "realize" themselves. The ACR's social workers were to combat 
poor employment by acting in "solidarity" with their fellow people by promoting 
                                                
91 "'Jornadas Sociais' da Acção Católica Rural - 'Mundo Rural, anos 80: uma Situação, um 
Desafio, uma resposta", Alvorada (August 1984), p. 1.  
92 Ibid. 
93 "património: folclore, jogos tradicionais, romarias e outras festas populares." See: "Ibid. 
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initiatives that would create work and helping with employment search services. 
The rural world had to operate with a "communal feeling." Part of the solution 
was to be found in reclaiming unused and abandoned farm land, upon which the 
"country depended to eat."94 The ACR also advocated for social security 
measures in light of what it saw as the exploitation of farmers by economic 
sectors that benefitted from cheap agricultural produce and labour. It was the 
State's responsibility to step in, especially before Portugal entered the EEC. This 
could also be solved with state education about EEC mechanisms.95 Finally, the 
ACR called for the proliferation of various rural associations. Association life was 
crucial in order to promote and achieve public participation in civic life and, in 
turn, the preservation of Christian values.96  
 
** 
 
 The agricultural industry and the rural world remained threatened 
throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In each decade, those in charge of the 
discourse dominating Lourinhanense politics, culture and economy called for 
development and modernization. Similarly, in each decade, development was 
based upon increased organization, mechanization, science, education, and 
increased civic engagement amongst farmers.  Despite the economic and 
                                                
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid.  
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political upheavals that Portugal experienced between 1960 and 1990, the goals 
and means of development promoted by the dictatorial Estado Novo and the 
Social Democratic regime that emerged after 1974 were remarkably similar. In 
fact, the modernization undertaken by the leftist democracy that won out in 1976 
should be seen as a continuation and deepening of the Estado Novo’s program 
of the 1960s. As new challenges and larger threats to Lourinhã’s agricultural 
industry emerged, modernization deepened.  
 Some historians, like Edgar Rocha, Alfredo Marques, Halpern Pereira and 
Fernando Rosas, have argued that it is, in fact, increased government 
investment as crises emerged that should be understood as what protected 
agriculture and rural Portugal in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.97 Arguments like 
this ignore the role of local organizations and individuals in preserving agricultural 
ways of life and contributing to their town’s development. Certainly, this chapter 
has outlined a number of ways in which local organizations, starting with the CML 
and the Alvorada, including various local and regional associations, promoted 
and participated in agriculture's modernization to meet the challenges presented 
to local development by national and international changes.  
In the chapters that follow, the continued emphasis on the elements of 
modernization discussed above will reappear in a variety of other contexts in 
Lourinhã’s development. The leading role of the CML and other governmental 
                                                
97 See: Edgar Rocha, "Evolução do Défice Externo Agrícola, Particularmente no Domínio 
Alimentar, e Suas Causas", Análise Social, 15 (1979), 853-54; and, Lains. Os Progressos do 
Atraso, 179. 
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institutions will also continue to be featured. However, what becomes evident is 
that development and desenvolvimento in the various areas was a conversation, 
not a lecture: local citizens worked within the discourse set by government 
officials and town elites to manipulate modernization and affect their landscape. 
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3. Making Lourinhã a Tourist Destination in the 1960s and 70s 
 
On May 28 1966, Portugal celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the 
‘Revolução Nacional’.1 The so-called National Revolution of 1926 ended the ill-
fated Portuguese First Republic (1910-1926) with a military coup. In 1928, just 
two years later, the military administration would bring António Oliveira Salazar to 
government as its technocratic saviour from financial mismanagement.2 The 
celebrations were marked by the inauguration of the Ponte Salazar on August 6, 
when the bridge was described as the "greatest work of engineering executed in 
Portugal."3 Spanning the Rio Tejo, the Ponte Salazar (today the Ponte 25 de 
Abril in honour of the revolution that toppled Salazar’s Estado Novo in 1974) was 
heralded as a triumph of the Portuguese nation and a symbol of the capabilities 
and patriotism of the Estado Novo and its functionaries.4 Its proximity to Belem, 
with the Monument to the Discoveries, the Monastery of St. Jerome (where 
Vasco da Gama and the national poet, Luis Vaz de Camões, are interred), and 
                                                
1 These celebrations existed despite the relative instability that plagued the military dictatorship in 
the years immediately following 1926. The instability stemmed partly from the nature of the coup 
– Marcelo Caetano later said that, “everyone knew what they did not want” – the various factions 
that emerged as power brokers after 1926, and from the tenuous relationship between Salazar, 
the military, and the radical right, particularly before World War Two, but after as well. For 
overview’s of the regime’s and Salazar’s difficult relationship with the army and radical right after 
1926 see: António Costa-Pinto, “The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: the 
National May 28 League (1926-1933), Luso-Brazilian Review, 23:1 (Summer 1986), 1-15; and, 
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, “Salazar, the Portuguese Army, and Great War Commemoration, 
1936-45”, Contemporary European History, 20:4 (2011), 405-418. 
2 As I write this in late 2011, democratic governments in Italy and Greece have appointed 
financial technocrats as Prime Ministers to reign in contemporary financial crises.  
3 "maior obra de engenharia executada em Portugal”. See: "Comemoração de Duas Datas", 
Boletim de Informações (August 7, 1966), Plano Comemorativo para 1966, Proc. O-12/3 (1966), 
Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.  
4 "Efectivamente Inaugurada a Ponte Salazar Sobre o Tejo ao Serviço da Nação", Alvorada 
(August 28, 1966) p. 1. 
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the medieval defensive Tower of Belem, further cemented the Ponte Salazar’s 
importance as a national symbol.5 
 Infrastructure projects like the Ponte Salazar would become the lasting 
legacy of the commemorations of the fortieth anniversary of the National 
Revolution of May 28, 1926. Lourinhã would use the occasion to embark on its 
own program of urbanization that would, as discussed in the introduction, define 
the next four decades of the town’s development.6 In the short term, Lourinhã’s 
program in honour of the fortieth anniversary of May 1926 saw "various 
improvements [that were] of public interest."7 The inauguration of the new postal 
building and the opening of the Parque de Campismo in PAB were the highlights 
of the town’s many projects and represented the initial steps in building its 
                                                
5 Ellen Sapega describes the Lisbon neighborhood as “a prime example of a site of national 
memory (a lieu de mémoire) in which, or onto which, successive generations have sought to 
inscribe symbolic reminders 
of collective experience, Belém presently constitutes an urban area where successive versions of 
official, state-sanctioned memories of Portugal’s imperial project have been conflated with 
material remains.” See: Ellen W. Sapega, “Remembering Empire/Forgetting the Colonies: 
Accretions of Memory and the Limits of Commemoration in a Lisbon Neighborhood,” History & 
Memory, 20:2 (Fall/Winter 2008), 19. 
6 "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional", 
Governo Civil do Distrito de Lisboa: Comemorações do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional de 
28 de Maio: Proc. D-13/3 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de 
Correspondência, 1966. The Pousadas were established in the 1950s by the Portuguese 
dictatorship in order to promote Portuguese tourism to foreignors while promoting the richness of 
Portuguese history and its rural culture. In this sense, they resembled the paradores y albergues 
nacionales established in the 1920s by the Primo de Riviera dictatorship in Spain. See: 
"Instalação de uma Rede de Pousadas", 1953, Arquivo Salazar, PC-8E1 cx. 562, pt. 107 
(Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisboa, PT); "Plano das Pousadas", 1954, Arquivo Salazar, 
PC-8E1 cx. 562, pt. 112 and PC-8E1 cx. 562, pt. 115 (Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisboa, 
PT); Daniel Melo, Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58). (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2001), 250-258; 
Raphael Costa, “The “Great Façade of Nationality”: Some Considerations on the Multiple 
Meanings of Estado Novo Portugal in Travel Literature”, The Journal of Tourism History, 5:1 
(Spring 2013), 58-60; and, M.T. Newton, “Tourism and Public Administration in Spain”, in M. 
Barke, J. Towner, and M.T. Newton eds., Tourism in Spain: Critical Issues (Wallingford, UK: CAB 
International, 1996), 138-140. 
7 "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Comemoração do 40 Aniversário da Revolução Nacional". 
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contemporary landscape. As such, the post office and Parque de Campismo can 
be understood as parts of a project of national and state renovation underway in 
a 1960s Portugal whose government’s legitimacy was questioned by the colonial 
wars in Africa and whose role was being reassessed as part of a general 
renegotiation of the social contract in post-war Western Europe. The 
commemorations linked advances not only to the regime’s founding moment, but 
also served as a reminder of revolution and a new start. The post office and the 
Parque de Campismo were the local manifestations of an attempt to rebuild and 
reshape the Portuguese state and nation in a time of crisis.  
Figure 5: Lourinhã's post office, which opened in 1966, continues to serve Lourinhanense 
today. "Novo CTT", Alvorada (November 13, 1966) p. 1. 
 
 The post office should be understood as a tool for both communication 
and the proliferation of bureaucracy.8 Lourinhã’s post office would house two 
                                                
8 Benedict Anderson, in his seminal Imagined Communities, identifies communication via print-
capitalism and the development of a unilingual bureaucracy, which spoke languages closer to 
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supervisors and ten postmen to improve distribution to the rural freguesias 
[parishes] of Lourinhã while overseeing mail, telephone, and telegraph services, 
thirty-seven local in-house mailboxes, and three service kiosks to sell stamps 
and serve the public.9 The new facility would expand the phone network past the 
existing two hundred and seventeen subscribers and nine phone booths, making 
it possible to service six hundred new subscribers.10 These improvements, 
according to the head of the Portuguese postal service, Sr. Eng. Duarte 
Calheiros, were made possible by the civil administration: Lourinhã's 
government, police, military, and church officials. The press, radio, and television 
services – the "organs of public information" – were also acknowledged. Mainly, 
though, the new post office was meant to be understood as part of the 
development of the Portugal’s Serviços dos CTT, particularly with respect to their 
telephone service network.11 
However, given that Lourinhã’s new post office was a national government 
initiative,12 it was the Parque de Campismo and the tourist industry that served 
as a key motivator for the local administration in the modernization of Lourinhã’s 
landscape, institutions, and political culture in the 1960s and early 1970s. Not 
                                                                                                                                            
local dialects than was Latin, as related and foundational aspects in the creation of “imagined 
communities” like the nation. See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (New York, NY: Verso, 1992), ch. 2-3. 
9 "Inauguração do Novo Edifício dos C.T.T na Lourinhã", Alvorada (November 13, 1966) pp. 1, 6. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The new post office had been proposed by the Engenheiro-Director for the Serviços dos 
Correios, Telégrafes e Telefones in 1961. Under the terms of article 10.4 of the Regulamento 
Geral das Edifícios Urbanos, national offices had the right to ask concelhos like Lourinhã to 
consider the installation of facilities in their towns. See: “Reunião 11/10/61: Anteprojecto do 
edifício dos correios, telégrafos e telefones da Lourinhã", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã, No. 23. (1961-1963), p. 41.  
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only was tourism important in building the Portuguese state in economic terms – 
it is no surprise that a country whose service sector grew from contributing 45.6% 
of its GDP in 1966 to contributing 74.7% of its GDP in 201013 would have started 
building with a tourism related facility—but the Parque de Campismo and tourism 
also became sites of cultural and political development in the decade following 
the Parque’s opening.  
 
Figure 6: The Entrance to Praia da Areia Branca's campground upon opening in 1966. A 
Voz (July 11, 1966). Clipping in: Parque de Campismo - Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. A-
12/19 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 
1966. 
                                                
13 See: Instituto Naçional Estatísticas, Estatísticas Para o Planeamento: Continente e Ilhas 
Adjacentes: 1960-1970 (Lisboa, PT: Instituto Naçional Estatísticas, 1972), p. 15, 
http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/search.do (accessed April 20, 2012); and, CIA Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/po.html (accessed January 20, 
2012).  
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When the campground was opened in 1966, Lourinhã’s mayor, João 
Ferreira da Costa, described his town as a rural concelho of the "2a. ordem" with 
a monthly market held on the first Monday of every month and annual fairs held 
in the various freguesias [parishes] over the summer. Lourinhã's economic 
activity was, he said, primarily agricultural. Ferreira da Costa noted that Lourinhã 
had no large industry, only two small ceramic makers and two small mechanic 
shops.14 By 1970, the town had added to its economic portfolio by reorganizing 
its Junta de Turismo: becoming one of thirty-seven Juntas in Portugal in 1970. 
Following some administrative turmoil surrounding the leadership of the Junta 
between 1968 and 1970, the Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã (CML) appointed a 
permanent president, Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. The appointment and 
reorganization included the increased formalization of the Junta’s structure and 
procedures. Along with the opening of the Parque de Campismo, this 
restructuring represents the single most obvious effort made by the CML in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s at formalizing its structures and organizing the 
landscape. 
 The formalization of governmental structures and the organization of 
space—in the name of tourism in this case—are widely accepted parts of the 
                                                
14 João Ferreira da Costa, Presidente da C.M. da Lourinhã to Chefe dos Serviços Culturais dos 
Correios, Telégrafos e Telefones (May 9, 1966), Administrcção-Geral dos C.T.T: Edifício dos 
C.T.T da Lourinhã - Inauguração, Proc. R-12/1 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de 
Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.  
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modernization of any society.15 The questions in this case become: why was 
tourism the chosen vehicle of modernization and what forms did modernization 
and development take? Tourism was one area that the Estado Novo recognized 
as not only a source of economic benefit, but of cultural benefit as well. The 
development of tourism in 1960s Lourinhã created an institutional culture that 
valued the development, protection and commercialization of an idyllic 
destination, characterized by a natural and rural setting that was serviced and 
made accessible by modern infrastructure amenities that the town lacked before 
the development of the region’s tourism. 
This chapter will first discuss the expansion of Lourinhã’s tourist industry: 
the reorganization of its Junta do Turismo in 1970 and its being put under direct 
control of the CML in 1973, as well as the development of local tourist sites and 
infrastructure. These efforts reveal both the infrastructure and ideological 
priorities of the local governing institutions in the modernization of Lourinhã. 
Second, it will explore the ways in which locals were invited to participate in 
                                                
15 For how increased government systems reflect modernization, see: C.E. Black, The Dynamics 
of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966), 13-16; 
Michael David-Fox, “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian 
and Soviet History”, Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 54 (2006) pp. 536; Samuel P. 
Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe", World Politics, 18:3 (April, 1966), 378-
414; Bernard E. Brown, "The French Experience of Modernization", World Politics, 21:3 (April, 
1969), 366-391; and, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), particularly 
section one entitled "State Projects of Legibility and Simplification", 11-83. For discussions of 
modernity and space, see: R.O. Whyte, The Spatial Geography of Rural Economies. (Delhi, India: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 12; Paola Lanaro, “Economic Space and Urban Policies: Fairs 
and Markets in the Italy of the Early Modern Age”, Journal of Urban History 30:1 (November 
2003), 37-49; Brian, Owensby, “Domesticating Modernity: Markets, Home, and Morality in the 
Middle Class in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 1930s and 1940s”, Journal of Urban History 24:3 
(March 1998) pp. 337-363; and, Eric Swyngedouw, "'Not a Drop of Water': State, Modernity, and 
the Production of Nature in Spain, 1898-2010", Environment & History, 20:1 (Feb., 2014), 67-92. 
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advancing tourism and the ways in which government officials promoted, 
controlled and conditioned this participation. Although this involved local 
authorities accepting some public criticism as Portugal’s dictatorship transitioned 
from Salazar’s Estado Novo to Marcelo Caetano’s Estado Social in its final 
years,16 the only acceptable relationship between state and citizen remained 
paternal in nature. In the end, what can be said is that although the relationship 
between state and subject proved to leave some room for popular expression, it 
was the institutions of the local government that ultimately mattered in how 
Lourinhã developed. 
 
** 
 
 Given the importance of institutions in building Lourinhã, it is crucial to 
understand some of the priorities and guiding principles of the actions that 
contributed to the town’s modern landscape. By the time Lourinhã turned to 
tourism in a significant way in the 1960s, Portugal’s national government had 
                                                
16 Pedro Ramos Pinto reminds us that Caetano attempted a “wider policy shift … to rebrand the 
regime as an ‘Estado Social’ (social state), giving public welfare provision a central role in the 
legitimating discourse of the dictatorship.” Ramos Pinto argues that these policies must be 
understood as part of the attempt to find new sources of legitimacy as social expectations 
changed after WWII and as the colonial question threatened the government after 1961. For 
Caetano, calls for democracy were misguided. What was needed instead was a measure of 
social security. Only with “prices that match salaries, decent houses, accessible education, 
efficient social insurance, good medical assistance and guaranteed pensions in old age and 
incapacity” would the people be satisfied. What actually occurred, however, was a renegotiation 
of the social contract in which the state took on new social responsibilities. Ramos Pinto argues 
suggests that the regime fell in 1974 because it over promised, and under delivered on its social 
promises – a fact that became obvious through open discontent in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. See Pedro Ramos Pinto, “Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth 
Century Portugal”, Contemporary European History, 18:2 (2009), 204-207. 
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been shaping the industry for decades.17 Lourinhã drew ideological inspiration, 
supplemented by financial and technical support for projects, from national 
institutions. After outlining the national government’s tourism policies, the 
discussion will turn to Lourinhã’s administration and its efforts, including the 
reorganization of its Junta do Turismo in 1970. 
In the 1930s, tourism in Portugal depended on the Ministério do Interior. In 
1940, the Sectretario Nacional de Informação (SNI) took responsibility for tourism 
and Portugal began to organize and develop tourism to compete with the rest of 
Europe.18 By the 1960s, the SNI had made tourism an increasingly important and 
transformative sector of the Portuguese economy. As the Portuguese 
government sought to find substitutes for its stagnant agricultural sector— 
from 23.2% of Portugal’s GDP in 1961, agriculture, forestry, and fishing had 
fallen to only 12.2% in 1973—19 tourism emerged as an important source of 
income.20 As Diamantino Machado has demonstrated, tourism became a key 
contributor of foreign currency and was second only to emigrant remittances as a 
                                                
17 See: Jim Lewis and Allan M. Williams, “Portugal: Market Segmentation and Regional 
Specialization”, in A.M. Williams and G. Shaw eds., Tourism and Economic Development: 
Western European Experiences. (London, UK: Belhaven, 1988); Turismo: Separata do Anuário 
Comercial de Portugal, 1932, 1st ed. (Lisbon, Portugal: Conselho Nacional de Turismo, 1932); 
and, H. de Carvalho Curado, “Cultural Tourism in Portugal”, in Greg Richards ed., Cultural 
Tourism in Europe. (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 250. 
18 O Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do 
Concelho da Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", Alvorada (December 27, 1970) p. 8. The State 
did not create a body responsible for tourism until 1911 when it opened the Repartição de 
Turismo [Department of Tourism] under the Ministério do Fomento [Ministry of Development]. H. 
de Carvalho Curado, “Cultural Tourism in Portugal”, in Greg Richards ed., Cultural Tourism in 
Europe. (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996), 250. 
19 See: Diamantino P Machado, The Structure of Portuguese Society: the Failure of Fascism. 
(New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), 21. 
20 By the mid 1930s, in fact, the Portuguese Central Bank was describing tourism as “the great 
new source of income to our economy.” See: Carvalho Curado, “Cultural Tourism in Portugal”, 
250. 
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source of “invisible income” in Portugal’s balance of payments in the late 1960s. 
In 1967, for example, Portugal carried a trade surplus of 9,564,000$00 escudos, 
yet by 1970 the country was carrying a trade deficit of 10,743,000$00 escudos. 
Throughout those years, tourism contributed a surplus of between 5,376,000$00 
escudos and 2,659,000$00 escudos.21 The increase in tourism’s relative 
performance reflected a shift that scholars Jim Lewis and Allan Williams have 
identified in Portugal’s tourism industry as it moved from relying upon domestic 
clientele and spa based travel before 1950 to one focused on taking advantage 
of increasing foreign tourist dollars and beach visits in an increasingly 
commercial 1960s Western Europe.22  
Beyond tourism’s importance economically, the Estado Novo recognized 
the sector’s propagandistic potential as well. Tourism became a privileged site for 
António Ferro (the head of the SPN and Salazar’s propaganda chief), who 
argued in the 1930s that the sector would become the "great façade of 
nationality." Tourism was not only considered "indispensible to our renovation," 
but it would also "lose its character as a small and frivolous industry in order to 
play an important role in directing and decorating our nation."23 This meant, as 
historians like Daniel Melo have noted, that tourism was part of an "omnipresent 
campaign for the 'reaportuguesamento de Portugal', inspired by the integral 
                                                
21 Machado, The Structure of Portuguese Society, 30-31. 
22 Lewis and Williams, “Portugal: Market Segmentation and Regional Specialization”, 121. 
23 “grande fachada da nacionalidade”; “perde assim o seu carácter de pequena e frívola indústria 
para desempenhar o altissimo papel de encenador e decorador da própria Nação.” António 
Ferro, quoted from Daniel Melo, Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-1958), (Lisboa, Portugal: 
ICS, 2001), 250-251. For a representative example of Ferro's work, see: António Ferro, Salazar: 
Portugal and Her Leader. (London, Great Britain: Faber & Faber, 1939). 
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ideas of a mythical ruralism … and a longing for Portugal's peasant origins." This 
led to the establishment of national standards in hotels—opening a number of the 
aforementioned state-owned Pousadas—manipulating folk culture and art, and 
holding and participating in both national and international fairs.24  
 Reflecting the dominant propagandistic motifs in Estado Novo literature, 
the establishment of standards and practices vis-à-vis tourism focused on the 
promotion of Portugal as a rural, sun-soaked and unspoiled destination whose 
beaches rivaled the best on the world.25 However, this focus should not be 
thought of as merely a cultural or political choice. Portugal’s government had 
institutionalized its tourist industry later than most of its wealthier European 
neighbors.26 Accordingly, given its increasing poverty relative to the rest of 
Europe, Portugal could not offer the same sorts of attractions that its European 
competitors could. As H. de Carvalho Curado explains, the Portuguese state 
knew that the rural nature of the country and its relative lack of “high culture 
resources” would mean a different approach to marketing tourism than Paris, 
London, etc. used. By the 1930s, Portugal’s propaganda office was developing “a 
touristic promotion of Portugal based on popular features, instead of traditional 
cosmopolitan, learned activities with which the country was not at ease.”27 
                                                
24 Melo, 250-258. 
25 See: Raphael Costa, “The “Great Façade of Nationality”: Some Considerations on the Multiple 
Meanings of Estado Novo Portugal in Travel Literature”, The Journal of Tourism History, 5:1 
(Spring 2013), 50-72. 
26 The State did not create a body responsible for tourism until 1911 when it opened the 
Repartição de Turismo [Department of Tourism] under the Ministério do Fomento [Ministry of 
Development]. Carvalho Curado, “Cultural Tourism in Portugal”, 250. 
27 Ibid. 
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Subsequently, propaganda officials developed a strategy that helped to 
emphasize Portugal’s rural nature, highlighting:  
the typical characteristics of our [Portugal’s] villages as an alternative to 
the international magnificence of great artistic centers; the gaudy colours 
of our craftsmanship were emphasized, instead of the excellent foreign 
museums; the colour of our folklore, instead of great cosmopolitan 
amusement; the generous simplicity of our hospitality, as alternative to the 
worldly mannerism of great social life; the simple, savory regional cooking, 
instead of the cuisine of famous centers.28 
 
 The regime developed a number of initiatives in order to exploit Portugal’s 
tourism resources. The tourism secretariat's 1970 plan of action, for example, 
established so-called "brigadas itinerantes" that were meant to visit local 
authorities and agencies involved in tourism and help them to improve services. 
Tourist officials would learn that to receive tourists, they "should possess, along 
with the delicacy and kindness of a civilized person," a basic knowledge of 
languages, complete knowledge of the region they work in, and the capacity to 
put tourists in contact with people in all the related industries in their area. As had 
been done in Porto, where the brigadas began their work, local authorities were 
to establish programs for the art and history of the region: art and religion; an 
inventory of monuments and artistic structures; and the information needed to 
complete the professionalization of the officials in the region.29 Second, the 
industry was to be professionalized and taught at tourism schools in Lisbon, 
Faro, Funchal and Porto. These schools would prepare tour-guides to present 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 "deve possuir, além da delicadeza e da amabilidade próprias duma pessoa civilizada". 
"Turismo", Alvorada (March 8, 1970) pp. 1, 5. 
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artistic and historic sites and help the visitor see the land as connected to its 
people, its monuments, and "the glories of the People [o Povo]." Through such 
initiatives, the visitor would see and learn about Portugal’s greatness.30 
 The involvement of the national government in tourism deepened in the 
latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s with new development plans that 
earmarked funds for the industry and continued to value certain types of touristic 
activities. The III Plano de Fomento (1968-1973) earmarked funds for the 
conservation of tourist-related sites, both natural and manmade: 42,000 contos to 
conserve and make beaches and rock cliffs on the coast more accessible; 
42,000 contos to stabilize rivers in tourist zones; 30,000 contos for the 
conservation and restoration of national buildings and monuments; 9,000 contos 
to pave roads that cut through forests; and 3,000 contos to develop and protect 
hunting species. These "enormous expenses" were needed for "national tourism 
... a strategic sector in our [Portugal's] economic growth."31  
 Certain national priorities were evident in the promotion of tourism across 
the various programs designed to shape the industry. These priorities were clear 
in a 1966 survey sent from the national tourist office to municipalities. As part of 
the "restructuring of Tourism" undertaken by the Comissariado do Turismo, Praia 
da Areia Branca's (PAB) Junta de Turismo [Tourism Office] was forwarded a 
questionnaire as part of a national study on how to improve tourism in the region 
                                                
30 "Turismo e Equipamento Turistico", Alvorada (March 22, 1970) pp. 1, 5. 
31 "turismo nacional ... um sector estratégico do nosso crescimento económico." See: O 
Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da 
Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", Alvorada (December 27, 1970) p. 8. 
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north of Lisbon. The cover letter explained that the Comissariado wanted 
information on historic and natural sites, as well as any folklore or artisanal 
information about the area.32 Earlier that year, the CML had received a separate 
questionnaire from the Comissariado do Turismo. The document was broken into 
sections asking Lourinhã to describe: its markets and festivals; its monuments 
(which included “churches, chapels, monasteries, castles, medieval fortifications, 
Roman bridges, etc.”); its museums; any artisanal producers that might exist; 
regional pastries and dishes; local folklore; local sports that might have interest 
for tourists; any local theater, cinema, or casinos; the state of the local Parque de 
Campismo (if it existed— Lourinhã’s opened a few months after receiving the 
questionnaire); any picturesque sites or vistas; any thermal baths that might be 
available to visitors; if the Concelho had an airfield or landing strip; and any 
lakes, swimming pools, oceanic or river beaches.33 These foci fit into Portugal’s 
concern for the protection, promotion and organization of traditional images and 
its recognition that it had to sell its less developed assets.  
                                                
32 Presidente da C.M. da Lourinhã to Presidente da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca 
(May 7, 1966), Comissariado do Turismo: Valorização Regional e Retenção do Turismo no 
Nosso País, Proc. X-4/4 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de 
Correspondência, 1966.  
33 Comissariado do Turismo: Repartição de Fomento to Presidente da C.M. da Lourinhã (January 
18, 1966), Comissariado do Turismo: Organização de um Ficheiro Turístico - Valorização do 
Património Regional, Proc. X-4/1 (1966). Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de 
Correspondência, 1966.  
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Figure 7: Newspaper Clipping. Praia da Areia Branca, Lourinhã looking to the north in 
1966. In view is the youth hostel that continues in operation today. The caption reads, 
"Praia da Areia Branca gives optimal conditions to attract national and foreign tourists." 
"Iniciada a Concertização de um Grande Plano Turístico na Praia da Areia Branca," Diario 
da Manha (July 11, 1966). Clipping in: Parque de Campismo - Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. 
A-12/19 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 
1966. 
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Figure	  8:	  Praia	  da	  Areia	  Branca,	  c.	  2014.	  The	  hamlet	  is	  at	  the	  north	  edge	  of	  the	  Concelho	  of	  
Lourinhã	  and	  is	  in	  the	  Freguesia	  of	  Lourinhã.	  
 
 Although the Estado Novo contributed to creating a local environment that 
reflected its propagandistic motifs, it was largely up to local governments to drive 
the modernization of the landscape. Nevertheless, this development was inspired 
by the same cultural priorities that lay behind the national government’s efforts. 
Indeed, both the local and national governments recognized the politico-cultural 
importance of urban development. 
In terms of local development, the CML was the main actor, touristic or 
otherwise, and following the opening of the Parque de Campismo, development 
reflected an increasing concern for building an urban environment to complement 
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the rural cultural priorities that dominated the discourse. Indeed, the CML's 
formal activity plans reflected a deep concern for urban improvement. At the 
beginning of the period, beyond noting schools, Lourinhã's activity plan for 1966 
also listed such priorities as a new town hall, the completion of the Parque de 
Campismo in PAB, the widening of the access road to PAB, an increase in the 
town's treasury, the improvement of the town's electrical net, the maintenance of 
heritage buildings, and the acquisition of land for a new monthly outdoor market 
ground and Civic and Commercial Center.34 Such projects had political value, 
and local opinions reflected it. A 1969 project to build a road from the town center 
to Abelheira was, according to the local newspaper, “well deserved”, especially 
given that fact that, "we [Lourinhanense] deserve the advantageous opportunity 
of a political union between us [those around the Concelho]. Roads would lead to 
this union."35 In another example, between 1970 and 1973, the CML approved 
the building of three "urban complexes" with residential and commercial units. 
The first was a complex in the north end of PAB and the second was planned for 
the Quinta de Santa Catarina. The third was a study in the possible urban 
development of the Quinta da Maria Gil in Lourinhã. Together they would help to 
"bear fruit for a better future for Lourinhã."36 
 Precisely because of the political and social ramifications of development, 
                                                
34 "Plano de Actividade da Câmara Municipal para o Ano de 1966", Alvorada (November 7, 1965) 
pp. 1, 3.  
35 "parece-nos oportuna como vantajosa uma política de união entre nós. As estradas estão no 
limiar dessa união." See: "A Abelheira, Zona de Turismo [II]", Alvorada (May 11, 1969), pp. 1, 3.  
36 "produzir frutos para um melhor futuro da Lourinhã." See: "XXVII Serviço de Imprensa da Junta 
de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: Informação Sobre o Turismo Local 
(II): Movimento da Construção no Concelho da Lourinhã," Alvorada (March 26, 1973) pp. 8, 4.  
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the CML was motivated to undertake certain types of projects and to control the 
foci of those projects. In the early 1960s, tourism and the tourist season were 
proving to be a massive motivation for development. As the 1963 tourist season 
approached, when swimming at the beach was possible, the CML scrambled to 
install fifty meters to read domestic water consumption.37 Similarly, the sewage 
system at PAB proved to be a worry near the end of the 1966 season. An August 
1966 letter sent to Lourinhã's mayor by the Subdelegação de Saúde do 
Concelho da Lourinhã warned that a "dangerous situation" existed for the public 
health of residents in PAB. The letter, which was sent in duplicate to all affected 
residents at the beach, explained that polluted water was seeping into the ground 
and contaminating the area between the campground and the Pensão Santo 
António – the small hostel at the center of tourist infrastructure at PAB. The 
“inadequate capacity” of the ditches along the walls on the main road running 
parallel to the coast, given the influx of tourists in the summer months, exposed 
the system’s faults. The Subdelegação explained that the existing ditches had 
been built before there was running water when there were many fewer 
residents. Residents had been warned of this danger and asked to clean the 
ditches along their property. Still, the only permanent solution to the problem was 
to expand the sewage system.38 
                                                
37 “Reunião 22/Maio/63: Fornecimento de cinquenta contadores volumétricos de àgua para redes 
domiciliárias", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 14 
38 Subdelegação de Saúde do Concelho da Lourinhã to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã (August 2, 1966), Direcção dos Serviços de Melhoramentos Urbanos: Obras no Edifício 
a VIGIA na Praia da Areia Branca, Proc. O-12/28 (1966), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de 
Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966.  
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 The concern with the tourist season, and how the landscape should be 
shaped for it, continued into the 1970s. In 1970, the CML discussed the expense 
of the excess use of electrical energy for public lighting in PAB and decided that, 
outside of the tourist season, the expense was not justified. As a result, the 
number of public lights was reduced between the fifteenth of October and the 
thirtieth of May every year.39 This is not to say, however, that the 1970s were a 
time of infrastructure subtraction. For example, in 1971 the CML demonstrated its 
proclaimed “great interest” in the "desenvolvimento" of PAB, by approving  the 
development of a project to spread the public bus lines to PAB.40 In search of 
allies in its efforts to improve the landscape, the CML proved interested in public 
feedback concerning how the environment could be changed. So, when the 
director of the Parque de Campismo was asked to summarize the complaints 
about the Parque in 1973, he reported that: visitors asked for more parking 
space; that the entrance to the Parque needed to be painted or white-washed 
along with the bathrooms and other facilities; sand needed to be placed in the 
parking spots and replaced after each rainfall; the pungent water from the nearby 
river needed to be cleaned or the Parque needed to be shielded from the smell; 
signs needed to be placed on main roads pointing to the campground; sewers 
needed maintenance; more public lights and electrical outlets needed to be 
added; and a receptionist and guards needed to be hired so that the Parque was 
                                                
39 "Reunião 26/Out./70: Iluminação Publíca na Praia da Areia Branca," Livro de Actas da Câmara 
Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 29 (1969-1971), p. 115.  
40 “Reunião 8/Out./ 71: Acesso a Zona Rodoviaria da Praia da Areia Branca," Livro de Actas da 
Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, No. 30 (1971-1973), p. 31. 
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staffed twenty-four hours a day.41  
Before public complaints and suggestions could be addressed by the 
CML, it was important to open access routes and infrastructure for development. 
Generally speaking, when it came to infrastructure and tourism, Lourinhã’s 
situation was seen to mirror the national situation. As the anonymous Pascoais 
explained in 1961, “by the grace of God” Portugal had been blessed by its 
“geography, its natural beauty, its history, its climate, and its hospitable and 
happy people [so that], in tourism, it would find a great source of income.”42 
Before Portugal and Lourinhã could take advantage of the “great source of 
income”, however, two “troubling problems” had to be solved. First, there was a 
shortage of accommodations and second roads were in poor repair and far too 
scarce. As Pascoais explained, “we need roads that are not discouraging,” wide 
roads, "happy, flowered, and fresh." The roadways needed to cover the country 
allowing the tourist to visit many places, where they could meet “simpler people.” 
As for accommodations, more hotels and hostels needed to be built while 
ensuring that the ones that endured met minimum standards like well-functioning 
bathrooms and tinted windows in rooms to reduce the heat in guest rooms.43 
When considering what to develop for its tourist industry in the 1960s, the 
CML decided that urbanization and infrastructure development were important if 
                                                
41 O Director do Parque de campismo to Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, (April 14, 
1973), Parque de Campismo - Funcionamento de Parque - Sugestões e Reclamações, Proc 21-
B/2 (1973), Câmara Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1973. 
42 Pascoais, "Turismo", Alvorada, ano 1, no. 12 May 5, 1961) pp. 5-6. 
43 “alegres, floridas, cobertas de perfume e de frescura”; "povos mais simples". See: Pascoais, 
"Turismo", Alvorada, ano 1, no. 12 May 5, 1961) pp. 5-6. 
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it were to take advantage of tourism income. This meant that electrical 
infrastructure, roads, waterworks, hotels, and other urbanization projects had to 
be started. In 1966, the Alvorada published an editorial defining Lourinhã’s 
touristic environment. In describing PAB as an ideal tourist destination, the paper 
argued that the beach had a “splendid” camping site and baths with "all the 
commodities", developed under the mayoralty of Sr. João Ferreira da Costa and 
the Câmara Municipal. PAB also had “beautiful dwellings” in the "modern style, [it 
had] running water, good wine stored at the Adega Cooperativa, cafés, 
restaurants, fluorescent lighting, a playground, and various daily bus routes 
between the center of Lourinhã and the beaches."44  
Despite such triumphant declarations, local commentators continued to 
call for basic improvements. In a 1968 article, the aforementioned Luis Fragata 
argued that "Lourinhã needed much more." Some places had a great present, 
while others, with just a short paved road, could have a great future. As Fragata 
pontificated:  
it would be an agreeable weekend, when one could visit Lourinhã and [all] 
its rich ocean coast ... not counting Ariea Branca which is already a 
princess, nor the already famous Porto-das-Barcas and its lobster and 
caldeiradas [fish stews], but counting, still, the future that Paimogo and 
Porto Dinheiro in Ribamar, could have with an easily created and short 
road to Maceira—and the springs in Vimeiro—already internationally 
known and frequented by nationals and foreigners.45 
                                                
44 "estilo moderno, boa água canalizada, belo vinho puro da região fornecido em garrafões pela 
Adega Cooperativa, cafés, restaurante, luz florescente, parque de jogos, a varias carreiras 
diárias de autocarros, entre Lourinhã e as praias." See: "As Praias da Lourinhã", Alvorada (June 
26, 1966) p. 1.  
45 será um fim de semana agradável, ai poderá encontrar a Lourinhã e toda a sua costa de mar 
riquíssima, se a soubermos aproveitar, não contando com a Areia Branca que já está sendo 
princesa, nem o já famoso Porto-das-Barcos das lagostas e caldeiradas, mas contando sim, 
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 More accommodation and sites also needed to be operational. In the 
spring before the Parque de Campismo was opened in 1966 Lourinhã reported to 
the Instituto Nacional Estatistica (INE) that, including the Parque, twelve tourist 
establishments would operate in the Concelho that year. Of these twelve, seven 
were restaurants (one in Lourinhã proper, one in Vimeiro and the rest in PAB), 
one was the Parque de Campismo, three were pensões (two in Lourinhã, one in 
PAB), and one was a restaurante/pensão in PAB.46 However, in the eyes of local 
critics, these facilities were not enough. In the Alvorada’s 1965 Christmas issue, 
always published with an eye to reviewing the year that was about to end, local 
pundit Moura Guedes wondered about how to develop Lourinhã’s tourism. 
Central to his argument were what he called urban improvements. He argued for 
developing Lourinhã's central square, for example, by adding a restaurant and a 
snack bar near the bandstand. He also called for a road connecting the beach at 
Paimogo to Ribamar. Yet PAB was Moura Guedes' focus. He suggested an 
Esplanade with tables, a hotel and restaurants, and a swimming pool, which 
would not be far from a nautical sports and recreation center near Paimogo. The 
installation of baths would, along with the hotels mentioned, help to bring tourists 
                                                                                                                                            
ainda, com o futuro que poderá ter Paimogo e Porto-Pinheiro, este em Ribamar, o que fàcilmente 
poderia ser ligado por uma curta estrada à Maceira - termas do Vimeiro - já internacionalmente 
conhecida e largamento frequentada por nacionais e estrangeiros. See: Luis M. Fragata, "Para 
Rever: Mas a Lourinhã Necessita Muito Mais", Alvorada (November 24, 1968) pp. 1, 5. 
46 "March 31, 1966 – Turismo: Estabelecimentos Hoteleiros e Similares", Instituto Nacional de 
Estatistica: Turismo. Establecimentos Hoteleiros e Similares: Proc. U-4/1 (1966), Câmara 
Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã: Arquivo de Correspondência, 1966. 
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in the winter as well as the swimming season.47 Five years later, similar 
discussions continued. The Junta de Turismo claimed that Lourinhã had 
welcomed something like "three million visitors in the decade before November, 
1970." This success had been achieved, the Junta further boasted, without hotels 
and other facilities. It was only then, in 1970, that Lourinhã had a private hotel at 
PAB ("o Luanda") and was beginning to improve its bathing facilities—the Junta 
noted that as many as three swimming pools could be completed by 1971-72 
(something that has not happened, even to this day).48  
 However, success, or lack thereof, was not only attributable to local 
officials. An article in 1970 describing the Serviços Centrais de Turismo’s plan for 
that year grumbled that slow development in tourism was a result of a lack of 
infrastructure beyond the CML’s control. As the author explained, despite “certain 
success” in the “many initiatives to organize the bases of tourism”, the plan did 
not address basic infrastructure needs.49 In the Algarve, for example, where the 
“sea, weather, hotels, and people” were “so splendid”, sanitation issues remained 
too prevalent. Although the Ministry of Public Works had taken steps to remedy 
these issues, it remained for the national government to solve similar problems 
across the country. The discussion concluded by saying that although local and 
national tourist officials had to do their part in terms of “touristic equipment and 
professional training”, it was ultimately up to the national public works officials to 
                                                
47 Dr. Afonso de Moura Guedes, "Enquanto Vemos Passar os Turistas", Alvorada (December 25, 
1965) pp. 9, 12. 
48 O Presidente de Junta de Turismo Carlos Luís Ferreira da Silva. "Junta de Turismo do 
Concelho da Lourinhã: XII Serviço de Imprensa", Alvorada (December 27, 1970) p. 8. 
49 "Turismo e Equipamento Turistico", Alvorada (March 22, 1970) pp. 1, 5. 
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lay basic infrastructure.50  
 Lourinhã’s undeveloped public beach at Paimogo provides an interesting 
example of a blank slate upon which officials envisioned an ideal tourism 
development—one, I should note, that has still not come to fruition. In contrast to 
PAB, which by the 1960s had an established base for the development of 
tourism, the beach at Paimogo was yet to be exploited. The site of a small wharf 
where fishermen launched their boats, Paimogo had a naturally sheltered 
harbor—one of the many sites at which the Duke of Wellington landed his army 
in the Peninsular War in 1808—and the ruins of an old fort. Some, like the future 
president of the Junta de Turismo, Silva, saw Paimogo as an ideal site for future 
nautical sports, such as the ones practiced in tourist hotspots like Cascais near 
Lisbon and Praia da Rocha in the Algarve.51 For Silva, development had to occur 
at Paimogo to further capitalize on the tourist dollar. As he explained in 1966, “we 
all regret” the exposed ruins of the fort at Paimogo, while admiring the beach's 
"magnificent bay" that should have inspired the national government and the 
CML to open a Pousada in the old fort. Silva also mused about the possibility that 
the bay could be developed without upsetting the natural setting surrounding of 
the beach. His motivation? To earn a share of the "dólares, libras ou francos" 
spent on the Algarve coast.52  
Three years after publishing Silva’s opinions, the Alvorada continued to 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 Pedro Luís, "Praia da Areia Branca/1966:8 Apelos a Junta de Turismo - O Aproveitamento de 
Paimogo", Alvorada(February 1, 1966) pp. 10, 9. 
52 Pedro Luís, "Praia da Areia Branca/1966:8 Apelos a Junta de Turismo - O Aproveitamento de 
Paimogo", Alvorada (February 1, 1966) pp. 10, 9. 
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complain about the lack of development at Paimogo. As one article explained, 
beyond the excellent natural conditions, its geographic connection to PAB, and 
its historic fort, Paimogo was a natural shelter and, as a place to launch fishing 
boats, was "superior to many ports in the country." They argued that building a 
quay for the lobster fishery, for example, would have great economic benefits. 
Such a facility would also help promote sport fishing. However, the Alvorada 
suggested that, "perhaps, the development of tourism at Paimogo had been 
ignored by the "Excelentissimo Secretatiado Geral do Informação e Turismo." It 
insisted that Paimogo had beautiful land that could be developed for buildings 
and "a beautiful swimming pool."53 
 This discussion about Paimogo also betrays the tendency amongst 
pundits in Lourinhã—following the lead of the national government—to 
romanticize and protect the natural environment and the rural Portuguese way of 
life. Indeed, Lourinhanense individuals and institutions used lyrics to describe 
their landscape as unspoiled, picturesque, and unpretentious.54 One local 
columnist wrote that Lourinhã was a, "Garden of Europe, planted on the ocean's 
coast" and a "Paradise" where "serpentine rivers with gentle waters flow, singing 
laments of love, kissing the rock bed and trees it meets on its way."55  
                                                
53 "superior a muitos portos do pais". See: "O Forte e Praia do Paimogo", Alvorada (March 9, 
1969) p. 1.  
54 The town was often described as being in an ideal geographic setting for tourism. See: Luis M. 
Fragata, "Para Rever: Mas a Lourinhã Necessita Muito Mais", Alvorada (November 24, 1968) pp. 
1, 5. 
55 "Jardim da Europa à beira-mar plantado"; "serpenteiam rios, sempre com águas mansinhas e 
suaves ao seu deslizar, cantando endeixas de amor, ao beijar as pedras do leito e as árvores 
que encontram no seu caminhar." See: José Manuel Landeiro, "da Lourinhã: Turismo", Alvorada 
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 The most important element of Lourinhã’s landscape, and the element that 
was cultivated and defended, rightly so according to commentators , was its 
distance from urban life. This is not to say that Lourinhã rejected urbanization, 
quite the opposite. It merely attempted to limit it to infrastructure improvements. 
Tourism in and around Lourinhã, and in Portugal in general, was defined in 
opposition to the type of tourism in cities like Paris, Madrid, Rome, and Lisbon. 
As the Alvorada explained in 1964, when Lourinhã's modern touristic agenda 
began to come into focus, there were two types of tourism. The first was the type 
found in great cities where one sought historic sites and “marvels of civilization 
and progress”. The other was defined by the search for, and discovery of, places 
that had not been “invaded by progress with all its vices and inconveniences.” 
The good news for travelers was that “many of [Portugal's] cities and towns were 
perfect for [the second] kind of tourism.” They were places where foreigners and 
Portuguese could find “traditional hospitality.” Industry and commerce had not 
interfered with the tourist's ability to see old monuments and the traditions of the 
“ancestors of the Portuguese.”56 In fact, Lourinhã’s commitment to the image of 
an idyllic escape from urban space was a cornerstone of its tourism. Local 
commentators like José Manuel Landeiro explained that Lourinhã was on the 
road to, but not in, the "great urban centers".57  
                                                                                                                                            
(July 14, 1968) pp. 1, 4. 
56 "A Problemática do Turismo", Alvorada, (March 8, 1964) pp. 1, 8. 
57 José Manuel Landeiro, "Da Lourinhã: Turismo", Alvorada (July 14, 1968) pp. 1, 4. For a further 
discussion of the Portuguese program that sought to align present the country as a rural or 
natural destination, see: Costa, "The 'Great Façade of Nationality'". Indeed, foreign guidebooks 
reflected Portugal's touristic motifs, presenting the country as a destination in which to enjoy 
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Indeed, PAB, as was explained, was an ideal escape from the city without 
having to give up modern conveniences. There, one found new homes with 
modern architecture and modern restaurants “where one could rest their body 
and spirit from the noise of the city and take the pure air and sea breeze”.58 
Where urban development was needed, local commentators called for the 
establishment of “norms of construction” that would create and preserve garden 
areas and highlight the natural features of the land: “architecture without muscles 
or makeup”. Specifically, certain pines and other decorative trees were seen as 
ideal for improving the beach at Areia Branca.59 
In Lourinhã, domestic visitors from urban centers were often highlighted in 
order to emphasize the town as an escape from the city. The Junta de Turismo 
reported that on June 6, 1971, "dozens" of cars came from Lisbon to Lourinhã. 
Along with six buses, the cars brought "more than 2000 people" to visit the gothic 
arcades of Lourinhã's Igreja do Castelo.60 Such visits were not only an 
opportunity to highlight local sites, but to also emphasize the value of Lourinhã’s 
                                                                                                                                            
historic and natural sites. See, for example: Peter Fryer and Patricia McGowan Pinheiro. Oldest 
Ally: A Portrait of Salazar’s Portugal. (London, UK: Dobson, 1961); Georges Pillement, Unknown 
Portugal, A. Rosin trans. (London, England: Johnson, 1967); Eugene Fodor, ed., Fodor’s Modern 
Guides: Spain and Portugal, 1959. (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1959); David Wright 
and Patrick Swift, Minho and North Portugal: a Portrait and a Guide. (Bristol, Great Britain: Barrie 
& Rockcilff, 1968); and, George Jacobs, How to Get Along in Portugal and Spain.  (New York, 
NY: Simon and Schuster, 1966). For archival records that confirm the dictatorship's concern with 
presenting this image, see, in the Arquivos dos Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, (Lisboa, 
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atmosphere, and the difference between it and an urban setting. Certain pundits, 
like Luis Fragata, contrasted Lourinhã to the city by suggesting that people were 
drawn to Lourinhã’s "pure air of the countryside".61 In fact, for Fragata, touristic 
success stemmed from the fact that people came with their families to Lourinhã 
in the summer to recuperate from the stress of their lives in the city.62 Beyond the 
economic benefits visitors brought, Lourinhanense would also benefit from the 
new roads and infrastructure that the local government needed in order to 
welcome these visitors.63 What was not often discussed as a consequence of 
domestic visitors was the potential corruption of the rural world that the Estado 
Novo’s propaganda so highly valued. 
 This dressed down anti-urban image of Lourinhã—a landscape ‘without 
makeup or muscles’—was then packaged by the CML and sold to tourists as 
goods and experiences. The three fishing ports in the Concelho da Lourinhã 
(Porto das Barcas da Atalaia, Porto Dinheiro, and Paimogo) provided fresh 
seafood and shellfish to tourists in two "beautiful restaurants" that served 
"delicious caldeiradas ... which were unrivalled." These restaurants offered 
lobster, octopus, crab, and regional wine in comfortable dining rooms above the 
rocks and over-looking the ocean.64 Similarly, Lourinhã’s agricultural setting 
provided visitors with a variety of fresh fruits and vegetables grown in Lourinhã’s 
“fertile soil”. Again, recognizing the importance of some modern infrastructure, it 
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was noted that goods were stored in "an important fridge by our friend, sr. 
Fernando Franco Bebiano Correia."65 Local businesses, like Foz Bar in PAB, 
practiced mixing modern infrastructure and an idyllic natural setting. In one of its 
advertisements in 1967, it explained that, built on the rocks separating the north 
beach from the south beach at PAB, Foz Bar was an ideal spot for lunch or 
dinner, baptisms, marriages, etc. The restaurant had "rare and agreeable 
architectural lines" and that, with all the "panoramic wealth of the sea that 
surrounded [the restaurant]", offered great opportunities for photographs that 
were "indispensible in great occasions."66  
Figure 9. Foz Bar, Praia da Areia Branca, 1967. As alluded to, Foz Bar sits on PAB and is 
surrounded by the ocean. It remains a popular and thriving business today. Alvorada 
(November 12, 1967) p. 6. 
 
Behind these priorities was an attempt by the CML to promote local 
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66 Alvorada (November 12, 1967) p. 6. 
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commerce. In the 1960s, both the CML and local individuals made an effort to 
develop a commercialized tourist industry—the landscape was for sale and the 
local government would support those who were working to sell aspects of it. 
Opinion pieces in the Alvorada often discussed the need to improve touristic 
infrastructure in such a way to make it financially profitable. Beyond additional 
roads to open access to lesser-used beaches like Paimogo, as Luis Fragata 
argued, the area also needed a stand to sell ice cream and refreshments in a 
garden with tables and awnings. More lodging was also called for. 
Accommodation could come either from new development or by converting 
historical buildings like the fort at Paimogo into Pousadas. In addition, Lourinhã 
needed a tourism information office that could sell local souvenirs.67 This was to 
serve as a base from which Lourinhã could expand to include a golf club, 
swimming pool, skating rink, and an aeroclube: all described as equipment that 
would offer income to Lourinhã.68 In fact, the Câmara Municipal supported a 
variety of initiatives. In 1968 when Sra. Laura de Almeida Godinho, the owner of 
Foz Bar at PAB, needed help with permission to do business on public land, 
Lourinhã’s administration had no problem supporting her. Proclaiming the 
importance of Foz Bar to Lourinhã's tourism, the CML requested that the national 
government allow Foz Bar to use the public street for the sale of goods. The Bar, 
in the CML's eyes, contributed to the "prestige of Lourinhã and the region's 
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tourism."69 Godinho had written Lourinhã’s mayor just a few days before he 
drafted his letter to the appropriate national office. In the letter to the mayor, 
Godinho explained that the area around her bar should be classified as an SNI 
approved tourist establishment and that it would help PAB and Lourinhã to have 
such an approved establishment at the beach. She also complained that she had 
been given a bill for the occupation of public land after she had already arranged 
and paid her rent to the authorities.70  
 The CML also directly engaged in offering, or attempting to offer, 
commercial opportunities to visitors. In May 1970, the Mayor informed the 
Câmara that the Adega Cooperativa intended to open a wine store at PAB. The 
CML granted permission after receiving a notarized petition and the payment of 
the appropriate tax for occupying a public site.71 A more interesting foray into 
capitalist development for the CML involved its attempts to open a Cantina/Bar at 
the Parque de Campismo in the late 1960s. In the winter after the Parque 
opened, the Câmara discussed making a public call for bids to open a 
Cantina/Bar at the campground. The competition would be run with the following 
conditions: the Câmara would sign a three year operating agreement with the 
successful bidder, at a cost of ten thousand escudos per year for the owners of 
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the bar; the cantina had to be open, at minimum, between the first of May and 
the fifteenth of October every year; and payment to the CML could be made in 
three installments throughout the year.72 By April, the CML had adjusted its 
requirements for the contract to run the Cantina in the Parque. Originally set at 
ten thousand escudos per year, the Câmara reduced the rent to eight thousand 
escudos per year to try to stimulate applications.73 From this process, the CML 
received just one proposal from Tomás da Silva Araujo Morais, of Lisbon. Morais 
accepted all the conditions, save one, offering only six thousand escudos per 
year. The CML deliberated and authorized the mayor to negotiate and sign a 
contract on their behalf.74 However, as of October 1967, nothing had happened. 
Morais, in fact, reminded the CML in the fall that he was still interested in running 
the Cantina/Bar at the six thousand escudo per year offer made in the spring.75 In 
1969, the CML ran another competition with no results.76 
 The fact that the CML’s touristic approach mirrored the national 
government’s approach stems from the nature of the Estado Novo’s 
governmental structure. As Stephen Syrett reminds us, under the Estado Novo 
local officials were agents of the central government. Presidents of the Câmaras 
Municipais were directly appointed by the national government. The only locally 
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elected bodies, the juntas do freguesias (parish councils), were reliant on the 
Câmaras Municipais for funding. The Estado Novo's political system ensured that 
no political system level had any leverage over a higher level: municipal officials 
could not overtake regional officials, etc.77 In fact, it was not until 1979 that local 
governments were given the power to raise funds from their population and then 
it was only in user fees such as land transfer taxes.78 
 In order to highlight the dependence of local governments upon national 
departments, the national government reminded Lourinhã in 1966 of its 
requirements for funding local projects. In order to provide help developing the 
necessary tourism infrastructure, the national Comissariado do Turismo (under 
the Presidência do Conselho), for reasons of "functional order and 
administration", informed local mayors of new guidelines for funding applications 
and selection criteria. Under the guidelines, the government set a deadline of 
November 15 of the year in which the event was to happen. The Comissariado 
insisted that requests for funding for festivals within the applying Concelho 
include full financial studies that demonstrated the value of the event to the town 
or region. All other projects needed financial reports as well, in addition to 
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architectural and administrative proposals and plans. According to the guidelines, 
the strategy for publication and advertising should also be included. However, the 
Comissariado warned that "only in very special cases would subsidies be granted 
for [the publication of] brochures, posters, vignettes, etc."79 Generally speaking, 
subsidies for advertising purposes should have been sought from the Repartição 
de Propaganda, which controlled tourist related publications under the Decreto 
no. 34134 of 1944 that required tourist publications to be submitted for approval 
to the Comissariado do Turismo. In order to "honour our general propaganda 
abroad", templates for publication were provided by the Gabinete de 
Publicações.80 Applications would only be accepted from local tourist offices or 
Câmaras Municipais, which must in turn connect the work directly with the 
improvement of the tourist industry in the area.81  
 In the 1960s, then, the people of Lourinhã were being told about the 
importance of the local government’s involvement in the development of 
Portugal’s tourism. The question was, how would the CML engage in tourism and 
achieve its goals? An Alvorada op-ed piece from 1964 entitled “Lourinhã and 
Tourism” opened by explaining that the advertising campaign undertaken by the 
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government to attract visitors would have no “practical value” if regional 
authorities did not participate in developing their touristic infrastructure.82 The 
national government had put in great effort to attract tourists to Portugal, 
ostensibly for the financial benefit of its citizens, and if Portugal were to take 
advantage of its “great natural beauty” through tourism, municipalities would 
have to follow Lisbon’s lead and prepare for tourists. In the forward-thinking 
Concelhos, the article explained, one found a Junta do Turismo charged with 
opening the region and its attractions to tourists. Not surprisingly, promoting 
Lourinhã's beaches was what the author argued that the Junta’s top priority 
should be. As was written, although the large beaches like PAB were well 
promoted, Lourinhã's coastline was generally unknown to visitors. The Castelo 
da Igreja with its medieval architecture and art was also a concern. Indeed, it was 
incumbent upon readers to recognize the site's importance.83 
Although Lourinhã had a Junta do Turismo in the 1960s, it seems to have 
played a minor role in touristic development and was subject to criticism. It was 
not unusual for the Alvorada’s pundits to criticize the Junta, criticism that 
eventually led to its reorganization. One such pundit was Silva, the man who 
would become president of the Junta in 1970. Under his penname Pedro Luis, he 
frequently criticized the Junta’s actions and inactions throughout the 1960s. In a 
series of articles in 1965 and 1966 entitled “Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito 
Apelos à Junta de Turismo” [Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Eight Appeals to the 
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Tourism Office] he outlined eight things that the Junta could do in 1966 to 
improve tourism in Lourinhã.85 These ranged from infrastructure improvements, 
to opening a tourist office at PAB, to organizing events for groups like youth. The 
articles led to the Alvorada accusing the Junta de Turismo of being in a 
“prolonged hibernation”, complaining that no official response had yet been 
given, either in writing or in deed—the language used in the article referred to the 
Junta de Turismo not responding to “us”, suggesting that “we all know” that no 
response had been offered.86 
Further, the Junta as it existed in the 1960s, by and large, continued to act 
only through Lourinhã’s mayor. For example, in order to propose the 
establishment of an esplanade with a bar and children’s playground at PAB in 
1961, the Junta had to rely upon the mayor to present their case to the Câmara 
Municipal.87 The Junta had little public presence with no major annual events and 
little to no direct engagement with Lourinhanense, either through the Alvorada or 
public consultations. In contrast, after 1970, the Junta would have an office, print 
weekly updates in the newspaper, start a complaints and suggestions book in its 
office,88 and attempt to offer visitor services. 
 A change in the Junta’s leadership in 1968 afforded the CML the 
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opportunity to create a more active tourist office. In December 1968, the 
President of the Junta de Turismo, Sr. Doutor Marques Real, submitted his 
resignation. The Câmara accepted the recommendation that Sr. Doutor Rafael 
Adolfo Coelho take over and they informed the Sectretariado Nacional da 
Informação Cultura Popular e Turismo.89 At this time, Silva was contacted to be 
the President of the Junta de Turismo by then Mayor Ferreira da Costa. The 
position had been technically vacant while Silva's nomination went through the 
Câmara Municipal and the Sectretaria do Estado de Informação e Turismo.90 
Why Silva did not become Presidente in 1968 is unclear from the documents.  
 The confusion ended on July 5, 1970, when Lourinhã's new mayor, Sr. 
Lucinio Cruz, created a new Junta de Turismo in the Concelho under the office of 
the Mayor of the CML in accordance with the Côdigo de Organização 
Administrativa. This represented a formalization of the Junta and its structure. 
Under the new administration members of the Junta de Turismo were to 
complete various exams. Silva was named the President of the new Junta de 
Turismo. He was forty years old, had been a member of the Mociedade 
Portuguesa [Portuguese Youth], had been a diocesan leader of Acção Católica, 
and had experience with administration in associations. He was also involved in 
publishing and community commentary writing in the Alvorada under the 
pseudonym, Pedro Luís. To help the new Junta, Sr. Flávio Alves, a sixty-year old 
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resident of Porto das Barcas, was named an advisor. His experience in the oil 
companies and his travels to Europe and Brazil were seen as important assets.91 
The Junta was to be made up of: a president designated by tourism's central 
service on the approval of the town mayor; at least one municipal doctor named 
by Lourinhã's mayor; a hotel official elected by the hotel owners of the region; an 
established business-owner chosen by the town's mayor; and the captain of the 
port or another maritime official to sit on the Junta’s board.92 
 Along with the new structure of the Junta came an increased formalization 
of its responsibilities. Under Article 127 of the Código Administrativo, the new 
Junta was obligated to: keep an inventory of the region's "natural, archeological 
and historic assets"; hold exhibitions, preserve and publicize regional dress; 
advertise the region's art and natural attractions; create and conserve public 
libraries; advertise notable aspects of the region's past and present life; explore 
local theaters and cinemas; build and administer gymnasiums and sports fields; 
hold public festivals; erect and preserve monuments; create and conserve parks, 
gardens, vistas and other sites for public enjoyment; work towards the 
proliferation of public lighting within the Junta's jurisdiction; and contribute, “as 
much as possible”, to the improvement of the touristic area for which the CML 
was responsible.93 In carrying out these responsibilities, the Junta was to have 
relative autonomy from the Câmara in decision-making. However, the Junta 
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relied upon the Câmara for funding and technical expertise.94  
 The institutionalization of Lourinhã’s tourism at a local level was 
completed in 1973 when the Câmara transformed the Junta de Turismo into a 
Comissão Municipal de Turismo [Municipal Commission of Tourism]. The 
Comissão was meant to express the CML's commitment to tourism. It would be 
more “efficient” than the Junta had been and would be integrated into the 
municipal governmental structure. This meant that it would be staffed directly by 
municipal employees.95  
After 1970, the reorganized Junta followed the precedent offered by the 
CML to develop commercial and tourist sites. However, the realities concerning 
funding limited the Junta’s ability. When, for example, the Alvorada asked Silva 
upon his appointment if money had been secured to complete projects like the 
mini-golf and tennis court, he responded by saying no and noting that all the 
Junta's effort had been focused on securing a subsidy for the Edifício de 
Turismo. The next subsidy had already been requested for the Palácio Foz—an 
area to be developed with a walkway and pedestrian bridge at PAB. The 
Alvorada pushed the funding question further and asked, since the Junta had no 
money, how did it pay for cleaning equipment, the Guarda Nacional Republicana 
(GNR) in the summer, advertising, etc.? Silva explained that he had promised to 
make the budget public at the end of every activity. Beyond that, the Junta 
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received a subsidy from the Câmara that came from a small tax on restaurants.96   
Whereas the new Junta was limited in direct infrastructure development by 
funding, it proved to be much freer to act in communicating with visitors and 
organizing their time in Lourinhã. As the Junta’s weekly contribution to the 
Alvorada suggested, its bulletin had improved the town’s tourism in a number of 
ways. The Junta noted the schedule it put up in its office that outlined water 
temperatures in the ocean, various other schedules, and accommodations. This 
information included airplane schedules, bank schedules, hotel prices and home 
rental information. They also administered the sand sculpture competition, 
always welcoming the maximum 120 children. The Junta took care of the 
gardens in PAB in a way that "made them more welcoming to those who visited." 
It also helped to organize the Dia do Turismo while keeping people involved with 
regular public meetings and with the meetings with the Câmara Municipal. The 
Junta also noted its creation of incentives for programs to improve tourism like 
expositions, fliers, colloquiums, and social economic development. A book of fifty 
sites was published in spring 1973.97  
The Junta’s plan for 1973 reinforces the evidence of the office’s inability to 
act independently on infrastructure improvement, while remaining freer in terms 
of traveller services. The first priority for 1973 was the construction of a mini-golf 
course in PAB, something that had been mentioned as a priority upon Silva’s 
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appointment to the Junta in 1970. The activity plan explained that the project had 
already been studied.98 The second project was to make tourists, both national 
and international, more welcome in Lourinhã. This meant that a panel inside the 
Junta had been working on compiling information on prices of accommodation 
and restaurants, transportation schedules, event schedules, and water 
temperature (of the ocean) throughout the year. The group aimed to report on 
their findings and compare Lourinhã to other areas in Portugal.99 Third, the Junta 
vaguely aimed to develop their economic and touristic potential in 1973. Although 
this was a general category in the Junta's activity plan, it did call for the 
advertising of the Concelho on the radio, in print and on television to 
"demonstrate the best of our Concelho of Lourinhã."100  
 The Junta’s advertising took a number of forms. Silva engaged the public 
and visitors in a limited dialogue. Immediately upon being appointed, he started 
the complaints and suggestions book in the Junta’s office.101 He also believed in 
cooperating with the press, something his Serviço da Imprensa, published in 
every issue of the Alvorada, is evidence of.102 At times, the two activities were 
combined to further Lourinhã’s image. Commonly, the Alvorada would print 
letters from visitors or excerpts from the Junta’s complaints and suggestions 
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book. A thank you letter to the Junta de Turismo dated May 21, 1971 from Carlos 
Manuel Renderio from Lisbon was printed in the Alvorada. In it, he explained that 
he remained “enchanted” with the "extremely kind manner with which he was 
attended to" in the Junta de Turismo at PAB. In particular, Ana Maria Vicente, the 
employee that dealt with the letter's author deserved "the congratulations of all of 
us" for graciously dealing with old and young visitors. Sr. Rendeiro then 
apologized to Ana Maria for publicly mentioning her—he was sure she would be 
embarrassed—but he wanted "all to know that there were kind and attractive 
youth in Lourinhã."103 Similarly, when poor reviews of Lourinhã’s sites appeared, 
Silva was not shy to release details about visitors’ positive impressions. For 
example, reviews of the Parque de Campismo that rated the facility in the second 
category were dismissed. Silva pointed to the opinions of those who visited as a 
better indication of the Parque's performance and he quoted an interview of a 
visitor who explained that he was looking forward to returning.104  
The press was also used by the reorganized Junta to pressure the CML. 
In a 1972 Alvorada story covered by reporter Eduardo Filipe, the Junta was given 
credit for forcing the Câmara to debate concerns over the town’s postcards. The 
Junta had run an article earlier that year, bringing the issue to the public’s 
attention. The issue concerned displeasure at the fact that the town’s postcards 
featured only PAB. Subsequent newspaper articles claimed that because of the 
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Junta’s pressure, a new run of colour postcards featuring other sites in Lourinhã 
would be printed.105   
 
 
Figure 10: Lourinhã’s new postcards (1972) highlighted attractions other then the beach. 
Here, the Norman era Igreja do Castelo and other sites in the town are featured. " Postais 
Ilustrados da Praia da Areia Branca e Concelho da Lourinhã", Alvorada (February 13, 
1972) p. 1. 
 
 The communication undertaken by the Junta under Silva is perhaps the 
most interesting aspect of its activities. The reorganized Junta’s priorities, the 
things that were supposed to be achieved by institutionalizing local tourism, went 
beyond opening tourist attractions and commercial sites. Silva wanted to 
"dinamizar" [dynamize] tourism at all the levels, in each freguesia, in each 
restaurant manager, etc. Although Silva wanted to implement touristic upgrades 
that would maximize output with little investment (the mini-golf course and tennis 
                                                
105 Eduardo Filipe, "Postais Ilustrados da Praia da Areia Branca e Concelho da Lourinhã", 
Alvorada (February 13, 1972) p. 1, 8. 
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court were examples of such projects), and to improve infrastructure like 
sanitation facilities, he also knew the importance of not focusing solely upon PAB 
and its facilities. He wanted to continue to help people by responding to their 
letters, to finance touristic endeavors, and to protect investments and facilities.106 
This reflected, according to the Alvorada, Silva’s "democratic spirit, which he had 
instituted in his 'Press Services.'" Silva explained that he undertook this, and 
other initiatives in his life (including membership in various committees), because 
he believed that they were the best way to serve his community and its 
citizens.107  
 
** 
 
 The idea that people could be conditioned to help improve tourism, and 
the recognition that the financial and bureaucratic resources available at the 
municipal level were insufficient to achieve developmental goals, lay at the base 
of Silva’s plan to dinamizar the local industry. If Lourinhã, and indeed Portugal, 
were to harness its touristic potential, the local people and local organizations 
would have to contribute. The important question is how the dictatorship would 
rally local participation while ensuring that individuals and groups acted within 
acceptable parameters. The answer was for both the government and local elites 
                                                
106 "Entrevista com o Presidente da Junta de Turismo: II Parte", Alvorada (March 14, 1971) pp. 1, 
7. 
107 "espírito democrático que instituiu estes <<Serviços de Imprensa>>". See: "Entrevista com o 
Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," Alvorada (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.  
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to deploy paternalistic language and messaging to encourage certain forms of 
participation while limiting others with legislation and other administrative 
deterrents. 
Before the Junta was reorganized, Silva’s colleagues at the Alvorada were 
telling Lourinhanense about the importance of being conscientious about tourism. 
As an article that called for "a Progressive and Efficient Tourism” argued, 
hospitality was key for the efficiency of tourism. When a worker in a hotel or 
restaurant attended a guest as if they were "granting a favour" by taking too long 
to serve customers, and by not having the things that tourist guides noted as 
regional items, the tourism industry in the region suffered. The article did not 
intend to present an excessively negative picture of service in Lourinhã. Instead, 
it argued that any problems stemmed from a lack of preparation. This could be 
solved by the creation of  tourism schools in regions that welcomed large 
numbers of visitors.108 For the reorganized Junta, according to Silva, the greatest 
obstacle was the "medieval mentality in our homeland" and he equated this 
‘mentality’ with inefficiency. In response, the Alvorada's interviewer asked Silva 
how the Presidente of the Junta de Turismo could help Portugal move from the 
“tail of Europe” ["cauda da Europa"]. Silva said, without explaining how exactly 
tourism would help Portugal, that Portugal's “sin” was inefficiency. Silva believed, 
"sincerely, in the economic, social and human power of tourism."109 For the new 
                                                
108 "Por Um Turismo Progressivo e Eficiente", Alvorada (December 18, 1969) p. 1. 
109 "sinceramente no poder económico, social, e humano do Turismo." See: "Entrevista com o 
Presidente da Junta de Turismo: 1 Parte," Alvorada (February 28, 1971) pp. 1, 5.  
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Junta, the success of tourism was not measured only in its economic benefits. As 
the Junta argued in 1971, tourism for restaurant and hotel owners meant hosting. 
For the banheiros at the beaches, tourism was conserving and keeping a clean 
beach.110  
Such opinions demonstrate the fact that it was important for officials to 
control, as much as possible, private initiative and to channel efforts to 
sanctioned ends. Thus, it seemed obvious to elites that the relationship between 
space and tourism was reciprocal. Space needed to be controlled as traditional 
Portuguese societal structures were challenged in the 1960s; tourism was not 
only a way to control the interaction between visitors and locals, but also a 
justification for the increased control of space and action.  
Approved sources told Lourinhanense what types of initiatives were 
worthy of support. According to one commentator, for example, since the main 
road in PAB had been opened with its first houses in the 1920s, no major 
updates had been done leaving the street with the appearance of an "old shoe." 
A model for improvement could be found in the "ancient Vila de Óbidos." There, 
the "lovingly maintained houses" at the beach in Baleal enchanted travellers. At 
São Pedro de Muel, families could rent apartments and houses together, but, the 
author asks, how many were saddened by not being able to do this at PAB? The 
author then asks, "what do we have?" The answer: disjointed architecture. Some 
houses had verandas. Meanwhile, other dwellings were not set back from the 
                                                
110 "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã - XVIII Serviço de Imprensa: Turismo e Anti-
Turismo no Verão," Alvorada (June 27, 1971) p. 6. 
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road at all. Further, houses sat on narrow, impassable roads. In ninety percent of 
the cases of new construction, neighboring houses were not copied, nor 
designed with their neighbor's broad lines considered. The exceptions, where the 
author found "expressions of beauty", were in houses that were cared for by a 
"woman full of wrinkles." For this author, the answer lay in imposing some 
standards of construction and adding trees and gardens to the existing 
buildings.111 The evident privileging of family-cared accommodations along with 
outward appearance reflected the author’s belief that although architecture was 
an artistic language, it was also functional. As such, it had to be subordinate to 
the sanctioned conditions of urbanization and the physical, regional, cultural, 
human, and social environments.112 
 The idea put forward in the Alvorada that space had to be subordinated to 
social and cultural concerns mobilized by officials was not lost on Lourinhã’s 
municipal administration when it opened the Parque de Campismo. The Parque’s 
regulations, covering a variety of areas from hygiene to conduct, were printed in 
the issue immediately following the site’s opening. Campers had to adhere to 
hygienic standards that called on them to dispose of dirty water properly. They 
were also restricted to wearing clothes that did not "exceed the norms of camping 
ethics and that never offended public morality and good manners." Further, 
control of action followed in campers’ restriction from "acts of propaganda 
                                                
111 "Praia da Areia Branca/1966: Oito Apelos à Junta de Turismo - 3. Arquitectura sem Músculos 
nem 'Maquiage'", Alvorada (December 25, 1965), pp. 12, 10. 
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[espousing] whichever attitude or argument that could bother campers." In 
addition, radios and musical instruments were banned between 23h and 7h as 
part of a general restriction on noise during sleeping hours. Games could be 
played, so long as this did not interfere with other campers. Game players had to 
vacate open campsites, if a new camper arrived to occupy the site they were 
playing on, and all equipment had to be removed at the end of the game. Finally, 
commercial activity within the campgrounds was prohibited without the special 
permission of Lourinhã's mayor.113 Personal property, and its use, was also 
regulated in the Parque. Vehicle use within the Parque was limited to "strictly 
necessary" activity. It was to be done at an absolute minimum speed while 
always yielding to bicycles, "with or with out a motor", and children. Animals were 
allowed on the grounds, so long as they did not interfere with, or disturb, other 
campers.114  
 By 1973, Lourinhã’s Junta made their expectations clear vis-à-vis private 
participation in civic life. One of the Junta’s Serviços de Imprensa explained that 
the Junta felt that it, along with the people of Lourinhã, “fought” against "anti-
colectivismo" and for the development of local tourism. All their struggles were 
made, they explained, without sufficient knowledge about the amount of touristic 
construction, camping in Portugal, and the commercial and industrial sectors. 
The Junta cited Deputado Oliveira Ramos of the Assembleia Nacional, who 
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defined ideal citizenship on January 31, 1973, while discussing "means of social 
communication," as someone educated and informed; and who would see the 
importance of taking part in civic life at the local and national level. Ramos 
complained that there was not enough participation from the masses in elections, 
nor was there enough discussion about civic issues. The central problem, the 
Junta complained via Ramos, was having citizens realize their importance in 
public affairs. The Junta argued that one important and, at the time, ever growing 
way to spread information and promote involvement was through economic and 
social groups like cooperatives and associations.115  
In conjunction with the reorganization of the Junta de Turismo, the 
Alvorada, as the local administration’s informal agent, offered Lourinhanense the 
history of their town’s tourism, one that legitimized certain forms of participation 
by private individuals.  Law no. 18.314 of March 25, 1930 named the Concelho 
da Lourinhã a "jurisdiction of tourism." In the same year, the CML approved the 
project to connect PAB to the road between Peniche and Lourinhã. The roadway 
was to be well marked with signs leading to the beach. In 1936, a new 
administration under José Pinheiro de Andrade laid piping to bring drinking water 
to PAB along the new road. Further, a wooden bridge was to be built over the Rio 
                                                
115 Ramos discussed "meios de comunicação social". Ramos' extended quote is as follows: 
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má que eles tomam. See: "XXVI Serviço de Imprensa da Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia 
Branca - Concelho da Lourinhã: Informação Sobre Turismo Local (I)," Alvorada (March 12, 1973), 
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Grande from Foz. But others, the Alvorada noted, also contributed to PAB's 
"urban progress". José Luís dos Santos and Francisco Pereira built the first 
multi-dwelling building along with their Pavilhão Verde. The mayor of the 1960s, 
Ferreira da Costa, following in this tradition of development, initiated 
"uncountable improvements" to the beach. His administration built the 
"headquarters of the Junta de Turismo" with the help of the SNI, where they 
placed a post station. He also contributed to the "beautification of the beach" and 
planned new projects that would improve the flow of clean water to the 
residences at PAB.116  
 Development, according to the narrative, was supported by projects 
initiated and championed by individual residents. The first was José Nunes da 
Costa Pinto. Heralded as a "tireless visionary",117 Costa Pinto was the man 
largely responsible for the development of PAB. He had championed the name 
change from Praia do João Soldado in 1923, after an old banhiero who owned an 
historic boathouse that was beside the Pavilhão Verde, to PAB. The 1923 law no. 
8.714, which he was said to have advocated for, classified the beach as a 
touristic destination, which granted support for the creation of a body to 
"manage" the beach's future.118 Before leading this cause Costa Pinto had been 
involved in developing the housing around PAB. The first initiative taken by Sr. 
Costa Pinto, and a society that he formed, was the building of "affordable 
                                                
116 "Junta de Turismo da Praia da Areia Branca e do Concelho do Lourinhã," Alvorada (April 19, 
1970) p. 6. 
117 Ibid. 
118 "praia de turismo com a nome a <<Praia da Areia Branca>>, sendo então criada uma 
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housing" in the early part of the 1910s. Landowners who had property near the 
beach opposed these new dwellings. However, as the Alvorada explained, these 
people lacked the "vision" that Costa Pinto and his group had.119 By 1918, Sr. 
Costa Pinto's group, described as an ad hoc commission, had been augmented 
by new touristic initiatives. Land had been acquired for new lodging. The first 
place to be built was the home of Sr. José de Almeida on the cliffs above the 
coast at PAB. However, the costs of building limited the development to Sr. 
Almeida's house and that of his brother, Joaquim. According to the Alvorada, the 
Almeida homes were the only ones at PAB until 1928 when Sr. Costa Pinto 
organized another "sociedade" to build a block of economic houses. Four houses 
were built this time.120 
Building on this narrative, it is no surprise that when Lourinhã turned to 
Silva to run the Junta, he was presented as a capable, responsive, and devoted 
citizen of Lourinhã. The Alvorada described him as someone who had always 
been interested in the town’s problems. He never entered a café to “kill time”. 
Silva went instead to talk to people about the issues facing Lourinhã, "our home." 
Silva was further described as a man who had spent many years on his 
grandparents’ farm, his spare time helping people load their tractors in town, and 
being a “prolific” writer. Not only had he written for the Alvorada as Pedro Luís, 
but also in the first six months of 1969 alone, he had written ten letters to the 
Junta de Turismo. Despite the fact that he read "one book a month", Silva still 
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had the time to participate in local roundtables, various meetings, and the social 
life of Lourinhã, all in addition to his job in the Planning and Studies Office 
[Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento] in the CML. Silva's reputation as a devout 
Catholic who preferred to spend time with his family at home helping his children 
with their education made him all the more notable.121  
For their part, local citizens, who acted as individuals or in small informal 
groups, were not only the heroes of official narrative, but they were also called 
upon to donate resources, both financial and in kind, to development projects. 
This gave them the opportunity to ask for infrastructure and, frequently receive 
positive responses, provided they wanted the improvements in key areas like the 
beach, electrical infrastructure, etc., where government interests aligned. For 
example, in November 1963, the CML received a letter from a citizen requesting 
the installation of a public street lamp in his neighborhood in PAB. In response to 
his request, municipal officials referred the matter to the Sociedade Electrica do 
Oeste Limitada in Caldas da Rainha asking for a cost estimate for the project.122 
By December 21, the Concelho had received a reply back from the Sociedade 
about this project. The Sociedade had quoted a cost of 251$40 escudos for this 
citizen’s project allowing the CML to move ahead with the installation of the street 
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lamp.123  
Residents occasionally organized and actively campaigned for 
infrastructure for their neighborhoods. First, in the fall of 1960, for example, 
Reverend Padré Mercelino, parish priest of Santa Barbara, asked Lourinhã’s 
town council if electrical service could be expanded to Santa Barbara for 1962. 
He argued that existing power lines already passed one kilometer from the parish 
and that the population would take responsibility for the work needed to connect 
the freguesia to them.124 Second, 1961 saw Lourinhã’s Mayor present a proposal 
on behalf of Sr. José Máximo da Costa, himself a future mayor of Lourinhã and 
deputy governor of the District of Lisbon (the regional governmental body 
responsible for Lourinhã). Sr. Máximo called for electrical infrastructure for one 
classroom in a Ribeira dos Palheiros school.125 Third, Lourinhã’s Mayor was 
given a donation of 40.600$00 escudos by  the residents of São Bartolomeu to 
pay for the electrification of their neighborhood. The residents were commended 
by the town council for trying to improve the "the level of life and progress that 
this improvement represented."126 
 Although the results of these three requests varied—money was set aside 
for Sr. Máximo’s project, Reverend Mercelino was informed that Lourinhã’s 
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electrical allotment had already been spent but that a study would be 
commissioned to look into preparing infrastructure, and the residents of São 
Bartolomeu were successful as electrical capacity had already been allotted for 
their area127—there are some interesting similarities in terms of private goals and 
participation in public decision-making. Beyond showing a clear willingness to 
take independent action to achieve goals, there was also an acceptance of 
private participation on the part of local administration. In Sr. Máximo’s and 
Reverend Mercelino’s cases, educated local elites took charge to solicit the 
Concelho on behalf of residents. In the case of São Bartolomeu, the residents 
organized themselves to raise the huge sum of 40.600$00 escudos.128 To put 
that effort into perspective, the average monthly for agricultural workers in the 
District of Lisbon, including Lourinhã, in 1970 ranged from forty-three to one 
hundred and fifteen escudos, depending upon the industry and skill level.129 
 Those locals who did not volunteer their participation found themselves 
under pressure to contribute to development. In May 1967, the cornerstone was 
laid for a new church to service the freguesias of PAB and Seixal. The church 
was meant to center what would be a new Freguesia in the north end of the 
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Concelho that could manage the urban and tourist development around PAB.130 
However, to complete the project, the Concelho required the financial support of 
the residents of Seixal and PAB. Described as a reflection of the population's 
"cultural level and ay of life",131 residents were meant to take ownership of the 
project. To remind residents of their role, the local newspaper printed updates on 
the state of the project and its finances. Reports printed in May and July 1967 
reported that materiel and labour at the cost of 377.111$00 escudos had been 
ordered for the building. It itemized the material and labour, listed donors and the 
amounts donated to the project, ranging from 10$00 escudos to 3.000$00 
escudos, and solicited further donations to make up for the project’s 26.000$00 
escudo deficit.132 
Thus, state officials expected Lourinhanense to participate in civic life in a 
number of ways. Due to the financial limitations of Portuguese municipalities— 
beyond lacking the power of taxation and having no consistent stipend from the 
national government they also had to apply to the national government for 
funding on a project-by-project basis—citizens were expected to contribute 
monetarily to local development. One example in which the citizenry was 
required to step in for both the local and regional governments concerned the 
installation of sewers and water treatment facilities in PAB and Seixal. A project 
for the sanitization of Praia da Areia Branca and Seixal at a cost of 4,97 contos 
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was developed by the Serviços de Fomento da Junta Distrital de Lisboa and 
presented to the CML in the summer of 1968. The mayor informed the Câmara 
that this project would only be possible with the financial participation of the 
property owners and landlords in PAB and that that participation had to be 
solicited with the help of the local neighborhood organization, the Grupo dos 
Amigos da Praia da Areia Branca (GAPAB).133  
Beyond financial contributions, citizens were also expected to control their 
behavior as a way to participate in tourism. The disposal of trash at the beach is 
perhaps the most interesting example of this type of contribution. Even before the 
Junta was reorganized and Silva was put in charge, he argued that there was a 
relationship between Lourinhã’s development and the behavior of locals. Writing 
as Pedro Luís, he argued that the “poor education”, of people contributing to the 
amount of litter and dirt at the beach, was like a "social blemish [in the eyes of] 
visitors."134 The litter found at PAB was “sad” and showed a lack of civility.135 He 
also complained about the disruption caused by portable radios, which were 
officially prohibited.136 However, Silva did recognize that part of the problem with 
behavior at the beach was lack of enforcement and he complained. The solution, 
then, was to lobby the tourism commission for an attendant for the summer 
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months to police the rules. The attendant could also police "all the soccer games 
and the like, which could disturb other beach visitors." By both regulating the 
behavior of visitors to the beach, and by taking personal responsibility for one’s 
own behavior, the "barbárie" at the beach could be eliminated.137  
 When Silva became president of the Junta in 1970, it is no surprise that he 
worked to highlight the importance of public cooperation in touristic initiatives. 
Under Silva’s supervision, the Junta explained to people through its bulletins that 
"everyone could help" in developing tourism.138 At Christmas in 1971, the Junta 
explained that Christmas time was the time to “give your hands for a better 
Lourinhã.” The Junta called on readers to undertake civic engagement to 
improve their home ("a minha terra"). All needed to ask themselves, "what can I 
do in 1972 ... to touristically improve my Concelho?"139 Youth could organize 
clubs in their schools to plant and maintain public gardens or clean public 
areas.140 Silva and the Junta went even further than suggesting that participation 
was important. Readers were told that to be selfish was a social crime, a 
"spiritual cancer." Not cooperating and participating in local development 
reflected poorly on individuals.141 
 As Silva had called for in the 1960s, this heightened expectation of civic 
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engagement went along with increased attempts at control. The Junta called on 
Lourinhanense to try "new habits, new actions, and, in the end, a new mentality 
to guide the people of Lourinhã." Part of this new approach was greater care with 
trash in tourist areas, greater collaboration between the public and their 
institutions, and, equally as important, the establishment of public washrooms in 
shared tourism space.142 One of the largest problems faced by Câmaras 
Municipais in 1972 around Portugal, according to the Junta, was the collection of 
trash. In Lisbon, for example, councilors had invested “thousands of contos” and 
begun a campaign for a "cleaner Lisbon." Much of this campaign was focused 
upon public education through advertising. However, it included placing new 
trash receptacles around Lisbon with ashtrays and cigarette disposal bins.143  
The Junta was also happy to note that the trash problem had been solved 
in places like Evora or Vila Viçosa as well as many of the neighborhoods in the 
Alentejo. Meanwhile, the North had also taken a big step towards dealing with 
the problem by introducing a public garden program. Lourinhã's Câmara had also 
recognized the importance of not only keeping the Concelho clean, but also the 
importance of the "presentation of our land."144 However, the Junta de Turismo 
argued that people who did not help to keep the Concelho clean did not deserve 
to reap the rewards of a clean environment. The biggest problem was the 
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“people of tomorrow.” The children who spent their time at the beach in the 
summer were targeted as the worst litter culprits. Despite this, the Junta 
suggested that their teachers were at least partly to blame for not instilling in 
them the importance of putting trash in receptacles. The Junta called the 
pollution sad.145  
In order to motivate locals to take responsibility for the tourist environment, 
Lourinhã's tourist officials did not mind using embarrassing reviews of the town 
and its facilities. PAB's Junta de Turismo, for example printed some excerpts 
from its complaints and suggestions book in its bulletin printed in the Alvorada. 
None of the excerpts printed celebrate PAB or its facilities. One complained that, 
in the thirty-two years the author had been visiting, PAB had never been in such 
a neglected state. The garbage in the streets—picked up by the garbage truck 
only every two days—was overwhelming and the mosquitoes were equally as 
abundant. This author, evidently Portuguese, hoped that these problems would 
be resolved, "for the good name of Portugal" not to be tarnished in foreigners’ 
eyes. Unfortunately for the author of this complaint, his excerpt was printed 
alongside that of a Marian Thomas from England. Thomas complained that she 
was "disgusted at our first experience camping in Portugal at Praia da Areia 
Branca ... there have been many dogs around the site making the site very soiled 
including the floors of the washrooms (which didn't seem to have been cleaned 
for weeks)." The Parque de Campismo was sorely lacking in hot water supply 
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and a place to keep food cold, amenities that were “important ... having young 
children." Yet despite these complaints, the excerpt concluded by thanking the 
"charming lady at the Turismo office who was most helpful."146  
Organized activities and events were also seen as important tools in 
achieving influence over citizen behavior and protecting citizens of the town from 
unwanted influences. The clean up of the beach at PAB was, as the Alvorada 
insisted, everybody’s responsibility. Locals who enjoyed the beach had to be 
more mindful about where they put their trash when at the beach. The Alvorada 
proclaimed, "areia suja, não e não!" [“dirty sand, no and no!].147  
More important at that time, however, was the development of summer 
programs for youth. Such programs could present local children with an 
alternative to the undisciplined and morally questionable activities of foreign 
teenagers. Instead, activities centered upon religious values were commended. 
Social pundits (in this case, the man who would later become a president of the 
Junta de Turismo) in Lourinhã called upon the Junta de Turismo to organize a 
holiday program for youth as their primary activity for the coming summer.148 
Pedro Luís argued in 1965 that youth tourism had to be managed for the sake of 
the children of PAB. The people of Portugal lived in a "meteoric age" in which 
youth maintained their distance from society. Luís complained that 
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Lourinhanense had seen “good sized groups of French youth” at the beach 
between PAB and Paimogo. This was called a "plague" that had garnered too 
much attention from newspapers.149 Instead, praise should have been given to 
the youth who formed the seminary group, who on their own initiative in 1965, 
created a provisional campground and a center from which holiday activities 
were planned for Christian and non-Christian boys and girls. They organized 
events like picnics, improvised a chapel in a nearby garage, had a lunch table 
open daily, improvised an altar that used a guitar instead of an organ during 
service, and used bricks for seats and pews. They also played modern music 
and placed posters in Lourinhã announcing that all were welcome. Luís 
suggested that the tourism office should collaborate with groups like this to 
organize their own events.150 Within such a controlled framework, foreigners 
would be welcomed without worry, and indeed, would have something to learn 
from locals. 
The socio-cultural effects of foreign visitors on locals were a priority in 
discussions of interaction between the two. Historians like David Birmingham 
have cited the transformative effects of new music, culture, and ideas that were 
brought by the tourist boom of the 1960s into a Portuguese society that had been 
closed from the world since the Second World War.151 This became increasingly 
important as the number of visitors increased in the second half of the 1960s. 
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One article from the Alvorada at the end of 1964 cited the Gabinete de Estudos e 
Planeamento Turistico do SNI which reported that between January and August 
of 1964, Portugal welcomed 681,279 foreign vacationers and projected that 
800,000 foreigners would visit Portugal in 1964 with 1,000,000 foreigners 
expected to visit in 1965.152 For a country of only 8,000,000 or so people, this 
kind of influx led some to refer to tourists as the "new invading hordes."153  
Despite such language, the Estado Novo sought foreign visitors. For 
government officials, tourism was an important way for Portugal to be known by 
the rest of the world.154 Its value lay not only in reinforcing the values espoused 
by the regime to both domestic and foreign travelers, but also in reinforcing the 
regime’s legitimacy as the successor to the Catholic monarchies that had 
presided over the reconquest of Portugal from the Moors and its Golden Age of 
discovery.155  
The use and promotion of mass media for tourism was also important in 
the relationship between Lourinhanense and visitors, both foreign and domestic. 
Commentators like Landeiro recognized the relationship between tourism and an 
exchange with visitors. As he explained, there was no doubt that Lourinhã was "a 
zone of incalculable value for tourism … with natural beauty that did not find an 
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equal in Portugal." Additionally, the case for tourism’s importance to Lourinhã 
was made all the stronger by the fact that both domestics and foreigners 
visited.156 In her study of Nazi Germany, Shelley Baranowski has highlighted the 
value of contact through tourism in building national community, arguing that 
tourism was a way to not only bring the working class into the socio-cultural 
fabric of Nazi Germany, but also to challenge  local and religious “particularisms” 
that undermined the German nation.157  
 Beyond moral controls on behaviour, some minor concrete measures 
were also taken to remind people of their responsibilities. Seeing as clean public 
washrooms were an important aspect of the Junta's call for a new mentality in 
Lourinhã, the Junta placed signs in public washrooms. Washrooms were cleaned 
daily and users were reminded to leave the washrooms in a condition they 
wished to find them. Generally, the Junta explained, the public washrooms in 
Lourinhã were "clean". This was in response to complaints received by the Junta 
on the cleanliness in the Parque de Campismo's washrooms. The same went for 
semi-public washrooms in restaurants and cafés.158 The Junta also highlighted 
legal means of behavioural control. People were mandated to act more “civilized” 
and use the trash receptacles at the beach. The Junta reminded people not to 
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leave their cigarette butts, food leftovers like bones and fruit peels, and plastic 
bottles at the beach. Leaving trash was punishable by a law enacted in 1965 (Lei 
46619) and reinforced in 1971 (Lei 90-71). If a person was caught littering fines 
could reach up to 1,000 contos.159 
Although there were suggested ways in which Lourinhanense could, and 
indeed should, participate in development, this was not an open invitation to civic 
life. Beyond the obvious means of control employed by the Estado Novo— 
repression through PIDE being the best example—civic participation was still 
limited to certain forms and venues. Entrepreneurial engagement in tourism, for 
example, was encouraged. A series of postcards published in 1972 featuring 
Lourinhã offers a number of clues to illustrate the public appreciation of 
entrepreneurship. Lourinhã’s Papelaria Santos published a series of postcards 
highlighting the Igreja do Castelo and the Largo Principal, which were sold in his 
store and at other establishments around the town. Although it congratulated him 
for this, the Alvorada suggested, that he might work with the Câmara to produce 
a larger series of cards that could be sold with the help of the Junta.160 Beyond 
being a clear case of public encouragement for entrepreneurism, it should also 
be understood, in part, as an attempt to limit action. The arrangement being 
suggested to Sr. Santos would see him selling his cards in more places while 
handing some control over what sites were featured in his cards to the Junta and 
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Câmara.161 In other words, his facility was needed to print the cards, the fact that 
he had independently started such a venture was rewarded, however, creative 
control over the product was to be limited.  
In addition to individual participation, the legitimizing history discussed 
earlier also highlighted organized groups of locals. Thus, certain local, semi-
official, interest groups emerged to supplement individual engagement. Perhaps 
the best example in the 1960s is the Grupo dos Amigos da Praia da Areia 
Branca (GAPAB). Founded in the 1950s by wealthy residents of PAB, the 
GAPAB had, and still has today, a headquarters in PAB built partly with 
government money. Its role was to consult with the Junta. It  took part in local 
tourist events, contributing judges, for example, to the annual sand sculpture 
competitions or to writing competitions. More generally, it promoted the area and 
its history. In the introduction to its 1971 activity plan, published by the Junta de 
Turismo in the Alvorada, the GAPAB noted that the beach had been a tourist 
spot for forty years and that the press and first construction undertaken in the 
early years of the beach were the "seed, which gave the fruits which we see 
today."162  
Again, however, the GAPAB did not engage in non-sanctioned 
discussions. Their general assemblies, although critical of government inaction, 
were never directly critical of Portugal’s system of government. Discussion 
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stayed focused on matters of urban development. Those attending the August 
1967 general assembly, for example, discussed whether or not to approve of or 
alter the budget for the year just finished. Then the floor was opened to discuss 
whatever the members of the GAPAB wanted to discuss and a large number of 
complaints were brought to the floor. These centered on the "constant lack of 
water and the lack of pavement that created continuous clouds of dust." The 
president of the GAPAB promised to discuss the issue with the President da 
Câmara da Lourinhã about improving water capacity for the next year.163 
Members of the GAPAB also discussed installing better ventilation for the dining 
hall in the Vigia (the headquarters of the GAPAB).164  
 The Junta, of course, was also an agent in development. Although the 
Junta’s profile picked up considerably after 1970, when it came to construction 
and urban development, its role was distinctly a secondary one. As late as 1973, 
the Junta recognized that urban development and construction was not its 
primary function. However, it still insisted that informing the population about 
development remained its central mission.165  
 The CML, however, was in direct control of project development. 
Generally speaking, the Câmara had the power to initiate projects and to set the 
parameters for them. Yet because it lacked the power to raise money on its own, 
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the Câmara found itself having to piece together funding from both the national 
government and locals on a case-by-case basis. Funding for upgrades to the 
sewage and water treatment systems in Seixal and PAB in the late 1960s serves 
as an example. The Governo Civil de Lisboa and the Direcção de Urbanização 
de Lisboa asked the Câmara in September 1969 if it could take financial 
responsibility for installation of the sewers in PAB and Seixal, as well as the 
water treatment center. The CML responded by saying that it could take 
responsibility for the portion of the investment (two thousand four hundred 
contos) because of the collaboration of the home and landowners in PAB who 
contributed one thousand two hundred and fifty contos. At this time, the Mayor 
also informed the Câmara of a telephone conversation that he had with the 
Governador Civil de Distrito de Lisboa in which the Governor reaffirmed that 
despite this one lapse in funding, Lourinhã could count "incondicionalmente" on 
the long-term support of the Governo Civil in this work. This left the Câmara 
grateful and reaffirming that it would need support to finish the work in the 
future.166 
 Perhaps the avenue used most often to manipulate the participation of 
Lourinhanense and local groups was mass media. The deployment of the press 
had been something that had been called for earlier in the 1960s by Silva’s 
colleagues at the Alvorada. In 1965, Dr. Afonso de Moura Guedes, a local 
columnist, complained that over one and a half million foreigners had visited 
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Portugal that year, attracted, no doubt, by Portugal’s climate and its low cost of 
goods and accommodation, both reflections of Portugal's low standard of 
living.167 On their journeys, Moura Guedes explained, tourists often visited two or 
three cities in the interior and then spent time on the Algarve's beaches or 
occasionally the beaches of the Atlantic coast. Yet, he grumbled, few stopped in 
Lourinhã. Why had Lourinhã not entered Portugal's “flourishing tourism market” 
even though it had four beaches of “indescribable interest”, the nearby 
restaurants of Peniche, and historic attractions dating from as early as the Iron 
Age?168 Moura Guedes insisted that the solution to Lourinhã's poor touristic 
performance was to be found in a “younger and more suggestive” approach 
through improved advertising and road signage.169  
The necessity of advertising and mass media for tourism was clear to 
other pundits like José Manuel Landeiro and the anonymous Pascoais. In 1961, 
Pascoais explained that Portugal's natural advantages in tourism needed to be 
promoted “through modern means like publication science [ciência publicitária] 
that could reach a range of men.”170 A near identical opinion was expressed 
seven years later by Landeiro who argued that tourism had been well developed 
in the intervening years, becoming a large source of income. For Landeiro, 
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"developed marketing" was required for the industry to expand further. He even 
went so far as to say that doing without marketing and publication was not an 
option.171 
 Local officials also recognized the importance of mass media in attracting 
tourists in the 1960s. When, for example, Lourinhã opened its Parque de 
Campismo in 1966, the local government not only monitored the national 
coverage the Parque’s opening garnered, but was also sure to invite reporters 
from national newspapers.172 However, a new facility could not be opened 
regularly. So, by the early 1970s Lourinhã’s Junta de Turismo and its Câmara 
Municipal were sponsoring regular events and competitions that drew attention to 
the town in the national press. In 1971, GAPAB along with the Junta started an 
annual competition for the best article or news report featuring PAB appearing in 
any Portuguese newspaper. A jury made up of “suitable” locals chosen by the 
Câmara Municipal, the Junta de Turismo and the GAPAB would judge the 
competition. The prize would be 5.000$00 escudos. Articles had to be submitted 
(they could not be ones that the judges came across) and no publicity pieces 
would be accepted.173 Local organs also offered continued support to an annual 
Concurso de Construções na Areia [sand sculpture competition] that had 
attracted the sponsorship of, and coverage by, the national daily newspaper, the 
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Diârio de Notícias.174 
 
Figure 11: Praia da Areia Branca sand sculpture competition, 1972. "Junta de Turismo do 
Concelho da Lourinhã: XXVIII Serviço de Imprensa - Praia da Areia Branca", Alvorada 
(October 22, 1972) pp. 10, 9. 
 
 
Figure 12: Praia da Areia Branca sand sculpture competition, 1972. "Junta de Turismo do 
Concelho da Lourinhã - Ainda o XX Concurso das Construções na Areia Realizado em 
6/9/71 na Praia da Areia Branca", Alvorada (January 9, 1972) pp. 10, 9. 
 
                                                
174 "Junta de Turismo do Concelho da Lourinhã: XIX Concurso de Construções na Areia”, 
Alvorada (October 25, 1970) p. 5. 
 174 
Through the 1960s and into the 1970s, the local individuals and groups 
that were told to participate in development also saw agents like the Alvorada try 
to hold the CML to certain standards and achieve certain goals. When these 
were perceived as not being met, the CML became subject to public criticism. 
Arms-length groups like the GAPAB and the Junta had the ability to organize 
criticism of the CML in key areas related to public health like sewers. They also 
called on officials to improve roads and, interestingly, tourism related sites in 
Lourinhã. As one article in 1971 complained, under the watch of the CML, PAB 
with its “natural beauty” and proximity to Lisbon had come to be considered "like 
a bastard daughter."175 PAB should have been "treated like a cherished 
daughter."176 PAB’s condition further caused outrage. One opinion piece 
published on the front page of the Alvorada in the fall of 1972 complained that 
the “sad reality” of PAB was that the Câmara Municipal, or elements within it, 
were not interested in maintaining the beach. This meant that necessary work 
was still not being done to minimum standards. The roads and boardwalk needed 
cleaning, for example fruit peels still littered the area, and asphalt was still 
needed. Also, the boardwalk should have been illuminated.177  
 It is not terribly surprising that the Câmara was consistently held 
accountable for infrastructure, or lack thereof, relating to areas like public health. 
In a letter in August 1966, the head of PAB's Junta de Turismo explained that the 
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sewer system in the beach town had become worse every year. This was an 
even greater problem in 1966 than it had been in the past, as was explained, 
because of the municipal campaign to improve hygiene starting on April 18, 1965 
and the inspectors that came with it. This meant that, for example, the Bar Santo 
Antonio needed to have emergency work done on the sewer pipe that ran 
alongside its property and that an open ditch (an unfinished sewer) was shared 
by many and represented a "danger to public health". Such occurrences, the 
Junta insisted, needed to be resolved. Residents “deserved” the basic 
necessities. The message was clear: the town was not upholding its end by 
offering the minimum infrastructure.178 Lourinhã's mayor responded 
sympathetically to the Junta's call for improvement in the sewer system in PAB. 
He thanked the Junta for the help that it had already given and offered in the 
process and explained that the GAPAB had already committed 3.000$00 
escudos for each water storage tank needed. He also explained that Lourinhã 
had undertaken studies on the full sewer system asked for by the Junta with the 
Distrito de Lisboa.179 The availability of clean water and related infrastructure was 
a related and ongoing concern for local organizations.  
In 1966, PAB's Junta de Turismo continued to question the  mayor about 
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the limited water supply and poor pressure at peak tourist times at the beach. For 
the Junta, the water related issues represented "a problem added to the deficient 
hygienic conditions in which we live during the summer." As such, the Junta 
made a number of observations for Public Works. First, they wanted temporary 
water storage tanks put in place that would supplement the supply until PAB 
could have access to the Concelho's main water supply. Second, the Junta 
pointed out that the low water pressure had become a major problem only after 
the opening of residences and places to stay in the lower plateau's of PAB's 
landscape, especially after the Parque de Campismo was opened. Finally, the 
Junta noted that if a temporary solution was to be implemented, the worst hours 
of the day for water pressure was between 9am and 1pm and 5pm and 9pm.180 
In response to PAB's Junta de Turismo, Lourinhã's mayor suggested that the 
lack of pressure had been due to a ruptured pipe that had been dislocated the 
previous winter, which had been "exceptionally intense". In fact, the mayor 
explained, the Câmara had already opened bidding for repair work that would 
include new water storage tanks.181  
 Although concerns related to health and hygiene affected tourism, they did 
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so as a secondary concern. Tourism itself motivated various public agents to call 
upon the Câmara to uphold certain standards and develop new areas. Beyond 
being on the ocean, with a beach and panoramic views, Abelheira, for example, 
was on the national road with easy access to Lourinhã and PAB, and it had 
electricity. However, the Alvorada noted, there were no signs on the national 
road directing tourists to the site. The article then asks: Was this due to a lack of 
money? Less populous centers had road signs, and in fact better roads that were 
found in Abelheira. Abelheira could not, it was argued, become a destination 
unless the roads were improved. In the end, the article argued that Abelheira 
paid its taxes. It should, thus, be entitled to improvements.182  
Another 1972 opinion piece complained that Lourinhã had built a 
successful Parque de Campismo that hosted foreign and national tourists. It also 
had a Junta de Turismo with an office at the Beach. The article asked, "para 
que?" [for what?] The main road leading to the beach was impassible, "like all of 
the roads." People could not enter their houses without knee-high rain boots. 
Readers were also reminded of the fact that electricity and running water had 
only recently come to the beach and much of the work that had been done 
should have been credited to the GAPAB, not the Junta or the Câmara. It was 
this group that pushed for the urbanization of the beach and had the boardwalk, 
wall, and bathrooms installed.183 This was only partly true. This group had been 
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involved in lobbying and consultations, but the construction had required the 
Câmara to go ahead. 
Most homeowners were, the reader was reminded, those who had bought 
their property as a tourist home. Further, PAB was a weekend destination for 
buses and organized tours. Did Lourinhã want to show these national and foreign 
tourists "the misery of the roads of this beach?" The article also asked what 
foreign visitors would think about these conditions given PAB's proximity to 
Lisbon.184 
 Others protested because of the financial burden the CML had placed on 
locals. For years, the Alvorada argued, tourism and touristic infrastructure had 
relied too heavily on private investment. This had left PAB with just one 
restaurant [Foz Bar] and one pensão with a dozen rooms or so. A few other café-
bars had emerged along the muralha. The government had talked about building 
a Pousada and a Hotel, but no one had risked investing in their construction. The 
Mociedade Portuguesa had finished its reconstruction of a Pavilhão de Férias 
beside the beach. Surely, the Alvorada suggested, the tens and hundreds of 
children that would visit the beach because of this facility offered reason enough 
to complete the lacking infrastructure.185 In the end, the article complained that 
the Concelho received tax and other revenue from tourism. Local businesses 
also earned much of their living from it. "And what do they do for the good of their 
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users? Absolutely nothing!"186 
By the summer of 1974, just months after the fall of the Estado Novo, the 
Junta de Turismo was printing apologies for its failure to deliver on promises like 
a mini-golf course, something that had been on the Junta's agenda since the late 
1960s. After “putting up with” the studies for a mini-golf course in PAB, the Junta 
submitted a proposal for funding to the national body (SECET) and its Fundo de 
Turismo. Initially, the Junta explained, the cost of the course was to be around 
sixty contos. However, the cost had elevated by twenty contos, needed for the 
surrounding flowers and gardens, and to have the outdoor electric lighting. This 
plan was to also lay the groundwork for a future tennis court, and other facilities 
of "collective interest." So, the Junta appealed to the reader's "courage … [and] 
spirit of sacrifice" in asking for forgiveness for how long the course took to 
build.187  
That the government controlled many of the venues for public participation 
does not change the fact that the citizens maintained some power in their 
relationship with the state. Collectively, citizens were considered an important 
part of the success of tourism. Throughout the 1960s, the Portuguese people 
themselves were a reason to visit. As the Alvorada explained at the end of the 
decade, Portugual’s tourism relied on the “special fashion” of the land and 
people.188 It was well known that “Experts and observers … are unanimous in 
                                                
186 "E o que se faz para o bem-estar dos seus utentes? Absolutemente nada!" See: Ibid. 
187 "Informação Sobre Mini-Golfe," Alvorada (July 14, 1974) p. 2. 
188 "Por Um Turismo Progressivo e Eficiente", Alvorada (December 18, 1969) p. 1. 
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their praise of the hospitality of the Portuguese.”189 Such statements granted the 
citizenry some power. Along with their financial contributions that were outlined 
earlier, feelings like this allowed the citizenry to expect the state to respond to 
certain of their concerns.  
However, the power that people had under the Estado Novo should not be 
overstated. Beyond the cultural and legal means of control discussed earlier, we 
must not forget the political and often violent means of control that historians like 
D.L. Raby and Irene Pimentel have highlighted.190 What should be understood is 
that the politico-cultural relationship between the government and its subjects 
under the Estado Novo was fluid. Although the state maintained a monopoly on 
power, even when Caetano attempted a modest liberalization after Salazar’s 
death, the fact that the state required public participation to achieve its goals 
granted individuals and groups a small degree of influence. 
 
** 
 
 Tourism was a key area for development in Portugal and Lourinhã in the 
1960s and 1970s. Its relative lack of development at the start of the 1960s in 
comparison to its European neighbors offered the Estado Novo and local 
                                                
189 "Conhecedores e observadores ... são unânumes em louvar a hospitalidade dos 
Portugueses". See: "Por Um Turismo Progressivo e Eficiente", Alvorada (December 18, 1969) p. 
1. 
190 See: D.L. Raby, Fascism and Resistance in Portugal: Communists, Liberals and Military 
Dissidents in the Opposition to Salazar, 1941-1974. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University 
Press, 1988); and, Irene Flunser Pimentel, A História de PIDE. (Lisbon, PT: Círculo de Leitores, 
2011). 
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governments the opportunity to promote its ideological and economic priorities. 
Rural life and artisanal activity, along with Portugal’s natural setting, became 
what the government promoted and protected through tourism. However, the 
Estado Novo quickly learned that modern infrastructure like roads, running water, 
and advertising were needed if the landscape were to be sold via tourism. So, 
tourism became a key motivator for modernization in the waning years of the 
Estado Novo. 
 Underdeveloped bureaucratic structures prevented the Estado Novo from 
developing its resources without help from the population. Thus, the Estado Novo 
and local governments, like the CML, worked to control local participation. 
Although the government more or less successfully manipulated participation, it 
did allow people to organize in sanctioned forms, one of which, cooperativism, is 
explored in the next chapter. 
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4. Lourinhanense and Their Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
 
 
In 1966, Portugal had three hundred and sixty three agricultural 
cooperatives, fifty-two Adega Cooperativas (cooperative wine cellars) and one 
hundred twenty-two consumer product coops. These produced 250,000 contos of 
economic activity annually in everything from bread, olives and olive oil, milk 
products like butter, in poultry, and in other service sectors.1 The popular 
discourse told citizens that such institutions helped to secure a fair return for 
farmers and lower prices for the consumers. They also gave farmers easier 
access to technology and production resources like insecticides, fungicides, 
fertilizers, and machinery.2 However, much like agriculture more generally in 
Portugal, coops served a political function as well. Indeed, coops were both: a 
site of coordination for farmers in which new techniques and expertise were 
shared amongst members; and advocacy centers as coop boards liaised with 
local and national government offices on behalf of their members.3  
Their responsibilities made coops sites of sanctioned political participation 
under both the dictatorship and the post-1974 democratic government. 
Cooperative activities were necessarily charged with political meaning as the 
modernizing aspects in their activities helped farmers, their communities, and 
Portugal as a whole defend their agricultural roots. As a 1971 open letter calling 
                                                
1 "Sessão Sobre Cooperativismo Agrícola na Moita dos Ferreiros", Alvorada (October 8, 1966) 
pp. 1, 4.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
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on farmers to join a fruit coop in Lourinhã suggested, if farmers wanted to 
continue to live an agricultural life, they needed to "accompany the evolution" that 
the cooperative movement embodied. Cooperativism, and the various 
advantages it offered small farmers (like the ability to stockpile produce) was the 
only way to continue to compete.4 Indeed, coops remained important sites of 
modernization and political participation in the defense of the rural world between 
the 1960s and 1980s. As Portugal’s Prime Minister, the Social Democrat 
Francisco José Pereira Pinto Balsemão lamented in 1981, farming had been the 
most unprotected sector in Portuguese society for too long. This was a "great 
truth that had to be said.”5 The Prime Minister argued that, as a long-term goal, 
“we want a modern and competitive agriculture.”6 However, this was not possible 
without help and expertise. Farmers needed to study their soil, how to effectively 
divide their land and to manage their equipment. They also had to help to build 
infrastructure like roads, and water facilities that would channel water to their 
fields. Agricultural coops needed to be – and in fact, as this chapter argues, 
became – important institutions in this work.7  
Three coops in particular contributed in significant ways in Lourinhã in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The first, the Adega Cooperativa, played a leading role 
in Lourinhã’s agricultural industry in the 1960s. As part of a national network of 
Adega Cooperativas, Lourinhã’s Adega organized the sale and production of 
                                                
4 "Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã", Alvorada (October 1971) p. 7. 
5 “grande verdade que tem de ser dita." See: "Primeiro-Ministro na Lourinhã", Alvorada (October 
1981), p. 1.  
6 "queremos uma agricultura moderna e competitiva." See: Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
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wine for local grape farmers. By the late 1960s, the Adega’s leaders joined other 
local farmers and turned their attention to organizing a fruit coop, Lourifruta, 
which opened in 1967 and would have a production and storage facility running 
by the early 1970s. Before Lourifruta closed in the late 1990s, it would become a 
successful producer and exporter of fruit, vegetables and processed food across 
Portugal and to other European countries. Lourifruta would become an example 
of economic success and of how local farmers could contribute and gain access 
to civic society in meaningful ways. By the late 1970s, locals moved from these 
production coops to supplement them with Louricoop, a supply and equipment-
purchasing coop that emerged out of the remnants of the town’s Estado Novo 
Farmers’ Guild [Grémio da Lavoura]. Louricoop was started in order to help 
farmers gain easier and cost effective access to their supplies.  
The Adega, Lourifruta, and Louricoop are just three examples of a 
plethora of coops that were created in Lourinhã, both before and after 1974. 
Along with the Adega and Lourifruta, another industry specific coop that emerged 
in Lourinhã was a bakery, the Padaria Modelo, which opened in 1965. The 
Alvorada described the Padaria as a “dream” that could only have been created 
by “association” and cooperation. The Padaria was opened by the Panificadora 
União Central da Lourinhã, an association started by twenty-two of the town's 
bakers in 1960. Its facilities were meant to provide a central location to make 
bread for the entire Concelho.8 First and foremost, the Padaria and 
                                                
8 "sonho que só a associação pôde concretizar". Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da 
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Panificadora’s goal was to modernize the bakeries of the Concelho by 
“remodeling” bakers' shops. This was not restricted to the commercial aspect of 
bakeries but also included a social aspect, as the Alvorada’s reporter, Alvaro 
Carvalho, noted. His first impressions of the Padaria Modelo, was that it was an 
institution of “health, dynamism, light, in contrast to night and the silence of after 
hours or the nocturnal sickness of the cafés.” Contrasting the work the bakers did 
to the nightlife of the cafés, Carvalho lionized and sanctified the bakers in their 
white jackets who worked at night so that there would be bread for the morning. 
There were seventeen bakers, three deliverymen and three administrators. Work 
began at eight pm on weekdays and Saturdays as bakers plied their trade until 6 
am each day.9 
 
 
Figure 13: Bakers at work in the Padaria Modelo, a bakery run on cooperative principles. 
Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) 
p. 1. These photos in the Alvorada highlight the importance of mechanization in 
production. They also tie cooperative organization to mechanization. 
                                                                                                                                            
Lourinhã", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) pp. 1, 5. 
9 “o ritmo, o dinamismo, a luz, contrastando com o mudo da noite e do silêncio das horas 
paradas ou do bulicio nocturno dos cafes." Ibid.  
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Figure 14: Bakers at work in the Padaria Modelo, a bakery run on cooperative principles, 
1965. Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 
1965) p. 1. Not surprisingly, the bakery environment also featured women as important 
parts of the workforce. 
 
 The relevance of coops’ contributions to the politico-cultural landscape 
continued to be important to Portugal throughout the 1970s. After 1974, when 
community organization and farmers’ collective action – which Nancy Bermeo 
and Charles Downs have chronicled in their seminal contributions to our 
understanding of Revolutionary Portugal10 – became a widespread phenomenon, 
Lourinhanense also engaged in community organization to address issues that 
residents felt would improve their lives. Thus, for example, motorists of Lourinhã 
and Peniche came together in 1976 to open a transportation and automotive 
coop based in Ribamar: the Cooperativa Rodoviária dos Trabalhadores de 
Peniche e Lourinhã [the Worker’s Transportation Coop of Peniche and Lourinhã]. 
                                                
10 See: Nancy Bermeo, The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers’ Control in Rural Portugal. 
(New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1986); and, Charles Downs, Revolution at the 
Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution. (New York, USA: SUNY 
Press, 1989). 
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Upon opening, the coop had thirty-three members. Together they purchased five 
Opel vehicles to share and to rent. These motorists cooperated because they 
lacked both the need and the ability to buy a car for full time use. When part time 
use of a vehicle was needed, cooperation would help members to avoid the car 
rental companies’ expensive rates. The announcement trumpeted the fact that 
“the creation of new work posts and the attempt to put car rentals at the public’s 
service, is also [a reflection] of the spirit of the Cooperative.”11 
 
 
Figure 15 : The first five Opels bought by Cooperativa Rodoviária dos Trabalhadores de 
Peniche e Lourinhã in 1976. "Advertisement: Nova Cooperativa Automóvel de Peniche e 
Lourinhã", Alvorada (March, 1976) p. 7. 
Despite examples like the Padaria and the Cooperativa Rodoviária, 
agricultural cooperativism remained the most common and accessible means for 
local individuals to engage in civic affairs throughout the period. On March 24, 
                                                
11 "a criação do novos postos de trabalho e a tentativa de pór o aluguer verdadeiramente ao 
serviço do público, está também presente no espirito da nova Cooperativa." See: "Advertisement: 
Nova Cooperativa Automóvel de Peniche e Lourinhã", Alvorada (March, 1976) p. 7.  
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1977, for example, an agricultural cooperative was founded in Vimeiro.12 
VIMACOOPE's constitution set the minimum number of members to ten. 
Members could be individual farmers of either sex engaged in any agricultural 
activity, including forestry (a reflection of the forested landscape around Vimeiro). 
Membership, however, also came with restrictions. Members, for instance, were 
limited in terms of where they were able to farm. If a member acquired land 
outside of VIMACOOPE's jurisdiction, the farmer had to notify the coop.13 
Members were also organized into three categories. The first, "honorários", were 
individuals who performed services for the coop and were recognized by the 
general assembly. "Fundadores" were those first members to draft and sign the 
statutes. Finally, "associados", were members who signed on to the coop and 
accepted its statutes.14 Thus, membership was egalitarian, to a point. Applicants 
had to be recommended by two members and would be considered on their 
"quality" and what they could contribute to the group.15 However, the only firm 
barrier to membership was that prospective members had to contribute a 
minimum of 120.000$00 escudos of economic activity to the coop per year. In 
years when members fell short, exceptions could be made with the approval of 
the coop’s board.16 
With the help of these coops, agriculture’s importance in Lourinhã 
remained a constant in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Agriculture was a key part 
                                                
12 "VIMACOOPE - Cooperativa Agrícola do Vimeiro, SCRL", Alvorada (May 1977), p. 7. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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of not only how citizens made their living, but also how their political lives were 
shaped. Further, agriculture influenced Lourinhã’s social and physical landscape 
as institutions emerged to support farmers. In many ways then, the key mode of 
agricultural development in Lourinhã – outlined in a previous chapter as being 
based upon education, technology and mechanization, public participation, 
education, and science – was the cooperative. This chapter argues that between 
the 1960s and 1980s, under both the dictatorship and the democratic 
government, cooperatives in Lourinhã were sites of modernization in defense of 
agriculturally based life. As such they became important and sanctioned sites of 
political participation and development, making them agents of both 
democratization, as citizens were welcomed into the public sphere, and of 
modernization by helping to shape the town that exists today. That said, the 
period between the 1960s and 1980s is not monolithic. The opening of the 
political sphere by the revolution in 1974 did lead to spontaneous cooperative 
organization in a number of sectors. This proliferation, however, abated in the 
1980s as regional and European organization increased.  
 What follows is a chronological examination starting in the 1960s and 
moving into the 1980s that highlights the emergence and contributions of some 
of the major cooperatives that acted in Lourinhã and contributed to the its socio-
political culture and landscape. Although largely defunct and ineffective by the 
1990s, the Adega Cooperativa, Lourifruta, and Louricoop, along with a 
smattering of cooperative associations that emerged in the late 1970s, 
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contributed to Lourinhã’s democratization and modernization in a key period in 
Portugal's development. Most importantly, the emergence of ‘modern’ techniques 
based on education, mechanization and science in the coop movement 
demonstrates a shift in the coop’s role from organizer to modernizer. In the early 
years, improvement in agriculture was to be won through cooperative 
organization of labour, sales and production. However, how development was 
encouraged shifted in the 1980s as coops, having already jumped the 
organizational hurdle, became educators and disseminators of modernity and the 
previously discussed desenvolvimento.  
 
** 
 
  The 1960s marked a fundamental shift in Portugal’s political economy. As 
such, Lourinhã’s farmers faced new opportunities and challenges. Portugal’s 
“opening to Europe”, with the European Free trade Area (EFTA) in 1959, 
signaled the end of policies inspired by economic nationalism and autarky that 
resulted in protectionism and limited access for foreign investment. This shift 
enabled a period of economic growth and modernization that saw the country’s 
GDP grow at a rate of eight percent per year, causing the GDP per capita to 
jump from US$275 in 1960 to US$1,271 in 1973.17 This, as David Corkill has 
argued, represented the culmination of a broader shift starting with the end of 
                                                
17 David Corkill, “Aspects of Portugal’s Economic Development During the Late Estado Novo”, 
Portuguese Journal of Social Sciences, 2:1 (2003), 61. 
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WWII that dismantled barriers to industrialization and modernization in Portugal’s 
economy as the regime experimented with economic planning.18 That said, the 
agricultural sector did not enjoy the kind of growth in the 1960s that Portugal’s 
overall economy did. In fact, the sector remained largely stagnant in that decade. 
Although some years, 1965 for example, saw growth of ten percent in the 
farming sector, other years – 1966 stands out – saw a contraction of over twelve 
percent. In contrast, industrial growth over the 1960s was constant with industrial 
GDP growing anywhere from six to fifteen percent per year.20  
 Cooperativism, sanctioned in the name of agricultural development, 
became an important tool for Lourinhã’s farmers in meeting these new 
challenges. However, as I argue below, elite promotion of cooperativism also 
allowed farmers to participate in civic affairs and to practice activities that gave 
them input in Lourinhã’s political, cultural, and urban development.  
 In the 1960s, the outstanding institution that developed to help farmers 
with new challenges was the winemaking Adega Cooperativa, today a mere 
shadow of its former self, but still renowned for the aguardente it produces. 
Unlike later cooperatives in Lourinhã, which would be organized locally, the 
Adega was part of a national network of Adega Cooperativas that were linked to 
the Junta Nacional do Vinho. The Junta Nacional was founded in 1937 and was 
part of the Estado Novo's efforts to control production, distribution and prices of 
agricultural products. The national body became instrumental in the founding of 
                                                
18 See: Ibid, 61-73. 
20 See Table 1 in: Ibid, 62.  
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Adega Cooperativas across Portugal in the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequently 
guaranteeing prices for local farmers associated with the Adegas.21 The Adegas 
in turn, featured the “best hygienic and technical conditions” farmers could 
expect. Farmers learned that “modern Adegas” were equipped to, and 
responsible for, creating the best wine possible in order to maximize the value of 
Portuguese wine by providing consumers with an improved and consistent 
product in both quality and price. The Adega movement, which began in the 
1950s, spread rapidly. As the directors of Lourinhã’s Adega Cooperativa 
reported, “in just a few years, Portugal had covered the country with a 
progressive network of Adegas, which fulfilled a development plan that, as was 
clear to all, benefitted the agricultural sector.”22 
The Adega's main activities centered around making, conserving and 
selling wine and wine-based products while reducing the cost of production and 
improving the quality of the product via mechanization.23 The Adega was no 
small concern or niche producer in Lourinhã. In 1964, for example, it produced 
20,120 liters of wine and 4000 kilos of crushed grapes left after the juice had 
been removed.24 In addition, the 1965 capacity of the Adega's warehouses was 
                                                
21 See: Margarida Fernandes, "State Cooperatives and Farm Policies in Portugal After the 
Carnations' Revolution", Session 72 – Cooperative Enterprises and Cooperative Networks: 
Successes and Failures, XIV International Economic History Congress: IEHA 2006 (Helsinki, 
Finland: August 21-25, 2006), 3-4. 
22 "Adega Cooperative: Falam os Directores", Alvorada, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) pp. 8, 
3. 
23 Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o 
Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico 
de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 
1965) pp. 1, 4. 
24 "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercicio de 
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2,900 barrels of wine while its production capacity was 4,000 barrels. This meant 
that they could process three million kilos of grapes. However, this capacity could 
still not meet local demand for production as the farmers associated with the 
Adega could produce enough grapes for around 6,600 barrels of wine. In order to 
solve the Adega's storage problem, the Junta Nacional was asked in 1965 to 
approve the expansion of Lourinhã's facility to accommodate 10,000 barrels.25  
Need for a larger facility demonstrates just one way in which the Adega 
was limited in the early 1960s. Until 1965, by way of example, the Adega had 
only sold its products to commercial wholesalers and the Junta Nacional do 
Vinho.26 Limited buyers proved problematic. As 1964’s Relatório e Contas da 
Gerência do Ano Transacto [budget] showed, the Junta Nacional was over a 
year behind in its payments to the Adega, not having paid for product shipped to 
it in 1962 and 1963.27 Despite receiving payment in 1964 for past years, the 
Adega proved unsatisfied with relying solely upon selling primarily to the Junta. 
Thus, the Adega diversified and began to sell its products directly to the 
consumer in order to have both increased control over prices, and to better serve 
the consumer and farmer.28 
                                                                                                                                            
1964", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5. 
25 Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o 
Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico 
de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 
1965) pp. 1, 4. 
26 Ibid. 
27 "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercicio de 
1964", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5. 
28 Luis Graça, "O President da Adega Cooperative Anuncia-nos o Êxito Alcançado com o 
Engarrafamento do Vinho e Fala-Nos Com Esperança Duma Nova Indústria Europeia (Fabrico 
de Sumos de Frutas com Base No Mosto do Vinho)", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 81 (February 28, 
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 In spite of certain retail limits, the Adega boasted a healthy membership 
base. In a town of roughly 20,000 people in the 1960s, 712 farmers and their 
families were associated with Lourinhã's Adega in 1965. The Adega’s President 
admitted, at the time, that this level of association created a demand from 
membership to process grapes that the Adega could not meet.29 Such intense 
demand from membership fueled efforts by Adega directors to seek further 
expansion. José Bento Gonçalves, member of the managerial board, “great 
worker of the Cooperative Movement in Portugal,” and President of the 
Cooperativa dos Empregados da Companhia dos Telefones [Cooperative for 
Telephone Company Workers], argued at the Adega’s 1965 general meeting that 
the expansion of the coop in Lourinhã was essential in allowing farmers to sell 
directly to the consumer market.30 
 The democratization of access to markets and resources that was a 
consequence of membership expansion also demonstrates that the Adega 
offered Lourinhanense farmers an opportunity to engage in civic life based on 
economic activity. In other words, individual access to the public arena was 
achieved through economic means, suggesting that citizenship valued by the 
government in the 1960s was based on financial contributions to society. The 
Adega offered a number of economic advantages, but only to those who could 
contribute to the whole that the coop represented. According to the official 
                                                                                                                                            
1965) pp. 1, 4. 
29 Ibid. 
30 "grande obreiro do Movimento Cooperativa em Portugal". "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia 
Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercicio de 1964", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 88 (April 
25, 1965) pp. 3, 5. 
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discourse, being a member of an Adega Cooperativa offered grape producers a 
number of competitive advantages. As a member of an Adega, farmers would 
deliver a load of grapes to the Adega’s processing facility on a fixed day. From 
there, the Adega’s technicians weighed your grapes and within a few days 
contributors would receive an allowance totaling roughly half of the value of their 
grapes. In addition to receiving a portion of the value of their grapes almost 
immediately, contributors to the Adega did not need to worry about the storage or 
sale of their wine, which was often a problem as farmers lost inventory due to 
small or dirty private facilities. As dirt entered the aging wine, it ruined it. Further, 
the pooling of financial resources and inventory allowed farmers to sell their wine 
at the optimum market price without having to worry about local competitors. The 
Adegas would help then, to standardize wine production and sales in the 
region.31   
 An unintended consequence of Adega members using their economic 
resources to engage with the civic sphere was that it allowed them to engage in 
democratic political practices. For example, members were given the opportunity 
to take part, and vote, in general assemblies. Of the roughly 700 members, 
approximately 200 associates of the Adega attended the General Assembly on 
the 4th of April, 1964 to discuss and vote on the Relatório e Contas do Exercicio 
de 1964 [1964's budget], and elect a new managing body on a three year 
mandate. The Relatório e Contas do Exercicio was unanimously accepted and a 
                                                
31 "Adega Cooperative: Falam os Directores", Alvorada, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) pp. 8, 
3. 
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motion praising the past board's work passed. The meeting ended with a wine 
tasting session featuring the Adega’s products.32 Several positions were voted 
upon with the election of three members to the managerial board with an 
additional three substitutes. Three members were elected to the fiscal council. 
Those elected to the Assembleia Geral – an advisory body in the Adega – 
included Lourinhã's mayor, João Ferreira da Costa.33 Although unanimous 
support and electing people like Ferriera da Costa to a leadership role are 
unremarkable voting results, the process – the voting itself – is an interesting 
example of democratic activity in dictatorship Portugal.  
 In contrast to these political contributions, the Adega had little impact on 
Lourinhã’s long-term economic development and landscape beyond its own 
facility, which stands to this day on the outskirts of the town’s core. The Adega’s 
headquarters enjoyed a concentrated burst of investment in the early 1960s. 
Outside of the town center,34 the Adega’s processing facility and central offices 
opened in 1962. As a notice in the Alvorada explained to associates on July 29, 
1962, the Adega's new offices had been open since July 12, 1962 at the 
warehouses of the Junta Nacional do Vinho, next to the future site of the Adega 
                                                
32 "Adega Cooperativa: Assembleia Geral; Nova Direcção; Relatório e Contas do Exercicio de 
1964", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 3, 5. 
33 The following individuals were elected: Dario Pedro de Matos, José Bento Gonçalves, and 
António Guilherme Gomes to the managerial board. Their substitutes were Dr. José de Carvalho, 
Horácio da Silva Alves, and Jorge Pedro Simões Silva. The fiscal council consisted of Joaquim 
Pedro de Carvalho, Lino Cordeiro Reis, and José Diogo Leitão. Horácio Duarte Caxaria L. 
Henriques and Luis Rei Venâncio were elected along with Ferrira da Costa to the Assembleia 
Geral. See: Ibid. 
34 As has been discussed, Lourinhã underwent a geographic shift between 1960 and 2000. As 
new institutions emerged the town developed, building a new town center around new institutions 
like the courthouse, market and a new town hall. However, the Adega’s facilities are still well 
outside Lourinhã’s geographic center of power.  
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Cooperativa.35 The facility’s first phase, when completed, housed 3,600 barrels of 
wine. Although these barrels were to service the farmers affiliated with the 
Adega, not all contributed consistently. In the year of the move, the Adega 
expected, for reasons that were not known, only forty-two of the two hundred 
producers to deliver their grapes for processing.36 Despite the underwhelming 
participation by members, the next phase of development in the Adega went 
ahead the following year. At a general meeting of the Adega Cooperativa in 
Lourinhã in March 1963, attended by representatives from the Junta Nacional do 
Vinho, it was announced that the national office would fund the second phase of 
construction on Lourinhã's Adega. This would bring the total storage and 
production capacity to around 6,000 barrels.37    
 Unlike its later counterparts in other industries, however, the Adega did 
not – or perhaps was not permitted to – conduct educational sessions for its 
farmers nor did it contribute to the proliferation of technology amongst its 
members. Although offering farmers access to its equipment, the Adega 
maintained a monopoly on the production of wine in its facilities. Farmers, via the 
Adega, enjoyed access to larger markets and the consolidation of commercial 
activity well beyond what individuals could have hoped to achieve on their own. 
The Adega, then, represented a first step towards agricultural desenvolvimento in 
Lourinhã. In contrast, Lourifruta, which emerged in the late 1960s, in many ways 
                                                
35 "Notiçia: Adega Cooperative da Lourinhã", Alvorada, ano II, no. 30 (July 29, 1962) p. 8. 
36 "Adega Cooperative: Falam os Directores", Alvorada, ano II, no. 31 (October 14, 1962) pp. 8, 
3. 
37 "Informação Vinícola", Alvorada, ano II, no. 41 (April 14, 1963), p. 7. 
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out of the Adega, represented a much more robust contribution to Lourinhã’s 
modernization and democratization. 
 
** 
 
 Founded in 1967 by twenty-four local farmers,38 at its height in the 1980s, 
Lourifruta would export fruit and vegetables across Europe before closing its 
doors in the late 1990s. For thirty years, Lourifruta was, in many ways, the crown 
jewel of Lourinhã’s agricultural sector, attracting national attention and actively 
participating in Lourinhã’s civic life and development. Like the Adega 
Cooperativa, Lourifruta made contributions to the economic and political life of 
Lourinhã, as well as the geographic landscape. However, Lourifruta was much 
more active in the civic life of Lourinhã than was the Adega.  
 As the Adega Cooperativa was consolidating the wine market in Lourinhã 
in the early 1960s, discussions turned to what could be done to improve 
conditions for fruit producers who, according to many locals, made up the 
backbone of one of Portugal's most important fruit growing regions.39 The sites of 
organization for a fruit coop early on were the Adega Cooperativa and the local 
church. In April 1965, in a meeting of the General Assembly of the Adega 
Cooperativa, a call was made to all those interested in the creation of a fruit coop 
                                                
38 "A Lourifruta e o seu Historial", Alvorada (February 1978) pp. 1, 3. 
39 “A Associação o Cooperativismo: Esta na Orem do Dia, e ai de Nôs de não Evoluirmos nesse 
Sentido!...", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) pp. 1, 3. 
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to meet on Sunday, May 2, "directly after Mass". That scheduling would allow as 
many local farmers to participate as possible. The Alvorada explained that, “we 
did not have doubt” that Lourinhã’s farmers would support the initiative 
demonstrating that a coop was a “part of their desire and would help achieve 
[members’] interests and aspirations.”40 In attendance at the inaugural meeting 
were a number of individuals involved with the Adega Cooperativa, Mayor 
Ferreira da Costa, agricultural engineer Pimenta de Castro, and Horácio 
Caixaria, who was an official from the local farmers' guild and the Adega. At the 
time, the mayor remarked that the farmers and notables had come together with 
two goals. First, they sought to produce top quality fruit in excellent conditions. 
Second, interested parties aimed to commercialize the fruit industry in 
Lourinhã.41 After the mayor, Pimenta de Castro spoke about some of the 
problems with developing the fruit sector while not upsetting the industrialization 
of agriculture and the development of the tourist industry in Lourinhã.42 From this 
meeting, a commission made up of many of the same people involved in the 
Adega was established to organize a fruit coop. Other notables like the mayor 
and João Marques (himself the future head of the administrative commission 
established in 1974 to manage the CML during the revolution), were also part of 
the commission.  
                                                
40 Luis Graça, "A Caminho da Organização Cooperativa da Nossa Lavoura: Vai Propor-se a 
Criação de uma Cooperativa Frutícola no Concelho, em Reunião de Lavradores a Realizar no 
Próximo Domingo", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 1, 5. "parte do seu desejo e vem 
ao encontro dos seus interesses e aspirações." 
41 "Com a Criação da Cooperativa de Frutas: Novas Perspectivas se Desenham para o Futro da 
Nossa Lavoura", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) p. 1, 5, 6. 
42 Ibid. 
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 After being founded in 1967, Lourifruta’s operations expanded rapidly in 
the 1970s. In 1971, it began storing fruit in a refrigerated facility and selling 
farmers' products. When business operations began, Lourifruta had the ability to 
store up to 1,600 tons of produce.43 In 1974, Lourifruta expanded operations 
beyond fruit production and sales to include activity in the horticultural sector.44 A 
year later in 1975, the fledgling coop expanded its refrigeration facility to facilitate 
the storage of up to 2400 tons of produce.45 By 1976 Lourifruta had begun to 
process fruit and place products into frozen packages for commercial sale.46  
Lourifruta’s rapid development helped the cooperative organization to 
grow. By winter 1978 Lourifruta had 390 members, 35 full time employees and 
the ability to store up to 2,400 tons of fresh produce and 1,000 tons of frozen 
produce. They could package up to 2.4 tons of frozen produce per hour. The 
organization sold 25.000$00 contos of fruit and 20.000$00 contos of horticultural 
produce. Lourifruta’s notoriety and success was evident in that they held spots in 
two prominent Lisbon markets, the Mercado de Frutas do Cais Sodré and the 
Mercado Abastecedor do Rego in Lisbon. They also sold directly to 
Lourinhanense in the villages of Laranjeiro and Areia Branca. In addition, 
Lourifruta exported their product to England and Belgium.47  
 Economic success gave Lourifruta the reach and cultural cachet to 
contribute to Lourinhã’s development both economically and politically. The 
                                                
43 "A Lourifruta e o seu Historial", Alvorada (February 1978) pp. 1, 3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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public image put forward by Lourifruta demonstrates that the coop’s management 
was aware of their political and social influence. A Lourifruta director’s meeting in 
1971 reveals that the coop considered it self an “industrial project for the benefit 
of the Concelho’s agriculture.”48 Ten years later a Lourifruta advertisement 
explained that the coop’s eight hundred farmers worked in “defense of farmers 
and the consumer.”49 
 
Figure 16: A Lourifruta advertisement from 1981 explains that the 800 farmers associated 
with the coop worked in “defense of farmers and consumers.” “Advertisement: 
Lourifruta”, Alvorada, (April 1981) p. 14.  
 
With Lourifruta’s elite and establishment origins in the Adega Cooperativa, 
and with the mayor’s involvement, the coop embarked on an economic program 
                                                
48 "empreendimento industrial para beneficio da agricultura do concelho." In: "Certidão da Cópia 
da Acta da Reunião da Direcção Realizada em 5 de Abril de 1971", Obras Particulares: Alvarás 
de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), (Arquivo Municipal da CML, Lourinhã, PT).  
49 “Advertisement: Lourifruta”, Alvorada, (April 1981) p. 14.  
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aimed at helping local farmers compete in existing national and international 
frameworks. Thus, remaking economic relationships, as opposed to economic 
systems in a revolutionary sense, was at the center of Lourifruta’s efforts 
between the 1960s and 1980s. At a meeting of fruit producers in 1965, in 
Lourifruta’s pre-history, Pimenta de Castro argued that because farmers were 
absorbed in tending their fields, they had little time to think about the problems of 
commerce and sale of their product.50 Sr. Pimenta further argued that the 
commercialization of fruit in Portugal had been “fundamentally missed.” He 
concluded that only strong groups or business blocs could overcome the 
problems of under-commercialization and catch up to more advanced 
producers.51 A coop was an available and important tool to build a strong bloc. 
Working in a cooperative would help small farmers to gain access to industrial 
techniques that would grant them the ability to deliver new products to the 
market. Such techniques would see farmers earn income from "sub-products" 
(fruit juice for example), which would be an important source of future income.52 
More generally, local news outlets described a fruit coop as beneficial, both 
economically and socially. Readers were told that the coop would allow 
Lourinhã's farmers to alleviate social problems by tapping into markets and 
profits that would end “economic mediocrity, misery and frustration.”53 
                                                
50 “A Associação o Cooperativismo: Esta na Orem do Dia, e ai de Nôs de não Evoluirmos nesse 
Sentido!...", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 89 (may 9, 1965) pp. 1, 3. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Luis Graça, "A Caminho da Organização Cooperativa da Nossa Lavoura: Vai Propor-se a 
Criação de uma Cooperativa Frutícola no Concelho, em Reunião de Lavradores a Realizar no 
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 A more coherent argument linking a fruit coop to giving farmers an 
advantage in the capitalist system was published in the year of Lourifruta’s 
founding. An open letter in the Alvorada, addressed to “dear men of the 
countryside,” discussed the need for a fruit cooperative in Lourinhã. The author 
complained that farmers were forced to take prices for their fruit below cost just 
“so they would not lose everything.” Consumers, "with well paying jobs" often 
took advantage of low prices, leaving the farmer with little. In Lourinhã, for 
example, the author pointed out that a kilo of pears could cost less than 3$00 
escudos. The author went a step further and wondered, “who knows, maybe 
some would have to take less than 2$00 [per kilo for their pears]?” The argument 
was that fruit farmers had been taken advantage of because there had been no 
collective resistance to such exploitation. Some, the letter insisted, did not resist 
because they felt that they lacked the economic resources. However, he 
continued, many “had more than enough wealth to not worry about immediate 
bills.” Put more simply, the letter insisted that greater coordination between 
farmers would help the situation without needing an out and out revolution in 
commercial relations. Simple resources, like access to refrigerated storage, 
would alleviate some pressure. Such equipment would allow farmers to prolong 
the life of their product and sell directly to the consumer, skipping the middleman. 
A cooperative would help farmers procure such equipment and gain a 
competitive advantage. The letter lyrically concluded by saying that it had been 
                                                                                                                                            
Próximo Domingo", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 88 (April 25, 1965) pp. 1, 5. 
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three years since the idea for a fruit cooperative had emerged, three years of 
discussion, and three years “in which others earned what we deserved to be 
earning!”54 
 Once Lourifruta began operations, it moved quickly to position itself as a 
strong competitor in national and international markets. With facilities opening in 
1972, Lourifruta would store fruit for local farmers. The fruit would be kept in 
refrigerators and sold when the market yielded the best price. Lourifruta’s 
farmers became both producers and retailers, eliminating the middleman, and 
helping locals compete with foreign producers, “especially the French”, whose 
agricultural sector was a strong European challenger. Such facilities would also 
allow farmers to extend their selling season well past what the climate would 
allow.55  
Lourifruta's business success garnered national attention within a decade 
of the opening of its facilities. In the fall of 1981, members from the national 
government including the Prime Minister, Pinto Balsemão, and the Minister of 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Fisheries, Bento Gonçalves, came to Lourinhã to 
tour the coop’s facility. Along with these elected officials, representatives from 
other coops from across Portugal also toured Lourifruta to examine the "quality" 
of the export and sales operation. Lourifruta was considered a prime example of 
                                                
54 "quem sabes, tavlez alguns a tenham entregado por menos de 2$00?"; "são mais que 
suficientemente ricos para não se preocuparem com receitas imediatas." In: "Argumento que 
Poderá Ser um Certo Estimulante Aos Fruticultores/A Constitução da Cooperativa dos 
Proprietários Fruticultores do Concelho da Lourinhã", Alvorada (October 22, 1967), pp. 1, 4. "que 
outros ganham o que devia ser ganho por nós!" 
55 "Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã", Alvorada (October 1971) p. 7. 
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Pinto Balsemão's government's emphasis on “work and export” as its economic 
priorities. The news report reasoned that, “when Portugal imitated Lourinhã, the 
Portuguese economy would be saved.” Because Lourifruta “exported much more 
than it imported,” it was considered to be an exemplar of “progress.”56 The Prime 
Minister explained that he had chosen Lourifruta as the site of his meeting with 
the country’s fruit industry representatives because of its “dynamism that placed 
[the coop] at the highest level in the country.”57  
 Lourifruta continued to lead the local economy through the economic 
challenges of the 1980s. Of particular concern to Lourinhã’s farmers in that 
decade was Portugal’s entrance into the European community. A 1987 
colloquium for example, encouraged farmers to continue to change how they 
conducted business. Ostensibly, the colloquium was called to teach farmers 
about the various sectors that would be affected by Portuguese entry into the 
EEC. The colloquium was sponsored by: Lourifruta; the Civil Governor Dr. 
Afonso Moura Guedes (a long time pundit in local outlets like the Alvorada); 
deputy Eng. Vasco Miguel of the national assembly; Lourinhã's mayor, José 
Manuel Custódio; and the Caixas de Crédito Agrícolas.58 The head of Lourifruta, 
Luis Damião,59 opened the colloquium by welcoming the various participants.60 
                                                
56 "quando o País [Portugal] imitar a Lourinhã a economia Portuguesa estará salva." "Primeiro-
Ministro na Lourinhã", Alvorada (October 1981) pp. 1, 5.  
57 "dinamismo que a coloca no nivel das melhores do país." Ibid.  
58 "Lourifruta no Contexto de Adesão de Portugal à CEE," Alvorada (January 1987) p. 4. 
59 Damião is my Godfather. A cousin of my father’s, Damião is a farmer with minimal education. 
Having lived in Canada in the early 1980s, Damião and his family returned to Portugal to take up 
positions in Lourifruta and the Caixa de Crédito Agrícolas while starting and maintaining a 
national horticultural production and sales operation – Soflor.  
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He explained that Lourifruta's twenty years of existence were evidence of the 
ability of local farmers to adapt to new challenges and situations. Accession to 
the EEC was just the latest of these changes. Damião also repeatedly returned 
to the need to sell to regional, national and international markets and to identify 
emerging opportunities.61 According to the Alvorada, many of the speakers 
emphasized the need to produce uniform goods and to attractively package it: 
products were “bought with the eyes. The better [a product] was presented, the 
more it sold.” This, the article suggested, indicated a "change in mentality" and 
advances towards “new goals [and] to be culturally developed.”62 Given 
Lourifruta's success, it was argued that the coop should lead the local fruit and 
horticultural industries in promoting local products on the international stage.63  
By 1991, Lourifruta was considering using greenhouses to grow tomatoes, 
peppers, potatoes, eggplants, and "other plants in that family." Lourifruta's 
facilities were used to hold a regional colloquium on raising these crops, which 
were grown on "more than seventy percent" of the local Torres Vedras region's 
agricultural land. Over one hundred and fifty farmers, scientists, and industry 
representatives met to attend the sessions. These included: a session on 
fertilization of tomatoes and peppers, led by Eng. Ana Maria Simões from the 
Rebelo da Silva laboratories; a talk on new methods and technologies used in 
growing tomatoes, peppers, and eggplants by Eng. Miguel Rato from Hortícola 
                                                                                                                                            
60 "Lourifruta no Contexto de Adesão de Portugal à CEE," Alvorada (January 1987) p. 4. 
61 Ibid. 
62 "é compra com os olhos. Melhor apresentação mais venda."; "novos quereres ou seja um 
desenvolvimento cultural." Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
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Oeste; a session on soil and its proper uses by Eng. Coimbra Dias from 
Neoquímica; a seminar on preventing diseases and plagues that typically struck 
tomatoes, potatoes and eggplants by Eng. Gralheiro from Rhone-Poulenc in 
order to "maximize" the commercial value and quality of the product. The 
meeting ended with a session by a Dutchman on how potatoes were grown in 
Holland. Paulus Squerk from Wolf & Wolf brought two representatives from his 
Dutch seed company with him to present the Dutch experience in potato growing 
and suggest some potato varieties that might work well in Portugal. These 
sessions all emphasized lessons from abroad, the use of scientific techniques 
and the professionalization of farming techniques.64  
 Lourifruta’s opening of access to economic markets through organization 
and modernization went hand-in-hand with the internal political democratization 
of decision-making. However, whereas Lourifruta was consistent in its mission to 
equalize farmer access to economic benefits, political benefits for Lourifruta’s 
farmers did increase after the Estado Novo fell. Damião for one is an example of 
these new opportunities. Emerging as a strong figure in Lourifruta and the Caixa 
de Crédito Agrícola in the 1980s, the minimally educated farmer who returned to 
Lourinhã after an attempt to emigrate to Canada in the early 1980s, did not have 
the socio-economic background or education to rise under the Estado Novo. This 
shift characterized how Lourifruta’s leadership evolved from elite and managing 
members of the Adega Cooperativa and the CML in the 1960s, to local farmers in 
                                                
64 Eng. Ana Tabarra Santos, "Jornada-Debate as 'Solanáceas' na Lourifruta", Alvorada (Oct., 27, 
1991).  
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the 1980s. 
 Lourifruta and other cooperatives represented what many considered an 
advanced way to organize the polity and funnel civic participation in the 1960s. 
According to Pimenta de Castro in 1965, association was “natural and 
spontaneous.” Association was the means by which more advanced fruit 
industries in France, Switzerland, Holland, and Italy had developed. The 
individual way of life had to be left behind. As Sr. Pimenta argued, “today [1965], 
the isolated farmer had no value.” He implored farmers to, “with their colleagues, 
fight for their interests.”65 Even the public general meeting was celebrated as a 
forum for participation, so long, of course, as it was productive and respectful. 
Indeed, after the first meeting of farmers interested in creating a fruit cooperative 
in Lourinhã, the Alvorada gave a glowing review of the proceedings stating that, 
“contrary to the pessimistic predictions of some doubters of the gentleness of 
others, the meeting of fruit farmers was a success.”66 
 However optimistic and inclusive the organization was about grassroots 
contributions to in the 1960s, the leadership in creating Lourifruta remained in the 
hands of local elites. The commission assembled – made up of men from the 
Adega Cooperativa’s management board and people from the CML – had felt it 
necessary in 1965 to proceed only with the blessing of government offices like 
                                                
65 "hoje [1965], o lavrador sózinho nada vale"; “com os seus companheiros, lutar com eles pelos 
seus interesses." In: “A Associação o Cooperativismo: Esta na Orem do Dia, e ai de Nôs de não 
Evoluirmos nesse Sentido!...", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 1965) pp. 1, 3.  
66 contrariando as previsões pessimistas de uns e contrapondo-se ao quietismo de outros, a 
reunião dos fruiticultores redundou em pleno êxito." "Com a Criação da Cooperativa de Frutas: 
Novas Perspectivas se Desenham para o Futro da Nossa Lavoura", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 89 
(May 9, 1965) p. 1, 5, 6. " 
 209 
the Direcção-Geral dos Seviços Agricolas and organizations like the Grémio da 
Lavoura before heavily recruiting local farmers. The Direcção-Geral dos Seviços 
Agricolas pledged their support for a fruit coop and the commission moved 
forward with recruiting fruit farmers to join the initiative.67 The participation of the 
guilds also remained an important consideration.68 In fact, Lourifruta’s origins, 
along with the Church and Adega Cooperativa, can be found in the local grémio. 
At the conclusion of the first public meeting for what would become Lourifruta, 
the Grémio’s head, Horâcio Caixaria, remarked that a fruit coop had already 
been discussed and approved by other bodies, yet the blame for it not being 
created sooner was not only the state's, but “ours” as well. Caixaria was 
reminding readers that they had to take responsibility for failures in the civic 
sphere. As president of Lourinhã's Grémio, Sr. Caixaria had invested over 350 
contos over the five years of his administration in order to create a fruit coop. In 
the end, the project died because it lacked a building and the interest to purchase 
the necessary land.69   
 After the dictatorship fell, Lourifruta’s leadership and priorities became 
more inclusive of those who would not have had the opportunity to take a formal 
leadership role under the Estado Novo. One of Lourifruta’s prominent leaders in 
                                                
67 "Desenvolvimento: A Cooperativa de Frutas em Plena Organização", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 91 
(June 13, 1965).  
68 In contrast, some, like José Bento Gonçalves, a noted expert in Cooperativismo, expressed the 
importance of autonomy from the grémios of any future fruit coop. Still others, like José Marques, 
disagreed suggesting that dialogue between the grémios and any future coop was not only 
essential but in the spirit of cooperativism. "Com a Criação da Cooperativa de Frutas: Novas 
Perspectivas se Desenham para o Futro da Nossa Lavoura", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 89 (May 9, 
1965) p. 1, 5, 6. 
69 Ibid. 
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the early 1980s, António Augusto da Costa, who was elected Secretary of 
Lourifruta in 1984,70 for example, was an uneducated local farmer who worked 
his modest landholdings on his own.71 Such men, like Damião, could not have 
hoped to gain this level of stature under the Estado Novo.  
 Lourifruta’s economic and political contributions to liberalization also 
guided how it contributed to the development of Lourinhã’s social, cultural, and 
urban landscape. Lourifruta’s most visible impact on Lourinhã is the large 
warehouse and office complex that sits, even today, at the south end of Praia da 
Areia Branca. Dominating the landscape overlooking the beach, the facility that 
once donned the Lourifruta moniker, represented, at the time of its construction 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, an ambitious commercial venture for Lourinhã, 
Lourinhanense farmers, and the CML. The nascent Lourifruta bought land from 
the CML in 1968 to build refrigerators, a reception and office area along with 
storage and production facilities to process fruit into other products. The land had 
been sold by the CML to Lourifruta as an investment in "municipal heritage."72 
From this, a supportive relationship between Lourifruta and the CML emerged, 
meaning that each institution, at times, pushed the other to develop new methods 
and infrastructure. Both institutions became officially invested in the facility’s 
                                                
70 "Lourifruta-Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã, Cooperativa de Responsabilidade Lda", 
Alvorada (February 1984) p. 13. 
71 António Augusto was my paternal grandfather. He was illiterate and never had the opportunity 
to retire, still working his land when he passed away at the age of 62. Although he contributed 
well above his station to Lourifruta, holding a leadership role his entire life – this included being 
the coop’s negotiator when the original land was purchased from the CML for Lourifruta’s facility, 
for example – he was not the prototypical dictatorial elite.  
72 "Reunião 28/Out./1968: Cedência do Terreno à Cooperativa de Fruticultores de Lourinhã", 
Livro da Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, no. 28, pp. 34-35. 
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success when the CML received a letter from the Direcção-Geral da 
Administração Politica e Civil in October 1968 concerning the transfer of land 
from the municipality to Lourifruta. The Administração Politica e Civil wanted an 
extra clause added to the sale’s contract that gave Lourifruta a maximum of two 
years to build its facility under threat of fines.73 From plans for Lourifruta’s 
building at the south end of Praia da Areia Branca we can see not only political 
and economic liberalization as priorities, but we can also see how the building 
pushed development of the area and institutions around the building.  
 
Figure 17: Lourifruta's mammoth facility stands today. It had a short life as the 
headquarters for Frutas, AB but was sold to an international hotel and resort developer 
who has not, despite plans, done anything with the land. Lourifruta’s Headquarters c. 
2013. Collection of the Author, (August 2013). 
                                                
73 Ibid. 
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Figure 18: Lourifruta's facility. In this picture, the developer’s billboard from the early 
2000s is as dilapidated as Lourifruta’s former office, storage and manufacturing facility. 
Lourifruta’s Headquarters c. 2013. Collection of the Author, (August 2013). 
 
 The building’s layout and amenities demonstrate Lourifruta’s dual 
economic and social purpose, as well as the importance of indoor and monitored 
space. Upon opening, Lourifruta's building consisted of an industrial refrigeration 
facility with three chambers that totaled 1,600 tons of storage capacity, a 
reception area, and a “social zone” with an office, washrooms and a 3,021 
square meter dining and cooking facility. The second level had two balconies 
totaling 480 square meters, and a public area of 26,331 square meters.74 The 
                                                
74 "Lourifruta to Exm. Snr. Presidente da Câmara  Municipal do Concelho de Lourinhã",  March 9, 
 213 
building would have an entrance big enough for bicycles, along with an area to 
park them as well. This would include a ramp leading up to the general platform 
upon which, facilities would be built for: a fruit processing station; social services 
for individual workers; administrative services; offices and garages to repair and 
maintain equipment; and “other buildings that could be considered necessary.” 
However, the fruit processing and storage station, an Estação Fruteira, would be 
the principal facility and would have its own designated entrances and transit 
way.75  
The Estação Fruteira was the facility's focal point. Thus, it was meant to 
occupy the majority of the indoor space. The Estação’s lobby would include two 
levels and house the social and administrative services. A potential workforce of 
fifty women and twenty-five men would use this space.76 Lourifruta's social 
services area would comprise: a foyer; changing rooms for men and women; 
washrooms, including showers, for men and women; an atrium; a kitchen with 
dish washing facilities; a dining area; and a meeting room.77 The building 
proposal explained that the changing rooms, washrooms and shower rooms for 
men and women would be separate. Eating and cooking areas, on the other 
hand, would be a mixed space.78 The administrative facilities, comprising the 
                                                                                                                                            
1973. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara 
Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal. 
75 "Mémoria Descritiva e Justificativa: Cooperativa dos Fruticultores da Lourinhã - Lourifruta", (c. 
1970). Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da 
Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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second of the three areas of the Estação, would include: a vestibule; a reception 
area; an archive; an executive office; a manager's office; offices for workers in 
various fields; and meeting rooms. The executive office would be on the second 
level and, importantly, have windows overlooking the facility's Estação Fruteira.79 
The refrigerators (the final area of the Estação) would be on the north side of the 
building in the back. This would initially have three rooms with the possibility of 
future expansion.80  
 Planning the exterior and orientation of the facility was heavily dictated by 
the building's surroundings. Beyond a planned parking lot lined with trees next to 
the administrative offices,81 Lourifruta’s planners built around the existing 
environment. Given that no access roads existed, the building's orientation would 
be dictated by the property's terrain.82 The facility was oriented on the property 
so as to take advantage of the “natural protection against the ocean winds” 
offered by the sand dunes to the east.83 It was also important that the pavement 
used at the facility "did not transmit vibrations." In addition, the proximity of the 
sea called for the use of materials that were resistant to salt.84  
 Underlying plans to work around the environment was the glaring problem 
of road access. In their evaluation of the construction of Lourifruta's facility, the 
Junta Distrital de Lisboa did not oppose the building or its location. However, it 
                                                
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 "protecção natural contra os ventos do mar." Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
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did express concern over access to the facility. In February 1971, the Junta 
Distrital warned that such a facility would see “intense vehicle movement”  that 
would require “adequate access.” In fact, the District explained that in its study it 
found that the area lacked the necessary roads. Thus, it insisted that a road be 
added to the project between Lourinhã and PAB to specifically service the facility. 
The District judged, in the end, that the CML should resolve the situation. 
Further, any future application was to take such considerations into account.85  
By March 1971, as predicted by the Junta Distrital, Lourifruta was 
admitting "difficulty" in building its facility. Following up on a conversation that 
took place with town officials, Lourinhã's mayor received a letter from the 
struggling coop. In the letter, dated March 5, 1971, Lourifruta explained that they 
would face a problem with funding the construction of their new facility and the 
necessary roadway infrastructure. The added expense was too much for 
Lourifruta to bear without help. Thus, the coop was writing to formally ask the 
CML to collaborate in expanding the road that went through Areia Branca to the 
facility. Specifically, the coop asked for “help aligning the road, and other 
technical considerations.”86 In response to the problem with the construction of 
the access points for the facility (as identified by the Distrital de Lisboa) in 1971, 
                                                
85 Mário Mota de Magalhães/Junta Distrital de Lisboa, "Construções Particulares - Concelho de 
Lourinhã, Cooperativa dos Fruticultores da Lourinhã - Lourifruta: Construção de uma Estação 
Fruteira, Parecer dos Serviços," Lisboa, February 4, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 
228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal. 
86 "colaboração em alinhamentos [of the road] e outros assunte técnicos." In: "Cooperativa de 
Fruticultires da Lourinhã, Lourifruta to Senhor Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Concelho da 
Louinhã", March 5, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo 
Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.  
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Lucínio Guia da Cruz, Lourinhã's mayor, invited Lourifruta's directors to meet 
with him to discuss a possible delay in the construction schedule and a bank loan 
for 140.000$00 to fund the delay.87 This episode would be resolved, in part, by 
the CML helping Lourifruta's application for credit with the Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino for 140.000$00 escudos in 1971.88 This was not the first time, nor 
would it be the last time, that Lourifruta and the CML collaborated. Both parties 
built their relationship upon the recognition that Lourifruta was an important 
institution whose “social and economic interest” contributed to Lourinhã.89 In fact, 
building Lourifruta and its facility would prove to be an ongoing concern 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the facility continued to expand.  
 The most successful and prominent production coop in Lourinhã’s history, 
Lourifruta’s contributions to the economic, political and modern landscape of the 
town between 1967 and the 1990s are clear. Further, the turn to more 
educational activities in the 1980s, mentioned above, also demonstrates how 
Lourifruta shifted along with the agricultural sector as a whole from development 
through cooperative organization towards development through technology and 
science. Lourinhã’s most prominent post 1974 cooperative organization, 
                                                
87 "adiçional de prorrogação do prazo da execução da obra" and receive a "garantia bancária, do 
valor daqueles trabalhos, no total de 140.000$00." In: "O Presidente da Câmara, Lucinínio da 
Cruz to Presidente da Direcção da Cooperativa de Fruticultores de Lourinhã", July 5, 1971. 
Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara 
Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal.  
88 "O Presidente da Câmara, José Maximo da Costa to Exm. Snr. Gerente da Agência do Banco 
Nacional Ultramarino", April 5, 1978. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa n. 3 
(1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal. 
89 "O Presidente de Direcção de Cooperativa de Fruticultores da Lourinhã to O presidente da 
Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã", June 26, 1971. Obras Particulares: Alvarás de 165 a 228, Caixa 
n. 3 (1971), Arquivo Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal. 
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Louricoop, would stand as a prime example of the renewed emphasis on 
modernization through science and technology in 1980s Lourinhã. 
 
** 
 
 
 Buoyed by Lourifruta’s success, local agricultural elites sought to 
supplement production coops with cooperative purchasing power through what 
would become Louricoop. In the open political environment that emerged after 
1974, local farmers made a presentation to the CML in June 1976 arguing that a 
certain piece of municipal land, the former site of the Grémio da Lavoura where, 
appropriately, the monthly feira was held, would be ideal for the headquarters of 
their new agricultural purchasing coop. Although this required alteration of the 
town's urbanization plan, the CML decided to develop plans to have equipment 
moved to the proposed site.90 Just three months later, in September 1976, the 
CML approved the establishment of the facility for the Cooperativa Agrícola da 
Lourinhã (Louricoop).91 This physically and symbolically represented the end of 
support for the former guilds as the method of organization preferred by 
authorities in Lourinhã. Further, by placing it at the site where feiras had been 
held, the CML also gave Louricoop a fitting historical heritage as a commercial 
                                                
90 "Reunião 9/Jun./76: Instalações para a Cooperativa Agrícola", Livro da Actas da Câmara 
Municipal da Lourinhã, no. 33 p. 28. 
91 "Reunião 28/Set./76: Implantação das Instalações da Cooperativa Agrícola",Livro da Actas da 
Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, no. 33, p. 73. 
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entity that would go some way in neutering cooperativismo as a potential 
challenge to capitalist relations by the 1990s. That said, like its predecessors, 
Lourifruta and the Adega Cooperativa, Louricoop contributed to Lourinhã’s 
development as it modernized and moved closer to Europe. For example, it, like 
its forerunners, ran courses for local farmers, such as 1986’s courses on treating 
apple and pear trees, on fertilizing the land and potato growing, which included 
lessons on new varieties of potatoes and the opportunities that existed to sell 
them. Courses would focus on experimenting with new crop varieties and 
cultivating techniques.92  
Louricoop was not a retail operation, but instead distributed supplies 
directly to farmers as a purchasing cooperative. Thus, Louricoop argued, it had a 
simple objective, to “serve the farmers” by helping them operate with lower 
expenses through collective and bulk buying.93 This also meant, of course, that 
Louricoop was interested in its own sales and profits. On May 11, 1980, 364 
members of the general assembly of Louricoop elected their board of governors 
for 1980/81. In 1979, Louricoop had welcomed 443 new members, and increased 
sales by thirty percent. The board was mandated with the continuation of the 
building of Louricoop's headquarters and engaging in various activities that would 
promote the coop, increase their membership and thus, their sales base.94  
The commercialism and social concerns evident in other coops were 
                                                
92 "Noticias da Louricoop", Alvorada (March 1986) p. 5.  
93 Ibid.  
94 "LOURICOOP: Cooperativa de Apoio e Serviços de Concelho de Lourinhã, SCRL", Alovrada 
(June 1980) p. 2.  
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evident in how Louricoop planned its central facility. Louricoop's building was to 
be located about five hundred meters from the northern exit of Lourinhã proper. 
This site was chosen, in part, because of its proximity to the site of the CML's 
projected storage facilities. The facility would be divided into three parts. One 
was reserved for the distribution of the products they would carry like pesticides 
and other equipment. Another section would store grain, rations and seeds.95 
The office, to be equipped with electric lighting, air conditioning, heating and 
telephones, would be in a two-story annex attached to the warehouse. The first 
story would include a waiting room, a store and a showroom for agricultural 
equipment, a reception area with a wicket to serve the public, and a community 
information board.96 The second floor would house a multi-purpose room with a 
library where one could view movies. The multi-purpose room was next to a 
meeting room, and a room for general cultural activities. The second floor would 
also include an office for the coop's bookkeepers, two archives and offices for an 
agricultural consultant, one for an inspector, and one for a sales manager.97  
                                                
95 Memória Descritiva, August 24, 1978. Proc. no 937/78: Louricoop - Construção de Armazém e 
Escritório, Lourinhã. "Obras Particulares: Sem Alvarás de 935 a 946, Caixa no. 4 (1978).  
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. See also: "Louricoop to Senhor Presidente da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã", 
September 4, 1978. Proc no. 932/78: Looricoop, Construção de um Stand para Exposição do 
Máquinas Agrícolas." Obras Particulares: Sem Alvarás de 697 a 934, Caixa no. 3 (1978). Arquivo 
Municipal da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Portugal. 
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Figure 19: A farmer rides his tractor to Louricoop's annual festival in 1984. "Lourinhã em 
Festa – Louricoop em Exposição", Alvorada (May 1984) pp. 1, 2.  
 
However, Louricoop’s most celebrated contribution to Lourinhã in the 
1980s was the annual expositions it held throughout the decade. Louricoop’s 
expos were elevated to nothing less than a Lourinhã-wide event: when Louricoop 
held an expo, Lourinhã was “em festa”.98 A poem published by the Alvorada, 
described 1984’s expo as a chance for “Government officials, ministers, doctors, 
presidents, priests, and senhores” to mingle together, celebrate, and fraternize. 
The expo, which had been “pretty” and had been a place where “animals were 
shown, … should remain in the memory and be inscribed in the history of the 
Concelho da Lourinhã.”99 
 As an important part of Lourinhã’s social and commercial calendar, 
Louricoop’s expos became an event that highlighted the aspects of modern 
                                                
98 "Lourinhã em Festa – Louricoop em Exposição", Alvorada (May 1984) pp. 1, 2.  
99 See: Figure Error! Main Document Only. A pome published about Louricoop's 1984 Expo. 
Ibid. 
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1980s Lourinhã. In the spring of 1983 (April 30, May 1 and 2), Louricoop held its 
first exposition. Its purpose was to “show modern agricultural machines and 
equipment and the varied products for farming.” The expo would also include 
cultural events like “children’s design competitions [with] the theme, 
‘Cooperation’.” Visitors would also be able to attend exhibits by the local 
firefighters, the local grupo foclórico, and seminars on Lourinhã in “the context of 
national agricultural.”100  
 1984’s expo followed suit with 1983's expo and demonstrated how to 
organize and run events that blended cultural and commercial priorities. 
Louricoop's 1984 exposition was heralded as an event that improved the social 
environment of Lourinhã for its people and the 4,100 members of Louricoop. 
Despite the fact that it was reported not to have made any money, exhibitors 
were “happy” with how the organizers improved the festival year after year, 
explaining that, "this was how to run a festival."101 The animal pavilion was 
“without doubt” the most visited at the 1984 exposition. The children especially 
liked it. These same children, it was explained, had their best moment, however, 
competing in athletic competitions on the expo's first day. The children’s athletic 
exploits revealed “some great physical prowess.”102 The public test for expertise 
in tractors was also reported as being a highlight. However, many were 
                                                
100 "mostragem das modernas máquinas e alfaias agrícolas e dos mais variados produtos para a 
agricultura"; "desenhos infantis subordinado ao tema <<Cooperação>>"; "a Lourinhã no contexto 
de agricultura nacional." In: "Louricoop - Exposição 83: Presidente da Republica na 
Inauguração", Alvorada (April 1983) pp. 1, 19.  
101 "Lourinhã em Festa - Louricoop em Exposição", Alvorada (May 1984) pp. 1, 2.  
102 Ibid.  
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disappointed that it was not run as a competition. Such a competition would have 
cultivated the “cooperation necessary” to be successful in operating such 
machinery.103 The expo also featured demonstrations in sheep shearing with 
electronic sheers. This allowed visitors to see the service and facilities that 
Louricoop could offer.104 Finally, there was also a soccer match between the 
Selecção das Cooperativas and the Velha Guarda. The match was a friendly 
affair that ended in a sardine BBQ.105  
 1984 best demonstrated modern Lourinhã by privileging indoor – and 
thus, monitored – space. In 1984 Louricoop cooperated with the Casa 
Misericórdia da Lourinhã. This allowed Louricoop to expand the expo's size and 
to offer visitors over one hectare of indoor exposition space. The indoor space 
was considered optimal. Not only was it “well illuminated”, but it also allowed 
organizers to house all the local organizations that contributed to the "culture, 
closeness, and cheerfulness" in Lourinhã in one, easily accessible place for 
visitors. Under one Louricoop sponsored roof, visitors found a one stop shop for 
the institutions that were important in Lourinhã: the Caixa de Crédito Agricola 
Mùtuo de Lourinhã, the Adega Cooperativa, Lourifruta, the MAFA da Lourinhã, 
the Instituto António Sérgio, the pavilhão da Holanda, the local firefighters, the 
Banda da Lourinhã, the Escola Preparatória, Adapecil, the Museum, the Rancho 
de Ribamar a Acção Católica Rural, and the Alvorada with spaces in the expo’s 
                                                
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid. 
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privileged and indoor facility.106  
 The following year, in 1985, Louricoop’s expo would continue with the 
usual themes. The Minister of Agriculture, two secretaries of state and the Civil 
Governor of the region would open the expo, which would include performances 
by the local rancho focloríco, a soccer match, tractor and equipment 
demonstrations, and a car show.107 However, as Portugal prepared to enter the 
EEC, Europe and education became important additions to the expo, which 
would continue to be a theme in 1986. Louricoop's 1985 expo included a number 
of events meant to educate local farmers. These included visits to an 
“experimental field", a colloquium about admission to the EEC, and an 
“information session about association and rural development.108 In March 1986, 
Louricoop took Europe a step further, insisting that their upcoming expo would 
have a different aspect from those in the past. It would engage more directly with 
the “new reality: our accession to the EEC is a fact!” Quoting "O poeta", 
Louricoop explained that “the whole world is composed of change” and that they 
too wanted to "evolve". This meant applying a “new dynamic to our organization.” 
Therefore the expo had to have an "international element". Louricoop felt it had a 
responsibility to present new ways of producing and selling in the new 
environment. So, pavilions in 1986 would focus on means of “development 
[towards] more interesting and productive work.”109  
                                                
106 Ibid.  
107 "O Ministro da Agricultura e a Banda da Armada na Louricoop", Alvorada (April 1985) pp. 1, 2.  
108 Ibid. 
109 "nova realidade: a nossa adesão à CEE é um facto!"; "todo o mundo é composto de 
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 Louricoop, to its credit, also insisted upon applying new techniques in 
agriculture throughout the year. For example, 1983/84 was considered a banner 
year for Lourinhã's agriculture. Potato sales and production fuelled this surge. In 
potatoes for seed alone, Lourinhã sent out more than thirty thousand sacs that 
production year. This success was a result of Louricoop's experimentation with, 
and dissemination of, new potato varieties. Louricoop's success was attributed to 
having developed and executed an effective plan of action. Louricoop had also 
undertaken a program of experimentation with soil enrichment and land 
organization under the supervision of Dr. Catanho Meneses. Meneses and his 
team had experimented with twenty varieties of potato in various conditions in 
order to learn which varieties yielded the best quality product in Lourinhã’s soil. 
They observed the resistance of various varieties to diseases and fungus, and 
the growth period of each variety. From the success of the past year and the 
experiments of Dr. Meneses, Louricoop recommended a certain variety to its 
farmers. After consulting the membership and the consultative council of 
Louricoop, the coop purchased its potato seed for 1984/85.110 
 
** 
 
 Although the Adega Cooperativa, Lourifruta and Louricoop were either 
                                                                                                                                            
mudança"; "desenvolver um trabalho mais interessante e mais produtivo." See: "Louricoop 
Comunicado", Alvorada (March 1986) p. 5.  
110 "A Agricultura no Concelho - Louricoop: Importadora e Distribuidora de Batata de Semente", 
Alvorada (Ocober 1984) p. 3. 
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closed or relegated to minor roles in Lourinhã’s economic and social landscape 
by the 1990s, there is no doubt that they were important agents of modernization 
between the 1960s and 1980s. Each made economic, political and urban 
contributions to Lourinhã, acting in response to difficulties faced by local farmers. 
The rupture in the Portuguese political landscape in 1974 did indeed make room 
for more direct involvement in civic associations like coops, however, to say that 
the fall of the Estado Novo was a significant moment in the cooperative 
movement in Lourinhã would be difficult. Although coop leadership did open after 
1974, membership and participation was already open and based on economic 
criteria from the beginning. The significant change in the coop movement instead 
can be found in a changing emphasis on how to best help farmers, which came 
in the 1960s. In the early years, cooperative organization and the mutual sales 
and production themselves were the highlights of cooperative hope. By the end 
of the period, the emphasis shifted towards education and improved techniques 
used by individual farmers. 
 Another way to look at the change in the cooperative movement is to note 
that it changed from focusing on the group and collective economic and social 
action, to focusing on the individual and liberal capitalist business. Given how 
Lourinhã’s agricultural industry developed, it is hard to argue that liberal 
capitalism was ever threatened, despite what some leftist actions in other parts of 
Portugal during the Revolution might suggest. Portugal’s modernization and 
development, as undertaken originally by the Estado Novo, continued to shape 
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the country well after European social democracy came to Portugal. What can be 
said is that this process accelerated after 1974 as Portugal embraced Europe. 
 In the next section of my dissertation, I turn to the 1980s in Portugal, 
culminating in the opening of Lourinhã’s new municipal market. Acclaimed as a 
‘modern’ institution in Lourinhã, it was said to introduce a “new Lourinhã, a 
Lourinhã of European Integration.”111 What made it modern above all, was the 
indoor and electrified environment it offered. Like the agricultural cooperatives, 
this institution was granted cultural importance. First, however, I will turn to 
discussing the political and cultural importance of both electricity and water, and 
the civic engagement those services inspired, before examining the market and 
central square in the final chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
111 ‘Novo Mercado Municipal Inauguração está Próxima: Com Custos Globais de Cerca de 3,500 
Contos’, Suplemento Alvorada: Informação Municipal, (February, 1989), iv. 
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5. Water, Electricity and Community Organization 
 
 
 
In 1959 when electricity – at the time considered a daily tool for some and 
a "dream for others" – came to the freguesia of Toxofal in the Concelho of 
Lourinhã, a local poet, Mariano Vicente, published the following verse in the 
Alvorada: 
It was one time, one place;  
Which [one] would be embarrassed to ask [for];  
The right to look;  
 
At the people who would want;  
They asked and cried so much;  
Toxofal, in truth;  
Which, finally came; to have electricity!"; 
 
Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!;  
We are in a day of celebration;  
That a more modest land;  
Does not like to be darkened; 
 
Eh! Eh! Eh! Eh!;  
Boys they sing;  
Who until they feel the beat;  
Here inside the heart!1 
 
Seven years later on July 4, 1966, Toxofal celebrated its anniversary with electric 
lighting. Manuel Rodrigues, writing in the local newspaper – by then the Alvorada 
that had been founded in 1960 – explained that he would never forget the 
support from the 1950s and 1960s mayors of Lourinhã, Srs. Capitão Simões 
                                                
1 Era uma vez um lugar; Que envergonhado pedia; A justiça dum olhar; Ao povo que pretendia; 
Tanto pediu e chorou; O Toxofal, na verdade; Que, afinal acabou; Por ter electricidade!; Ah! Ah1 
Ah! Ah!; Estamos em dia de festa; Que a terro por mais modesta; Não gosta de escuridão; Eh! 
Eh! Eh! Eh!; Rapaziada é cantar; Que até se sente pulsar; Cá dentro o coração! See: Dr. Mário 
Batista Pereira, "A Inauguração da Electricidade no Toxofal", Alvorada (June 11, 1995), p. 7.  
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Belo and João Ferreira da Costa respectively, who helped bring electrical lighting 
to Toxofal. The congratulations then finished with a reprinting of Sr. Vicente’s 
poem, this time dropping the final two verses.2 The Alvorada returned to the topic 
of Toxofal’s electrification in 1995, producing a retrospective of the completion of 
electrical infrastructure for the parish thirty-six years earlier. Dr. Mario Batista 
Pereira recalled the "popular contentment" from all at the "marvelous source of 
energy." Electricity, so Pereira asserted, was "so important and so used daily by 
all Portuguese to ... turn night into day." 3  
Similar sentiment about "such magic"4 was also an important way for 
Lourinhanense in the 1960s to come to understand electricity. The Alvorada’s 
Reporter X wrote in 1964 that, "fluorescent lamps …made night into day", a feat 
that was clearly important for the center of Lourinhã. As Reporter X continued, it 
had been three or four years since Lourinhã had seen, “with delight”, fluorescent 
lamps installed on the main road. Those were meant to have been the first set of 
lamps in a series of new installations that were to replace the gas streetlights. 
However, “unhappily”, the new lamps had yet to appear. The author conceded 
that for those who had lived with gas illumination in the streets and who had only 
enjoyed electricity in their homes for a short while, the need for new fluorescent 
lamps on the streets would seem to be an "exaggeration or a luxury." But those 
who said this, Reporter X complained, were the people who did not live in central 
                                                
2 Manuel Rodrigues. "Salve a Electricidade!", Alvorada (July 26, 1966), p. 6. 
3 Dr. Mário Batista Pereira, "A Inauguração da Electricidade no Toxofal", Alvorada (June 11, 
1995), p. 7. 
4 Ibid. 
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Lourinhã, only coming into the center during the day to visit or conduct business.5 
 In deploying Sr. Vicente’s poem on a number of occasions, linking electric 
lighting to happiness, safety and, to be sure, a right in both the authoritarian and 
democratic years, Lourinhanense discourse over the last fifty years shows that 
seemingly mundane infrastructure remained socially and politically charged. 
Indeed, academics agree that electricity had a profound effect on the home and 
social processes in the Western world. With the United States leading the way in 
the 1920s, power tools, heating and cooling appliances, and full electrical lighting 
– which had begun to emerge in earnest in the 1880s when gas lighting was first 
challenged as the primary utility in American cities – changed domestic work and 
improved the home environment. However, as Historians like Ronald Tobey 
lament, a scholarly consensus emerged in the 1980s that treated residential 
electrical modernization as a phenomenon of consumerism linked to mass 
production economies.6 In other words, Tobey correctly, in my estimation, 
complains that these scholars denied the public and collective aspects of 
electrification – and by extension, infrastructure – reducing the process to 
                                                
5 Repórter X, "A Iluminação da Lourinhã", Alvorada (October 25, 1964), p. 8. “lâmpadas 
fluorescentes, que quase faziam da noite o dia.” 
6 See: Ronald C. Tobey, Technology as Freedom: the New Deal and the Electrical Modernization 
of the American Home. (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996) 2-3. For examples 
of work that Tobey considers part of the consumerist thesis of electrical modernization see: Ruth 
Schwartz Cowan, More Work for Mother: the Ironies of Household Technology from the Open 
Hearth to the Microwave (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983); Harold L. Platt, The Electric City: 
Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 1880-1930 (Chicago, IL; University of Chicago 
Press, 1991); David Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940 
(Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press, 1991); Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in 
Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); and, Mark 
H. Rose, Cities of Light and Heat: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in Urban America (University 
Park, PENN: Pennsylvania State University, 1995).  
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rationality and individuality.7 In fact, as Tobey argued, there is nothing rational 
about consumerism as people purchase well beyond utility. Tobey wanted to 
move the debate to politics and, in his case, the political struggle over the 
American home in the 1920s and 1930s, suggesting that Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal and its household revolution – raising American residences to minimal 
standards of shelter, electrical access (80% of homes in the USA were not 
serviced by electricity in the mid 1930s), and, as such, improve the “qualities of 
the families in those homes” – was the base of a national revolution of social 
modernization that mobilized popular and political groups and discourses in 
support of various positions.8  
 Similarly, historians like Jonathon Coopersmith have looked to 
government policy as a driver for electrification. In his work, Coopersmith argues 
that Russia’s revolutionary Bolshevik government made electricity its top 
infrastructure priority in order to differentiate itself from the Tsarist regime that 
preceded it.9 He also agreed that electricity had a cultural and social role: “As 
well as changing night into day, electrification transformed capital markets, the 
military, manufacturing, the spatial geography of cities, and many other facets of 
… life.”10 Likewise, both the domestic and the public context in Estado Novo 
Portugal, and particularly in settings like Lourinhã, became important sites of 
social and cultural negotiation through infrastructure. As Irene Vaquinhas and 
                                                
7 See: Tobey, Technology as Freedom, 3-4. 
8 See: Ibid, 2-6. 
9 See: Jonathon Coopersmith, The Electrification of Russia, 1880-1926.  (USA: Cornell University 
Press, 1992). 1-3. 
10 Ibid, 1. 
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Maria Alice Pinto Guimarães tell us, order was at the base of governance in both 
the public and the private spheres. This meant organizing time, activities, and 
social and moral attitudes in clearly demarcated spaces: a popular Portuguese 
maxim reminded all that, “a proper place for each thing and each thing in its 
place.” In order to put each thing in its place, homes needed to be clean and 
accessible.11 By the late 1960s, this was to be done in Lourinhã with electronic 
appliances, lighting, and running water. 
 This chapter examines the political and cultural meanings of water and 
electrical infrastructure in Lourinhã from the late 1960s into the 1980s and how 
the development of that infrastructure intersected with the town’s political culture 
against the backdrop of Portugal’s shift from dictatorship to democracy. 
Generally speaking, we think of dictatorial subjects as benign and passive. 
Particularly in the Portuguese case, where the Estado Novo’s subjects were 
under-educated and widely distracted with maintaining their subsistence way of 
life, our understanding of citizen engagement with development and politics is 
that civic engagement was a low priority for people. However, this chapter, and 
indeed this entire dissertation, reveals a strong private commitment to 
participating in public development of infrastructure and services. At the heart of 
this chapter is a sample of private letters received by Lourinhã’s mayor – as we 
will see, he was the point of contact with the municipal government for many – 
                                                
11 “Um lugar certo para cada coisa e cada coisa em seu lugar.” See: Irene Vaquinhas and Maria 
Alice Pinto Guimarães, “Economia Doméstica e Governo do Lar: os Saberes Domésticos e as 
Funções da Dona da Casa” in José Mattoso and Irene Vaquinhas, eds. História da Vida Privada 
em Portugal: A Época Contemporânea (Lisbon, PT: Circulo de Leitores, 2011), 211-213.  
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requesting electrical and water infrastructure. These letters were most common 
as a form of citizen/subject-government communication in the 1970s and range 
from demands for service to polite requests with offers of financial and labour 
contributions to the development of infrastructure. 
 From the context and negotiations framing these letters we can draw 
conclusions about the meaning of development and about political culture as 
Lourinhã and Portugal modernized and democratized. Electricity and water were 
sites of rapid development in Lourinhã, where improvements carried cultural as 
well as practical meaning. In addition, they were part of the larger series of 
events and developments forcing local governments like the Câmara Municipal 
da Lourinhã (CML) to further coordinate and modernize their processes: we see 
the role of private individuals, for example, decrease as other institutions 
developed to deliver service in the 1980s. As this chapter demonstrates, locals 
were actively engaged in the public realm under Portugal’s dictatorship. Even 
more striking, despite proclamations of a new participative political culture 
emerging after 1974, evidence shows that citizens took it upon themselves to 
engage in civic and infrastructure affairs more frequently and in more direct ways 
before 1974 than they did after.  
 The letter samples I highlight establish the cultural investment in 
infrastructure that underpins this chapter. As they represent an important aspect 
in the culturally charged development process in Lourinhã, the letters reveal 
some of the dynamics surrounding the relationship between subjects/citizens and 
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the Portuguese government as it transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in 
the 1970s. As I argue below, the coincidence of governmental and private 
priorities in infrastructure development between the 1960s and 1970s, opened 
space in the civic sphere for subject-citizens to participate in governmental affairs 
under Portugal’s dictatorship. After explaining the state of Portugal’s water and 
electrical infrastructure between the 1960s and 1980s and establishing the 
consistent importance of change and development in that period, this chapter will 
turn to a conversation about the political capital of Lourinhanense and how they 
engaged in development. What will follow is an outline of the cultural aspects of 
private engagement with infrastructure development: the ways in which people 
organized to engage; what arguments they made in their requests for service; 
and the source of their political currency in societal priorities in the landscape and 
the home. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the practical and 
institutional considerations of infrastructure development and civic participation: 
put plainly, private and governmental priorities ran up against an underdeveloped 
bureaucratic and governmental service delivery system that, as it advanced, 
came to supplant the role that private citizens enjoyed in the 1960s and 1970s in 
their landscape’s development.  
 
** 
 
 The 1980s, especially following Portugal’s entrance into the European 
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Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, were the beginning of a renewed and 
overwhelming makeover of Portugal’s infrastructure and economy. Like in the 
1960s, the economy grew in leaps and bounds in the 1980s and was buoyed by 
a new wave of foreign investment and aid from Portugal’s EEC partners that saw 
the country’s roads and infrastructure emerge and resemble what we see today. 
This included the building of Portugal’s first one thousand miles of highways to 
replace aging rail and local road networks. As David Birmingham so charmingly 
put it, with new roads Portugal’s “cities skipped with alacrity from the age of the 
electrical tram to that of the motor car without adopting either Dutch-style 
bicycles or Italian-style motor scooters.”12 Such tremendous change was evident 
at the private level as well. António Barreto has noted that the late 1970s and 
1980s in Portugal was a period of development in infrastructure providing running 
water, electricity, sewers and sanitation facilities. This led, Barreto continued, to 
an invasion in the latter part of the 1980s of modern household equipment in the 
Portuguese home. The years between 1987 and 1994, for example, saw the 
number of household telephones rise from 33% to 74%; electric washing 
machines from 44% to 74%; and, the number of households with video viewers 
rose from 15% to 40%.13 
Coastal and rural towns like Lourinhã were the chief beneficiaries of new 
national transport routes, local water networks and completed electrical lines. As 
                                                
12 David Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 200-201. 
13 António Barreto, Tempo de Mudança. (Lisbon, PT: Antropos, 1996), 76-77. 
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the Alvorada’s municipal supplement was riddled with photos of roads dug up for 
water pipes and sewers in the mid-1980s, Lourinhã’s mayor, Manuel Custódio 
announced in 1987 that the CML had completed the electrification of the 
Concelho.14 This was a large step in Lourinhã's modernization. As local 
economists, Mário Bairrada et al., have explained, the availability and 
consumption of electricity have long been considered markers of infrastructural 
modernity.15 In fact, by 1991, 96% of Lourinhã’s homes had electricity, 93% were 
attached to sewers, 90% had running water and 84% had a shower or bathtub.16  
 
Figure 20: Lourinhã road construction, 1987. This image comes from the Municipal bulletin 
printed with every issue of the Alvorada in the late 1980s. A prominent feature of these 
bulletins was the front-page images of infrastructure improvements from across the 
Concelho. See: "Informação Municipal", no. 2. Alvorada (January, 1987). 
                                                
14 “A Lourinha, na Senda do Progresso: Entrevista ao Presidente da Camara Municipal 
Conduzida pelo Director do Alvorada”, Alvorada, 593 (November 1987) 6. 
15 Mário Bairrada, et al., Perspectivas Para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinha.  (Lisbon, 
PT: Instituto do Emprego e Formacao Profissional, 1997) 28. Bairrada and his colleagues actually 
do use the term “modernidade” (modernity), and although they never explicitly define their 
rhetoric, their definition of modernity and modern in Lourinha indicates that they see modernity as 
being in a ‘modern’ environment: see Bairrada et al, 88-90. 
16 Ibid, 26-27. 
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Figure 21: Digging a trench for water infrastructure, 1987. In this photo, a mechanical 
digger digs a trench for piping. One will note the proximity of the equipment to existing 
houses, highlighting the advanced residential network around which basic infrastructure 
needed to be installed. See: "Informação Municipal", no. 2. Alvorada (January 1987). 
 The proliferation of infrastructure and household goods in the 1980s was 
matched in magnitude by the advancements of the 1960s. According to the 
national statistics institute (INE), per capita consumption of electricity in Portugal 
increased from 260.2 kWh in 1960 to 705.4 kWh in 1970 with steady year over 
year increases. Further, measuring in units of 1000kWh, INE reported that 
domestic consumption of electricity increased from 630,877 units in 1964 to 
1,062,639 units in 1970. In the same period, electrical use in the kitchen 
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effectively tripled from 44,575 units to 153,801 units. In addition to domestic 
consumption, INE reported, using 1000kWh units again, that electricity 
consumption for public lighting almost tripled from 67,319 units in 1960 to 
155,343 units in 1970. Although increase in water consumption did not match the 
rate of increase in electrical consumption, it nonetheless almost doubled in the 
1960s. INE reported that, this time using units of 1000 cubic meters of water, 
total consumption in Portugal increased from 96,935 units in 1960 to 177,984 
units in 1970.17 This increase in water and electrical consumption occurred at a 
time when Portugal’s population was stagnant. According to INE, between 1960 
and 1970 Portugal’s population declined marginally from 8,851,289 in 1960 to 
8,668,267 in 1970.18  
 However, a 1969 survey of Lourinhã’s infrastructure conducted by the 
CML with its eight freguesias reveals that these impressive figures concerning 
the spread of infrastructure in Portugal in the 1960s mask the reality that most 
people, certainly in Lourinhã, did not benefit from these services. Freguesias 
were asked to report, by neighborhood, on road access, electricity, water 
treatment facilities, garbage collection and cleaning services, and if they had a 
cemetery. Doing a tally of the survey’s results shows that of seventy-eight 
neighborhoods in the Concelho of Lourinhã, sixty had road access, forty had 
                                                
17 Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Estatísticas para o Planeamento: Continente e Ilhas 
Adjacente: 1960-1970 (Lisbon, PT: May, 1972). 113-114. 
http://inenetw02.ine.pt:8080/biblioteca/viewImage.do?me=view&key=supcod%3D1%26sercodg%
3D1%26iddoc%3D5343%26pagini%3D1%26pags%3D166%26pos%3D1 (accessed May 14, 
2013). 
18 Ibid, 29. 
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some form of electrical service, twenty-five had water treatment infrastructure, 
seven enjoyed garbage collection or cleaning services, and sixteen had a 
cemetery. As responses were hand written, freguesia officials were able to add 
addendums in the margins that show that respondents felt that an additional five 
neighborhoods needed road access, three areas needed electricity, thirteen 
needed water treatment, thirteen needed cleaning services, and two needed a 
cemetery.19  
 In addition, the survey reveals varied understandings of the meaning of 
the categories of infrastructure and no apparent patterns in the coincidence of 
certain types of infrastructure. For example, access to roads did not always mean 
that electrical infrastructure existed and vice versa: Vale da Viga reported road 
access but no electricity while Seixal reported electricity but no major road 
access.20 It is also interesting to note that in some cases under the category 
“energia electrica”, the ambiguous response “tem luz” [has light] (not necessarily 
indicating electricity at all) is used instead of the oft-used “tem” [has].21 As for 
water service, in Santa Barbara public fountains and washbasins were 
                                                
19 See: "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo 
Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
20 “Relação dos Melhoramentos Necesarios na Freguesia da Lourinhã no Concelho da Lourinhã”, 
1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo 
Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT).  
21 “Relação dos Melhoramentos Necesarios na Freguesia da Miragaia no Concelho da Lourinhã”, 
1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo 
Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT).  
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recognized as water treatment infrastructure.22 In Vimeiro, water treatment was 
needed because all “tourist centers had running water” and if Vimeiro was to take 
advantage of its assets as the site of the battle of Torres Vedras in which 
Wellington confronted Napoleon’s forces, such infrastructure was a must.23 On 
the whole, these responses reveal that water infrastructure, sewage and cleaning 
facilities were generally considered more desirable in 1969 than was electricity.24  
 The 1969 survey came at a time when infrastructure was a popular topic 
for the local paper, letters to the municipal government, and within the CML’s 
chambers. In the 1960s, roads and particularly the water supply were common 
topics while electricity became the dominant issue in the 1970s. As mentioned, 
the above-discussed 1969 survey was part of a larger evaluation of infrastructure 
conducted by the CML. In fact, roads and road repairs were the second area 
discussed in the CML's evaluation of its infrastructure in 1969. However, 
particular attention was paid to a road destined to link Ribamar to the fishing port 
in Porto Dinheiro. What made this a "necessary work" was the advantage it 
would bring to the fishermen in the area. This was considered a region where 
fishermen and workers lacked "decent working conditions" in comparison to other 
                                                
22 “Relação dos Melhoramentos Necesarios na Freguesia da Santa Barbara no Concelho da 
Lourinhã”, 1969. "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, 
pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
23 “Relação dos Melhoramentos Necesarios na Freguesia da Vimeiro no Concelho da Lourinhã”, 
1969. See: "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide 
pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal 
da Lourinhã, PT). 
24 See: "Obras Municipais: Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo 
Governo Civil de Lisboa", Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
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ports. Porto Dinheiro needed the road so that Lourinhã could fully exploit the 
resource. Exposing an awkward list of priorities in the construction process, the 
road had already been landscaped, had the decorative aspects installed, and 
had seen berms built to protect neighboring residential areas. The road’s budget, 
however, ran out before it had been paved.25  
 By the 1970s, when attention turned more towards electrical infrastructure, 
similar issues emerged. Despite not gaining significant steam until the 1970s, 
Lourinhã’s administration was aware of their infrastructural needs and appeared 
proactive about dealing with deficiencies. For example, as early as 1960, they 
had deemed the public lighting in Regueugo Grande deficient, and so launched a 
study on how to improve the situation.26 Deficiencies continued well into the 
1970s, as was the case with water infrastructure. A month after the Revolution in 
1974, the CML decided to launch an investigation into the parishes, which "still 
did not benefit from the electrical network." The goal was to assess what was 
needed for those places to have electricity.27 Further, electrical conservation and 
energy consumption was on an ongoing concern in 1976. Monitored by the 
Ministry of Industry and Technology, Lourinhã's administration was reminded that 
electrical usage would be limited during Christmas and the New Year. This would 
be part of the energy savings initiative announced in 1975's Diário do Governo, 
                                                
25 CML, "Relatório das Obras Necesárias no Concleho", July 22, 1969. "Obras Municipais: 
Diversos; Relatório das Obras necessárias no concelho, pedide pelo Governo Civil de Lisboa", 
Arquivo Correspondencia, 1973, proc. 17-e/19 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).  
26 “Reunião 23/11/60: Iluminação de Regueugo Grande", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã, No. 22. (1959-1961), p. 143. 
27 "Reunião 24/Maio/74: Electrificação total do Concelho", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal 
da Lourinhã, n. 31 (1973-1974), p. 177. 
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series 1, no. 17 of the January 21, and which was confirmed by a resolution from 
the Council of Ministers published in the Diário da República on July 6 1976.28  
 All this reveals the piece-meal and, at times, varied approach taken by the 
CML towards infrastructure development. A 1965 project for water infrastructure 
had first been proposed and developed in February 1951. A water treatment 
network, it was argued, would "lift the deficient conditions presented" in the 
parish of Lourinhã. However, as the Ministry of Public Works explained in 1965 
the project did not, as originally conceived, resolve issues caused by Lourinhã's 
landscape, namely the inconsistent flow of the river leading from the south of the 
Concelho through Lourinhã parish and out to PAB, not to mention the need to 
elevate the water storage and filtration facilities in relation to the water outlets in 
homes and businesses. Installing a fully elaborated water system – as opposed 
to piece-meal improvements – was needed from the start, ministry officials 
argued, as their population and water consumption projections assumed that 
between 1965 and 2005, consumption would nearly double with the population. 
They assumed that Lourinhã parish's population of 1,350 in 1965 would balloon 
to 2,450 by 2005 while each inhabitant's water consumption would rise from sixty 
liters per day to one hundred liters per day.29 The CML moved quickly to address 
the Ministry’s concerns. Halting work until the problems related to construction, 
                                                
28 "Secretaria de Estado da Industria e Energia: Direcção Geral dos Serviços Eléctricos to Pres. 
da Comissão Administrativa da CML", November 26, 1976. "Electricidade: Diversos; Poupança 
de Energia", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-B/3 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
29 Ministerio das Obras Públicas, Direcção Geral dos Serviços de Urbanizaão, "Informaçåo ao 
Exmo. Engenheiro Director Geral", November 2, 1965. "Revisão da Rede de esgotos de 
Lourinhã", Arquivo Corresspondencia 1965, proc. A-12/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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including what the ministry noted, repaving of certain areas, lack of water supply 
and “protests and complaints" from the population, the CML explained that they 
would move forward with work as part of the projects related the 40th anniversary 
of the May 28, 1926 celebrations. That way, the CML could "honour" the 
Concelho and the national government, augmenting the "brilliant period" as much 
as possible.30 
 The apparent lack of overall planning, coupled with the rapid proliferation 
of infrastructure, caused service problems for the CML and national government. 
An August 1973 note from the Secretary of State for Industry explained that the 
budget for the proliferation of electrical infrastructure was stretched as the 
number of projects underway (185 as of August) already matched the total 
number of projects for all of 1972. As such, the Secretary was informing 
municipalities that the application process for projects would be altered slightly. 
"Normally", obtaining the license for work would be the final phase in the 
process, however, applicants would be required to obtain work permits "in 
advance." In addition, the ministry would not accept applications during the 
remainder of August and September, unless it was for work that "absolutely" 
needed to be done, in order to clear the backlog.31 In a continuing effort in late 
1973, the national body responsible for coordinating the development of electrical 
                                                
30 "Pres da. CML to Sr. Ministro das Obras Públicas: Revisão da Rede de Esgotos de Lourinhã", 
December 2, 1965. "Revisão da Rede de esgotos de Lourinhã", Arquivo Correspondencia 1965, 
proc. A-12/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
31 Ministério da Economia, Secretaria de Estado da Indústria, "Nota", August 9, 1973. "Obras 
Municipais: Electrificações: Projectos de Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 
37-D/18 (Arquivo Muniipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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infrastructure (the Secção-Geral dos Serviços Eléctricos) established their 
priorities in terms of which projects were to be favoured in 1974. First, "new 
works" were preferred over expansions or renovations of existing infrastructure. 
Second, all applications were required to list all participating parties up front. 
Next, all things being equal (including cost), applications would be prioritized in 
the order which they were received.32 Especially after the revolution, as 
Portugal’s government changed, the quick rate of electrification and the creation 
of the necessary infrastructure could cause problems for the CML/Commission.33 
In October 1975, for example, the CML/Commission had to delay construction on 
the electrical infrastructure for the Quinta da Santa Catarina until an undefined 
problem with "various complaints" that concerned "the entire Concelho's 
network", could be resolved. However, the CML/Commission decided to grant 
final authorization for the Qta. Sta. Catarina project.34 The electrical company 
would also provide the CML with obstacles to service. Citing difficulties in 
supplying needed electricity in 1976, SEOL informed the CML that their supply of 
electricity would be cut at the source – as opposed to relying upon locals and 
their institutions to limit their usage. Cuts were made on a weekly basis, with the 
                                                
32 "Secção-Geral dos Serviços Eléctricos to Pres da CML", October 8, 1973. "Obras Municipais: 
Electrificações: Projectos de Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 37-D/18 
(Arquivo Muniipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
33 The CML was shaken up in July 1974 with the President being replaced by an administrative 
commission. Sr. Joaquim Pedro de Carvalho became the Secreary of the Treasury and Police. 
Sr. José António Simões took responsibility for hygiene, cleaning and the cemeteries of Lourinhã. 
Public Works and road maintenance became Sr. M. Vicente's office. Finally, Sr. Luciano de Jesus 
Ferreira took over as secretary for Markets, Sport and Tourism. See: "Reunião 27/Jul./74: 
Distribuição de Pelouros", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, n. 31 (1973-74), p. 
196. 
34 "Reunião 8/Out./75: Electrificação da Urbanização da Quinta da Santa Catarina", Livro de 
Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, n. 32 (1974-76), p. 16. 
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week of July 9, 1976 seeing electricity to Lourinhã cut for 1.3 hours a day in 
certain areas. The letter suggested that, "for reasons of security", the CML 
should consider using backup generators and electrical storage units in affected 
areas. Failing that, SEOL would be able to reestablish the energy supply at a 
moment's notice if an emergency arose. Such institutions and situations would 
involve hospitals, the firefighters, police, or "other justified cases."35 
 Problems in service development and delivery, as this chapter argues, left 
space in the civic sphere for private participation under Portugal’s dictatorship. 
As we will see, when the context is considered it is not surprising that the Estado 
Novo would open space for the public to practice civic engagement. This should 
be understood as part of a growing trend in the West after 1970. Urban planners 
and governments have increasingly accepted the importance of social support for 
projects to develop 'sustainable cities', for example. Luis Loures and Pat 
Crawford, although acknowledging that the role of the public has been 
considered in projects for the better part of the twentieth century, point to the 
1970s as a turning point in the West. They suggest that the increasing need for 
public consultation evident since the 1970s is likely due to the "growing 
dissatisfaction with the results of the technocratic administrative process" that 
has increased exponentially since 1945.36 Perhaps more importantly for 
governments like the Estado Novo, concerned with Portuguese identity and 
                                                
35 "SEOL to Pres. da CML", July 2, 1976. "Electricidade: Diversos; Poupança de Energia", 
Arquivo Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-B/3 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
36 Luis Loures and Pat Crawford, "Democracy in Progress: Using Public Participation in Post-
Industrial Landscape (re)-Development", WSEA Transactions on Environment and Development, 
9:4 (Sept., 2008), 794-795. 
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nation building, Loures and Crawford have argued that public participation in the 
development of the landscape encourages a sense of belonging to, and 
responsibility for, the larger social and cultural community along with the 
development of a common identity.37 
 The period that this chapter and dissertation deals with cannot be 
described as monolithic, and the local contemporary discourse recognized that it 
was a time of change. However, the importance of development and 
improvement remained constant. In the decade leading to the Carnation 
Revolution, progress and technology, for example, were considered important 
elements of a society that many were told needed improvement. The 1960s, as 
described by the Alvorada, were an age in which "our technical progress had 
made manual labour more profitable, cheaper, and produced better quality 
goods, easing human tasks." Sources continued to say that in Portugal, however, 
the proliferation of small industry, many times rudimentary, did not have the 
ability to switch from hand to machine production. They lacked the necessary 
capital to invest in machinery, and the Portuguese lacked the knowledge to apply 
technical know-how to production with new machinery.38 This was a “situation 
without exit” in which the baking industry found itself in the 1960s. The difficulty in 
mechanization and development constituted a crisis that needed urgent action to 
replace the old ways of producing bread with newer and more hygienic methods. 
                                                
37 Ibid, 794. 
38 "nos progressos da técnica que tornam a mão de obra mais rentável, mais barata, e a 
produção de melhor qualidade, facilitando por isso a tarefa humana." See: Alvaro Carvalho, "A 
Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 1965) pp. 1, 5. 
 246 
The scant profits made by the industry made this kind of investment impossible, 
so, bakers of each region created societies with quotas on production, ensuring 
that enough bread was produced while still maintaining prices. These actions 
were in response to a state initiative to industrialize the sector in which the 
government called upon each bakery to remodel its facility. In Lourinhã, this led 
to the founding of the Panificadora União Central da Lourinhã, in 1960.39  
 By the time the dictatorship was toppled in 1974 discourse surrounding 
development, looking to the future, and inclusion was being applied to political 
culture as well – even if, as this chapter will demonstrate, people had been 
participating in the civic realm before the revolution. Just three weeks after 25 de 
Abril, the Alvorada led with an article about the “Portuguese Family” (in this case 
the Portuguese polity) in the context of the revolution: other front page stories 
from that day included the next article in an ongoing series on Russia and a note 
from Portugal's Bishops about the revolution.40 The article led by saying how 
pleased it was at the "liberation of the Portuguese Family." Liberation did not only 
refer to political liberation. Instead, it referred to the fact that each individual had 
gained the power to "speak and feel" how they wanted, "without fear and 
interference in their problems" from what the article called, "the community in 
which they were integrated." Further, although one always had to be wary of 
interference from the "political chiefs", that fear was mitigated by certain political 
                                                
39 See: Alvaro Carvalho, "A Padaria Modelo da Lourinhã", Alvorada, ano IV, no. 90 (May 23, 
1965) pp. 1, 5. For more discussion on the cooperative bakery, see Chapter 3. 
40 See: "A Família Portuguesa em Reconciliação", Alvorada (May 12, 1974), pp. 1, 4; and, 
Alvorada (May 12, 1974), p. 1. 
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arrangements. The Alvorada was happy to be a "constant" in the revolution and 
in the program of "non violence" of the Junta de Salvação Nacional. Perhaps 
reflecting the fact that the Alvorada was an approved organ of the dictatorship, it 
argued that the new regime had to reject "vengeance" and extend clemency to 
those associated with the Estado Novo. In this way, the "Portuguese family 
[would be in] reconciliation."41 A year later, in the spring of 1975, when the first 
elections for Portugal's Constituent Assembly were held, the Alvorada proclaimed 
that the results demonstrated a "desire of the Portuguese people to participate … 
in the construction of the new society." What they voted for, the paper explained, 
was "progress", "liberty", and the rejection of extremes like "totalitarianism". The 
election results, which rejected dictatorship – a new communist one as well as 
the Corporatist one of the past42 – and embraced liberty, could not have come 
from, so the argument continued, an "uncultured or illiterate" people. The results 
showed a solidarity and willingness to help one another in progress and 
development.43 
 At the end of my period, elements of Lourinhã’s society were looking back 
in reverence on the years since the 1960s and the transformation that their 
environment had undergone. An editorial in 1995 explained that in the past 
century much had changed: electricity; transport; telecommunications; 
                                                
41 "A Família Portuguesa em Reconciliação", Alvorada (May 12, 1974), pp. 1, 4 
42 At the time the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) under Alvaro Cunhal, which had ties with 
the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), played a key role in governing Portugal in the months 
following 25 de Abril and represented one potential dictatorship and a combatant in what was a 
near Portuguese civil war in 1975. 
43 "A Cultura do Nosso Povo", Alvorada (May 25, 1975), pp. 1, 3.  
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information technology; medical advances; industrial and agricultural 
advancements; and changes in commerce and tourism. These developments, 
the editorial continued, were coupled with revolutions in governmental and 
political practices, tension between the Church and State, revolutions, wars and 
colonial independence, emigration, an “explosion” in schooling, and Portuguese 
integration with Europe. The consequences of all these shifts were nothing short 
of the alteration of modes of thought, of the lives and feelings of people, families 
and communities. Agriculture, for example, did not need the human labour it 
once did. Instead, the agricultural world needed people who could understand 
the language and formulas of the new commercial challenges facing the sector. 
Farmers needed to understand chemical uses (for fertilizers, insecticides, etc.) 
and how to organize and work efficiently. In the end, farmers, and 
Lourinhanense, needed to keep two things in mind when navigating the modern 
world. First, they had to remember and be proud of their heritage, recognizing 
that they played an essential role in society. Second, they had to integrate new 
technology, had to continue to organize in defense of their culture, work with a 
critical eye always looking to improve, and to be attentive to the "signs of the 
times with creativity" in creating new habits and ways of life and new ways of 
doing business. Citizens should "be more democratic and better prepared" to 
contribute to "our land ... our life and our collective and institutions … in the 
interests of the community and the common good." Parents had to work for better 
schools. People needed "less television and more meetings." Finally, the editorial 
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concluded by reminding people to do more for "nossa terra", for "human 
relations", each day doing more for "people and for the community."44 
 However, what editorials like the one from 1995 fail to do is historicize its 
comments. Again, the fact that progress remained valuable in discourse and 
culture is important. Yet, many of the things that it asked readers to do (engage 
in community and contribute to its development) were things that Lourinhanense 
had been doing for decades.  
 
** 
 
Subject-citizens and government worked within a complex and shifting 
political culture to resolve infrastructure deficiencies. These actors’ struggles 
reveal important aspects of Portuguese politics as it transitioned from dictatorship 
to democracy. First, the letters that citizens submitted to the CML’s mayor reveal 
that under the dictatorship people both had political currency with officials and 
acted as bargaining chips between government agents. Whether letters were 
always successful in shaping action is not as important as the fact that they 
constitute a clear example of people engaging in civic affairs.  
 As mentioned, Lourinhanense engaged their local administration in the 
late 1960s and 1970s by writing letters about infrastructure, asking for assistance 
in unresolved repair issues or for new service. Sometimes they offered resources 
                                                
44 J.B. "Editorial", Alvorada, (February 26, 1995) p. 1. 
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to help resolve requests, sometimes they simply invoked ‘need’ or ‘lack of 
service’ to justify their demands. Neither argument seems to have affected the 
result of the request. I shall return to the arguments used by letter writers later. 
For now, what is important is that people asked, revealing that they felt they had 
power with officials. What follows will consider from where they derived this 
power, how they chose to spend it, and a discussion of some of the institutional 
effects the exchange between officials and citizen-subjects had on political 
mechanisms and culture.  
 Although the sea change in Portuguese politics around the Revolution of 
1974 eventually secured political freedoms and responsibilities for Portuguese 
citizens, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the Portuguese did not possess 
a level of political responsibility, and thus power, before 1974. This is particularly 
true when it came to individual health and the individual’s environment. As early 
as 1964 the message was clear: it was up to the people themselves to create a 
healthy environment. Locals were not to wait for authorities to provide clean 
water. They were to be sure to live near a fountain if they did not have running 
water in their homes. Further, they were to have their water chemically tested, 
again, not waiting for the government to test it for them.45 
That said people were not left without direction in how to monitor 
resources. The Alvorada's pedagogical function was evident in all sorts of areas, 
including in instruction of how to protect water supplies. In 1966, for example, it 
                                                
45 Lima Bastos, "Educação Sanitária A Casa", Alvorada, ano IV, no, 76 (October 25, 1964) p. 8. 
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printed an article written by a nurse entitled "Water" which reminded people to 
have their well water analyzed, to keep their well covered to prevent bugs and 
other debris falling into it, to build their wells away from animal barns where 
manure was collected, and finally to boil drinking water (or treat it with chlorine) if 
they were not sure about its cleanliness.46  
As the dictatorship entered its final years and Marcelo Caetano’s modest 
liberal reforms were beginning to change the country’s political culture, 
messages encouraging citizen-subject involvement were reinforced. At the end of 
the tourist season in 1972, for example, the Alvorada wrote about how the public 
needed to become involved in public sanitation. Taking inspiration from "one of 
the more illustrious (and newer) deputies in the National Assembly, Dr. 
Magalhães Mota" who had spoken about people's responsibility for self-learning 
and acquiring information, the Alvorada talked about the need for Lourinhanense 
to take responsibility for the care of the town, especially in the tourist season. 
Information was to be made available by the CML and the Junta de Turismo, but 
citizens were responsible for consuming it. This meant that Lourinhanense had to 
attempt to develop “new habits, new actions leading to a new way of thinking 
and, finally, a new life for the people of Lourinhã." Lourinhanense were to look to 
Lisbon for an example, where local officials had invested “thousands of contos” in 
infrastructure and citizens were using that infrastructure to its fullest potential: in 
                                                
46 Enfermeira Lima Basto, "A Água", Alvorada (April 24, 1966), p. 3.  
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this case, the writer was discussing Lisbon’s new public trash receptacles.47 
Such discourse continued after the Revolution and into the 1980s. As late as 
1981, Lourinhanense were reading that two important aspects of public hygiene 
– sewers and clean roads – were still lacking in many places across the 
Concelho. Without such "important improvements", the population’s wellbeing 
deteriorated. In addition to improvements in infrastructure, citizens needed to 
learn about the advantages of sewers and running water, lighting, and what 
equipment was still needed in their areas. Above all, citizens needed to be 
"implicated" in the "responsibilities and worries of their governments." Citizens 
needed to encourage and mobilize support for improvement: the best asset they 
had was the "public manifestation … of alarm" around problem areas. The 
Alvorada’s writer, Francisco Curto, concluded by saying that he had "confidence" 
that he would not "be frustrated by [the] indifference [of the people]."48 
 Such discourse, however, was not rooted solely in a belief in the 
importance of public participation in civic affairs. Although we should not discount 
that such a sentiment existed, even under the dictatorship, we must also 
recognize that municipalities needed private resources in order to complete 
projects.49 For example, a project with a total cost of 4,797 contos developed by 
                                                
47 "Lixos / Colaboração do Público / W.C. Públicos: Precisa-se duma Nova Mentalidade 
Colaboradora da Parte de todos Nós", Alvorada (August 13, 1972), p. 8.  
48 Francisco Curto, "Moledo: Não Tem Esgostos Nem Ruas Asfaltadas; Apenas a Principal e 
Muito Deteriorada", Alvorada (October 1981), p. 13.  
49 Indeed, many have discussed local administrations' reliance upon both administrative 
resources from regional and national governments, as well as private cooperation in lieu of the 
ability to apply direct taxes on local constituents. See: Rui Afonso Lucas and João Francisco de 
Magalhaes Ilharco, “The Role of Public Administration in the Consolidation of Democracy in 
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the Serviços de Fomento da Junta Distrital de Lisboa for the sanitization of Praia 
da Areia Branca and Seixal was presented to the CML in the summer of 1968. 
The mayor informed the CML that this project would be possible only with the 
financial participation of the property owners and landlords in Praia da Areia 
Branca and that participation had to be solicited with the help of the "grupo de 
Amigos da referida Praia."50 Moving quickly, by 1969, the Civil Governor of 
Lisbon and the Direcção de Urbanização de Lisboa had completed its sewers 
and water treatment station in PAB and Seixal and were asking the CML to pay 
the share of the work they had approved in the project's development plans. The 
CML responded to the Civil Governor's letter and explained that it would indeed 
forward the necessary funds (2,400 contos), in part because of the contributions 
of homeowners in PAB – Seixal, however, was not mentioned, perhaps reflecting 
the very different socio-economic makeup of each village.51 
 In fact, in the 1960s and early 1970s, some institutions and offices in 
Lourinhã reflected a growing concern for public opinion that went beyond 
financial contributions to projects.52 One such institution was established in 1968 
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when the CML created a commission to investigate what areas needed electricity 
and lighting – "our dream". A targeted area for infrastructure was the 
neighborhoods of Pregança in Santa Bárbara. Despite the commission setting 
aside 21.000$00 escudos, since the residents of that area were "too poor" to 
contribute to the work, the job remained too expensive to complete: early 
estimates came in just short of 500.000$00 escudos.53 However, by 1973, the 
CML was making progress towards funding the project with national and regional 
bodies like the Distrito de Lisboa. Explaining that the area was densely populated 
and underdeveloped, the CML pleaded with the District's Governor for aid. The 
CML explained that the local population was "active and [would have] influence in 
the next elections."54 Similarly, Lourinhã’s mayor solicited the Secretary of State 
for Industry for support in electrifying Pregança. As with the Distrito, Sr. Lucinio 
Guia da Cruz (Lourinhã’s last pre-Revolution mayor) appealed to the secretary 
on political grounds explaining that electricity was a very important issue for the 
local residents and that bringing electricity to the area would have “good political 
repercussions”. Further, the fact that the residents of Pregança were the only 
ones in the area lacking electricity provided more tension in what da Cruz called 
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the “actual political moment.” The situation had been further exacerbated since 
1970 when the industry ministry had built facilities without extending the electrical 
infrastructure to nearby Pregança.55 Da Cruz then pressured the Distrito for 
support with the news that the Secretary of State for Industry was “very 
interested in the problem” of electricity in Pregança.56 In the end, 1973 was not to 
be Pregança’s year for electricity. The Lisbon District governor sent a copy of a 
letter he received from the Direcção dos Serviços Eléctricos to the CML which 
explained that no help could be expected from the state for that year as 1973’s 
budget had already been allocated. Instead, the Direcção explained that the 
room existed in the first months of 1974 for help and that the CML should 
prioritize this work.57 Ultimately, 1974 would see the necessary work begin.58  
 A more cynical reader of the attempts to secure Pregança’s electrical 
infrastructure might suggest that utilization of ‘public opinion’ as a reason to 
engage in public policy was simply another tool in the inevitable negotiations 
between officials as they worked to secure certain projects or advantages in 
Portuguese politics. However, such discourse should be seen as related to 
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similar sentiment, especially after 1974, when citizens moved from those who 
requested and offered to help to those who complained about lack of services. In 
other words, the type of political capital held and the way that residents of 
Lourinhã spent that capital changed in the 1970s as they moved from being seen 
as subjects to becoming sanctioned and active citizens. In the post-Revolutionary 
period, newly-elected officials like Lourinhanense Vereador senhor Manuel Gentil 
da Silva Horta, were quick to take up the torch for electrical infrastructure. In 
February 1977, for example, Horta presented the "case for electrical storage" 
that would benefit "consumers". As he explained, the electrical energy supply 
was "much less than normal, a fact which contributed to public complaints." After 
hearing Horta, the CML committed to improving electrical service and resolving 
the "deficiencies" in the electrical infrastructure.59 Similarly, into the 1980s, public 
complaints, as opposed to requests, to the CML became more common. Sr. João 
Henriques of Atalaia, for example, approached the CML in November 1980 about 
two different problems. First, he complained that recent roadwork had caused 
rain water to pool on his property and flood his storage space. Second, he 
complained that his neighbor had built a structure onto the public road, thereby 
blocking access to his property. In response the Mayor commented that he had 
noted the two complaints and would look into possible solutions.60  
Regardless of the use of the peoples’ opinion in government discourse, 
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what is important to note here is that public opinion carried weight in discussions 
about development. Now I turn to discussing the cultural and social uses and 
sources of this political power. Between the late 1960s and late 1970s, 
Lourinhanense did, indeed, use political capital and engaged in the civic sphere, 
mobilizing around the issues pertaining to water and, more so, electrical 
infrastructure. A sample of the letters found in Lourinhã’s municipal archives sent 
from citizens to the CML’s mayor reveals a high degree of engagement with civic 
affairs and a willingness, both under the dictatorship and the post-1974 
democratic regime, to be proactive about issues concerning their daily lives. The 
letters in question consist of correspondence from Lourinhanense between 1969 
and 1977 (after which the letters are either no longer archived or simply stop 
coming), always addressed to the mayor personally, requesting the installation of 
new electrical or water service or the repair of existing service. They reveal that 
locals acted as individuals and in groups, that people from various educational 
backgrounds from the illiterate to the middle class engaged with the CML, and 
that these actors not only wanted resolution of their requests, but were willing to 
contribute resources, both financial and in kind, in order to see that requests 
were answered.  
 In all, I randomly sampled sixty-three letters from annual folders with 
dozens of letters each. The twenty-five letters from 1969 are requests pertaining 
to water. Thirteen of the letters asking for water service or water service repair 
offered to contribute to the needed work with financial resource or labour. 
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However, letters about water abruptly ended after 1969, when peoples’ attention 
turned to electricity. Between 1970 and 1977, thirty-eight letters involving 
electricity requests (primarily seeking new or repaired public lighting) were 
sampled: sixteen of these letters offered some financial help or to provide some 
of the labour; seventeen were from groups of community residents; fifteen of the 
letters were hand-written; eight included hand-drawn diagrams of the 
neighborhood and requested placement of new infrastructure; and only three 
were signed by women. The majority of letters asked for public lighting and did 
not provide rationale beyond a simple lack thereof for their request. In contrast, 
seventeen letters expanded on the lack of public lighting and offered a myriad of 
affects that the lack of lighting had, thereby providing further rationale for their 
request.61 
 First and foremost, the letters sent to the Mayor of the CML were a tool 
used in the place of other freedoms like association and demonstration, which 
the regime did not allow, for Estado Novo subjects to draw attention to issues. 
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Some residents, for example, took it upon themselves from time to time to inform 
the mayor when public lamps were out of service. This practice saw Sr. Américo 
da Silva ask in 1970 that the CML remove a lamppost outside his home, next to 
the cemetery in Porto Dinheiro because it was not working. In response, the 
CML's Secretariat informed the residents that the post would be repaired so that 
the area would "remain lit."62 In fact, off-hand and suggestive remarks like Silva’s 
(and many of the letters sampled), should be considered a volley in a negotiation. 
Seemingly, if residents could draw attention to issues in an amiable way, they 
could then get authorities to take control of the issue. In the fall of 1973, the 
residents of Casal Serrano in Reguengo Grande wrote the mayor complaining 
that on a street with six houses, there existed only one lamp at the extreme end 
of the street. Beyond "great benefit" to the residents of the street, the letter’s 
authors offered no special circumstances justifying the need for more lamps, nor 
did they offer to help with the costs.63 However, the residents' request caused the 
CML to investigate. What the CML’s Secretariat found was that indeed, a single 
lamp serviced the street at the road's entrance. In addition, two other posts 
already were in place that could house a light (a fact omitted in the residents’ 
letter), leading the investigator to recommend installing a lamp on the second 
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post – about eighty six meters from the first post. Winter especially caused poor 
conditions along the road, further stressing the point that a light was required. In 
addition, the investigator secured financial help for the work from affected 
residents, in spite of the absence of such an offer in their original letter.64 The 
negotiation then, was successful for the residents of Casal Serrano as the Mayor 
began the process in January 1974 to install a lamp.65 
 As tallied above, financial participation was a common tool used by 
residents in securing projects for their areas and no individual donation was too 
small as letter writers frequently pooled resources. This sometimes led residents 
to be vague about their contributions. In April 1970, the residents of Matas 
argued that despite two electrical posts, the town lacked public lamps. Thus, they 
asked the CML's mayor to communicate with SEOL. For the necessary work, 
each signatory could contribute, "more or less", 235$00 escudos.66 Other groups 
were more specific. As of November 1969, the residents of Casais de Porto 
Dinheiro requesting "lighting" had collected almost 25.000$00 escudos from 
nineteen residents. Individual donations ranged from 100$00 to 3.500$00 
escudos as the letter writers provided a break down of their pool of money.67  
                                                
64 Secretaria da CML, "Informação", December 20, 1973. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Pedidos de Particulares para ampliaçõe das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, 
proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
65 “Pres. da CML to SEOL”, January 9, 1974. “Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de 
Particulares para ampliaçõe das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
66 "António Mocencio to Pres. da CML", April 11, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 
1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da lourinhã, PT). 
67 "Peditorio da Luz", Novemebr 16, 1969. "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). See figure 1, as well. 
 261 
 
 
Figure 22: Community donations in Casais de Porto Dinheiro for street electrification, 
1969.  "Peditorio da Luz", November 16, 1969. "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", 
Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).  
 
 Another approach taken by letter writers was less conciliatory. Showing 
frustration and a sense that they were entitled to some service, local people also 
complained. In 1969, residents of Reguengo Grande, like Francisco Mário 
Rodrigues protested that he was, "for many days", without water. On days when 
water returned, it was only for certain hours in the day. The worst part for 
Rodrigues was that, in July of 1969, he "paid more than 161$00 escudos” for 
service that he did not receive and in August he paid "more than 190$00 escudos 
having missed so much water!" Riddled with exclamation marks, Rodrigues' letter 
reminded the mayor that the writer had visited the city hall many times to 
complain of the "injustice." Rodrigues, however, clearly had no real recourse 
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besides complaint, asking only that he be reimbursed: his frustration seemed 
palpable.68 Other construction issues led Lourinhanense to grumble. Américo 
Mendes, for example, wrote Lourinhã's mayor from his home in Lisbon 
complaining about an abandoned home construction site next to his second 
home in Porto da Barcas. The abandoned site was not only ugly, but it had also 
disintegrated at points due to rain leaving water pooled on the site and on Sr. 
Mendes' property causing "increased humidity" in the Mendes house. For the 
beauty of the neighborhood and the potential for future development in Porto das 
Barcas, Mendes asked the mayor to act.69  
 It is also of note that letters were addressed to the Mayor and not the 
municipal government – no doubt a reflection of the paternalism and personalism 
of Portuguese politics under both the Estado Novo and the Social Democracy.70 
As early as 1966, identifying herself as a "consumer of water", Elvira Cardoso of 
Nadrupe complained in a letter to Lourinhã's mayor that faults in the piping in her 
neighborhood had meant that, for “twenty-one days”, she had been with reduced 
water service. As such, she asked the mayor to look into the problem and see to 
                                                
68 "Francisco Mário Rodrigues to Pres. da CML", September 19, 1969. "Agua e Saneamento: 
Fornecimento de Agua; A Particulares. Ligações e Desligações. Reclamações", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1969, proc. 10-B/a (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
69 "Américo Mendes to Pres. da CML", December 30, 1971. "Obras Municipais (e Paroquiais): 
Electrificações; de Pregança", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 37-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal 
da Lourinhã, PT). 
70 For discussions of the importance of personlaism and paternalism in Portuguese political 
culture, see: Douglas Wheeler, “The Revolution in Perspective: Revolution and Counterrevolution 
in Modern Portuguese History,” in in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler eds., In Search of Modern 
Portugal. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 342; Phillipe C Schmitter,  
“The ‘Régime d’Exception’ That Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination 
in Portugal,” in L.S. Graham and H.M. Makler eds., Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and 
its Antecedents. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979); and, Kayman, Revolution and 
Counter-Revolution, x. 
 263 
it that she was not charged for water that she did not consume.71 Notably, the 
majority of the time, the mayor was the one to begin the process of resolving 
issues in letters as many were riddled with the handwriting of Ferreira da Costa 
before 1970 and Cruz after. A typed letter of August 1970 to the mayor of 
Lourinhã from Sr. Luis Augusto Valviga asked that the CML install a public lamp 
outside his building in Sobral and offered to take responsibility for the costs of the 
project. As was often the case, the mayor wrote a short instruction for CML 
officials on the letter on September 2, saying that Sr. Valviga would have to wait 
for an opportunity for the CML to proceed with the work.72  
 All that said there was no discernable pattern or formula for success for 
requests with each being assessed by the CML on its own merits. Informal 
approaches, for example, could be successful. An undated letter from 1970 
consisted of one sentence – "the residents of the road that needed light in Atalaia 
de Cima" – and was signed by a list of seven names (three of the surnames were 
Morgado) which included a hand-drawn diagram showing a curved road with 
seven houses on it with suggested locations of public lamps.73 In July 1970, the 
CML announced that two streetlamps would be provided.74  
                                                
71 "Elvira Cardoso to Pres. da CML", October 30, 1966. "Reclamações Contra o Consumo de 
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72 "Luis Augisto Valviga to Pres. da CML", August 28, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a 
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1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da lourinhã, PT). 
73 "Residents of Atalaia de Cima to Pres. da CML", undated. "Electricidade: Relações com a 
SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 
1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da lourinhã, PT). 
74 "Informação: Iluminação - Atalaia de Cima Casal do Bargassalinho", July 21, 1970. 
"Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes 
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 The written format as well, although some might think it limiting given the 
degree of illiteracy in 1970s Portugal, was surprisingly inclusive. Beyond 
requests being sent by groups of people (so long as one in the group was 
literate, the illiterate could participate in this form of participation), those who 
were illiterate could nonetheless participate as individuals. Many letters were 
signed in the name of the "signatories who did not know how to write". Lourinhã's 
mayor received a request, for instance, for electricity from Joaquim de Sousa, 
Augusto Rosa da Costa and Manuel Batista de Sousa. Sousa et al, from Sobral 
shared a building where they found "darkness" and thus asked for the installation 
of a lamp on an existing post while offering to pay for the costs of the project: it is 
unclear which signatories were the ones who “did not know how to write.”75 In 
addition Lourinhã’s mayor received a sort of form letter, which appeared several 
times with minor variations that could offer the illiterate access to the civic sphere 
on an individual basis."76 These letters were always typed and occasionally, but 
not always, signed on behalf of someone who cannot read or write. The form 
letter cited “total darkness” around the house or area in question, which 
“occasionally turns everything to disorder”. Importantly, the letter also offered to 
                                                
75 "Joaquim de Sousa, Augusto Rosa da Costa and Manuel Batista de Sousa to Pres. da CML" 
April 23, 1971. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação 
das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
76 See, for examples: "José dos Santos to Pres. da CML", June 21, 1974. “Electricidade: 
Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliaçõe das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); “Sr. José Branco Vilela 
to Pres. da CML”, May 10, 1974. “Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares 
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 265 
cover some of the costs of the work.77 The letter often, but not always, worked, 
as, in the case of one such letter sent in October 1976 from Sr. Joaquim Luis, the 
CML forwarded the matter to SEOL for a quote.78 An additional tool employed by 
writers was to draw a diagram of the area and the lamps they wanted. As 
mentioned, eight of the thirty-eight letters sampled included hand-drawn 
diagrams illustrating requests. This was often done "for better explanation"79, 
although it additionally offered the illiterate a chance to engage. 
 
Figure 23: Residents often drew diagrams describing where they wanted streetlamps. 
"Silvério Santos to Pres. Da CML", October 3, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Pedidos de Particulares para ampliaçõe das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 
1974, proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
 
                                                
77 “ocasionando transtornos da todo a desordem”. See, for example: “Joaquim Luis to Pres. da 
Comissão Adminstrativa da CML”, October 6, 1976. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
78 “Pres. da Comissão Administrative to SEOL”, October 19, 1976. "Electricidade: Relações com 
a SEOL; Redidos de Particulares para Ampliações por Redes Eléctricas - Orcamentos", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1976, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
79 "Silvério Santos to Pres. Da CML", October 3, 1974. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Pedidos de Particulares para ampliaçõe das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, 
proc. 29-A/9 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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 Typically, letters were sent by groups which organized around 
neighborhood and family – two categories that were far from mutually exclusive 
as settlement patterns frequently progressed along family lines with multiple 
generations often living in the same household or on family land. In the early 
1960s, this organization often involved ‘elite’ leadership. In the fall of 1960, 
Reverend Padré Mercelino, parish priest of Santa Barbara, asked Lourinhã’s 
council if the electricity service could be expanded to Santa Barbara in 1962. 
Before the council, he argued on behalf of residents that existing power lines 
already passed a little more than one kilometer from the town and that the 
population would take responsibility for the work needed for the connection to the 
existing infrastructure. The deputy mayor informed the priest that Lourinhã had 
already spoken to SEOL the previous August about the overall availability of 
electricity in 1962. Given the limited supply of electricity, Lourinhã had decided to 
focus on São Bartolomeu, Cabeça Gorda and Moledo and that the possibility of 
expanding the electrical net beyond these pre-allotted projects was limited: 
Lourinhã could likely electrify two areas or towns per year given future electrical 
restraints. The deputy mayor proposed that Lourinhã launch a study on the 
possibility of preparing the infrastructure for electrification in 1962 of Santa 
Barbara.80  
 However, as the decade progressed, more impromptu organizations 
emerged without elite representation from priests or notables. This took two 
                                                
80 “Reunião 26/10/60: Electrificação de Ribamar", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã, No. 22. (1959-1961), p. 135. 
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forms. First, residents would take it upon themselves to write on behalf of their 
neighbors, drawing legitimacy from a call for the common good. Nadrupe 
resident José Barbosa, for example, took it upon himself in November 1969 to 
ask Lourinhã's mayor for a lamp on his street. In the name of the farmers of 
Nadrupe, he explained that his road had no lighting and that two more people 
lived along the street. Even without offer of assistance, the mayor forwarded the 
request to SEOL asking for the work to be done as soon as possible.81 Similarly, 
writing on behalf of the eight families who lived in the Casal de Porto de Chão 
neighborhood in Moita dos Ferreiros, Sr. José Isidoro wrote the mayor of 
Lourinhã to request that his neighborhood be electrified and for which the 
families would take responsibility for the expenses of the work.82 Second, formal 
and inclusive organization emerged to resolve specific issues. This meant that 
people like Francisco Antunes and his neighbors, João da Conceição, Manuel 
Francisco Rato, Faustino Francisco Rato, and Bernardino Francisco, explained 
in a letter to Lourinhã’s mayor dated April 14, 1970, that the residents of Ribamar 
near Poco da Quinta "needed" public lighting outside their houses. Antunes et al. 
concluded by thanking the mayor and asking him to take the necessary steps to 
have the lighting installed. The letter then had a hand written note from the mayor 
dated April 17, 1970, asking the Secretariat to take the necessary steps to begin 
                                                
81 "José Barbosa to Pres. da CML", November 28, 1969. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 
1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
82 "José Isidoro to Pres. da CML", July 3, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; Pedidos 
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work.83 Such organization also opened space for women like Sra. Maria Antónia 
Pinto of Porto Dinheiro, to write. Along with Srs José Alfaiate da Fonseca and 
José da Fonseca, she pleaded for herself and the two other residents for lighting 
infrastructure for their houses, which, of course, first required electricity. Sra. 
Pinto explained that she was asking again for electrical infrastructure. The Mayor 
did not acknowledge the repetition but did send a letter to SEOL to begin the 
needed work.84   
 Formal groups and institutions also got involved in lobbying for electrical 
infrastructure. One letter, the first found in my research from an association, was 
from the "youth of the Secção Cultural de Clube de Santa Barbara" in July 1974. 
In it, the youth asked for four lamps to be installed on existing posts, explaining 
that "at night, especially in winter," youth and the elderly had difficulty travelling 
between Marquiteira (where the club met) and Casal Miso.85 However, arms 
length governmental organizations also lobbied. In 1966, Lourinhã's sub-
delegation for health, made up of local engineers, doctors, and other notables, 
reported to the CML about the ongoing danger to public health due to the flow of 
waste into the ocean at PAB. Caused mainly by the "insufficient construction" 
around sewers and retaining walls, run-off from farmers’ fields and sewers found 
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its way to the beach, soaking the sand and polluting the water. The group called 
on the CML to advise locals about the dangers associated with this problem and, 
"with the utmost urgency" to clean the area and proceed to upgrade the sewage 
and retaining systems.86 In addition, the Juntas da Freguesias would 
occasionally send letters to the CML requesting lamps on behalf of residents. In 
1975, for example, the Junta da Freguesia de Moita dos Ferreiros sent a letter on 
behalf of Srs. Francisco Julio Rodrigues and Horácio Rodrigues asking for lamps 
on their street. Srs. Rodrigues offered to cover the costs of the work which was 
needed because the nearest lamp was "about one hundred meters" away.87 
Direct government organizations like the Junta do Turismo also engaged 
the CML about things like water shortages, complaining that they were leading to 
problems in hygiene and sanitation. By the end of the 1966 tourist season, the 
CML and the Junta do Turismo were discussing water shortages and sewage 
leaks at PAB: both organizations recognized these as leading problems.88 For 
the Junta do Turismo, these two problems contributed to PAB's "deficient 
hygiene" during the summer when visitors inundated the area and water pressure 
was nearly non-existent between the hours of 9am and 1pm, and 5pm and 10pm. 
The lack of water and sewage links was, according to the Junta, a result of the 
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conjuncture of a number of factors. First, blocked drainage routes limited water 
pressure to homes. Second, the distribution network had been expanded too 
quickly without augmenting the water storage and treatment facilities. Finally, and 
directly related to the second point, the inconsistent demand – very high in the 
summer and low the rest of the year – meant that developing the source 
infrastructure was difficult.89 The CML agreed with the Junta's assessment of the 
problems with PAB's water infrastructure, however, it also explained that sewage 
leaks had been caused by the unusual winter of 1965-66 which had dislocated 
many underground pipes as the temperature rose and fell. This also helped to 
explain the reduction in water pressure and supply as underground pipes leaked. 
The CML also explained that they planned to open a bidding process on the 24th 
of August for the contract to repair the pipes between the end of the tourist 
season and the winter.90 
 Often individuals who acted on behalf of the groups they represented led 
these organizations, particularly in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1961, 
Lourinhã’s mayor presented a proposal to council on behalf of Sr. José Máximo 
da Costa – himself a future mayor and deputy head of the District of Lisbon. 
Recognizing the limited availability of electrical power, Sr. Máximo called for 
electrical infrastructure, including interior equipment, to be provided to one 
classroom in Ribeira dos Palheiros’ school. The proposal was well researched 
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and required that any work would conform to the conditions of the 'Caderno de 
encargos e desenhos (fornecidos?)' of the Direcção-Geral de edifícios e 
monumentos Nacionais and that a budget of no more than 1,350$00 be 
allocated. The CML decided to ask the finance department to allot the funds to 
execute this project with the addition of exterior installations as well as the 
interior ones asked for.91 Sr. Máximo submitted a budget of 1,020$00 two weeks 
later, which the town council approved.92 Also causing individual action by 
notables, some infrastructure represented an ongoing cost for wealthier residents 
of Lourinhã. Sr. António Vieira, a first Sergeant working in the military schools, for 
example, wrote the mayor of Lourinhã in 1970 in order to end his ongoing cost 
for public lighting outside his building, "Vivenda Eulália", on the road to Atalaia. 
Sr. Vieira complained that since lamps had been installed in 1967, their upkeep 
had cost him "more than 5.000$00 escudos" and that with recent problems due 
to "the uncertain and doubtful days in which they lived", he could no longer 
maintain the infrastructure. The CML responded by passing a note to SEOL 
asking for an estimate on the ongoing costs for the lights. The CML later sent a 
letter in which, since the two lamps lit the whole street, they took on the 
responsibility.93  
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 Underlying these letters, whether they were from individuals, groups, or 
associations, is a sense that writers believed that the government carried a 
responsibility for service delivery and development. Issues straddling the 1974 
Revolution highlight this best. First, requests continued throughout the 
revolutionary years (1974-76) – it was business as usual – except that letters 
were directed at the Administrative Commission, as opposed to the Mayor. In 
one such 1974 letter from residents in Casal Mulato of Moita dos Ferreiros, five 
signatories (all surnamed Rego) explained that an extension of electrical 
infrastructure thirty meters into the neighborhood would allow the signatories to 
add another three streetlamps to their area. The improvement would "benefit the 
users of the neighborhood and benefit the Câmara Municipal in an electrified 
future for Casal Mulato.”94 Second, and more importantly, residents did not 
excuse the revolutionary and democratic governments of pre-revolutionary 
promises. Lisbon residents who owned homes in PAB often requested lighting on 
more sophisticated grounds than a simple “lack of infrastructure.” Sr. Neves of 
Lisbon, for example, finished work on a home in PAB in September of 1974 and 
reminded the CML that his building license, dated June 8, 1972, granted by the 
CML, acknowledged that there was a lack of public lighting and that this would be 
remedied. Thus, Sr. Neves asked that the CML proceed with the installation of a 
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lamppost in front of his house.95  
 In fact, letters from both before and after 1974 leave the impression that 
some subject-citizens viewed electrical lighting as a right, not a privilege. One 
letter, from August 1971, from five residents of an apartment building at 12 rua 
Miguel Bombarda in Lourinhã complained that as the area around the building 
gained electrical lighting, their building had been left in the dark. They explained 
that at the turn of the century, the building had installed a gas-lamp, which 
remained in operation until 1932, when another building in the area got an 
electrical lamp. Much remained unchanged until "1968 or 1969" when the "old 
[were] substituted for new" lamps in the area. However, "inexplicably", their 
building was left without public lighting, an asset deemed "indispensible." The 
writer concluded by suggesting that a "simple trip at night" to the area would say 
more than could be written. The letter concluded not by asking for a lamp 
directly, but instead by asking if their building had been inadvertently looked 
over.96 Through the revolution, the idea that lighting was indispensible can be 
gleaned from other requests. Silvério Santos' October 1974 request for a street-
lamp in Casal do Seixo was unsuccessful as the road in question was under the 
Câmara Municipal de Torres Vedras' jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Sr. Santos’ letter 
shows, once again, the impression that residents increasingly saw lighting as a 
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basic right – especially when one considered that some had it and others did not. 
Santos explained that close to three hundred meters of road remained unlit 
outside his home and that people had to "pass that distance at night without a 
single light". Santos called the situation "inhuman" and complained that raising 
the necessary money could only be done "with difficulty!" by local residents. 
Santos continued by insisting that his request was "so simple" and "just."97 Some 
residents thought so highly of lights and electricity that they questioned post-
Revolutionary Portugal's priorities when it could not deliver such infrastructure. 
Sr. António Ilídio Martins João of Casais Novos in Moita dos Ferrieios asked why 
Portugal was "on the road to socialism if there could not be a society where he 
could ask for a lamp or lantern" for his neighborhood. Sr. João was expressing 
his frustration over two months of waiting for a follow up letter that was promised 
to him by the mayor in a face-to-face conversation in which he had asked for 
lighting and offered to help with the costs.98 
 Residents insisting that electrical lighting was a right reflected a common 
impression that emerged, especially after 1974, when letters more and more 
demanded infrastructure because others had it. In October of 1976, Sra. Gabriela 
dos Santos complained to Lourinhã’s mayor. She had lived next to the 
slaughterhouse in Casais Araujo since 1963. The area enjoyed public lighting, 
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which as a resident she had contributed to – presumably financially. However, 
she evidently felt that she was not getting her money’s worth. Complaining about 
the darkness around the public stairs near her house, she explained that when 
she visited Lisbon, and “other places”, such areas were much better lit than the 
one outside her home. Insisting that the mayor would agree that the stairs near 
her home were under-lit, she asked him to investigate and install additional 
lighting.99 Similarly, a group of twenty-five residents in Reguengo Grande wrote 
to the mayor of Lourinhã in 1976 arguing that some neighbourhoods of the 
freguesia "already benefitted from electricity and lights," while others did not. In 
the minds of those who signed the letter this was not "just." The letter went on to 
describe by neighborhood (outlining five locales and suggesting exactly how 
many lamps were needed in each case) where lights existed and where they did 
not (a passage which someone at the CML has highlighted). The letter outlined 
sections of up to five hundred meters of roadway that were without public 
lighting, going so far as to name the residents of houses where electricity 
stopped along the line. The letter also explained how many lamps were needed 
in certain sections of Reguengo Grande in order to provide sufficient lighting. In 
one neighborhood, the letter explained, six public lamps were needed to satisfy 
the fifteen residences whose occupants were interested in electricity and public 
lighting. In other neighbourhoods, some residents enjoyed electricity in their 
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homes but had no public lighting on the street while their neighbours would be 
happy with getting either. The letter included notifications to the CML about 
residents who had already, individually, requested lighting: Sr. José João 
Agostinho of Vale de Fora, for example. In addition, the Junta da Freguesia da 
Reguengo Grande signed the letter with a note suggesting that they felt that the 
described projects would provide maximum “justice”, clearing all inequities in 
electrical infrastructure.100  
However, residents made other arguments in support of their requests for 
light, underscoring what they valued – beyond the sense of equality outlined 
above – about infrastructure. At the basest of levels, some asked for 
infrastructure because it would improve how people moved in and accessed the 
landscape. Some, like Srs Henrique dos Santos and Heitor dos Reis, not only 
asked for street lighting but also took the time to provide a reason beyond the 
normal "lack of lighting" for a lamp. They explained that the poor condition of the 
road, coupled with the lack of lighting at the entrance to their neighborhood in 
Atalaia de Baixo beside the football field, made it difficult to enter their street, 
"especially during the winter." Although Srs. Dos Santos and dos Reis could not 
offer financial assistance for such a project, they did insist that they would "help 
in the ways they could." The mayor instructed that the matter be referred to 
SEOL for a quote on the cost of the work.101  
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 Such arguments also spoke to the fact that subject-citizens saw improved 
infrastructure as a means to improve Lourinhã’s safety. Seniors, like Pedro José 
Noivo and Artur Gregório of "a dark alley" in Abelheira, who wrote Lourinhã's 
mayor in October 1971, asked for a lamp to be installed on an existing 
neighborhood post where one had been placed in the past so as to make the 
road easier to navigate. They asked for forgiveness. Being seniors, they lacked 
the ability to contribute to the project. This was passed onto the CML as opposed 
to SEOL directly.102 Other writers saw infrastructure as a means to improve 
safety for neighborhood children. Sr. António Rodrigues Antunes da Silva, a 
corner-store owner in Ventosa, had his request for lighting met in 1969. His 
corner store, the CML's Secretariat explained, served many farmers who "did not 
return from work until night time" to buy their bread and other goods. Since the 
street outside Sr. da Silva's store lacked public lighting within one hundred 
meters, the CML decided that a lamp should be installed. The lamp would be 
placed within nine meters of the store and "serve all the people who need the 
store." Further, since it was often children who were sent to buy bread from the 
store, "it was absolutely necessary" to have the street outside lit.103 
 Infrastructure was also needed, so arguments went, to secure the safety 
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103 Sectretaria da CML, "Informação", October 21, 1969. "Electricidade: Relações com a SEOL; 
Pedidos de Particulares para Ampliação das Redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 
1970/71, proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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of those other than seniors and children. Sr. José Ferreira of Marteleira wrote a 
letter on August 8, 1970 to Lourinhã's mayor explaining that the square in town, 
where he lived and operated a store, lacked light despite the fact that an 
electrical post that could power a lamp existed. The problem, Sr. Ferreira 
continued, was that many people lived on the square and had trouble travelling 
through at night due to the "broken visibility" in the neighborhood. He asked the 
CML to install and maintain the "much needed" lamp on the square. The mayor 
read the letter on August 12 and explained that he would visit the square and 
investigate the situation.104 Some requests for public lamps, like Sr. Fernando da 
Silva's, explicitly invoked the good of the community as reason for new 
infrastructure. With his house at the fork in the road between Casal Novo and 
Ribamar, Sr. da Silva complained that public lighting ended before the fork in the 
road, leaving the area "isolated". In addition, lighting the fork would help traffic 
flow and benefit a "large part of the population" by improving that traffic artery. 
Although Sr. da Silva did not offer assistance, financial or in-kind, he did ask the 
Mayor to advise him on the potential costs of the work. For his part, the mayor 
sent the matter to SEOL to obtain a quote.105 
 Indeed, when residents wrote and argued that infrastructure could provide 
a safe environment, they were also suggesting that infrastructure would bring 
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proc. 29-A/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
105 "Fernando da Silva to Pres. da CML", ebruary 20, 1970. "Electricidade: Relações com a 
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order to that environment. The aforementioned form letters directly suggested 
that darkness meant disorder, suggesting that the cover of night led to all sorts of 
ill behavior.106 Although at times this argument worked, we should not think of the 
CML and the Portuguese government as passive suppliers of infrastructure by 
request. I have already made reference to some limitations placed on 
development by circumstances that the CML had to navigate: limitations in 
electrical supply, for example. In fact, the CML had to vet requests, regardless of 
unsubstantiated claims of darkness causing disorder. A January 1972 letter from 
Joaquim da Silva Prazeres of Moita dos Ferreiros asked Lourinhã's mayor to 
have "one or more" public lamps installed. At night, the neighborhood "was in 
total darkness, occasionally [causing] upheavals in all order." If the mayor would 
have lamps installed, the residents promised to take responsibility for "all of the 
costs", likely not knowing what all of the costs were.107 However, Sr. Prazeres' 
request was denied in the end. The mayor had sent a town official to investigate, 
who found that the road in question was "peculiar" in that it was an old service 
road for local cattle farmers. Since the street was not a "public roadway" and was 
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107 "Joaquim da Silva Prazeres to Pres. da CML", January 13, 1972. "Obras Municipais (e 
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outside the communal domain, the mayor informed Sr. Prazeres that nothing 
could be done by the CML. This decision came despite the fact that the 
Secretariat's investigator agreed that a light was needed on the road at night.108  
 
** 
 
 Rejections like that of Sr. Prazeres’ request reveal of course that the CML 
and the Portuguese government had their own concerns in infrastructure and that 
some of the political power that residents displayed when pushing for projects 
derived from the coincidence of resident and governmental priorities. Further, 
there is no doubt that the CML and the national government placed great value in 
infrastructure and in local participation in its development. In 1963, the Mayor 
presented a donation to the Concelho by the population of São Bartolomeu, in 
the value of 40,600 escudos for the electrification of their neighborhood.  In the 
eyes of the council, this showed the effort that this population made in trying to lift 
the "level of life and progress that this improvement would represent."109 
 Town planning in Lourinhã backed pronouncements of infrastructure’s 
significance. Beyond being a key focus in the CML’s activity plans, various 
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infrastructure improvements were to serve as the basis to secure a healthy and 
hygienic environment, a secure transit system, an improved education system 
and to allow the region to grow its demographic and economic profile. 
Throughout the 1960s, the CML listed water and electrical works in its Planos 
das Actividades. Divided into “rural” and “urban” improvements, these documents 
differentiated between the two by suggesting rural improvements would open 
access to areas with roads and new basic services like water while urban 
improvements meant expanding services and creating new buildings (service 
points) in densely populated areas like the center of the freguesia of Lourinhã.110  
 Water infrastructure, particularly in the 1960s, was a major component of 
the CML’s plans. For instance, Lourinhã considered the development and 
expansion of its waterworks and sewage network to be top priorities in its activity 
plan for 1961. Two of the four sections of the plan focused on the treatment of 
water and the development of the town’s sewers. They prioritized the continued 
construction of the treatment station in Reguengo Grande as a key facility in 
providing residential areas with water. Beyond this facility, two areas were 
targeted for the expansion of the Concelho’s water infrastructure: PAB and 
                                                
110 See, for example: “Reunião 14/9/60: Plano de Actividade Para o Ano de Mil Novcenots e 
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Lourinhã proper.111 In addition to making these two centers the CML’s priority, 
councilors successfully insisted that Lourinhã also prioritize the expansion of the 
waterworks to residential areas in the freguesias that were in need of public 
fountains and washrooms.112 In 1963, the municipal government continued to be 
concerned with maintaining and expanding their water sanitation and distribution 
network. Generally speaking, Lourinhã targeted the installation of public 
fountains and washrooms in order to have some service provided to “as many 
citizens as possible.” More specifically, residential areas in Reguengo Grande 
were targeted to receive domestic infrastructure while it was hoped that villages 
like Seixal, São Bartolomeu, Reguengo Pequeno and Feteira would receive 
public fountains.113 Additionally, the fact that clean water was not provided to the 
southern part of the Concelho was a concern. Here a study was commissioned 
by the Concelho’s Health Services, which explored the potential use of a large 
well in the southern part of the municipality that could, by the town’s estimate, 
provide up to one million liters of water per day.114 Although these works 
continued, they came to be identified as 'obras de abastecimento' by 1965 when 
five projects were prioritized. The first was the second phase of the Concelho's 
water treatment plan to provide service to Moita das Ferreiros, Cesaredeas, and 
Zambujeira do Mar. Next, Lourinhã aimed to replace the old network servicing 
residential properties in the center of Lourinhã. Third, Lourinhã was to engage in 
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exploratory work in the Vale do Roto to see about expanding water service to the 
southern part of the Concelho. Fourth, the installation of new well-based 
fountains was to be considered along with the continuation of ongoing 
maintenance of the existing infrastructure. Finally, Lourinhã hoped to install new 
bathrooms in Casal da Galharda, Pinhoa, Féteira, and Toledo, which had been 
projects for the previous year but which had not been completed.115 
 By the mid 1960s, electrical works were beginning to take a more 
prominent position in the CML’s plans. Included as rural improvements in 1966, 
electrical infrastructure along with roads, including the public bus network, were 
listed as priorities in Lourinhã's activity plan. Electricity was to be provided to 
Paço, Pena Seca and Cabeça Gorda as per the CML’s plan to provide the 
Concelho with electricity.116 The improvement of existing electricity networks was 
also made a priority.  Beyond noting schools, Lourinhã's activity plan for 1966 
listed priorities like a new town hall, the completion of the Parque de Campismo 
in PAB, the widening of the access road to PAB, an increase in the town's 
treasury, the improvement of the town's electrical net, the maintenance of 
Lourinhã's heritage buildings, and the acquisition of land for a new Campo da 
Feira and a Centro Civico e Comercial da Lourinhã.117 
                                                
115 "Plano de Actividade da Câmara Municipal para 1965", Alvorada (February 14, 1965), pp. 3, 
5. 
116 "Plano de Actividades da Câmara Municipal par o Ano de 1966", Alvorada (October 10, 1965) 
pp. 1, 4. 
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 Infrastructure would serve to help with the improvement of public health. It 
was, in fact, at the center of governmental health initiatives in the 1960s and 
1970s. In 1968  the national government launched a national hygiene campaign 
under the auspices of the Comissão Permanente de Educação Sanitária.118 
Readers of the hygiene pamphlet released as part of the campaign were warned 
to combat flies by properly storing food such as meat, fish, cheese, fruit, 
preferably in refrigerators, powered of course by electricity. This was no 
substitute though for vaccinations against disease that flies and mosquitoes 
carried.119 Typhoid was another major concern in the campaign. Readers were 
reminded that it could be transmitted through urine and feces. Direct contact with 
those infected could cause transmission. Indirect contact through shared 
clothing, contaminated water, unwashed food, etc., could also lead to illness.120 
Instructive images accompanied written lessons. They featured children drinking 
potentially contaminated water and playing in uncontained runoff from public 
washrooms and outhouses.121 All these concerns fed the need to promote 
infrastructure development. Local officials were on the same page as their 
national counterparts while concerns about hygiene continued to mobilize 
officials into 1973. When, for example, the sub-delegation for health in Lourinhã 
found that Luis Moreira's patio had been flooded by sewage, the CML ordered 
                                                
118 "Pres. da CML to Pres. da Comissão Permanente de Educação Sanitária, Lisboa", August 12, 
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the corresponding freguesia of Miragaia to clean the area and investigate the 
blockage.122 
 Health and infrastructure continued to fuel local and national politics 
throughout the revolution. In the fall of 1974, the revolutionary government's 
commission for local administration, along with health services and public works, 
took to organizing the sanitary conditions across Portugal. Citing the need to 
establish basic health conditions and a "healthy environment" to end epidemics 
of diseases like cholera, which, so the argument went, the Estado Novo had not 
controlled, the revolutionary government's health office set short, medium, and 
long term goals. 123 The short term was limited to the period until March of 1975, 
the medium until December 1979 and the long ended in 1985.124 In order to fix 
what it saw as a broken hygiene system, the revolutionary government set short-
term goals that would standardize and rationalize how the water supply across 
the country would be treated. It argued that existing water infrastructure (to 
homes and public fountains) should be the subject of special legislation aimed at 
disinfecting water by controlling bacteria in the supply. This would go hand-in-
hand with a "special regime of transition" that would take total control of ensuring 
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the safety of the water supply. This meant the monitoring of sewage where both 
human and animal waste was diverted, regular tests of city and town water 
systems, new financing for infrastructure, and various education programs for 
both infrastructure workers and locals, among other provisions.125  
 Infrastructure development was also to contribute at a more abstract level 
than outlined above. Infrastructure was to serve as the basis of a modern 
landscape that could accommodate and promote economic growth. The Quinta 
de Santa Catarina in Lourinhã emerged in the late 1960s as the area upon which 
the town could grow onto a blank slate. Thus, the environment, infrastructure and 
all, could be built to create an ideal setting. A long running advertisement in the 
Alvorada for the development of the area explained that the Quinta would have 
residential units, both to  rent and to buy, shops in a commercial center, as well 
as gardens and schools, all serviced by water and electrical lines. The  
accompanying aerial view of the proposed development showed a rational and 
contained compound composed of straight lines and clear pathways and roads: a 
far cry from the muddled center of old Lourinhã, which had grown organically 
over centuries. 126 Future development was a further consideration when 
installing new facilities. When the CML built electrical infrastructure for the Zona 
da Palmeira, the construction plan focused on the structure that would house the 
electrical transformation and storage cells, with an eye to the uses of the 
electricity produced by those transformers. The transformers would serve as the 
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126 See: “Urbanização da Quinta de Santa Catarina: Lourinhã”, Alvorada (October 22, 1972), p. 2. 
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center of a network to provide public illumination for the area's road entrances 
and its residential streets. The construction of the infrastructure would affect, it 
was noted, “underused” public bus routes, a parking lot, and the existing public 
illumination in green spaces in the area.127 The project represented an effort to 
bring the lighting in this neighborhood to the "recommended ... minimum value" 
so as to provide uniform infrastructure to an area which did not have what was 
called "reasonable" lighting for an expanding urban area.128  
 Throughout the period, economic development was linked time and time 
again to tourism by municipalities across the region. In the spring of 1966, the 
CML was advised that the Concelho of Torres Vedras was moving to install 
hydraulic equipment in service of its water infrastructure in the areas of Vimeiro 
and Maceira (villages where the CML also had some purview) that it governed. 
Torres Vedras cited two prime concerns: touristic development and the region's 
"limits [on growth], which were greatly prejudiced by the lack of drinking water." 
Until 1966, Torres Vedras had been able to get by with the natural mineral water 
springs and wells in the area. However, with all the "touristic industry and the 
regional hotel" built at the beach, the Concelho had to "insist" that the district of 
Lisbon resolve the problem. The CML was advised because Torres Vedras 
requested that, as part of the solution, their infrastructure be integrated with that 
of the southern zone in Lourinhã in the freguesias of Vimeiro and Maceira. The 
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rationale, for Torres Vedras, was that the source of much of the natural spring 
and well water used in the area was found in the CML’s jurisdiction. Such a 
project, it was explained, could be the first step in creating a larger “Western 
Zone of Torres Vedras.”129 
 Although the CML was in step with Portugal’s developing tourism in the 
1960s130, the late 1970s continued to see infrastructure as a basis for 
development in that sector. In 1978, PAB continued to be called a touristic center 
of unequaled beauty by the CML where hundreds of people relaxed on 
weekends and in the summer. It was, "without doubt", valuable to the CML. The 
area serviced between 4000 and 6000 residents, a campground, three 
restaurants, a small hotel, a motel, a casino, two markets and a cinema. These 
privileges were warranted given the fact that national and international visitors 
frequented the beach.131 Despite PAB's importance, the public lighting was 
considered "simple, rural and antiquated" with its incandescent bulbs hanging 
unprotected without reflectors from tubes. In addition, the existing infrastructure 
was in poor repair having been "attacked" by the "clima salino" which had rusted 
iron components. This was inefficient given that these components needed 
frequent replacement. The state of repair, coupled with recent road and 
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waterworks repair and expansion in PAB meant that electrical infrastructure 
needed to be expanded and updated.132 The construction was to be completed in 
four phases prioritized by locality as follows: the area around the pensão S. João; 
the area around the "motel"; the area around the cinema; and the 2nd phase. 
The first phase would allow expansion towards the fort (built in 1674) near 
Paimogo; the motel phase was needed to allow expansion near the major road 
between Lourinhã and Peniche; the cinema phase was to be done in conjunction 
with water and sewage facilities that were "evidently needed." The 2nd phase 
was an open-ended phase that would be worked out in the future. The first three 
phases were to be worked on simultaneously. The S. João phase covered the 
Pensão S. João, the Parque Campismo, the boardwalk, the casino, the future 
swimming pool and the play park. The "Motel" phase would cover the restaurant 
and a future market while the "cinema" phase was to cover the water pumping 
station. Finally, the "2nd Phase" would cover a future market, cinema, stores and 
a second water station.133  
 These public priorities were matched by governmental priorities for the 
private sphere as well: infrastructure was not only an important part of health, 
development, and tourism, but it was also vital for the completion of what officials 
in the 1960s and 1970s felt was the ideal Portuguese home. The fact that the 
government would highlight the importance of development in the home is 
unsurprising given the importance the family held in official discourse throughout 
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the period. On the cover of its first edition, the Alvorada argued that a group of 
families coming together created a neighborhood, a group of neighborhoods 
coming together created a Concelho, a group of concelhos created a Distrito, 
and finally a group of Distritos formed a nation. Thus, the family was the base of 
the nation and the family's health was of key importance for the future. A family 
was defined as a man and woman “united by love” to confront life, to share joy, 
hope, work and sadness. Also, the local paper warned that because youth is 
filled with dreams and kindness, one only thinks about the hopes and happiness 
of life, not the sadness and labour that must be shared by a husband and wife.134  
Sobering discussion about the family was not uncommon. In the early 
1960s, a feeling of crisis existed in Portugal. For some, this crisis manifested 
itself in the deterioration of the family. Lourinhã's local paper commented in 1962 
that, “the world was on a short path to ruin” because the “proper family, the 
fundamental rock of society, was in great danger of destruction.” Threatening the 
world and the family was the pursuit of material wealth, motivated by a “demonic 
hate of God.” This hate had led, in the eyes of the Church-run Alvorada, to men 
attacking one another out of a hate that “had never been seen.” It was a time of 
“massacre and abortion.” The way out of ruin was to rebuild the fundamentals of 
society. The family had to be defended so that “salvaremos o mundo todo” [we 
will save the world].135 Such alarms sounded into the 1980s. The Alvorada's 
Christmas issue in 1980 began by reminding readers that the "family is the 
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foundation of human life and of all societies." Sadly, it continued, the family was 
being "gradually destroyed" as some of the "more important family values" were 
in decline. Under attack were spousal fidelity and the "sacred character" of 
matrimony with its "ordained objective" (children) along with the "greatness of 
paternity and maternity", and finally, the "inabdicatable" parental responsibility for 
moral education. Along with organizations like the Confederação Nacional das 
Associaões de Família (CNAF), the Alvorada urged the "fortification" of the family 
in order to protect Portugal's future. Amongst other vague suggestions, the CNAF 
called for the defense of the "familial building".136 
 Defining, defending and building up the home was one point where 
government and official discourse could help the family, and, of course, providing 
infrastructure was important to this objective. A 1964 article by Lima Bastos 
described the ideal Portuguese home and its advantages. The goal of the home 
was to build public health and, “without health, it is difficult to live happily.” But 
what was health? As Bastos explained, “it goes beyond the absence of illness 
(which is how the World Health Organization defines health), it is physical, 
mental and social well-being.”137  
 In order to achieve a healthy home certain amenities had to service the 
residence. First, Lourinhanense were told that water had to be accessible. 
Improvements in sanitation, and by extension, life, depended upon access to 
clean water via direct plumbing, or nearby fountains. Sending it for chemical 
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analysis was the best way to ensure that it was safe to drink and cook with.138 
Closely linked to water as a major contributor to sanitation was the sewer 
system.  Sewers would help keep at bay the flies and rats that were the source of 
many illnesses.139 Second, Lima Bastos  identified central heating as an 
important part of creating a healthy home. It avoided the need to use a fire, which 
not only endangered the house, but also poured toxic gases into the home.140 
Third, having a finished floor that covered exposed soil was also an important 
necessity. Cement flooring, rock, tile or wood were preferred methods to finish a 
home. These floors could be covered with a carpet to be more comfortable to 
walk on. These types of finished floors would also reduce danger to children, as 
they would help to avoid contamination by vermin, like cockroaches, as well as 
keeping dangerous things like excrement, if the home did not have a bathroom, 
from soaking into the ground.141   
 A home also had to be compartmentalized and space was to be defined 
by the activity carried out in that room. A family had to have a designated 
sleeping area and arrange the beds in order to reduce the transmission of 
diseases. This was to be done by limiting the number of people sleeping in the 
same room and having rooms well ventilated. It was also essential to separate 
adolescent boys and girls. If your dwelling did not have enough rooms to 
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separate people, then a curtain or tabique, could be used..142 Further, sleeping in 
the same bed carried the risk of spreading disease, “not to mention the 
discomfort involved.”143 Some solutions were available for those who had neither 
the rooms, nor the beds to separate people. Children who were young enough 
for a cradle could sleep in a box or a drawer placed on the floor. Arranging two 
chairs together could also help to solve space issues. For older people, 
mattresses could be placed on the ground at night and stored in the kitchen, the 
home's entrance, or in the sitting room during the day. As Bastos pointed out, 
many houses had a dining or sitting room that was often closed and rarely used. 
Judgment was then passed as it was explained: "it is a shame if [the room] was 
not used to sleep when they lacked [sufficient beds] in the bedroom."144 The 
message was clear: staying healthy meant sleeping apart.   
 Homes also needed designated cooking and washing areas. The room in 
which one cooked and ate was very important. It had to be positioned such that 
the smoke created from cooking could easily exit the home, be airy and have 
both a window and a door with nets to keep flies out. Dangerous liquids like 
gases or poisons for rats that children could drink needed to be locked away with 
a key. That said, if children were going to be in the kitchen, it would be best to 
keep hazardous liquids out of that room altogether.145 If your home did not have 
a bathroom, then an arrangement should be made with a neighbor who did, so 
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144 "É pena não se aproveitar para lá dormir aqueles que não têm cama no quarto." See: Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
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that one could wash. That said, Bastos was clear that it would be easy enough to 
build a place beside the home where people could wash. A shower, for example, 
could be built with "with little work and little money."146 
 Five years later, in 1969, local editorials continued to call for a reworking 
of the home along similar lines. One article explained that a comfortable house 
would include a washroom, a clean kitchen, running water, bedrooms with a 
“minimum degree of comfort”, rooms “where a family could read”, heating 
systems, furniture, and comfortable beds. The editorial reminded readers that 
“everyone knows that the environment of the home influences our development 
and our future lives.” For this reason it was important to take “special care” in 
creating the home.147 Unfortunately though, as the paper lamented, rural 
Portugal did not have the ability to build such houses. This is why, as the author 
argued, there was a “great exodus from the rural areas of Portugal to Lisbon, 
France, Germany, and Canada.” Portugal needed to urbanize by installing 
sewers, electrical infrastructure, and running water. The article called on Portugal 
to study the problem, create a program and a policy to “build a future for the 
Portuguese.”148 
 Lourinhanense felt pressure from those like the CML and commercial 
companies, who controlled discourse, to develop such homes. Pressure came 
only from articles like the two described previously, but also from advertisements 
                                                
146 Ibid. 
147 "A Habitação nos Meios Rurais", Alvorada (January 11, 1969) p. 1. 
148 Ibid. 
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that reminded Lourinhanense of the need to run a clean and serviced home. Ads 
similar to one for Sulfazul, a chemical mold remedy for the home, emerged in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, insisting that commercial products would help make 
management of the home easier. Sulfazul, for example, would help “against 
mildew the way you want”.149 Another advertisement in the Alvorada in 1968 
explained to shoppers that "a great part of happy homes" was the availability of a 
refrigerator150, which, of course, required electrical service to the home.  
 Beneath all of these discussions about the importance of electricity and 
water infrastructure lay the fact that the desires of both local governments and 
local subject-citizens were undercut in the 1960s and 1970s by an 
underdeveloped government and bureaucracy that was incapable of delivering a 
modern landscape and services without public participation. Put plainly, the 
coincidence of government and local interests went some way in opening the 
civic sphere to subject-citizens in exchange for their help in developing Lourinhã. 
However, as democratic government took control and standardized service 
delivery, the state  began to monopolize development, which had the peculiar 
effect of reducing the kind of civic participation described earlier. We must 
remember that in any analysis of political culture, priorities and goals were bound 
to reach well past logistical capabilities in Portugal, looking to what ideally would 
be created, not what was actually capable. This was true under both the 
dictatorship and the democracy.  
                                                
149 See: “Sulfazul”, Alvorada (March 14, 1971), p. 4. 
150 "Ad: AEG Santo", Alvorada (July 28, 1968), p. 3. 
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 The complex and tangled negotiation between locals and government 
over infrastructure, especially in the years of the dictatorship and the early years 
of democracy, reflects the basic reality that the CML lacked the resources 
necessary to carry out its own program.  In fact, funding issues dogged the CML, 
which often relied upon bank loans and private contributions to complete 
projects. In November of 1963, for example, the Câmara received notice from the 
Direcção-Geral dos Serviços Electricos requiring the CML to explain their plans 
for electrification through 1967. Prompted by this letter, Lourinhã named four 
areas of priority. First, the Câmara wanted to see, in 1963, the completion of the 
projects that had entered the Director-General's office before Aug 31. Second, 
the Câmara wanted the projects submitted since August 31 to the Director-
General's office to be completed in 1964. Third, in the three years following 1963, 
the Concelho wanted to electrify the following neighborhoods: in 1965 they aimed 
to electrify Casal Novo, Mereudeiro, Ventosa, e Pregança; in 1966 the Câmara 
wanted electricity for Reguengo Pequeno, Fontelas, Casais da Galharda, Pinhoa 
and Casal do Simplício; in 1967, the hope was to electrify Casais Serranos, 
Vaizea, Casias do Moinho, Casal Tormeiro, Casal de Feitosa and Casal de 
Leafa. Finally, the Câmara wanted to avoid accessing credit at the Caixa-Geral 
do Depositos, Credito e Providéncia, despite making it clear that it would borrow 
money if that was “in the people’s interests.”151 In another example of limited 
resources the CML discussed the electrification of Pinhera e Casais da Galbarda 
                                                
151 “Reunião 13/Nov./63: Plano de obras de electrificação", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal 
da Lourinhã, No. 24. (1963-1964), p. 84. 
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in July of 1974. The CML discussed the fact that they did not have the necessary 
money to complete the infrastructure needed. They would need to set aside 
money in the next annual budget for this project. The project had been initiated 
when local commissions in the neighborhoods asked the CML to supplement 
their investment.152 
 Covering expenses often involved several contributors including various 
levels of governments, organizations and individuals.  The electrification of 
Casais de Porto Dinheiro, a representative case, was undertaken in the summer 
of 1970. Of the total cost of 98.000$00 escudos, the national and district 
governments gave forty-five percent (44.100$00 escudos) with the remaining 
fifty-five percent to be raised by the CML.153 Interestingly, nowhere does the 
correspondence between the CML and SEOL mention that any of this money 
came from local residents. However, given that we know that residents promised 
close to 25.000$00 escudos for this project, we have to assume that their money 
would be included in the CML’s portion, leaving the local administration to 
contribute around 30.000$00 escudos.154 In other cases, the CML was not even 
a financial player. In one such project, plans for a sewer system in PAB had been 
sent to the Direcção de Urbanização in March 1969 and approved. Considered 
an "urgent work", the state promised half of the money with the landowners 
                                                
152 "Reunião 27/Jul./1974: Participação do Município em Electrificações", Livro de Actas da 
Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, n. 31 (1973-74), p. 199.  
153 "SEOL to Pres. da CML", May 27, 1970. "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).  
154 See: "Electrificações: Casais de Porto Dinheiro", Arquivo Correspondencia 1971, proc. 37-
D/8. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).  
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providing the other half: "over three hundred and fifty contos.”155  
By the early 1980s, such projects were more commonly funded, at least in 
part, by bank loans. Indeed, despite municipalities gaining financial autonomy in 
1979, they nonetheless lacked the ability to raise money through direct taxation 
and so remained dependent for upwards of sixty-five percent of their funding on 
the national government. In addition, local contributions tapered off, leaving 
institutions like the CML scrambling for alternate sources of revenue.156 Thus, 
funding for the major water and sewage infrastructure upgrades and installations 
in the south of the Concelho (a scheduled fifteen year project) that would 
dominate much of the agenda in the mid and late 1980s was secured in 1981 
with a thirty million escudo (or thirty thousand conto) loan from the Caixa Geral 
de Depositos. The loan would cover roughly fifty-eight percent of the cost of the 
work. The rest would come from public funds at various government levels – 
there was, by this point (1981) no mention of direct private donation.157 
 In fact, projects in the 1960s and early 1970s were often contingent on 
private financial participation. In an example from 1965 of local participation in 
the maintenance of water infrastructure, Dr. José Machado of Ribeira de 
                                                
155 CML, "Relatório das Obras Necesárias no Concleho", July 22, 1969. "Obras Municipais: 
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Palheiros wrote the CML about a decaying, thirty year old pipe that supplied 
clean water to public fountains and cleaning stations.158 A little over a month 
later, Dr. Machado forwarded, through his lawyer, a 25.000$00 escudo donation 
to the CML to help pay for the repair of the decrepit pipe.159 At times, money 
could be such an important factor in the CML's assessment of which projects to 
undertake that when Sr. José António Gomes asked for lighting on his street in 
January 1974, necessary because darkness could lead to disorder at times, the 
CML responded by asking him if he could contribute to the expenses for the 
requested work.160 Similarly, in the summer of 1970, the CML was moving on 
requests from Sr. Herminio Antunes Henriques, of Casal Vale da Cruz, and Sr. 
Américo da Silva of Casais de Porto Dinheilro, about the installation of public 
lamps in their neighborhoods. In a councilors’ meeting, the CML agreed that 
lamps were needed in these neighborhoods and agreed to work on their 
installation, provided that those residents interested in the success of the project 
paid for the cost of the installation of lamps.161  
 In developing infrastructure, a few institutions and officials emerged as key 
actors and mediators between the various levels of government and local 
                                                
158 "Dr. Francisco José Vieira Machado to Pres. da CML", December 14, 1965. "Solicita 
Reparações de Caminhos em Ribamar de Palheiros e Conduta de Abastecimento de Água", 
Arquivo Correspondencia, 1966, proc. Z-13/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
159 "Duarte Ferreira Pires to Pres. da CML", February 10, 1966. "Solicita Reparações de 
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160 "Pres. da CML to José António Gomes", January 21, 1974. “Electricidade: Relações com a 
SEOL; Pedidos de Particulares para ampliaçõe das redes Eléctricas", Arquivo Correspondencia 
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161 "Reunião 27/Jul/70: Instalação de Lampadas para Iluminação Pública", Livro de Actas da 
Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, n. 29 (1969-71), p. 87. 
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subject-citizens. These included governmental bodies like the Juntas de 
Freguesias (parish councils), the CML, the Distrito de Lisboa, SEOL and later 
Energias de Portugal (EDP is the national energy company in Portugal) along 
with various national ministries. They also included loose and unofficial groups 
organized around specific issues, locality, and family; neighborhood 
commissions, which emerged around the revolution; and individuals. However, 
Lourinhã’s mayor was first and foremost amongst these.  
As the main recipient of letters to the CML, Lourinhã’s mayor was not only 
able to guide responses and results, but also to receive a high degree of 
exposure to his constituents and other institutions. So, the Mayor's 
responsibilities in the 1960s consisted of relaying information and requests from 
citizens, institutions and businesses to the CML. By way of example, in late 
November 1967 the Mayor of Lourinhã brought João Henriques' letter of October 
17 to the CML's attention. Sr. Henriques had written regarding the electrification 
of certain neighborhoods in the south end of the Concelho bordering Torres 
Vedras. Sr. Henriques need the CML's help in dealing with the municipal 
government in Torres Vedras since the neighborhoods in question straddled both 
the municipalities of Lourinhã and Torres Vedras. Sr. Henriques was seeking the 
installation of some street lamps in Lourinhã's area, which would need to be 
serviced by Torres Vedras’ power lines. From this exchange, the CML noted that 
instead of using Torres Vedras' infrastructure, they needed to electrify their parts 
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of the neighborhoods in question.162 The Mayor was also responsible for 
recommending his own projects and setting general policy direction to the CML. 
In 1965, Councilors considered a proposal from the Mayor calling for the 
“elimination of deficiencies” in infrastructural aspects in Lourinhã. These 
improvements concerned street lamps in various locales, including the main 
streets in Lourinhã proper (from rua Visconde ... de Almeida, and Avenida José 
de Almeida) and the street running parallel to the ocean in Praia da Areia 
Branca, along with the walkway on the beach.163  
The mayor’s power and role has changed little as the position remains 
central in the town. José Manuel Dias Custódio, who first took up the position as 
Lourinhã's Mayor in 1983 and only retired in the fall of 2013, exhibited signs in 
the early 1980s that he would continue the legacy of his predecessors in 
promoting infrastructure. As a councilor, Custódio took the lead on several issues 
including the supply of electrical equipment. In September 1981, he presented a 
plan to the CML in order to "rectify the illumination of Lourinhã" in which Phillips 
had proposed to supply the needed material at the "price [the CML] had hoped." 
The CML approved of the plan; however, the Chefe de Secretaria of the CML 
noted that the existence of the project had not been through the necessary 
consultation process or a public competition. In addition, the materials, their 
                                                
162 27/Nov.67: "Electrificação da Casais do Ripo", Livro de Actas da Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã, n. 27 (1967-68), p, 121.  
163 "Reunião 27/Jan./65: Melhorias na iluminação pública de Lourinhã/Melhoramentos na Praia 
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costs, the budget and plan of activities were also unknown.164 
 Such warnings from the Sectretariat of the CML reveal that by the 1980s 
an important level of bureaucratic oversight had assumed new importance in how 
local business was done. We should remember that the Secretariat existed in the 
1960s and 70s and investigated many complaints and requests but that they held 
no real power over the CML and thus were not able to act as a level of oversight 
in municipal government. Time and time again in the 1980s, however, the 
Secretariat emerged in the documents playing a role they had not in the 1960s. 
By September 1981, the CML was going ahead with the installation of public 
lamps in the Quinta de Santa Catarina. The CML approved the work and since 
the contract was won in an "open competition" and there had been no 
"duplication of payments", the Chefe de Secretaria did not "have any objections" 
about how the work was contracted.165 Similarly, the CML, in October 1982, 
decided to replace the public lighting around the courthouse to match the work 
Philips had done in other areas of the Concelho. They set a budget of 
500.000$00 escudos, while the Chefe de Sectretaria reminded councilors that 
they needed to hold a public competition for the contract.166  
 That said, the emergence of the Secretariat as a level of oversight in the 
1980s should be seen as step in the ongoing standardization of services in 
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Lourinhã that was well underway in the 1960s as infrastructure development 
pushed the CML, and indeed Portugal, to develop its regulations and institutions. 
As early as 1962, as more and more “industrial” consumers of water emerged, 
the CML was pressed by institutions like the Adega Cooperativa to set a fixed 
price for water consumption for commercial use. The Council unanimously 
decided that they would establish a price of two escudos per cubic meter of water 
used.167 By 1966, the CML was turning its attention toward regulating and 
overseeing residential hygiene. In approving orders from national bodies like the 
Direcção Civil e Politíca, the CML set into its bylaws a requirement that no 
residence could be newly occupied without having been inspected and found to 
have the "indispensible conditions of hygiene." These conditions included access 
to washrooms (not necessarily in the home or with running water); and, access to 
wells (no more than 100 meters from the home), if running water did not exist in 
the home. If drinking water was not readily available to the home, then it would 
not be possible to have the inspectors visit. In addition, inspections could not be 
done for people in arrears on tax payments and fees for the inspection: 
financially, the resident must have been in good standing with the CML.168 In 
1971, with the completion of the water infrastructure in PAB and Seixal, the CML 
felt the need to write "proper regulations" for the municipality's sanitation 
services. This meant that walls on or bordering public throughways could not 
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cause rain water to pool or sewers to back up. Domestic water systems – those 
within houses – must have been kept separate from systems that collected and 
channeled rainwater. The regulations covered everything from payment for 
services to basic information about infrastructure in both private and public 
buildings such as schools. New construction would have to comply with the 
regulations and existing structures would have to be brought up to code. The 
regulations also standardized the minimum requirements for project applications. 
After listing the various fixtures one might find in a bathroom, the regulations 
noted that the minimum that a bathroom must have was: a toilet, a bidet, a 
bathtub (with or without a shower fixture), and a sink.169  
 Inevitably, institutions also emerged and developed along with regulation 
in response to growing demand for service. In 1969, the Civil Governor of Lisbon 
and the Direcção de Urbanização de Lisboa had completed its sewers and water 
treatment station in PAB and Seixal and were asking the CML to pay the share of 
the work they had approved in the project's development plans. The CML was 
able to raise the funds because of local donations and the recently organized 
survey office responsible for mapping "rustic property". Opened by Lourinhã's 
mayor with the participation of the civil governor of Lisbon, the office gave the 
CML a better understanding of the Concelho and how improvements would affect 
specific properties (making taxation for services easier).170 
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 However, the greatest push for standardization came with the founding of 
the EDP after the revolution. After the regional electrical services like SEOL were 
nationalized and placed under EDP, problems related to the interference of high-
tension power lines came to the fore. As the EDP explained to the CML in a letter 
from September 1977, "frequent and dangerous situations of incompatibility" 
between high-tension lines and local infrastructure had been discovered in 
Lourinhã. The interests of property owners and "promoters of urbanization and 
the obligation of the public distribution of electricity" wanted to establish new 
electrical lines by altering existing infrastructure. Similarly, the letter continued, 
the construction of isolated houses frequently conflicted with technical 
recommendations, creating "irregularities in energy supply for large urban 
zones." Thus, greater coordination between the various actors was needed, 
especially in order to ensure that those areas that were "most important" and 
"deserving, [like] urban and industrial zones," had sufficient access to electricity. 
This was done in the name of the national economy.171 
The urbanization, and requisite electrification, of the Quinta da Santa 
Catarina in Lourinhã offers one example of the EDP having to reconcile past 
projects with national infrastructure requirements. A letter in July 1977 from the 
EDP to the CML explained that there were problems with the ongoing 
urbanization of the Qta. Sta. Catarina. Acknowledging that electrical 
                                                
171 "EDP to Pres. da CML", September 18, 1977. "Obras Municipais: Electrificações: Assuntos 
Gerais sobre Electrificação", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 37-D/7 (Arquivo Municipal da 
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infrastructure was "indispensable" to the urbanization of the area, EDP explained 
that a number of buildings had gone up without the addition of any new electrical 
lines thus taxing a system that "could not support other loads." Exacerbating the 
situation were construction projects close to the high tension lines, forcing EDP 
to undertake "onerous modifications … and expenses" in order to complete the 
electrical projects already underway in the area. In short, EDP was taking this 
opportunity to present the CML with a bill for 41.339$00 escudos, leaving open 
the possibility for further "questions" between EDP and the CML about the 
urbanization of the Quinta da Santa Catarina.172 
 
** 
 
As highlighted above, Lourinhanense enthusiastically engaged in the 
improvement of their landscape and the creation of a modern Lourinhã. However, 
we should not think of the Estado Novo as a misunderstood government that 
welcomed private action in all areas of civic affairs. Indeed, locals continued to 
be barred from direct and meaningful political organization. Only certain sectors, 
such as infrastructure, were important and sanctioned sites for Portuguese to 
engage in civic affairs.  
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, basic infrastructure was central to 
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Lourinhã’s development. As we have seen throughout the rest of the dissertation, 
these services emerge time and time again as central to the way Lourinhanense 
understood a modern, and what came to be ‘European’, Lourinhã. With both the 
government and subject-citizens interested in these services, a sort of perfect 
storm emerged under the dictatorship in which those who the Estado Novo 
consciously tried to keep disinterested and unengaged were allowed and 
sometimes called upon to act in civic affairs. With the Portuguese government 
and the CML unable to fund and complete all projects on their own, civic 
engagement in infrastructure development was welcomed and, indeed, 
encouraged. Having considered the state of infrastructure in Lourinhã between 
the 1960s and 1980s, the priorities of both locals and the government, as well as 
the ways in which both of these sectors acted in order to achieve their goals, the 
discussion will turn in the dissertation's final chapter to Lourinhã's contemporary 
urban landscape. By the 1980s, the CML had turned its attention to building the 
modern center it boasts today. By looking at the development of the town's 
market hall and central-square, the dissertation will continue to discuss Portugal's 
urban priorities and political culture by highlighting the elements that the CML 
ultimately valued as representative of a modern Lourinhã. 
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6. Towards the "New" Lourinhã's Contemporary Center 
 
 
 
In July 1989, eleven years after the first architectural proposals were 
tabled, Lourinhã opened a new market hall.1 Considering the facility a center of 
both social and economic activity, the municipal government boasted that the 
new market hall was in a “privileged location” on the ring road connecting 
Lourinhã to larger centers like Lisbon, and Peniche: that it was an integral part of 
the development of a new municipal center that would include a new bus-station, 
new municipal offices, and a soccer field; and that visitors would find the cleanest 
environment possible.2 Lourinhã’s mayor, José Manuel Custódio Dias, heralded 
the market as an important step towards building “a different Lourinhã … a 
European Lourinhã.”3 More than anything, however, the market hall ought to be 
understood as emblematic of the development of Lourinhã’s organized, spacious, 
and modern landscape in the 1980s, which had developed in parallel to 
Portugal's political culture and its political institutions.  
Nevertheless, a single market hall would never make a "European" urban 
landscape by it self. In fact, the term “European” is riddled with ambiguity and 
complexity meaning different things in different contexts. In late 1980s Lourinhã, 
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2 "Abriu ao Público O Novo Mercado Municipal", Suplemento Alvorada: Informação Municipal, 
(August 1989), iv. 
3 "Novo Mercado Municipal Inauguração está Próxima: Com Custos Globais de Cerca de 3,500 
Contos", Suplemento Alvorada: Informação Municipal, (February 1989), iv. 
 309 
building a European environment became merely the latest label attached to a 
project that began in the 1960s to modernize the town, while rationalizing and 
realigning the urban built environment, beginning with tourism facilities, 
agriculture, and then basic infrastructure. Throughout this time, the Câmara 
Municipal da Lourinhã (CML) had discussed the prospect of moving the town’s 
center from the Praça Marquês de Pombal, in Lourinhã’s medieval center, out to 
the periphery of the medieval core at the Praça da República (later renamed the 
Praça José Máximo da Costa for the town’s first democratically elected Mayor 
and former deputy governor of the District of Lisbon). Little was done to achieve 
this realignment in the 1960s and 1970s as the CML struggled to set up such 
basic infrastructure as water, electricity and roads. However, as the 1980s 
progressed the CML found itself with a Praça da República that was developing 
with the opening of a long-promised municipal courthouse in 1982, and a new 
main road (N247) connecting Lourinhã to Torres Vedras and Peniche that 
circumvented the old town and passed alongside the Praça da República, its new 
market hall and the existing post-office, fire hall, and principal church. The 
opportunity to abandon the town’s old centre and build a new square to represent 
the modern Lourinhã was presenting itself.  
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Figure 24: Central Lourinhã's landmarks. The Praça Marquês de Pombal is marked in 
orange. In contrast, the new administrative center, the Praça José Máximo da Costa, with 
its more organized topography, is marked in yellow.   
 
The drive to rationalize the built environment was made all the more 
appealing since, after the 1960s, Portuguese citizens became increasingly active 
in civic affairs in a number of arenas, including urbanization. At the macro level, 
as has been discussed in previous chapters, Portugal was undergoing a dramatic 
political, social, and economic transformation. In the 1950s, Portugal was 
primarily a rural society, under an inward looking and conservative authoritarian 
dictatorship that, despite its economic frailty, maintained an overseas empire. By 
the early 1990s, however, Portugal had developed a semi-industrialized 
economy with a democratically elected government whose future was bound to 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Union (EU).4 
                                                
4 Stephen Syrett, Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic Initiative in Portugal. 
(Great Britain: Avebury Ashgate, 1995), 86. This evolution included a bloodless political 
revolution, the Carnation Revolution, which ended the Estado Novo (1932-1974) on 25 April 
1974; a series of bloody, drawn out, and costly colonial wars in the 1960s and 1970s which in 
large part triggered the 1974 revolution; and Portugal’s entrance into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1986. As to the cost of the colonial wars, the Portuguese regime was 
spending nearly fifty per cent of its revenue on its efforts to suppress the revolutions in its African 
colonies in the 1960s. See, Maria Baganha, "From Closed to Open Doors: Portuguese 
Emigration under the Corporatist Regime", Electronic Journal of Portuguese History, 1:1 
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Accession to the EEC was the culmination of a process to move the 
country economically closer to mainstream Europe, starting with Portugal’s 
admission to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1960. Macro changes of 
this magnitude challenged Lourinhanense citizens at the micro level to adapt. As 
local agents like the Alvorada newspaper celebrated Portugal’s modest 
industrialization and the economic resurgence of the 1960s that propelled this 
change, it also reminded its readers that the Portuguese could not forget that 
industrial developments were supported by long-term improvements to the 
country's scientific infrastructure, technical base, and "sociological character." 
Through education, "modern generations" had to be "adapted" to meet the 
challenges of the future.5 
Waves of economic modernization altered many of Portugal’s public 
spaces through the development and reordering of its infrastructure. As previous 
chapters have shown, dictatorship subjects and democratic citizens were given, 
and spent, political capital as active participants in this reordering. This chapter 
uses the development of Lourinhã’s market hall – a major step in the creation of 
the new town center – to consider the ways in which public space was 
reorganized as Portugal democratized and modernized, and as towns like 
Lourinhã sought to regulate an increasingly politicized urban setting.6 In part, this 
                                                                                                                                            
(Summer 2003), 5. 
5 "Adapter-se às Exîgências do Mundo Moderno", Alvorada (June 28, 1970), p. 1.  
6 For other examples of historical work using markets as a site of enquiry, see Herbert Eder, 
"Markets as Mirrors: Reflectors of the Economic Activity and the Regional Culture of Coastal 
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chapter focuses on the development of Lourinhã’s contemporary built 
environment and argues that this urban landscape, its new town center, and the 
new market hall, became important sites for the expression of what Portuguese 
political culture came to value as representations of modern and democratic 
Portugal in the late 1980s: modern Lourinhã was to coordinate and rationalize its 
landscape designating space for various specific purposes. This was a long-term 
project that had begun under the dictatorship. Yet, despite the severe ruptures in 
Portuguese political structures and mechanisms, the country’s political culture 
and modernization was marked by continuity as Portugal transitioned to 
European social democracy in the 1980s. Additionally, this chapter considers this 
process in the context of the Lourinhanenses’ understanding of their rights vis-à-
vis their built landscape, which were, in many ways a legacy of Estado Novo 
policies.7  
With the consolidation of democracy in Portugal in the 1980s, citizen 
involvement in urban development waned as the CML completed its modern 
urban center.8 Indeed, as previous chapters have demonstrated, citizen 
                                                                                                                                            
Oaxaca", in Markets in Oaxaca, ed S. Cook and M. Diskin. (Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 1976) 67. He reminds us that, "Markets can be viewed as microcosms containing a 
representative array of the elements comprising a regional environment. Markets provide a 
compressed display of an area's economy, technology, and society – in brief, of the local way of 
life." For similar uses of markets as analytical tools see: Anand Yang, Bazaar India: Markets, 
Society, and the Colonial State in Gangetic Bihar. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998), ch. 1; B.L. Anderson and A.J.H Latham eds., The Market in History, (Great Britain: 
University of Texas Press, 1986); and R.O. Whyte, The Spatial Geography of Rural Economies. 
(Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
7 See: Pedro Ramos Pinto, “Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in Twentieth Century 
Portugal”, Contemporary European History, 18:2 (May 2009), 199-215. 
8 This dissertation suggests that civic engagement in Lourinhã waned in that citizens did not 
directly organize and lobby local government in the 1980s to the same degree that they had in the 
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engagement in urban development during the 1970s was high, often being 
required to supplement insufficient government action. In the late 1970s and into 
the 1980s, such citizen engagement decreased as service-based infrastructure 
projects, which local residents saw as benefitting them directly, were completed 
and then replaced by less immediately relevant institutional infrastructure 
embodied by the re-alignment of the town center. This chapter contrasts the 
burst of 1970s’ political activity, largely around urban issues, with the relative 
quiet of the 1980s as the CML built its new center, including its market hall. I 
explore this contrast in the context offered by the various issues that emerged in 
the 1970s around the landscape by first considering both private and 
governmental activity that demonstrates an increasing sophistication in both 
spheres in terms of their understanding of the issues and of organization. 
                                                                                                                                            
1970s and 1960s. Ultimately, Lourinhã's experience suggests that engagement faded, not 
because of the souring of a relationship between the government and locals, but because the 
issues that mobilized citizens (electricity and water infrastructure for example, as demonstrated in 
the previous chapter of this dissertation) were by and large resolved. This chapter will provide 
further evidence that engagement was issue-based in its section on clandestine builds in 
Lourinhã. 
 Such an argument stands in contrast to some models of post-dictatorship 
government/citizen engagement that have emerged when discussing the Spanish experience of 
Francisco Franco's dictatorship after 1975. For example, Pamela Radcliffe suggests that there 
was a breakdown of trust between government and citizens. Indeed, she argues that family 
associations, for instance, developed new and more radical ways of engaging with the 
government after 1975, which suggest a "breakdown of the collaborative model of relations with 
the state." See: Pamela Radcliffe, Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the 
Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78. (London, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 306-
316. Two other important and useful works on the Spanish experience are: Manuel Castells, The 
City and the Grassroots: a Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1983), 213-288, in particular; and, Peter Donaghy and Michael 
Newton, Spain: a Guide to Political and Economic Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). For further reading on models of citizen engagement see: Bryan S. 
Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", Sociology, 24 (1990), 189-217; Martin Parker, 
"Organizations and Citizenship", Organization, 4 (Feb, 1997), 75-92; Fiona M. Smith, "Discourses 
of Citizenship in Transition: Scale, Politics, and Urban Renewal", Urban Studies, 36 (January, 
1999), 167-187; Michael Marinetto, "Who Wants to be an Active Citizen? The Politics and 
Practice of Community Involvement", Sociology, 37 (February 2003), 103-120. 
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Second, I turn to the 1980s, when governmental institutions continued to improve 
and the CML took a stronger control over the landscape and its development with 
tools like legislation, mapping, and electricity.  
Although it is clear that supervision of growing private action and political 
activity was a priority for the CML in the 1980s, the potential explanations for the 
contrasting drop off of private action are numerous and fluid. One factor 
motivating the decline in citizen participation presents itself with the CML 
completing improvements near and dear to the hearts of locals, including 
electrical and water works, and, not coincidentally, economic issues like housing 
and farming. Similarly, the emergence of higher-level outlets for political 
expression after 1974, like legal political parties and civil society organizations, 
served to funnel direct action away from more personal methods of civic 
engagement used before 1974, like, for example, letter-writing and private 
discussions. Also to be considered is the possibility that governmental institutions 
successfully developed their own mechanisms of control and coercion that 
adequately discouraged, or at least channeled, complaints through approved 
outlets and bureaucracy. As this chapter points out, all of these activities were in 
play as citizens and governmental institutions negotiated their places in the 
changing post-1974 political environment that attempted to deal with both 
dictatorial legacies and a democratic future.  
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Figure 25: Map of central Lourinhã with the area that would become the new town center in 
the 1970s, highlighted. Dominated by the old soccer field, the area also included the old 
market. Today, the new square, the Praça José Máximo da Costa, is an open area bounded 
by the medieval convent, a courthouse, a fire hall, a post office, a music academy and the 
new town hall. The renovation of this space was total. CML, Plano de Pormenor da Zona 
Central: Extracto do Plano Aprovado, 1979’, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã’, 
1984. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
 
 
 
** 
 
 
 The 1970s were, in many ways, a fluid decade for Portugal’s politics. At 
the national level, the colonial wars were inciting renewed and virulent dissent 
within the army – junior officers formed the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) 
which was responsible for the coup on April 25, 1974 – while Marcelo Caetano, 
Salazar’s successor, wrestled with former Salazar loyalists to implement a series 
of liberalizing reforms. During the Revolution, of course, Portugal went through a 
two-year period of extreme political instability that, at times, nominally threatened 
to turn into civil war. National politics calmed down after 1976, when Mário 
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Figure ii - ‘The old town square: Praça Marquês de Pombal c. 1940.’ (Collection of Maria Isabel 
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Soares’ Socialist Party (PS) won the first democratic election of the post-
dictatorship period and consolidated democracy. By the late 1970s Portugal 
found itself in peculiar circumstances: people were endowed with new freedoms, 
but political institutions had not developed to the point where they could channel 
the new freedom to political participation. In places like Lourinhã, this meant that 
citizens engaged their local administration demanding action in their urban 
landscape – an area which the dictatorship had allowed and encouraged people 
to understand as inherently open to them – from an institution (the CML) that 
could not effectively respond to their concerns. The lesson, it seems, for the CML 
was that in the democratic world more management was needed over both 
political participation and the landscape, particularly where these two matters 
coincided.  
The need to monitor private political action in the late 1970s was 
particularly acute, especially given the legacies of political action and culture from 
the revolution. The various ways in which Lourinhã’s political culture changed 
and became more organized must be understood in the context of 25 de Abril. 
The revolution’s legacy in Lourinhã was not to provide a moment of rupture but 
was more subtle and felt only in the years following 1974-76.  
The revolution’s immediate effects in Lourinhã were limited to changes to 
the CML’s leadership. In the weeks, and indeed days, before 25 de Abril, Lucinio 
Cruz, Lourinhã's mayor since 1970, was being applauded for his election to 
another four year mandate. Acção Nacional Popular's Lourinhã office, for 
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example, congratulated him and was arranging a meeting with the Governor of 
the District of Lisbon, Sr. Dr. Afonso Marchueta. In the meantime, Cruz was to 
know that the Governor had "great respect" for the mayor and confidence in him.9 
However, Cruz’s tenure as mayor ended by July 1974,10 as an administrative 
commission was appointed to head the CML. Under the leadership of João 
Marques, the CML’s administrative commission - made up of certain notables 
who were engaged in politics before 1974 and trusted by the new revolutionary 
administration, but who did not belong to any political party - would last until the 
election of José Máximo da Costa as Mayor in 1976. Further highlighting the 
continuity of political leadership in Lourinhã, Costa was himself a member and 
deputy mayor in the administrative commission and had been involved in various 
political actions throughout the 1960s and 1970s, advocating particularly for 
education and electrical infrastructure.  
The transition in leadership was without incident. Upon taking power, the 
administrative commission asked for, and was granted, support from various 
governmental institutions like the District of Lisbon, which, itself a part of a larger 
series of bureaucratic upheavals in the wake of 1974, had experienced changes 
                                                
9 "Acção Nacional Popular to Pres. da CML", April 22, 1974. "Presidência: Inaugurações; 
Homenagens; visitos; Cumprimentos," Arquivo Correspondência, 1974 proc. 3-B (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). For another congratulatory note see: 'secção Cultural do Clube de 
Santa Bárbara to Pres. da CML", March 26, 1974. "Presidência: Inaugurações; Homenagens; 
visitos; Cumprimentos," Arquivo Correspondência, 1974. proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT).  
10 It is important to note that continuity in politics was much more prevalent than discontinuity and 
Cruz stands as a shining example of this. Indeed, Cruz returned to the CML as a town councilor 
in the first municipal elections in 1976.  
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in its leadership.11 Local organizations, which, by and large, did not experience 
bureaucratic upheaval en masse in 1974, also accepted Lourinhã’s new 
leadership without protest. The Junta do Turismo quickly lined up behind the 
administrative commission. The Junta's head, Carlos Ferreira da Silva, appointed 
by the dictatorship’s CML, recognized the commission's nomination and 
supported them in their work "contributing to the real dinamização [dynamization] 
of the various problems in Lourinhã."12 In fact, the administrative commission did 
not need help in relations with their Lourinhanense citizens. Requesting some 
technical support from the District of Lisbon (an accountant and an engineer to 
assist the new administration), the administrative commission reported that they 
enjoyed good relations with the population with whom they had a "frank 
dialogue."13 
 However the longer-term effects of the Revolution were more significant. 
In terms of day-to-day operations, it was business as usual in the CML although 
there had been a substantial shift in the town’s political culture: organized action 
through formalized groups became a prominent form of political expression. The 
                                                
11 "Pres da Com. Admin da CML to Director dos Serviços Fomento da Junta Distrital de Lisboa", 
July 19, 1974. "Presidéncia: Inagurações; Homanagems; visitos; Cumpriméntos", Arquivo 
Correspondencia, 1974 proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). Although no exhaustive 
study has been done to date on personnel change in the Portuguese democracy in 1974, some 
general discussions exist. See, for example: Dimitri A. Sotiropolous, "Southern European Public 
Democracies in Comparative Perspective”, West European Politics, 27:3 (2004), 409, 412; Nancy 
Bermeo, “What's Working in Southern Europe?”, South European Society and Politics, 4:3, 
(1999), 263–87.  
12 "Pres. da Junta do Turismo da CML, C.L.F da Silva to Pres. da Com. Admin da CML", July 24, 
1974. "Presidéncia: Inagurações; Homanagems; visitos; Cumpriméntos", Arquivo 
Correspondencia, 1974 proc. 3-B (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
13 "VP da Com. Admin. da CML to Gov. Civil e Gabinete Técnico de Lisboa", September 28, 
1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
 319 
most obvious effect of the Revolution, of course, was the emergence of political 
parties. The long illegal and beleaguered Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) 
emerged from the shadows. It was joined by dozens of other parties in the 
immediate run up to, or aftermath of, 25 de Abril led by what have become 
mainstays like the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the 
Christian Democrats (CDS) and the Popular Party (PP).14 Joining political parties 
as agents on the local level were the various national professional organizations, 
some of which had existed before 1974, while others emerged afterwards. The 
former Grémio Nacional das Farmácias, by way of example, became the 
Associação Nacional das Farmácias after the revolution and lobbied local 
governments about developing new retail space for pharmaceutical services.15 
 The most novel newcomers to the political arena after 1974 were the 
Comisões Moradores (resident or neighborhood commissions). Organized 
around locality as opposed to profession or political belief, the neighborhood 
commissions emerged in the wake of the revolution to lobby governments about 
housing and municipal infrastructure.16 By early 1975, four neighborhood 
commissions emerged in Lourinhã: in Vimeiro, Sobral, Nadrupe e Casalinho das 
                                                
14 For various correspondence between local political party offices and the CML see: "Diversos: 
Reuniões … Políticos", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1974, proc. 28-A/67 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
15 "Associação Nacional das Farmácias to CML", October 30, 1975. "Obras Municipais (e 
Paroquiais): Plano de Urbanização: Lourinhã", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 37-A/1 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
16 For an introduction to these organizations see: Charles Downs Revolution at the Grassroots: 
Community Organization in the Portuguese Revolution. (Albany, NY: University of New York 
Press, 1989). 
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Oliveiras and Pinhal da Cruz, with more to follow later that same year.17 Gauging 
the commissions’ success in terms of strength and effectiveness is difficult as the 
organizations fizzled by the late 1970s. However, the commissions’ existence is 
a testament to an opening and democratizing political culture after 1974 and they 
are excellent examples of sites of practice in activities like association, debate, 
lobbying and election. Nadrupe's Comisão de Moradores, for example, elected its 
board on June 15, 1975 and, as required, informed the CML. Eleven men sat on 
the board: two business owners; six farmers; one store clerk; one electrician; and 
the final member was an unspecified "public functionary."18 This board then 
lobbied the CML on behalf of its constituents. Toledo's Comissão, for instance, 
was mobilized in 1975 to advocate for the installation of public lights. Calling the 
infrastructure an "urgent necessity", the commission asked that new lights be 
installed as new homes were built.19 Likewise, Atalaia-Montoito's neighborhood 
commission made six requests of the CML in November 1975, which ranged 
from road repair to garbage collection and street cleaning, to mapping the 
sewage system.20 Indeed, in short order the neighborhood commissions became 
a recognized vehicle for public consultation and participation. Also in 1975, as 
                                                
17 "VP da Com. Admin. da CML to Gov. Civil e Gabinete Técnico de Lisboa", September 28, 
1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
18 "Com. da Moradores da Nadrupe to Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML", June, 1975. "Organização 
Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-
C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
19 "António Paulo to Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML", November, 1975. "Organização 
Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-
C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
20 "Comissão Moradores de Atalaia-Montoito to Pres. da Com. Admin da CML", November 12, 
1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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the district of Lisbon's Governor tried to organize its future priorities for urban 
landscape development, it asked its various municipal governments to contribute. 
Concelho level governments were to consult with their Juntas de Freguesias (the 
traditional representatives of parish residents) along with the newly minted 
neighborhood commissions as to what the population needed.21 
When considering the revolution in context, the emergence of the various 
neighborhood commissions was not surprising. Preceding the revolution, 
Lourinhanense had proved eager to organize and practice democracy through 
authorized associations and lobbying. Reguengo Grande's 'Improvement 
Commission' went straight to the District of Lisbon in January of 1974 to request 
water infrastructure for their town. Reminding the District Governor of their 
meeting upon his last visit to Lourinhã, the commission reasserted its desire to 
have running water brought to the town. As it insisted, "everyone wants to help, 
everyone wants progress."22 Other pre-existing and dictatorship-sanctioned 
groups like the volunteer firefighters’ band also continued as agents in urban 
development after the revolution. As one of the oldest and most active 
organizations in Lourinhã, the band was an effective agent in the project to 
change the town into the 1980s and beyond. As part of the band's undertakings, 
it ran a small music school for the local youth. In 1983, the school had forty 
                                                
21 "Gov. Civ. do Distrito de Lisboa to Com. Admin. da CML", August 22, 1975. "Organização 
Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-
C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
22 "A Comissão de Melhoramento, Reguengo Grande to Governador Civil de Distrito de Lisboa", 
January 30, 1974. "Cultura e Desporto: Grupo Desportivo de Reguengo Grande", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1974, proc. 27-A/11 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
 322 
students who, according to the band, "deserved much attention." As such, the 
band appealed to the CML for a permanent facility designated for use only as a 
music school in order to improve the town’s “musical culture.” In 1983, however, 
the band did not envision having its current facility – an impressive and large 
building opened shortly after the turn of the millennium, adjacent to the new town 
hall – on the central square (indeed, today’s central square was not the town’s 
center in 1983); instead they appealed for space in the town hall.23  
By the 1980s, neighborhood commissions had taken their place as 
permanent, if minor players that did not fulfill the promise of their early activities, 
in the culture of organizational and individual involvement in urban development. 
Neighborhood commissions worked in many of the same ways that 
Lourinhanense had in years previous. However, what their diminished role in the 
1980s reveals is that in the 1970s institutions like the CML lacked the resources 
to meet local expectations for housing and infrastructure. Pedro Ramos Pinto has 
explained that Estado Novo policies that privileged the family and private 
property, when coupled with dictatorial willingness to manipulate the landscape, 
meant that citizens developed expectations of their government to provide 
housing and urban services that were sometimes met, but which, in this 
discussion, demonstrate a degree of political literacy in Portugal before 1974.24  
Expectations by residents in Lourinhã were also expressed independently 
                                                
23 "Banda dos Bombeiros Volunt. da Lourinhã to Pres. da CML", May 26, 1983. “Orgãos da 
Autarquia: Câmara Municipal; Relações com a Administração em Geral; Sindicatos e 
Associações Semelhantes", Arquivo Correspondencia 1983, proc. 01.02.05.15 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
24 See Ramos Pinto, “Housing and Citizenship", 199-215. 
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of groups like the Comissões de Moradores, both before and after 1974 as the 
urban landscape was an ever shifting, organic, and contestable aspect of day-to-
day life for individual residents who experimented with lobbying the government 
over specific cases. By 1975, for example, young Lourinhanense were asking the 
CML to help them secure rental housing. Complaining of a lack of suitable 
housing for him and his future wife, Alvaro José Pereira Ferreira wrote the CML 
describing an apartment, including its owner, which would be available once 
renovations were completed. Ferreira asked that the CML support his application 
for tenancy. Similarly, Orlando Ribeiro wrote the mayor informing him that he 
would need a home once he was married. In this case, he noted that a house in 
Nadrupe was being built for the primary teachers who had been housed 
elsewhere since 1969. He asked if he could rent the home, if there were no 
teachers interested in it, suggesting that the teacher’s current residence had 
sufficed and could continue to be sufficient for them.25  
 Renters’ issues emerged as an important entry point for Lourinhanense to 
access the civic sphere as both property owners and would-be renters accessed 
their political representatives to express opinions over, and to affect the town’s 
physical environment while respecting housing rights. Property owners like João 
André Júnior solicited the CML about renters' issues. Júnior owned a property in 
Vimeiro but lived in the neighboring Concelho of Torres Vedras immediately to 
                                                
25 "Alvaro José Pereira Ferreira to CML", October 21, 1975; "Orlando Fernandes de Fonseca 
Ribeiro to Pres. da CML", February 28, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos 
termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal 
da Lourinhã, PT). 
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the south of Lourinhã. He had a tenant there whom he wanted evicted. The 
tenant owned another house, so would not be homeless, Júnior explained. For 
his part, Júnior had to sell his building, which was proving too costly to maintain. 
The CML’s administrative commission responded by telling Júnior that they did 
not have the power to evict his tenant, suggesting that he should seek help from 
the courts.26 In similar cases an individual’s need, in comparison to others, was 
legitimate grounds for request for CML intervention. For example, in December 
1974, Rui Pereira had targeted a unit for himself and his family to live in. 
However, it was already rented. Yet, as he explained, the renter lived elsewhere 
and did not need the home in question. The unit would provide "favourable 
conditions in which to live" for he and his family and the current tenant gave no 
justifiable reason to remain as leaseholder.27 
Although the CML could not help in cases like Júnior or Pereira’s, it could 
step in if a rental building or unit were in disrepair; and residents did, at times, 
take advantage of this. When António Rodrigo of Ribeira dos Palhieros 
complained to the CML about the state of the building in which he rented a unit, 
the administrative commission had the office of the Mayor's Chief of Staff 
investigate and ensure that there were "minimum conditions of livability." The 
complaint centered upon the lack of an on-site washroom, so the CML ordered 
                                                
26 "João André Júnior to Pres. Com. Admin. da CML", June 23, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas 
Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, 
proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
27 "Rui Pereira to Pres. da Com. Admin da CML", December 16, 1974. "Diversos: Queixas 
Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, 
proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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that the Chief of Staff's office ensure, together with the building's manager, that 
one be installed.28 Cases where the CML stepped in over the state of a building 
not only displayed its willingness to respond to residential concerns, but its 
concern for the urban environment's appearance, as well as a general agreement 
between citizens and government over urban conditions. It is no surprise then 
that the municipal authority would be proactive about urban maintenance. 
Targeting "ruined homes" and other buildings in disrepair, the administrative 
commission sent letters to land owners like Dr. Fernando Quintas do Nascimento 
whose properties had ruined buildings, ordering the demolition of such 
structures.29 In fact, the CML’s Administrative Commission developed a 
standardized letter by 1975 that ordered the destruction of "ruins of various 
buildings". Landowners were given sixty days to comply by either repairing or 
destroying the offending building before the government expropriated the land 
upon which it sat.30 
 Consensus also emerged around how the urban environment affected 
health, and individuals complained to the CML about how the landscape smelled, 
for example. In particular, animals, barns and chicken coops became a 
potentially offensive urban issue by the late 1970s. Property owners, like 
                                                
28 "Pres. da Com. Admin da CML to Chefe do Gabinete do Pres. da CML", July 21, 1975. 
"Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo 
Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
29 "Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML to Dr. Fernando Quintas do Nascimento", June 5, 1975. 
"Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo 
Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
30 "Pres. Com. Admin. da CML", June 5, 1975. "Diversos: Queixas Particulares; Rendas casa nos 
termos do Dec. Lei n. 345-74", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1975, proc. 28-A/63 (Arquivo Muncipal 
da Lourinhã, PT). 
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Laurentina Pereira of Praia da Areia Branca (PAB) lobbied the CML and had to 
apologize in her letter of August 1977 for complaining about the same issue she 
had raised the previous summer. Nevertheless, she explained that the smell 
coming from her rented basement was unbearable because of the animals kept 
there. After she had written and warned the tenant herself, a CML official had 
ordered her tenant to remove the animals, but they remained.31 In response, the 
CML asked the health office for advice. After having investigated, health officials 
told the CML that the basement housed two dogs and a rabbit, and that the smell 
must have been coming from nearby sewage lines.32 Likewise, António Moço 
complained in 1977 about the bad smells coming from his neighbor's property 
where a chicken coop had been built and rabbits were raised. Moço insisted that 
it was a "true offence" to him and asked the CML to take action.33  
 Indeed, chicken coops inspired higher-level political activity both in terms 
of collective action and in terms of governmental action beyond the CML, 
pushing local urban issues beyond Lourinhã's political sphere. By way of 
example, the Junta de Freguesia de Miragaia forwarded a 1977 complaint to the 
CML, "signed by various residents," about chicken coops owned by Rui Antunes 
da Silva and Mário Antunes which "contaminated the water of a public 
                                                
31 "Laurentina Adão Pereira to Pres. da CML", August 22, 1977. 'serviços Policiais: diversos; 
Queixas; Existéncia de uma Instalação …" Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
32 See: 'serviços Policiais: diversos; Queixas; Existéncia de uma Instalação …" Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
33 "António Silvério Moço to Pres. da CML", September 10, 1977. 'serviços Policiais: Diversos; 
Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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fountain."34 The CML had health officials investigate. They found a poultry coop 
that they “should have been informed about”, which was attached to a building 
that was more than fifty years old. The building lacked running water and was the 
source of foul odors, leading health officials to advise the CML that the building 
should be taken down.35 This case even garnered national action as one of the 
organizing residents, António Rodrigo Canoa, wrote then Prime Minister Mário 
Soares about the offending coop, complaining that the owners of the coop, who 
were wealthy and had running water, and thus were not in need of the public 
fountain, continued to raise chickens “forty-nine meters” from his neighbors' 
source of water. Despite various complaints to the CML, nothing had been done. 
Silva’s and Antunes’ chicken coop had become an issue of social justice that was 
playing out over the urban landscape.36 So, when residents like Sr. José Rêgo 
complained against his neighbor, João Antunes, asking the CML to have Sr. 
Antunes' pig barn taken down, it was presented as an issue of basic fairness. 
The barn bordered Sr. Rêgo's "rustic" property and runoff from the barn was 
polluting his vegetable patch, encroaching on his ability to make a living.37  
Although the CML often sympathized with offended residents, local 
officials could not always resolve issues. In one instance, a letter was received 
                                                
34 "Pres. da Junta da Freg. da Miragaia to Pres. da CML", February 2, 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; 
Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
35 "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
36 "António Rodrigo Canoa to P.M. Mário Soares", January 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; 
Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
37 "José Joaquim da Silva Rêgo to Pres. da CML", March 30, 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; 
Queixas", Arquivo Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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regarding Ramiro da Silva Carruço’s “offensive pit” where water collected and 
where he dumped his compost. Worried neighbors protested that the pit was 
affecting the water in the area and asked the CML to study the issue.38 The 
complaints led to an investigation in which the CML found that the pit in question 
was not leaking pollution into the neighboring properties, but was, nonetheless, a 
potential danger. If the complainants wished to proceed further, they would have 
to seek action through the courts.39 In fact, governmental offices higher than the 
CML were often involved in managing issues of landscape and animals. The 
agricultural ministry, for example, worked in 1980 to protect Portugal’s natural 
growth forest around Mafra, not far from Lourinhã, from possums. The forest’s 
density had “always been rigorously controlled.” Given the potential problems 
that the animals could cause for the forest, the ministry was suggesting 
relocating some to Lourinhã where they could be used for educational programs 
about Portugal’s nature. The ministry could have created the program if the CML 
provided the facility to house the animals.40   
 The proliferation of private organizations, especially neighborhood 
commissions, along with increased individual engagement around the landscape, 
was matched and overtaken by a redoubling of efforts from officials to maintain 
an understanding, if not control, of the shifting political environment. As early as 
                                                
38 "Unknown to Pres. da CML", March 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
39 "Informação", April 26, 1977. "Assuntos Policiais; Diversos; Queixas", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1977, proc. 42-D/6 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
40 "Ministério da Agricultura e Pescas: Direcção-Geral de Ordenamento e Gestão Florestal to 
Pres. da CML", December 26, 1979. 'secretario: Serviços Gerais; Dir. Geral do Ord. e Gestão 
Florestal" Arquivo Correspondencia 1980, proc.04.05 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).  
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the fall of 1975, bodies like the District of Lisbon were trying comprehend the 
outlets of "local popular power" and asked each Concelho to complete a survey 
on neighborhood commissions. Lourinhã's administrative commission reported 
that the Concelho had four neighborhood commissions in Vimeiro, Sobral, 
Nadrupe e Casalinho das Oliveiras and Pinhal da Cruz. These supplemented the 
Comissões de Melhoramento [improvement commissions] from the freguesias 
but, according to the CML, lacked any sort of advanced organization or 
cooperation between the varied neighborhood and improvement commissions, or 
for that matter, with the local government. In addition, there were no workers’ 
commissions or unions to support these organizations either. Beyond these, no 
other “popular assemblies” emerged during the revolution. Indeed, in terms of 
real effect and success in lobbying, the neighborhood commissions did not 
achieve anymore in terms of results than had their ad hoc and individual 
predecessors.41 It should be noted, however, that this does not diminish the 
significance of the commissions as novel and effective sites of political 
organization and practice.  
The newly emerging political parties also warranted attention and, for the 
most part, cooperated, with local authorities. Political parties that were active in 
Lourinhã in the wake of the revolution fell in line with recognized governmental 
institutions like the CML. The Partido Popular Democrático, for example, 
                                                
41 "VP da Com. Admin. da CML to Gov. Civil e Gabinete Técnico de Lisboa", September 28, 
1975. "Organização Administrativa: Diversos; Comissões de Moradores", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1975, proc. 39-C/4 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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informed the CML when and where their meetings in the Concelho would take 
place.42 That said, and despite the seeming freedom of activity in the wake of the 
revolution, political action continued to be policed in the democratic period. The 
Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) reported to the administrative commission 
in November 1974, for example, that an unnamed political party had held an 
unsupervised and unapproved meeting that could have caused a public 
disturbance. In turn, the Interior Ministry reminded municipal authorities that all 
meetings had to be preapproved.43  
Indeed, controlling political activity through the urban landscape was not 
new to Portuguese governments in the 1980s. After 1974, the processes 
discussed in previous chapters by which the urban environment and public space 
became an arena for public engagement in the civic sphere accelerated as the 
expanded democratic political sphere  in Portugal and Europe was embraced. 
This was, in many ways, an inherited legacy of the dictatorship as urban issues 
were considered political before 1974. António Oliveira Salazar, the dictator 
himself, dealt with individual housing and space issues throughout the 1950s.44 
More substantially, the dictatorship was engaged in large urbanization plans by 
                                                
42 "Partido Popular Democrático to Pres. da CML", November 13, 1974. "Diversos: Reuniões … 
Políticos", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1974, proc. 28-A/67 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
43 "Ministerio do Interior a. Interna: Guarda Nacional Republicana to Pres. da CML", November 
13, 1974. "Diversos: Reuniões … Políticos", Arquivo Coresspondencia 1974, proc. 28-A/67 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
44 See: A Urbanização e o Problema Habitacional da Região de Lisboa, #37 - “Ministério das 
Corporações e Previdência Social” January 24, 1959. Arquivo Salazar AOS/CO/CR-4 pt.4. 
(Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, PT). In this example, Salazar received a letter from a 
Lisbon official about a resident's complaints over barn space in Portugal's capital. As a testament 
to both the importance of housing and space issues in Estado Novo Portugal, and to Salazar's 
work ethic and micro management, the dictator wrote instructions in the margins to have a reply 
written suggesting some solutions. 
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the late 1950s aimed at expanding Lisbon. The first major urbanization plans in 
Lisbon had been undertaken as part of the 1940’s celebration of the 1640 
restoration of the independence of the Portuguese Monarchy45 and were 
concluded in 1946 with the development of the Lisbon districts, Alvalade and 
Areeiro. The 1950s had proceeded with the expansion of Lisbon’s industrial 
zones, residential zones, and with the completion of Cidade Universitária at the 
north end of Lisbon's Avenida da República. 1959 saw the national government 
pass a law establishing the basis for the creation of a “Plano Urbánistico da 
Região de Lisboa.” The plan would include the construction of “great arteries” – 
including the Ponte Salazar – to create means of communication and contact 
between centers. The plan also aimed at creating the conditions needed to 
facilitate the permanent migration of people from the countryside as Lisbon 
urbanized. Fifty thousand new residents were to be accommodated over the 
following twenty years. Politically speaking, Lisbon’s expansion was to create 
unity and end “inconvenient social segregation [that was] not part of the culture of 
interaction between Lisbon's neighborhoods.”46 
 For immediate post-revolution governments, increasing control over 
                                                
45 In 1640, the Portuguese monarchy was restored after decades of Spanish rule. Indeed, so 
seminal is the moment that a historiographical debate has long been argued between those who 
suggest that 1640 was a Portuguese national revolution from Spanish rule against those who 
maintain that it was a mere dynastic restoration in Portugal. See: David L. Tengwall, The 
Portuguese Revolution, 1640-1668: A European War of Freedom and Independence. (Lewiston, 
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010); Francis Dutra, "The Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of 
Portugal, 1580-1640", in Mark Greenglass, ed., Conquest and Coalescence: the Shaping up of 
the State in Early Modern Europe. (London, UK: Edward Arnold, 1991); and, Francis Dutra, 
"Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy" in Robert Foster and Jack P. Greene, eds., Preconditions of 
Revolution in Early modern Europe (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1970).   
46 A Urbanização e o Problema Habitacional da Região de Lisboa, #39 - “Plano de Expansão de 
Lisboa”, 1959. Arquivo Salazar AOS/CO/CR-4 pt.4. (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, PT). 
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political culture included the development of new levels of oversight in the 1980s, 
giving local and regional institutions more ability to develop on their own. In 
addition to new national laws granting greater power to municipalities, including 
some freedom to manage their own budgets, the government created new 
mechanisms of regional administration, such as  the Interior Ministry’s white 
paper in 1980 on regionalization in continental Portugal, which proposed 
decentralization and the dissemination of responsibility for service 
development.47. Regionalization was defined as an institutional arrangement in 
which new organizations emerged to make independent decisions. It was a 
decentralized system in which the law transferred decision-making power that 
had belonged to the national government to its local dependents.48 In practice, a 
balance needed to be found between the national, regional and municipal levels 
of government.49  
Several steps had already been taken since the 1960s towards 
regionalizing Portugal's administration. In 1969, the dictatorship divided the 
Portuguese mainland and islands into six planning regions and created the 
Comissões Regionais de Planeamento. In 1976, the Gabinete de Apoio Técnico 
(GAT) was created to help municipalities. The Constitution of 1976 established 
space for regional administrations corresponding with the dictatorship's six 
                                                
47 Ministério da Administração Interna, Secretaria de Estado da Administração Regional e Local, 
Livro Branco Sobre Regionalização. 1980. 'secretária: Serviços Gerais; Direcção-Geral de 
Administração Regional e Local", Arquivo Correspondencia 1980, proc. 09.01.04.01 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, 7. 
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planning regions as well as autonomous regions, with legislatures, in the Azores 
and Madeira. In 1977, laws were passed defining the organizational structure of 
regional planning departments. In addition, the 1977 "Lei das Autarquias” [Law of 
Authorities] was passed defining local administrations' functions and organs with 
an eye to giving more responsibility to the municipalities. 1979 saw municipalities 
achieve some financial independence with the Lei das Finanças Locais [Local 
Finances Law], allowing them to take on some expenses without national 
government approval. Highlighted was 1977’s creation of the Comissões de 
Coordenação Regional (Commissions of Regional Coordination – CCR) made up 
of municipal representatives and GAT officials to replace the regional planning 
commissions as bodies of communication with national ministries.50  
 This apparent decentralization of power should be understood, however, 
as an attempt by the central government and its institutions to guide the 
discourse as Portugal democratized in the 1970s and 1980s. The biggest 
challenge to regionalization, in the interior ministry's estimation, was not 
institutions of public administration or other organizations, but the Portuguese 
population in general. Given new chances to participate in choices about their 
socio-economic reality, their culture and their politics, people would be required 
to learn about their choices and, determine if regionalization was something they 
wanted.51 In this way, the ministry linked regionalization to the development of 
Portuguese democracy. In part, regionalization would involve political lessons in 
                                                
50 Ibid, 3-4. 
51 Ibid, 1-2. 
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that it required the "practice of equality in rights and opportunities between 
citizens" in organizing the state and wielding its power. In practice, in terms of 
commercial service delivery, industrial organization, agricultural services, 
professional organizations, etc., the white paper argued that regionalization was 
already well underway (and had been since the 1960s). However, the Interior 
Ministry argued that a lack of political oversight in past private discussions in the 
process had left an imbalance in rights and opportunities for people across 
Portugal: indicators like infant mortality, electrical energy consumption and 
literacy remained imbalanced across Portugal's regions. Indeed, the white paper 
itself was a testament to democratic practice as it had been developed in 
consultation with the public and representatives from various sectors of 
Portuguese society. It was the hope of the white paper’s authors that its 
publication would open a “constructive dialogue” within Portuguese society about 
what “democratic Portugal” should be.52  
 Discussions surrounding the white paper on regionalization clearly 
channeled public dialogue towards at least considering, and, at best, favouring 
both regionalization and democracy; asking citizens how they envisioned these 
structures. Meanwhile, local administrations like the CML did their best to 
channel development with the tools at hand. By way of example, the mapping of 
the roads in Lourinhã became an important activity for the CML as it moved 
towards greater control over the town’s geography. As early as 1972, the CML 
                                                
52 Ibid, 1-5. 
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recognized the need for new street names in PAB as the beach town expanded. 
Seeking the advice of the Junta do Turismo, it was suggested that street names 
continue to honour the pioneers of the beach village like Prof. Lima Bastos, 
actress Emília das Neves and painter Eduarda Lapa. In addition, names should 
be descriptive based on features of the roads surroundings, like the church or 
market, while new roads should be given names inspired by nature: of maritime 
flowers or trees, for example.53 The group in charge of naming new streets 
consisted of the CML's deputy mayor Manuel Gentil Horta, the president of the 
GAPAB, Jorge Vences, town councilor António José dos Santos, and Carlos da 
Silva, the head of the Junta do Turismo. Following the suggestion to name things 
based on historical figures, geographic or institutional features, and flora and 
fauna, nine of thirty-five suggested names were descriptive, twenty-four were 
named after historical or popular figures, and the rest were inspired by nature.54 
Horta, who remained a town councilor, proposed these names again in 1977 
since nothing had been done on the file since 1972.55  
This coincided with a growing desire in Portugal to understand the 
country’s urban networks and roads after 1974. Typically, roads and lanes had 
emerged organically under the dictatorship as farmers and residents simply cut 
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their own paths on the landscape to access fields and new homes. During the 
revolution, the new government made naming roads a priority. Acting on 
complaints from the post office, authorities in Lisbon asked district officials to fill 
the gaps in the road naming and building numbering across Portugal. The post 
office had experienced "many difficulties in mail distribution" due to errors in 
mapping and designating roads and properties in Portugal.56  
 Beyond mapping and, thus, rationalizing the roadways, officials continued 
to police the streets, maintaining and developing laws and regulations. The 
CML's administrative commission was acutely aware of transit and its effects on 
urban movement. In the summer of 1976, for example, the GNR was reminded 
about parking regulations in Lourinhã that had not been properly enforced, 
especially in front of the Town Hall.57 Likewise, the CML also worked to control 
the roadways around schools, reminding the secondary school's administration 
that scooters were not allowed on the sidewalk in front of the  entrance and that 
measures would be taken to control traffic.58 This had come as a result of a 
complaint by various school employees whose classes were disturbed every 
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afternoon by vehicular noise.59 The CML's administrative commission, in yet 
another example of its willingness to respond to public concerns, especially when 
their interests coincided, installed a crosswalk on the main road from Torres 
Vedras. The CML had previously received "various complaints" from 
pedestrians.60 
 As the 1980s dawned, the CML faced a growing tide of popular 
participation ranging from private complaints to organized lobbying. For their part, 
post-revolutionary administrators worked to respond to citizens and their 
organizations while building new institutions to respond in areas where the 
dictatorship had relied on coercion and intimidation. Into the 1980s, however, this 
dynamic would shift. Private involvement would diminish since many of the 
issues they lobbied for would be resolved: Lourinhã would complete its electrical 
network and sewage system in the 1980s and farming would become more 
centralized with the cooperatives, discussed earlier in chapter four, and new 
companies limiting small farms. Although this points to the fact that it was 
economic issues that motivated private initiatives, and that, as Portugal’s 
economy began to benefit from European markets and funds in the 1980s, it 
stands to reason that complaints would drop, we cannot overlook the fact that 
governmental institutions also developed further, becoming more adept at 
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controlling development, thereby limiting room for private input.  
As the next section reveals, the 1980s were the decade when the CML 
could finally turn to building the infrastructure that would create its discernible 
environment. With basic work in electricity and sewers well underway, the CML 
put a face on its modern landscape, beginning work on what would become its 
new town square. This meant re-purposing roads through the old town center, 
beginning to develop its new central square, building a new municipal market in 
an indoor and controlled setting, and curbing private illegal builds called obras 
clandestinas. Using tools like the electrical infrastructure, largely installed in the 
previous decade, and legislation, the CML made a concerted effort to control the 
landscape and complete the town’s project first introduced in 1966.  
 
** 
 
 If any doubt had existed as to the CML’s intentions in the 1980s, the 1984 
municipal urbanization plan made it clear that development would be funneled 
through the municipal administration. Furthermore, the plan would see the goals 
of 1966 largely achieved.  
1984's urbanization plan detailed how Lourinhã had expanded since the 
early 1970s towards Torres Vedras, primarily in the Zona Quinta Santa Catarina 
where new facilities like the soccer stadium, a residential suburb of mixed use 
residential and commercial condominium buildings, and schools would continue 
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to “dinamizar [dynamize] the social and cultural life of the town and promote 
future urban growth.”61 A result of “clearly expressed necessities,” the plan had a 
number of overarching goals: to promote the ongoing study of the urban 
environment in order to identify and resolve issues before they affected Lourinhã; 
to bring together the smaller diverse plans developed over the preceding years 
into one general urbanization plan; to eliminate gaps in urban development at the 
municipal level; to mobilize all available mechanisms in support of Lourinhã's 
urbanization; to establish a schedule for periodic revisions and the maintenance 
of the plan; and to inform the public while promoting their participation and input 
in the town's urbanization objectives. These goals went hand-in-hand with the 
desire to increase Lourinhã’s population by almost 1000 people by 2004; to 
create jobs across the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors; to improve the 
quality of the town’s housing; to expand its industry without polluting the 
environment; and to improve town services like transportation via road 
improvement.62  
 Road and transit management was an important aspect of the 
organization of space in the years following the 1984 plan. Certainly, easing the 
movement of people and goods was vital for Lourinhã's development. By way of 
example, the urbanization plan discussed the need to balance accessibility to the 
urban environment between pedestrians, cars, commercial vehicles, and 
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urbano." Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã", 47.  
62 Ibid. 3-5. 
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transport animals while maintaining trees and green infrastructure.63 Already in 
1980, Lourinhã's plans had to be revised to accommodate a new road that 
bypassed the center of the old town, linking Lisbon, Lourinhã, and Peniche. The 
new road would pass near the Campo da Feira, the soccer field, a school and 
day care, the “future Câmara Municipal,” the bus station, the market, the health 
center, the old age home, and a town parking lot.64 This was a convenient 
development for the CML, which recognized that traffic had to be diverted away 
from the old town center. The first proposal undertaken after the 1984 plan was a 
1985 proposal to expand Lourinhã's bus terminal along the new road and on the 
outskirts of town, keeping heavy bus traffic outside of Lourinhã’s cramped 
streets. In 1985, Lourinhã dealt with roughly 108 buses per day: 82 different, 
local, bus trips and 26 express, inter city routes. To service these, Lourinhã's 
terminal featured seven bus quays. The 1985 proposal called for ten loading 
quays and an additional ten parking spots for buses between routes. The new 
bus station would be serviced by a help center with a ticket office, a parking lot 
with thirty-four spaces, and "green space and trees."65  
 Two zones in Lourinhã proper were foci of space management after 
having traffic pushed to the outskirts. First, the new town square was to be a 
mixed-use space with an open-air amphitheater that could sit 226 people. 
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Surrounding the amphitheater would be a space with trees, as well as a bar with 
a patio and flowerbeds.66 Along with the new town hall, the square included the 
1982 courthouse, the 1966 post office, the fire hall, a music academy, and the 
seventeenth century convent that was converted to a multiuse facility housing a 
day care, the offices of Alvorada, a popular, if run-down café, and the town’s 
main church. Secondly, at the same time that the CML was moving to complete 
its new square, it was also preparing to turn Rua João Luis de Moura, which runs 
through the center of the old town, into a pedestrian mall. This project was made 
possible by the Lisbon-Lourinhã-Peniche road around Lourinhã that opened in 
1980.67 Formerly the only road through Lourinhã between Lisbon or Torres 
Vedras and Peniche, the Rua J.L. de Moura has become a commercial zone 
limited to pedestrians with cafes and restaurants, stores, the town’s museum, 
library and local art galleries.  
 
                                                
66 Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, "Arranjo Urbanistico em Frente ao Paçoes do Concelho: Plano 
de Execução", 1993-1994. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da 
Lourinhã, PT). 
67 Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, "Arranjo Urbanístico da Rua João Luis de Moura", October 15, 
1997. Caixa: Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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Figure 26: Map of Rua João Luis de Moura, which has become a pedestrian mall. However, 
it was the only throughway for traffic en route between the factories and fishing port of 
Peniche and urban centers to the south like Lisbon. Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, 
‘Appendix: Arranjo Urbanístico da Rua João Luis de Moura’, October 15, 1997. Caixa: 
Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
 
 
Since the 1960s, a new town square had been a high priority of the CML, 
which recognized its economic, bureaucratic, and cultural significance: the CML 
also saw it as a space it could control. An early proposal for the center of 
Lourinhã was approved in 1966: it included a bus station, market, cinema, 
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schools, a post office, a courthouse, a new town hall, and an office building for 
the Grémio da Lavoura (farmer's guild), an Estado Novo institution.68 With little 
movement in the intervening years, beyond the opening of a post-office in 1966 
and a courthouse in 1982, Lourinhã’s new town center remained a fluid project in 
the mid 1980s. In 1984, many of the CML’s public services were still offered and 
administered from the town hall on the Praça Marquês de Pombal. However, 
even at this early stage (seventeen years before the new town hall would open 
and complete the new square) the CML was insisting that these services would 
need to move to a new town center on what was then called the Praça da 
República (to be renamed the Praça José Máximo da Costa for Lourinhã’s first 
elected post-revolutionary mayor, in 2001).69 This area was targeted as the site 
for a new civic center where the town hall would eventually be situated.70 The old 
town, being “compact [and having] low buildings”, was in “strong contrast” to the 
areas of recent urban expansion – in part, a model for future development – 
where apartment blocks towered over the old town.71  
 
                                                
68 JDL, Serviço de Fomento, "Lourinhã: Pl. Porm. da Zona Central", 2. Caixa: Plano Geral de 
Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
69 For the announcement of the renaming of the central Praça see: Câmara Municipal da 
Lourinhã, Boletim Municipal, no 4. (2001). http://www.cm-
lourinha.pt/SEARCH/search.aspx?query=boletim%20municipal%202001 (Accessed December 
11, 2013). 
70 Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã", (1984), 56. Caixa: 
Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
71 Ibid, 49. 
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Figure 27: The old town square, the Praça Marques Pombal in the early 1940s, and the 
new, Praça José Máximo da Costa in the late 2000s. The old square was a cramped 
parking lot by the time the new one opened in the 1990s. The new square is open and airy, 
while the old one has become a cramped parking lot in the center of the old town. ‘Praça 
Marquês de Pombal, c. 1940’ (Collection of Maria Isabel Mendes); and, ‘Praça José Máximo 
da Costa, c. 2008’ (Collection of the author). 
 
By this time, the goal was to create a large, central space that could 
accommodate several buildings to house services and that could also become a 
meeting space for locals. Thus, it had to include leisure spots (today, the square 
includes a café and an amphitheater), be easily accessible, and include trees 
and other green infrastructure.72 Along with the District of Lisbon, the CML felt 
the need to establish an “instrument that would provide the best possible 
                                                
72 JDL, Serviço de Fomento, "Lourinhã: Pl. Porm. da Zona Central", 13.  
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development of urban space in order to achieve equal development.”73  
 Lourinhã’s new market was an integral part of this remodeling; it was 
meant to anchor the commercial infrastructure that would attract people and 
business to the Praça José Máximo da Costa. When planned in 1982, the market 
was to be situated alongside a new bus terminal, municipal offices that would 
eventually become the new town hall, a garden, and a music school.74 The 
market’s site on the new praça would benefit from its proximity to the bus station 
and the Campo da Feira (site for a monthly flea market) and would be easily 
accessible to the exponentially growing number of cars in Portugal with a new 
traffic circle, and a parking area on the new town square.75 In addition, the size of 
the new square, coupled with its proximity to the main road that passed by the 
market, made it more accessible to automotive and bus travelers than the old 
center. Further, it was assumed that the new square would attract business to 
Lourinhã. The market proposal from 1978, in fact, suggested ten self contained 
stores, separate from the market’s indoor stalls, instead of the twenty that 
Lourinhã’s representatives had originally requested: the planners’ assumption 
was that the market would entice entrepreneurs to establish stores in the area, 
and so reducing the number of stores in the market building would encourage 
                                                
73 Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, Plano Geral de Urbanização da Lourinhã", 1.  
74 "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", 1. 
75 Ibid, 1. Indeed, the number of cars in Portugal was to explode in the 1980s despite a relatively 
stable total population. In 1980, there were 94 cars per 1,000 Portuguese. However, by 1990, that 
number had almost doubled to 187. See: European Environment Agency, Indicator: Vehicle 
Ownership. (August 20, 2001). Table 1. http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/indicators/access-to-transport-services/vehicle-ownership-term-2001, (Accessed June 15, 
2014). 
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development by would-be store owners in the surrounding area.76 
  Like the new town square, a new market was a 1966 priority and, given 
the inadequacy of the older facility, the matter became urgent. By the 1970s, 
Lourinhã’s daily market, founded in 1933, was tarnishing the town: indeed, in 
many ways, the institution’s rejuvenation was emblematic of the town’s change. 
In the 1970s, the CML considered the conditions of the market "deplorable".77 
Among other problems, the roof had fallen into disrepair and this sent the CML 
on a search for a replacement that could transmit light, which ignored the fact 
that the electrical infrastructure was insufficient to provide enough artificial 
lighting for the facility.78 In fact, in many ways, electrical service was at the heart 
of the renovation of Lourinhã’s market, the town’s landscape, and how both were 
to become controlled spaces.  
In 1987, Lourinhã’s Mayor, José Manuel Dias Custódio, announced that 
all residential and commercial areas were finally on the electrical grid.79 The 
completion of the electrification of Lourinhã was a large step in the town’s 
modernization, and the transformative power of electricity was not lost on the 
planners of the new market. The 1982 architectural proposal, the one that was 
eventually accepted and built by the town, declared that electricity was a 
                                                
76 "Câmara da Lourinhã, Mercado: Ante-Projecto", June 13, 1978. Obras Municipais, Box 56, 
proc. P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
77 "Junta Distrital de Lisboa from Presidente da Câmara da Comissão Administrativa, Lourinhã", 
September 17, 1976. Obras Municipais, box 56, P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); 
"Reunião de 24 de Abril de 1980", Actas da Câmara, Livro 36 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, 
PT) 5. 
78 "Acts de Reunião de 14 de Abril de 1973", Actas da Câmara, Livro 31, Caixa 15 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT) 23. 
79 "A Lourinhã, na Senda do Progresso: Entrevista ao Presidente da Câmara Municipal 
Conduzida pelo Director do Alvorada", Alvorada, (November 1987) 6. 
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necessary aspect of new markets as it would help shape the consumer’s 
experience, putting it in line with other “modern markets that had been built” in 
Lisbon, Cascais, and Loures.80 Architects argued that electricity would light the 
interior, including the shops and stall area, as well as the exterior of the building. 
Furthermore, for safety reasons the emergency exit signs required electricity, as 
did  the insect repellent lights – needed for hygienic purposes. Finally, 
infrastructure including the clock, the sound system, and public telephones also 
needed electricity.81 Planners linked these services to modern markets that could 
be better monitored than older facilities, stating that these facilities needed “good 
illumination to make things look clean and attractive,” as well as electric cash 
registers, and illuminated signs to exhibit the prices of products.82 Electricity 
would also facilitate proper exposition of everything from farmers’ products to 
luxury items.83 Moreover, certain areas, including municipal offices, the 
veterinarian, and the office of the market’s administrator required electrical 
heating for their workplaces.84  
Electricity would also have a great impact on the area surrounding the 
market. As late as 1984, the project’s planners sought to use Lourinhã’s new 
market as a starting point to develop the town’s east end. With a planned 
                                                
80 "Moderno mercados construidos". "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – 
Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", (October 1982), 1. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo 
Municipal da Lourinhã, PT).  
81 "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", 
(October 1982) 1. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
82 "Um moderno mercado exige uma boa iluminação não só para facilitar a leitura dos cartazes 
de localização e rotulos de preços dos produtos expostos como também para se apresentar ao 
público com aspecto alegre, limpo e atractivo." See: Ibid, 5-8. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid.  
 348 
electrical transformer station in the new market, Lourinhã would be able to 
spread its electrical net to new neighborhoods. This would allow future residents 
to bring lights, telephones and refrigerators to their homes.85 Electricity from the 
market’s transformer station would also power traffic lights and street lamps in 
the immediate neighborhood.86 This initiative helped to ensure that by 1993, the 
growth in the number of domestic energy consumers in Lourinhã tripled the 
growth in the number of consumers in Lisbon and the Tagus Valley.87  
 The public support for electrical infrastructure in Lourinhã, outlined in 
previous chapters, allowed the market’s planners to develop an ever-more 
monitored space. However, the market’s layout would also need to contribute to 
this goal. Planners called for a specific market layout that reflected a concern for 
formal control and standardization. The 1978 plan suggested that the common 
space in the market be reduced to allow for more permanent stores to be 
included on the building’s periphery. This would create room for street vendors to 
move into the facility and operate under the watchful eye of the market’s 
manager, whose office was to be placed in the most central position possible.88 
Not content to wait until the market’s opening, the CML moved in 1983 to begin 
controlling the market’s space more carefully with its first formal regulations for 
                                                
85 "Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã: Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã, Projecto das Instalações 
Electricas", (August 1984) 1. Obras Municipais Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
86 "Novo Mercado Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", 
(October 1982) 5-8. Obras Municipais, Box 55. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
87 Bairrada, et al., Perspectivas Para o Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã, (year?) 28. 
88 See: "Câmara da Lourinhã, Mercado: Ante-Projecto", (June 13, 1978). Obras Municipais, Box 
56, proc. P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT); and, "Novo Mercado Municipal da 
Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", (October 1982), 7. Obras Municipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal 
da Lourinhã, PT). 
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the space. These regulations were the first to establish a standard fee for the 
stalls in the market, rules for lease transfers, and a schedule of lease payments 
on the stalls. There was also a penalty system that disciplined those who violated 
the regulations with increasingly severe penalties, including fines and suspension 
leading to eventual expulsion.89 
 Market planners and town officials also arranged the facility’s interior in an 
ongoing attempt to manipulate how consumers experienced the market. By 
arranging the products for sale, planners emphasized certain products, 
aesthetics, hygiene, and customer comfort. In the proposals for the market tabled 
in 1978, it was suggested that Lourinhã reduce the total number of planned stalls 
from sixty-five, without reducing the number of stalls allocated for fish, eggs, 
turkey, and chicken.90 By 1982, the product emphasis had slightly changed along 
with the local agricultural sector, but a concern for certain goods was still evident 
with twenty-five per cent of the stalls designated for fish, and thirty-four per cent 
for fresh fruit and vegetables.91 In order to make the market space more 
aesthetically appealing and more hygienic, the flower vendors were to be at the 
entrance, whereas fishmongers would occupy the stalls in the corner furthest 
from the main door.92 As first mandated in 1983, six years before the new facility 
was ready, the CML limited the sale of all salted and fresh fish to a specific zone 
                                                
89 Regulamento Interno do Mercado Municipal, December 1983. (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, 
PT). 
90 "Câmara da Lourinhã, Mercado: Ante-Projecto", June 13, 1978. Obras Muncipais, Box 56, 
proc. P37-H/22 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
91 "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", (October 1982) 1. Obras 
Muncipais, Box 55 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
92 "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", 6. 
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in the market, and prohibited the preparation of the fish within the market 
grounds.93 In addition, consumers would be spared the sight of animals that had 
been allowed to enter the market to deliver goods before 1983. 94 Finally, all 
surfaces were to be tile or stainless steel, and the market was to be equipped 
with bug-lamps on the periphery in order to maintain the highest hygienic 
standards possible.95  
For the most part, the CML was able to successfully apply such standards 
in order to manage Lourinhã's development and the municipal space that that 
development created. Indeed, the market hall, as first conceived by its planners, 
was an effective retail space into the late 1990s, when it began to face serious 
competition from international and national grocery store chains like Lidl, 
Intermarché, and Pingo Doce. Faced with this competition, the market hall's 
managers accepted product retailers into stalls that did not fit the original 
distribution of goods in their facility: clothing stalls have emerged to supplement 
the fruit, vegetable, flower, fish and meat retailers who sell in the market hall. For 
its part, the CML maintained the regulation of retail space in Lourinhã despite 
competition to its own facility. Intermarché, Lidl, and Pingo Doce, opened in the 
1990s and early 2000s, are regulated by the same principles under which the 
                                                
93 Regulamento Interno do Mercado Municipal, 1983. 
94 Ibid. Seeing as this document tells us that Lourinhã's government felt the need to ban large 
animals from the market, it is reasonable to assume that large animals were an unwanted fixture 
in the old market. 
95 See: "Novo Mercado Municipal da Lourinhã: Memória Descritiva", 8; and "Novo Mercado 
Municipal, Instalações Electricas: I – Memória Descritiva e Justificativa", 8. 
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market hall was opened in 1989.96 This confirms the success and endurance of 
the principles that governed the market hall's space.  
Certainly, commercial spaces where food or services were offered to the 
public were regulated and their development was effectively managed. However, 
while the CML was developing its market hall and central praça, Lourinhanense 
citizens undertook spontaneous and illegal private builds, as they had for 
decades before. These works were deemed obras clandestinas by the CML and 
they were seen to fly in the face of the CML’s efforts to control its landscape. 
Obras clandestinas, ranging from additions to homes, wall augmentations, 
freestanding ocean-side getaways to shanty dwellings, became something that 
was not to be tolerated in the 1980s. Built largely by African immigrants from the 
former colonies, and demolished in the late 1980s, shanty dwellings are by far 
the least documented instance of the obras clandestinas as the local newspaper 
– very much an establishment voice – offered no coverage and municipal 
archives fell into mismanagement. In such cases, clandestine works and their 
owners were associated with poverty and those outside the mainstream. As early 
as 1970, the Alvorada reported on the campaign by the municipal government in 
Lisbon to eliminate the “[in]famous huts”. The problem with clandestine builds, 
the paper insisted, was that they were “huts and other installations that did not 
offer security, hygiene, a salubrious environment and were what the people 
called 'bairros de lata [garbage can  houses].” These places were the result of 
                                                
96 See: Aviso # 6144/2000: Regulamento dos Mercados Municipais do Concelho da Lourinhã, 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã) August 2000. 
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poverty and unemployment, the Alvorada explained, and were, sadly, a feature of 
many urban centers.97 
However, documented instances of crackdown on clandestine builds in 
Lourinhã were more commonly related to illegal builds undertaken outside the 
shantytown. Lourinhanense like Pedro Teodoro dos Anjos of Santa Barbara 
faced an increasingly coordinated administration that was intolerant of illegal 
construction. When in 1974, for example, he went ahead and built an addition to 
his house that exceeded his permit, the CML investigated and decided that the 
illegal portion of the new build would have to be demolished, as per various laws 
and regulations under the Regulamento Geral das Edificações Urbanas.98 
Others, like Joaquim da Costa of São Bartolomeu, faced fines if they did not 
demolish their clandestine works. Having built a wall around the first floor of his 
home without a permit from the CML, da Costa was warned in October 1974 that 
if the offending wall were not demolished within three months, he faced a fine of 
10.000$00 to 50.000$00 escudos.99 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CML was using the Guarda 
Nacional Republicana (GNR) to help control clandestine works. In 1978, the 
GNR, via the Ministry of Internal Administration, informed the CML that it had 
                                                
97 "A Atracção das Cidades e as "Habitações dos Pobres"," Alvorada (February 22, 1970), 1, 5.  
98 "Pres. da Comissão Admin da CML to Delegado do Procurado da Repéblica na Comarca da 
Lourinhã", December 21, 1974. "Obras Particulares: Diversos; Construções Clandestina; 
Embargos," Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 38-C/5 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
99 "Pres. da Com. Admin. da CML to Joaquim da Costa," October 30, 1974. "Obras Particulares: 
Diversos; Construções Clandestinas; Embargos," Arquivo Correspondencia 1974, proc. 38-C/5 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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warned several residents about their illegal builds.100 Indeed, the CML, in its 
efforts to clamp down on such projects, turned to other organizations for help. 
The mayor of Cascais, sent the CML a correspondence between Cascais and 
the Ministry of Urban Habitation and Construction about that municipality's own 
problems with illegal builds. As the mayor explained, he lacked the proper 
regulation and the national ministry was able to help. In their case, Cascais faced 
a number of problems including those clandestine works that, although illegal, 
were in fact beneficial to local residents. As the mayor explained, in Cascais, 
many illegal buildings existed that locals rented to tourists and residents, 
benefitting owners, but remaining beyond municipal control. In such cases, 
demolition was not ideal for either the Câmara or the owner. Put simply, the local 
Câmara was more interested in bringing offending builds under taxable 
control.101 When not controllable, clandestine works like José da Costa's were 
slated for demolition. Having built a “barraca de madeira [wooden tent]” at 
Paimogo, Sr. Costa, who owned a home in Seixal and used the hut to relax at 
the beach, was ordered on July 15, 1980 to demolish it within eight days. 
Referred to as the “transgressor” in the correspondence, Sr. Costa had failed to 
demolish his hut as late as August 6th. The port captain at Paimogo asked the 
                                                
100 "Pres. da CML to Comandante do Posto da GNR", June 28, 1978. "Obras Particulares: 
Diversos; Construções Clandestinas; Embargos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1978, proc. 38-C/5 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
101 "Pres da Câmara Municipal de Cascais to Pres da CML", March 2, 1978. "Obras Particulares: 
Diversos; Construções Clandestinos; Embargos", Arquivo Correspondencia 1978, proc. 38-C/5 
(Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). 
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CML to demolish the hut and charge Sr. Costa for all the costs.102  
Although largely successful in curbing private and spontaneous 
contributions to the landscape through illegal builds and managing local 
interactions in public space, the CML has not been entirely successful in 
dominating the landscape. Indeed, today locals have found new unauthorized 
ways to use the landscape to express their opinions. In the following images 
taken from 2010, unhappy residents have used the walls adjacent to the 
municipal market to protest agricultural conditions complaining that, 
“supermarkets eat everything” and calling for “fair prices for farmers.” Adorned 
with the logo of the Left Bloc (a political party made up of disaffected socialists 
and communists that was founded in 1999), such graffiti illustrates the 
landscape’s ongoing importance for political expression today.  
 
 
                                                
102 "Direcção-Geral de Portos to Capitão do Porto de Peniche", June 1980; "Capitão do Porto do 
Paimogo to Pres. da CML", August 6, 1980. "Obras Particulares: Demolições", Arquivo 
Correspondencia 1980, proc. 3/1 (Arquivo Municipal da Lourinhã, PT). Sr. Costa's case is also 
interesting for the long-term outcome, which I suspect was common. My great uncle, José da 
Costa maintained a weekend hut at Paimogo until his death in the mid 2000s. The CML seemed 
to have won the fight over the wooden hut however, as the one I remember was a brick and 
mortar structure with a full kitchen and deck overlooking the ocean. 
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Figure 28: Graffiti outside the new market hall. Although little resistance to Lourinhã’s 
renovation is evident (in fact, locals played an active role in building the town’s modern 
landscape), public space remains a site for protest. The above graffiti, appearing outside 
Lourinhã’s modern market hall in the wake of the financial crisis of the late 2000s, remains 
there today (into 2013) and complains that ‘supermarkets eat everything’ and calls for ‘fair 
prices for farmers.’  The new town hall is visible in the background of figure 27. ‘Market 
Graffiti’ (collection of the author, 2010). 
 
 
** 
 
 Custódio’s European Lourinhã would not, it should be noted, come to 
fruition until 2002 when he opened the new town hall, completing the municipal 
administration’s move to the Praça José Máximo da Costa. However, the stage 
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had been set in the 1980s. Faced with a vocal and increasingly organized 
citizenry in the late 1970s, the CML struggled to respond to complaints and 
requests. With the help of new institutions and mechanisms, the CML took steps 
to manage its political culture and landscape and, during the 1980s, it was able 
to both  manipulate  existing space and create new venues where public activity 
could be monitored. For their part, locals were left to respond to CML initiatives, 
going from proactive to passive agents. This exposes a shift in Lourinhã’s 
political culture as Portugal democratized and modernized in the 1980s: in some 
ways, democracy in Portugal meant less direct access for citizens to affect the 
shape of their landscape. The CML’s new-found power over the landscape in the 
1980s, symbolized in the town’s municipal market and the Praça José Máximo 
da Costa, pushed civic participation to the outskirts of the political realm as 
ordinary citizens were no longer invited to contribute to development.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 The changes in both Portugal’s urban and economic infrastructure, along 
with its political culture since the 1960s were drastic and occasionally 
coincidental. As has been argued, infrastructure and urban development had the 
power to inspire political action. In many cases it was the government itself that 
invited political involvement and helped to create the discourse surrounding the 
citizen’s roles and responsibilities in Portuguese society and its future. Thus, 
when 25 de Abril seemingly brought democracy to Portugal in mere hours, 
Portuguese citizens had already been practiced participants in the polity. Nor 
was the “development”, that was part of the MFA’s program along with 
“democracy” and “decolonization”, novel to Portugal in 1974. Places like Lourinhã 
had, through government investment and guidance from many levels, a 
development plan that was already well underway. 
It is not surprising that important areas of development for the CML in 
Lourinhã are also areas where we see movement in the relationship between 
citizens and their government. Certainly, agricultural modernization, tourism, the 
cooperative movement, electrical and water infrastructure installation, and the 
building of a new town center have all been CML priorities since the 1960s. In 
discussing how these areas have progressed in Lourinhã, I have largely focused 
upon government-initiated interventions into the debate around development: 
these interventions included encouraging citizens to act in support of CML 
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priorities. However, there are moments of seemingly spontaneous civic 
participation as well, even if that participation was very often guided or inspired 
by various discursive mechanisms from above.  
This interpretation of Portugal’s democratization and modernization, which 
robs 25 de Abril of its place as the seminal event in that process, is part of a 
historiographical shift, as outlined in the introduction. However, it also represents 
a contribution to an even broader shift in how the history of Portugal is being 
examined. Indeed, historians of Portugal have been looking to new areas of 
inquiry to reassess key assumptions in Portugal's development. The body of 
historical work produced in the modern period on Portugal is primarily found in 
multi-volume histories that cover the scope of Portugal's past since the country's 
founding in the twelfth century. These works also privilege political and economic 
topics like dynastic intrigue or the Discoveries.1 The basic focus on high politics 
and economy in Portuguese History was challenged, however, beginning in the 
1960s. A.H de Oliveira Marques, an historian working in the United States, thus 
outside the direct influence of the dictatorship's historical program, led a general 
re-focus and reinterpretation of Portugal's past. In a Historical Materialist vein, 
                                                
1 For examples, see: Alexandre Herculano, História de Portugal: Desde o Começo da Monarquia 
até o Fim do Reinado Do Afonso III, vols. 1-4, José Matoso, ed. (Lisboa, PT: Bertrand, 1980-81); 
J.P. Oliveira Martins, História de Portugal, vol. 1-2. (Lisboa, PT: Parceria A.M Pereira, 1917); 
and, Baquero Moreno, Aurélio de Oliveira, and Fernando de Sousa, História de Portugal, vol. 1-2. 
(Porto, PT: Porto Editora, 1983). In this trend, the Estado Novo was an author, publisher, 
sponsor, and subject. See: Franco Nogueira, História de Portugal, 1933-1974. (Porto, PT: 
Civilação, 1981); Secção de Propaganda e Recepção da Commisão Executiva dos Centenários, 
Portugal: Oitos Séculos da História. (Lisboa, PT: Sociedade Industrial de Tipografia, 1940); Costa 
Brochado, Historiógrafos dos Descobrimentos. (Lisboa, PT: Comissão Executiva das 
Comemorações do v. Centenário da Morte do Infante D. Henriques, 1960); and, João Martins da 
Silva Marques, Descobrimentos Portugueses: Documentos para a sua História Publicados e 
Prefeaciados, vol. 1-3. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto para a Alta Cultura, 1944-71). 
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Marques and a new cohort of historians looked to socio-economic topics to 
explain Portugal's development.2 The longer term effect is that studies like this 
dissertation, which explore specific, social, cultural and political topics, are being 
used more and more to explore the specificities of the Portuguese experience. I 
was focused on urban development and municipal culture. Likewise, the history 
of other cultural activities and sectors are now being fleshed out as well.3 
This historiographical reassessment has been recently matched by a 
popular reassessment of the development of Portugal, particularly in the wake of 
the economic crisis of 2008, as citizens questioned Portugal's transition from 
dictatorship to democracy. Indeed, Portuguese citizens, struggling in one of the 
most severe crises of the economic downturn of the first decade in the twenty-
first century, have begun to question both the process and results of their 
country’s development since the Second World War. In one particularly negative 
                                                
2 It is interesting that Marques used the same form, the multi-volume collection, as those against 
which he was arguing. See: A.H de Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal: Desde os Tempos 
Mais Antigos até ao Governo do Sr. Marcelo Caetano, vol. 1-3. (Lisboa, PT: Edições Agora, 
1972-73); A.H. de Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal. (Lisboa, PT: Comisariado para a 
Europália – Portugal, 1991); A.H. de Oliveira Marques, Daily Life in Portugal in the Middle Ages, 
S.S. Wyatt, trans. (Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971); Joel Serrão and A.H. de 
Oliveira Marques, eds., Nova História de Portugal, vol. 1-13. (Lisboa, PT: Editorial Presença, 
1990); José Narino Figueira de Campos, Os Descobrimentos: Encontros de Povos, Culturas, e 
Religiões. (Lisbon, PT: Paulus, 1998); and, José Eduardo Franco, Mito de Portugal: a Primeira 
História de Portugal a a sua Função Política. (Lisboa, PT: Fundução Maria Manuela e Vasco de 
Albuquerque d'Orey, 2000). 
3 For examples ranging from film, literature, music, consumer culture, women's politics, youth 
culture, etc, see: Patricia Vieira, Portuguese Film, 1930-60: the Staging of the New State Regime. 
(New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); Ellen W. Sapega,  Consensus and Debate in 
Salazar's Portugal: Visual and Literary Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-48 (State College, 
PA; Penn State University Press, 2008); Isabel Gumarães Sá, "The Uses of Luxury: Some 
Examples from the Portuguese Courts from 1480 to 1580", Análise Social, vol. XLIV: 192 (2009), 
589-604; Rita Costa Gomes, The Making of Court Society: Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval 
Portugal. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez, 
"Women and Decision-Making Participation within Rightist Parties in Portugal and Spain", Análise 
Social, vol. XLIV:191 (2009), 235-263; and, Samuel Weeks, "Cultural Dimensions, Lusophone 
Spaces", Análise Social, vol. XLVII:1 (2012), 2182-2199. 
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2011 account of Portugal’s transition into the European mainstream, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) discussed the “credit crunch” that Portugal 
faced after 2007. The BBC’s reporter, representing the Euro-skepticism ever 
present in Britain, reinvigorated after 2007, highlighted problems in the Lisbon-
Brussels relationship, and the disenchantment of some Portuguese with their 
government’s chosen paths of development. Indeed, the report warned that in 
Portugal, the “age of free money, doled out by Brussels, is over.” Such 
investment had been an integral part of Portugal’s plans in the past, financing 
roads, infrastructure and a building boom that had left the country with countless 
housing and building developments left unfinished by the economic crash.4 To 
show the effect of such failures on Portugal’s citizens, the reporter turned to 
Jorge Silva Melo, an actor and stage director described as a “veteran of 
Portugal’s revolution in 1974.” Melo yearned for his youth in the years before 
1974 and explained that,  
under the dictatorship, there was hope. We felt that things were changing 
and, for instance in the theater and in the film world, people were starting 
to do films without money. The actors from the main companies were 
leaving the main companies to build cooperatives or things that were 
without money – that was in ‘72/’73. Nowadays, its exactly the opposite: 
there is no hope.5 
 
 Of interest in Melo’s account is his discussion of money. There was "hope" 
when he and his compatriots could engage and work in their field using 
cooperation as a substitute for the money they did not have. In a sense, what 
                                                
4 Paul Mason. “BBC News - Mason’s Europe: Portugal Faces Strain in Economic Revolution”, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12512815 (February 18, 2011: accessed 2011-02-24 
08:19:58). 
5 Ibid. 
 361 
underlies Melo’s and other assessments in Portugal of the roots of the crisis is 
the failure of the Left to counter-balance capitalism at various stages in 
Portugal’s development.6 One of the more critical accounts of Portuguese 
development published in the wake of the economic crisis was Portugal: Ensaio 
Contra a Autoflagelação. In this essay, legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos argues that the ideological roots of the crisis were to be found in the 
unquestioning acceptance of the capitalist system. Santos suggests that the 
defining moments in this battle were the loss of communism and socialism as 
competitors to liberal capitalism with the fall of the USSR in 1990 and Tony 
Blair’s election in 1997 in Great Britain. As global communism crumbled with the 
USSR, and Tony Blair tried to ‘humanize’ neoliberalism with his brand of social 
democracy, Santos infers that the irrational pursuit of profit that the capitalist 
neoliberal system is built upon was left unchecked.7 However, as this work 
suggests, the wholesale acceptance of capitalism in the West, and in Portugal 
more specifically, can be dated to well before the period suggested by Santos. 
Despite flirtation with the extreme Left during the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon 
and in the Alentejo, capitalism was never in question for any extended period as 
was seen in the discussion of Lourinhã’s tourism and its development in the 
1960s, and even in the development of cooperativism in the town’s agriculture 
                                                
6 For examples of popular essays written by former government officials and journalists 
reassessing Portugal’s development leading to the crisis see: Medina Carreira, O Fim da Ilusão, 
2nd ed. (Lisbon, PT: Objectiva, 2011); João César das Neves, As 10 Questões da Crise. (Lisbon, 
PT: D. Quixote, 2011); and, Mário Soares and Teresa de Sousa, Portugal Tem Saida: Um Olhar 
Sobre a Crise. (Lisbon, PT: Objectiva, 2011).  
7 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Portugal: Ensaio Contra a Autoflagelação (Coimbra, PT: 
Almedina, 2011), 16-18. 
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industry. In fact, Lourinhanense were mobilized by the Estado Novo in order to 
cash-in on Western tourism dollars by making the landscape more accessible 
and sellable, while cooperatives emerged in order to defend the farmer’s place in 
national and international markets. In the end, any flirtations with the extreme 
Left on the national stage between 1974 and 1976 were well and truly 
suppressed with Portugal’s acceptance of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in the late 1970s.  
 This dissertation has contributed to this discussion with its assessment of 
Lourinhã’s modernization. Because I was motivated, in part, by the recent 
reconsideration of Portugal’s modernization and democratization spurred by the 
financial crisis, I presented an explanation of how Portugal came to find itself in 
the state it does today. Beginning in the 1960s with an economic turn towards 
Europe, Portugal’s rapid modernization, brought basic industry and infrastructure 
to places like Lourinhà by the 1980s and 1990s. However, the rapidity of this 
process meant that key developmental steps, particularly in industrial and 
economic terms, were either missed or downplayed.8 By the 1980s and 1990s 
then, Portugal’s modernization had led primarily to a concern with the aesthetics 
of modernity: making traditional sectors and landscapes look modern with 
infrastructure and other amenities, as opposed to consolidating modernization’s 
gains through the slow development of the necessary industry and structures to 
                                                
8 For one discussion of Portugal’s missed developmental steps see: Stuart Holland, “Dependent 
Development: Portugal as Periphery”, in Dudley Seers, Bernard Schaffer and Maria-Liisa Kiljunen 
eds., Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations. (New Jersey, USA: 
Humanities Press Inc., 1979), 140. 
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build a sustainably modern society. Indeed, investment in struggling, traditional 
sectors too often trumped investment in non-traditional economic sectors in local 
decision-making. This meant that modernization in Lourinhã was inherently 
conservative, an attempt to modernize to stay the same, improving output just 
enough to maintain traditional ways of life. Only in the past five to ten years, with 
Portugal’s heavy investment in the development of nanotechnology and health 
sciences has the country begun to develop the industry and branding that can 
provide it with a sustainable economic base from which to maintain the amenities 
of a modern society. 
 Portugal and Lourinhã’s modernization is an ongoing process. Thus, my 
study of the modernization of Lourinhã did not seek to catalogue, organize and 
recount a completed event or process. Instead, I discussed a process that 
continues to be an ongoing concern for the municipality. As C.E. Black noted in 
his seminal work, The Dynamics of Modernization, the recounting and 
organization of past events is often concerned primarily with societal institutions 
and forms while explanation is concerned with causality, or how society 
functions: explanation was my primary focus. That said, Black also warns that the 
desire to explain is too often motivated by a contemporary problem and can lead 
the researcher to hasty or superficial conclusions which, he complains, have too 
often become canons of historical and causal explanation by the followers of 
modest historians who are aware of the limited or superficial nature of their 
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conclusions.9 Consequently, the local nature of my study allowed me to avoid 
grand conclusions about human development and to go beyond homogenizing 
the experience of European and Portuguese modernization. 
 Certainly, when considering European History, the experience has been 
homogenized, which, at times has led to Portugal being excluded from 
consideration as a participant in the European past. Some arguments in 
particular, which emerged in the twentieth century, ended Europe at the Franco-
Spanish border in the Pyrenees.10 Such assertions, by and large, suggest that 
Portugal's economic and political development were what left the Iberian country 
on the outside of Europe, looking in. Indeed, the general course of European 
History (as problematic as an assertion that such an homogenized path exists) 
teaches that European development required the emergence of a middle-class 
that would end absolutism and replace it with some form of liberal government – 
defined primarily by a governance agreement laid out in a constitution that 
replaced governance by divine right. Such a middle-class would, naturally, 
                                                
9 C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. (New York, NY: 
Harper & Row, 1966), 36-37. 
10 For a good introduction to arguments that placed Portugal outside Europe and the European 
development path, thereby explaining its backwardness in the modern period, see: Francis M. 
Rogers, “Portugal: European, Hispanic, or Sui Generis?” in R. Herr and J.H.R. Polt, eds.  Iberian 
Identity: Essays on the Nature of Identity in Portugal and Spain. (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, Berkley, 1989); Douglas Wheeler, Republican Portugal: A Political History, 
1910-1926. (Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 12-13. Spain is also often left 
on the outside of Europe in some considerations. For examples of those who challenge this 
assumption, see: Mary Vincent, Spain: 1833-2002, People and State. (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University press, 2007), 1: Jesus Cruz, Gentlemen, Bourgeois, and Revolutionaries: Political 
Change and Cultural Persistence Among the Spanish Dominant Groups, 1750-1850. (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 260-265: Adrian Shubert and José Alvarez Junco, eds, 
Spanish History Since 1808. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10: Isabel Burdiel, 
"The Liberal Revolution, 1803-1843", in Adrian Shubert and José Alvarez Junco, eds, Spanish 
History Since 1808. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 17.    
 365 
emerge as a consequence of an industrial revolution.11 In comparison to its 
European neighbours, the development of liberalism and industrial society in 
Portugal seems insignificant: France, Germany and England are frequently 
celebrated as the drivers of European industrial and liberal development. 
However, Portugal's liberal history is as long as that of any other European 
country.12  
 Europe’s History and modernization, as defined by liberal development, 
was evident in Lourinhã's experience since 1960. Surely, the experience of 
Lourinhanense, as they consistently engaged with their local government 
regardless of national governmental structures, demonstrates that Portugal 
practiced a form or consequence of European liberalism along with its 
                                                
11 For examples of works that, taken together, discuss the emergence of liberal democracy and 
an industrial society in the modern period as pillars in determining the course of 'European 
History', see: R. D. Anderson, France, 1870-1914: Politics and Society. (Boston, MA: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1977), 30-41; Philip Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in 
Nineteenth-Century France. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-13; Sanford 
Elwitt, The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France, 1868-84. (Baton Rouge, 
LS: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), 1-14; Jonathon Sperber, The European Revolutions, 
1848-51, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 241-255; P.H. Noyes, 
Organization and Revolution: Working Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848-49. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 1-5; Clara M. Lovett, The Democratic 
Movement in Italy, 1830-1876. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 1-3; Fritz 
Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, 1st ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1967), 3; and, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois 
Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 144-155. 
12 In fact, successive liberal monarchical governments, supported by the military, marked 
nineteenth-century Portuguese politics. After Napoleon's forces were expelled from Portugal and 
succession was decided in the civil war of 1828-34, some form of liberal government ruled until 
the twentieth century. See: David Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 100-148; José Manuel Freire Nogueira, As Guerras 
Liberais: Uma Reflexão Estratégica Sobre a História de Portugal. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto da Defesa 
Nacional, 2004); Victor de Sa, Liberais e Republicanos. (Lisboa, PT: Horizontes, 1986); Pedro 
Tavares de Almeida, Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista (1868-1890). (Lisboa, PT: 
DIFEL, 1991); Pedro Tavares de Almeida, ed., Burocracia, Estado e Território: Portugal e 
Espanha, Séculos XIX-XX. (Lisboa, PT: Horizontes, 2007); Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, União 
Sagrada e Sidonismo: Portugal em Guerra (1916-1918). (Lisboa, PT: Edições Cosmos, 2000).  
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neighbours.  
Europe’s modernization and liberalization, which had profound effects on 
people’s understanding of citizenship and polity after the Second World War, is 
often labeled as a process of Europeanization.13 However, the results of 
Europeanization are ambiguous at best. It is not surprising then that the CML’s 
mayor did not define what a European Lourinhã would be when he employed the 
term in describing what Lourinhã could be in the 1980s and 1990s after the 
opening of its market hall. European Integration and ‘Europe’, or, the idea of 
‘Europe’, remain contested terms. Most can agree that European identity and 
heritage remain equated with Christian civilization, the ideals of the 
Enlightenment, including Progress and Reason, and a sense of liberal justice 
based upon humanism.14 The fathers of the European Project after the Second 
World War embraced this loose and potentially fluid definition. In fact, the 
ambiguity of ‘Europe’ became the term’s strength after WWII. Tony Judt notes 
that, “like ‘growth’ or ‘peace’ – with both of which [‘Europe’] was closely 
associated in the minds of its proponents – ‘Europe’ was too benign to attract 
                                                
13 For a recent reassessment of the link between Europe’s modernization and Europeanization 
see Kiran Klaus Patel’s 2013 article which argues that the European Union is too often used as 
the lens through which to assess Europe’s modernization and Europeanization. Nonetheless, the 
link between modernization in Europe and institutional Europeanization remains clear. See: Kiran 
Klaus Patel, “Provincializing European Union: Co-operation and Integration in Europe in a 
Historical Perspective”, Contemporary European History, 22:4 (2013), 649-673. 
14 For some examples see: Gerald Delanty and Paul R. Jones, “European Identity and 
Architecture,” European Journal of Social Theory, 5:4 (November, 2002), 455; Ross Balzaretti, 
“The Creation of Europe,” History Workshop, 33 (Spring, 1992), 181-196; Roberta Guerrina, 
Europe: History, Ideas, Ideologies. (London, England: Bloomsbury, 2002); Hélène Ahrweiler, 
“Roots and Trends in European Culture,” in Soledad García ed. European Identity and the Search 
for Legitimacy. (London, UK: Pinter, 1993) 30-45; and Denis de Rougemont, The Idea of Europe, 
Norbert Guterman trans. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1966), 366-379. 
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effective opposition.” When Pompidou first spoke of a European Union in the 
1970s, France’s Foreign Minister Michel Jobert asked Edouard Balladur what it 
meant exactly. Balladur replied, “Nothing … but then that is the beauty of it.” 
Even Pompidou referred to Europe as a “vague formula ... [created] in order to 
avoid paralyzing doctrinal disputes.”15  
 The goals of European integration, culturally associated with the 
development of a common European heritage and a European polity, are equally 
undefined. The tensions between forces for state-to-state (confederal) relations 
and those for supranationalism (via the subjugation of national European 
governments to a European super state) have dominated the history of European 
integration. However, Desmond Dinan reminds us that these two concepts are 
not mutually exclusive and in fact remain present in the European Union’s (EU) 
institutions today.16 Nowhere is this more evident than in debates regarding the 
possibility of deepening European citizenship beyond a common passport and 
currency. Although most scholars seem to agree that a deepening of common 
cultural bonds between Europeans is ideal, there remains much debate on what 
the development of European citizenship means and how it may be achieved. 
Scholars like Derrida and Habermas argue that European identity must abandon 
cultural reference points because they will always prove divisive or may be 
inappropriate in the context of a multi or poly-national Europe. These authors 
                                                
15 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. (New York, NY: Penguin, 2005), 733. 
16 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 3rd ed. (Boulder, 
CO: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 2. 
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want to maintain a “limited non-essentialist degree of European identity.” 
Opposing scholars like Anthony Smith and John Pocock argue that European 
identity could never threaten national identity and thus, all attempts to codify 
European identity are doomed to failure. Smith et al point to the absence of a 
shared language, a functioning civic order and strong cultural ties evident in 
national contexts. As Gerald Delanty and Paul Jones suggest, the first option will 
likely result in little more than a European association with legal and economic 
structures, while the second option will offer a culturally deficient identity that will 
do little more than offer the EU an identity that legitimizes the projects of its 
political masters.17  
Nonetheless, a process of Europeanization, in which both the citizens and 
states of Europe are becoming more closely associated with the EU and a 
common European identity is well underway. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio 
Radaelli’s edited work, The Politics of Europeanization, notes the institutional 
spread of Europe, arguing that ‘Europeanization’ does not mean convergence 
“because convergence is a consequence of Europeanization and there must be a 
difference between a process and its consequence. Nor does it mean 
‘harmonization’, because within the EU, not even agricultural policy is fully 
harmonized.” Instead, Europeanization has meant the spread of ‘institutional 
similarity’ across Europe.18 The political philosopher Étienne Balibar, on the other 
                                                
17 Delanty and Jones, 455-466. 
18 Alan S. Milward, “Review: The European Union as a Superstate,” The International History 
Review, 27:1 (Mar., 2005), 96.  
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hand, takes Europeanization further by looking at the development of 
‘transnational citizenship’. Balibar argues that, “what has emerged is neither a 
reproduction of the same ‘constitution of citizenship’ [Balibar’s equivalent for the 
classical Greek term politeia] at a supranational level (not even in the form of a 
‘federal citizenship’ in a ‘federal state’), nor a dissolution of the notions of 
‘community’ and ‘people’ in a post-national ‘cosmopolitical society’.”19 Instead, 
transnational European citizenship leaves the bases of citizenship – identity, 
sovereignty, and membership – in flux. For Balibar, therefore, the key to 
European citizenship is what he calls the ‘borders’, “where political and economic 
structures meet the collective imagination. In play is the definition of the means 
and modes of exclusion and inclusion. Here the symbolic forces of material and 
political reality and power meet representations of identity.”20 In the end, although 
Balibar sees the development of a European citizenship, he concludes that an 
active European citizenry has not emerged to push forward the European 
agenda.21 
 That said, in some ways, this dissertation has suggested a way forward in 
the development of citizenship, European or otherwise. Lourinhã’s 
modernization, which locals at times labeled Europeanization, demonstrates how 
                                                
19 Balibar argues that ‘transnational citizenship’ is different from supranational and postnational 
citizenship. Balibar sees the concept of transnational citizenship as a direct result of the way in 
which European unification “has progressively divorced the two concepts of citizenship and 
nationhood that the classical state practically identified.” See: Étienne Balibar, We, the People of 
Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, James Swenson, trans. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), viii. 
20 Ibid, 3-4. 
21 Ibid, 178-179. 
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infrastructure issues can mobilize would-be citizens and engage them in a 
nation-building project. Beyond the advantages of closer communications and 
shrunken distances, infrastructure development, in Lourinhã, brought groups of 
people together on a case-by-case basis and engaged them with their 
community. As scholars like Luis Loures and Pat Crawford have argued, public 
participation in the development of the landscape encourages a sense of 
belonging to, and responsibility for, the larger social and cultural community 
along with the development of a common identity.22 In fact, landscape architects 
and governments have increasingly accepted the importance of social support for 
projects to develop sustainable cities. Loures and Crawford, although 
acknowledging that the role of the public has been considered in projects for the 
better part of the twentieth century, point to the 1970s, not coincidentally within 
the period this dissertation deals with, as a turning point in the West. They 
suggest that the increasing need for public consultation evident since the 1970s 
is likely due to the "growing dissatisfaction with the results of the technocratic 
administrative process" that has grown exponentially since 1945.23 Policy-makers 
have turned then to a variety of methods of consultation including public 
meetings, workshops, citizen juries, focus groups, interviews, etc. However, 
public workshops are often considered the most effective means as they can be 
                                                
22 Luis Loures and Pat Crawford, "Democracy in Progress: Using Public Participation in Post-
Industrial Landscape (re)-Development", WSEA Transactions on Environment and Development, 
9:4 (Sept., 2008), 794. 
23 Ibid, 794-795. 
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a forum for direct discussion and negotiation between various parties.24  
 Such a limited view of public participation fails to take into account the 
very important ways that locals and government interacted in modernization 
processes like the one in Lourinhã. Certainly, aided by various levels of 
government support, the CML managed to control the town’s development 
agenda. It was them and their allies who promoted modernization in agriculture 
and the adoption of various techniques and technologies. Similarly, the CML and 
the national government identified tourism as an area of priority for economic 
growth. With the government’s blessing, the influx of tourist dollars coincided with 
a reorganization of agricultural labour into cooperatives. Such tourism and 
agricultural development required advances in infrastructure, including the 
introduction of basic services like water and electricity. With the base that these 
four areas offered the CML, it finally turned in the 1980s to completing its built 
environment, in part closing old doors to citizen participation that Lourinhanense 
had enjoyed while aiding tourism, agriculture and infrastructure to grow in their 
town. The building of the 1980s saw some Lourinhanense turn to non-traditional 
forms of contributions to their landscape through things like the obras 
clandestinas. Unsurprisingly, once citizens had been invited to participate in civic 
affairs in the 1960s and 1970s, it proved hard to totally shut them out of 
development in the 1980s.  
In the end, the modernization of Lourinhã reveals the collaborative nature 
                                                
24 Ibid, 796. 
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of Portugal’s democratization. It is clear that at each stage locals were invited 
and encouraged to participate in development. It is also clear that individuals 
became active on a case-by-case basis around issues of immediate concern to 
them. However, what is also evident is the power that these individuals and 
groups attained. As they demonstrated their effectiveness in aiding development, 
the CML found itself increasingly reacting to civic participation, instead of 
encouraging it. By the 1980s, the CML got ahead of its residents and was able to 
drive the agenda as it had in the 1960s. In the final analysis, Lourinhã is today a 
modern town. Its residents enjoy all the trappings of a modern lifestyle while its 
administration has developed the means to service its constituents while driving 
its agenda forward.  
What has been reviewed goes some way in explaining how Lourinhã got 
to where it is today. However, some important considerations have not been 
introduced in this dissertation, either because of the availability of sources or 
their direct relevance to the CML’s agenda since the 1960s. Reflecting the local 
nature of this study, these topics are international in nature. Namely, exploring 
the international contributions to Lourinhã’s landscape could attain a fuller 
understanding of Lourinhã’s development: those contributions stemming from 
emigration, the Portuguese empire, and the institutions of a united Europe.  
As mentioned, Lourinhã has a large emigrant community in North America 
and Europe. These people often maintain close ties with their hometown. Beyond 
maintaining personal ties, many are engaged in the economic life of Lourinhã. 
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Remittances were just one way in which they could contribute to Lourinhã’s 
development. The Alvorada was an enthusiastic promoter of remittances from 
those Lourinhanense who emigrated. One 1979 article explained that between 
January and August of 1978, some 46.117.000$00 contos had been sent in 
remittances to Portugal from its emigrants. This money would help unemployed 
and needy recipients.25 On a local scale, such contributions helped local 
organizations with expenses. Emigrants in Toronto, Canada, for example, helped 
to buy Lourinhã’s volunteer firefighters a new ambulance in 1980, raising 520$00 
Contos (approximately $12,000CAD).26 Indeed, the Alvorada thanked each donor 
by listing them and their donations over a half page of newsprint.27 This is to say 
nothing of the contributions made to Lourinhã’s landscape in the form of home 
purchases made by those emigrants who maintain summer homes in the town. 
The number of foreign flags found on Lourinhã’s homes in the summer is 
testimony to how important emigrants continue to be in contributing to the shape 
of the town’s landscape. On top of this, of course, is the exchange of cultural and 
political capital brought back by emigrants who, along with their children, bring 
their music, art, commercial preferences and ideas with them each time they 
visit. The story of Lourinhã’s emigrants deserves future attention. 
Likewise, the Portuguese empire and its fall played a role in Lourinhã’s 
political development as well. Certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, local 
                                                
25 "Remessas de Emigrantes", Alvorada (January 1979), p. 8. 
26 "Viagem ao Canadá", Alvorada (December 1980). 
27 "Festas em Toronto" Alvorada (January 1981), p. 3. 
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discourse reminded residents that a colonial war was on and that all needed to 
do their part for those conscripts and countrymen in the colonies. Particularly in 
the immediate aftermath of the revolt in Angola, local institutions mobilized in 
relief of victims. Just one issue after making a call to citizens for support for the 
victims of the “terrorism in Angola”, the Alvorada published the total donations 
made by each of Lourinhã’s freguesias. From Reguengo Grande, 645$00 
escudos were collected; from Miragaia, 6,042$50; from Moledo, 80$20; from 
Vimeiro, 2,252$50; from Moita, 7,300$00; from Santa Barbara, 1,767$50; from 
São Bartolomeu, 738$30; and from the freguesia da Lourinhã, 9,000$00. The ad 
concluded by reminding people that had not donated through their parish 
councils that they could still do so.28 In the official discourse around the colonial 
war, the values of the Estado Novo were reinforced, contributing to the broader 
emphasis on traditional institutions and systems in the 1960s for which the CML 
mobilized support. Lourinhanense were reminded of what hung in the balance of 
their struggle in Africa in the Alvorada in January 1964. As the paper reported;  
Yet again, the energy of the UN exploded against us [Portugal]. Yet again, 
our foreign minister gave understanding, with words that could not leave 
doubt, that we, the Portuguese, would not leave threats, that we were 
resolved to meet those who dared to steal our spirituality, morality and 
history … no one had doubts about Portugal's responsibilities for the 
defense of Europe and the West ... If Europe had not abandoned Africa, if 
the principles of responsibility for defense and survival had not been 
dropped ... Europe would have been an invincible bloc that could have had 
great strength in civilization and Christian culture. But, Europe ignored 
Salazar's sensible and clear warnings, and today the situation was ... 
denigrated and ridiculous.  Portugal would not contribute anything to this 
                                                
28 Illustration, Alvorada, ano 1, no. 13 (May 30, 1961), p. 1. 
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embarrassing position.29  
  
Unsurprisingly, the empire and the colonial war was an ever-present motivation 
for Lourinhanense and their government to remain conservative in the 1960s. 
Although it had no ostensible effects on Lourinhã’s landscape, the empire’s fall 
and its relationship to the democratization underway in the 1960s could be 
explored further. 
 
 
Figure 29: Propaganda: 'Somos um todo - uma força que não quer amputações', the 
Alvorada also proclaimed that “in Lourinhã, the aid movement for victims of terrorism in 
Angola was underway: todos temos obrigação de dizer - Presente!”. Illustration, Alvorada 
(May 5, 1961), p. 1. 
 
 As Portugal abandoned its empire, Europe became even more important 
to its development. Like the empire, this is not obviously evident in Lourinhã’s 
landscape. However, the importance of European investment for Portugal’s 
infrastructure, particularly into the 1990s, should not be ignored. Indeed, the next 
logical step in exploring the relationship between infrastructure and political 
culture is to look at EU programs for infrastructure investment in Portugal in the 
                                                
29 "Na África Defendendo o que resta da Europa e o Ocidente", Alvorada (January 12, 1964) p. 1. 
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1990s and European culture, identifying common goals and coincidences.  
 For now, Lourinhã’s development stands as an example of how economic 
and infrastructure development can contribute to political inclusion and 
democratization. The municipal governments and Lourinhanense, along with 
residents and local governments of countless municipalities in Portugal, who 
have struggled to be heard and contribute to the development of their township 
deserve a place in our understanding of how modern democratic societies were 
built in the last half of the twentieth century. Further, at the core of the argument 
of this work is a belief that policymakers and academics need to look harder at 
the local level for solutions to national and global problems. As issues of 
democratization and governance become more and more prevalent in Eastern 
Europe, Asia and Africa, and citizens struggle to earn equal footing in civic 
affairs, an appreciation of the experiences of those who have struggled in the 
past to engage in civic affairs will have benefits beyond improving specific 
localities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 377 
Bibliography 
 
 
Archives and Archival Collections Consulted  
 
 
Arquivos do Jornal Alvorada, (Lourinhã, PT) 
- 1960-present. 
 
 
Arquivos dos Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, (Lisboa, PT) 
- Propaganda de Portugal no Canadá: 1954 a 1960. P.E.A 297. Proc. 
362,41. 
- Propaganda de Portugal nos Est. Unidos da América, 1954 a 1961, proc. 
362,42, P.E.A. M.304. 
 
 
Arquivos Municipal da Lourinhã (Lourinhã, PT) 
- Arquivo Correspondencia. 
- Arquivos das Obras Particulares: Alvarás 
- Arquivos das Obras Municipais 
- Arquivos das Obras Particulares: Sem Alvarás 
- Arquivos dos Ofícios Expedidia 
- Livros das Actas da Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, no. 22-56 (1959-
2001). 
- Livro de Sugestões/Reclamações, 1974-83. Arquivo da Junta do Turismo. 
- Orcamentos e Plano de Actividades Muncipais, 1963-71, 1999. 
 
 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Digital Library 
(http://winlib.ine.pt/winlib/winlib.aspx)  
- Anuário Estatístico de Portugal, 1970. (Lisboa, PT: 1970) 
- Estatísticas para o Planeamento: Continente e Ilhas Adjacente: 1960-
1970 (Lisbon, PT: May, 1972). 
- População e Condições Socais: Condições de Vida das Famílias, (Lisboa, 
PT: 1987).  
- Portugal 1935-1985: 50 Anos (Lisboa, PT: September, 1985). 
 
 
Arquivos Nacional de Torre do Tombo (Lisboa, PT) 
- Arquivo Salazar 
 
 
 
 378 
Published Primary Sources 
 
 
Da Silva, Manuela Maria. “Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Uma Técnica de 
Progresso Social”, Estudos de Economia Aplicada, 16 (Lisboa: PT: 
Associação Industrial Portuguesa, 1962). 
 
Employment and Basic Needs in Portugal (Geneva, CH: International Labour 
Organization, 1979). 
http://www.ilo.org/public/portugue/region/eurpro/lisbon/pdf/79b09_903_en.p
df (accessed April 22, 2014). 
 
European Environment Agency, Indicator: Vehicle Ownership. (August 20, 2001). 
Table 1. http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/access-to-
transport-services/vehicle-ownership-term-2001, (Accessed June 15, 2014). 
 
Ferro, António. Salazar: Portugal and Her Leader. (London, Great Britain: Faber 
& Faber, 1939). 
 
Fodor, Eugene, ed. Fodor’s Modern Guides: Spain and Portugal, 1959. (The 
Hague, Netherlands: Mouton & Co., 1959). 
 
Fryer, Peter and Patricia McGowan Pinheiro. Oldest Ally: A Portrait of Salazar’s 
Portugal. (London, UK: Dobson, 1961). 
 
Jacobs, George. How to Get Along in Portugal and Spain.  (New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 1966). 
 
Pillement, Georges. Unknown Portugal, A. Rosin trans. (London, England: 
Johnson, 1967). 
 
Programas de Desenvolvimento Regional (Comissão de Coordenação e 
Desenvolvimento Regional do Centro, February 26, 2010). 
http://www.ccdrc.pt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=331&It
emid=229&lang=pt (accessed April 22, 2014). 
 
Turismo: Separata do Anuário Comercial de Portugal, 1932, 1st ed. (Lisbon, 
Portugal: Conselho Nacional de Turismo, 1932). 
 
Wright, David and Patrick Swift. Minho and North Portugal: a Portrait and a 
Guide. (Bristol, Great Britain: Barrie & Rockcilff, 1968). 
 
 
 
 379 
Conference Papers 
 
 
Fernandes, Margarida. "State Cooperatives and Farm Policies in Portugal After 
the Carnations' Revolution", Session 72 – Cooperative Enterprises and 
Cooperative Networks: Successes and Failures, XIV International Economic 
History Congress: IEHA 2006 (Helsinki, Finland: August 21-25, 2006). 
http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers2/Fernandes.pdf (Accessed 
September 19, 2012) 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
Ahrweiler, Hélène. “Roots and Trends in European Culture,” in Soledad García 
ed. European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy. (London, UK: Pinter, 
1993). 
 
Alexandre, Valentim. “The Colonial Empire,” in António Costa Pinto, ed., 
Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture. (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2003). 
 
Almeida, Pedro Tavares de. Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista 
(1868-1890). (Lisboa, PT: DIFEL, 1991). 
 
-------------------, ed., Burocracia, Estado e Território: Portugal e Espanha, Séculos 
XIX-XX. (Lisboa, PT: Horizontes, 2007). 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (New York, NY: Verso, 1992). 
 
Anderson, B.L and A.J.H Latham eds. The Market in History, (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1986). 
 
Anderson, R. D. France, 1870-1914: Politics and Society. (Boston, MA: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 
 
Andresen-Leitão, Nicolau. “The Reluctant European: A Survey of the Literature 
on Portugal and European Integration 1947-1974”, e-JPH, 3:1 (Summer 
2005).  
 
-------------------. Estado Novo, Democracia e Europa 1947-1974. (Lisboa: ICS, 
2007).  
 
 380 
-------------------. “A Flight of Fantasy? Portugal and the First Attempt to Enlarge 
the European Community, 1961-63”, Contemporary European History, 16:1 
(2007), 71-87. 
 
Baganha, Maria. “From Closed to Open Doors: Portuguese Emigration under the 
Corporatist Regime”, Electronic Journal of Portuguese History, 1:1 
(Summer 2003), 1-16. 
 
-------------------. "Portuguese Emigration After World War II", in António Costa 
Pinto, ed., Modern Portugal, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
 
-------------------. "As Correntes Emigratórias Portuguesas no Século XX e o seu 
Impacto na Economia Nacional," Análise Social, vol. XXIX: 128, (1994), 
959-980. 
 
Baioa, Manuel, Paulo Jorge Fernandes, and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses.  “The 
Political History of Twentieth-Century Portugal”, Electronic Journal of 
Portuguese History, 1:2 (Winter 2003). 
 
Bairrada, Mário, Paulo Madruga, Berta Rato, Conceição Moreno, José Luís 
Albuquerque, M. Alberto Branco, and Pedro Costa. Perspectivas para o 
Desenvolvimento da Zona da Lourinhã. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto do Emprego e 
Formação Profissional, Ministério para a Qualificação e o Emprego, 1997).  
 
Baklanoff, Eric N. The Economic Transformation of Spain and Portugal (London, 
UK: Praeger Publishers, 1978).  
 
-------------------, "The Political Economy of Portugal's Later 'Estado Novo': A 
Critique of the Stagnation Thesis", Luso-Brazilian Review, 29:1 (Summer, 
1992), 1-17. 
 
Balibar, Étienne. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational 
Citizenship, James Swenson, trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004). 
 
Balzaretti, Ross. “The Creation of Europe,” History Workshop, 33 (Spring, 1992), 
181-196. 
 
Baptista, Fernando Oliveira. "A Agricultura e a Questião da Terra – o Estado 
Novo à Communidade Europeia", Análise Social, xxix:128 (1994), 907-921. 
 
Baranowski, Shelley. Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in 
the Third Reich.  (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 381 
 
------------------- “Strength Through Joy: Tourism and National Integration in the 
Third Reich”, in S. Baranowski and E. Furlough eds., Being Elsewhere: 
Tourism, Consumer Culture, and Identity in Modern Europe and North 
America. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001). 
 
Barreto, António. Tempo de Mudança, 3rd ed. (Lisboa, PT: Relógio D’Água, 
1999). 
 
------------------- “Portugal, a Europa e a Democracia”, Análise Social, XXIX (129): 
5 (1994), 1051-1069. 
 
Bermeo, Nancy. “What’s Working in Southern Europe?”, South European Society 
and Politics, 4:3, (1999), 263–87. 
 
------------------- The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers’ Control in Rural 
Portugal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
 
Birmingham, David. A Concise History of Portugal, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
 
Black, C.E. The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History. 
(New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966). 
 
Blackbourn, David and Geoff Eley. The Peculiarities of German History: 
Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany. (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
 
Brettel, Caroline B. We Have Already Cried Many Tears: Portuguese Women 
and Migration (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1982). 
 
Brito, J.M.B de. "The Portuguese Economy: From Salazarism to the European 
Community", in A. Costa Pinto ed., Modern Portugal (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). 
 
Brochado, Costa. Historiógrafos dos Descobrimentos. (Lisboa, PT: Comissão 
Executiva das Comemorações do v. Centenário da Morte do Infante D. 
Henriques, 1960). 
 
Brown, Judith C.  Immodest Acts: The Life of a Lesbian Nun in Renaissance 
Italy. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
 
Brown, Richard D.  “Microhistory and the Post-Modern Challenge,” Journal of the 
Early Republic, 23:1 (Spring 2003) 1-20. 
 382 
 
Brown, Bernard E. "The French Experience of Modernization", World Politics, 
21:3 (April, 1969), 366-391. 
 
Bruneau, Thomas C. "Out of Africa and Into Europe: Towards and Analysis of 
Portuguese Foreign Policy", International Journal, 32:2, European Foreign 
Policies (Spring 1977), 288-314. 
 
Burdiel, Isabel. "The Liberal Revolution, 1803-1843", in Adrian Shubert and José 
Alvarez Junco, eds, Spanish History Since 1808. (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Cabral, Manuel Villaverde. “Sobre o Fascismo e o Seu Advento em Portugal: 
Ensaio de Interpretação a Pretexto de Alguns Livres Recentes”, Análise 
Social, XII:48 (1976), 873-915. 
 
------------------- “A Economia Subterrânea Vem ao de Cima: Estratégias da 
População Rural Perante a Industrialização e a Urbanização”, Análise 
Social, XIX: 76 (1983), 199-234. 
 
Campos, José Narino Figueira de. Os Descobrimentos: Encontros de Povos, 
Culturas, e Religiões. (Lisbon, PT: Paulus, 1998). 
 
Carreira, Medina. O Fim da Ilusão, 2nd ed. (Lisbon, PT: Objectiva, 2011). 
 
Carvalho Curado, H. de. “Cultural Tourism in Portugal”, in Greg Richards ed., 
Cultural Tourism in Europe. (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996). 
 
Castells, Manuel. The City and the Grassroots: a Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban 
Social Movements (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983). 
 
Cazorla-Sánchez, Antonio. "Did You Hear the Sermon? Progressive Priests, 
Conservative Catholics, and the Return of Political and Cultural Diversity in 
Late Francoist Spain," The Journal of Modern History, 85:3 (September 
2013), 528-557; 
 
------------------- "Dictatorship from Below: Local Politics in the Making of the 
Francoist State, 1937-48," The Journal of Modern History, 71:4 (December, 
1999), 882-901. 
 
Cerezales, Diego Palacios. O Poder Caiu na Rua: Crise de Estado e Acções 
Colectivas na Revolução Portuguesa, 1974-1975. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003). 
 
------------------- Portugal à Coronhada: Protesto Popular e Ordem Pública nos 
 383 
Séculos XIX e XX, Ricardo Noronha, trans. (Lisbon, PT: Tinta da China, 
2011). 
 
Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life, S. Rendall trans (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1984). 
 
Chabal, Patrick.  “Review: Portuguese Decolonization,” The Journal of African 
History, 39:1 (1998), 161-162. 
 
Cipriano, Rui Marques. Vamos Falar da Lourinhã. (Torres Vedras, PT: 
Sogratol/Câmara Municipal da Lourinhã, 2001). 
 
Coopersmith, Jonathon. The Electrification of Russia, 1880-1926. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1992). 
 
Corkill, David and José Carlos Pina Almeida, “Commemorations and 
Propaganda in Salazar’s Portugal: The Mundo Português Exposition of 
1940”, Journal of Contemporary History, 44:3 (2009), 381-399. 
 
Corkill, David. “Aspects of Portugal’s Economic Development During the Late 
Estado Novo”, Portuguese Journal of Social Sciences, 2:1 (2003), 61-73. 
 
Costa, Raphael. “The 'Great Façade of Nationality': Some Considerations on the 
Multiple Meanings of Estado Novo Portugal in Travel Literature”, The 
Journal of Tourism History, 5:1 (Spring 2013), 50-72. 
 
Costa Pinto, António. Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of 
Interpretation. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
 
------------------- “Twentieth Century Portugal: An Introduction,” in A. Costa Pinto 
ed., Contemporary Portugal: Politics, Society and Culture, 1st ed. (Boulder, 
CO: Social Science Monographs, 2004). 
 
------------------- The Blue Shirts: Portuguese Fascists and the New State. (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
 
------------------- “The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: The 
National May 28 League (1928-1933)”, Luso-Brazilian Review, 23:1 
(Summer, 1986), 1-15. 
 
Cowan, Brian. “What was Masculine about the Public Sphere? Gender and the 
Coffeehouse milieu in Post-Restoration England,” History Workshop 
Journal, 51 (Spring 2001), 127-157. 
 
 384 
Cowan, Ruth Schwartz. More Work for Mother: the Ironies of Household 
Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1983). 
 
Cruz, Jesus. Gentlemen, Bourgeois, and Revolutionaries: Political Change and 
Cultural Persistence Among the Spanish Dominant Groups, 1750-1850. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
 
Cruzeiro, Maria Manuela. ‘‘Revolução’ e Revisionismo Historiográfico: O 25 de 
Abril Visto da História’, in Martins, Rui Cunha, ed. Portugal, 1974: Transição 
Politíca em Perspectiva Histórica. (Coimbra, PT: Imprensa da Universidade 
de Coimbra, 2011).   
 
Cutileiro, José. A Portuguese Rural Society. (Gloucestershire, UK: Clarendon, 
1971). 
 
Darnton, Robert. The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural 
History. (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1984). 
 
David-Fox, Michael. “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent 
Debates in Russian and Soviet History”, Jahrbucher fur Geschichte 
Osteuropas, 54 (2006) pp. 535-555. 
 
Davis, Susan G. Parades and Power: Street Theater in Nineteenth-Century 
Philadelphia. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986). 
 
Delanty, Gerald and Paul R. Jones. “European Identity and Architecture,” 
European Journal of Social Theory, 5:4 (November, 2002), 453-466. 
 
Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 3rd 
ed. (Boulder, CO: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
 
Donaghy, Peter and Michael Newton. Spain: a Guide to Political and Economic 
Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
 
Downs, Charles. Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organization in the 
Portuguese Revolution. (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 1989). 
 
Dutra, Francis. "The Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal, 1580-
1640", in Mark Greenglass, ed., Conquest and Coalescence: the Shaping 
up of the State in Early Modern Europe. (London, UK: Edward Arnold, 
1991). 
 
 
 385 
------------------- "Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy" in Robert Foster and Jack P. 
Greene, eds., Preconditions of Revolution in Early modern Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1970). 
 
Eder, Herbert. “Markets as Mirrors: Reflectors of the Economic Activity and the 
Regional Culture of Coastal Oaxaca”, in Markets in Oaxaca, S. Cook and 
M. Diskin, eds. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1976). 
 
Eksteins, Modris. Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age. (Toronto, Canada: Houghton Mifflin, 1989). 
 
Elwitt, Sanford. The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in France, 
1868-84. (Baton Rouge, LS: Louisiana State University Press, 1975). 
 
Epstein, James. “Spatial Practices/Democratic Vistas,” Social History, 24:3 
(October, 1999), 294-310. 
 
Finlay, Robert. “The Refashioning of Martin Guerre,” The American Historical 
Review, 93:3 (June, 1988) 553-571. 
 
Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims in the First World War, 1st ed. (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1967). 
 
Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de 
France, 1977-78 (New York, NY: Picador/Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). 
 
------------------- Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan trans. 
(New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977). 
 
Franco, José Eduardo. Mito de Portugal: a Primeira História de Portugal a a sua 
Função Política. (Lisboa, PT: Fundução Maria Manuela e Vasco de 
Albuquerque d'Orey, 2000). 
 
Friedman, Susan. “Definitional Excursions: the Meanings of 
Modern/Modernity/Modernism”, Modernism/Modernity, 8:3 (2001) 493-513. 
 
Gallagher, Tom. Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation. (Manchester, 
Great Britain: Manchester University Press, 1983). 
 
Garcia-Arenal, Mercedes and Gerard Weigers. A Man of Three Worlds: Samuel 
Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe, M. Beagles 
trans. (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
 
 
 386 
Ginsborg, Paul. “Civil Society in Contemporary Italy: Theory, History and 
Practice”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 18:3 (2013), 283-195. 
 
Ginzburg, Carlo. The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos if a Sixteenth- 
Century Miller, J. and A. Tedeschi, trans. (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1992).  
 
Ginzburg, Carlo and Carlo Poni. “The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange 
and the Historiographic Marketplace,” in E. Muir and G. Ruggiero eds., 
Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1991). 
 
Gomes, Rita Costa. The Making of Court Society: Kings and Nobles in Late 
Medieval Portugal. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
Goode, Luke. Jurgen Habermas: Democracy and the Pubic Sphere (Ann Arbour, 
MI: Pluto Press, 2005). 
 
Goucho Soares, António. “The Place of Portugal in the European Union” in R. 
Herr, ed. The New Portugal: Democracy and Europe. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California, 1992). 
 
Gorjão, Vanda. Mulheres em Tempos Sombrios: Oposição Feminina ao Estado 
Novo. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2002). 
 
Graham, Helen. "Money and Migration in Modern Portugal: An Economist's 
View", in David Higgs, ed., Portuguese Migration in Global Perspective 
(Toronto, ON: MHSO, 1990). 
 
Green, Gil. Portugal's Revolution (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1975). 
 
Griffin, Roger. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under 
Mussolini and Hitler. (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
 
Guerrina, Roberta. Europe: History, Ideas, Ideologies. (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 
2002).  
 
Habermas, Jurhan. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an 
Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society, T. Burger and F. Lawrence 
eds. (Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press, 1989). 
 
Harvey, Karen. “Gender, Space and Modernity in Eighteenth-Century England: A 
Place Called Sex,” History Workshop Journal, 51 (Spring 2001), 158-179. 
 
 387 
Herculano, Alexandre. História de Portugal: Desde o Começo da Monarquia até 
o Fim do Reinado Do Afonso III, vols. 1-4, José Matoso, ed. (Lisboa, PT; 
Bertrand, 1980-81). 
 
Holland, Stuart. “Dependent Development: Portugal as Periphery”, in Dudley 
Seers, Bernard Schaffer and Maria-Liisa Kiljunen eds., Underdeveloped 
Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations. (New Jersey, USA: 
Humanities Press Inc., 1979). 
 
Hudson, Mark. Portugal to 1993: Investing in a European Future. (London, UK: 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report n0. 1157, 1989). 
 
Hughes, Thomas P. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-
1930 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
 
------------------- “The Third Wave”, Journal of Democracy, 2:2 (Spring 1991), 12-
34. 
 
------------------- The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
(Oklahoma City, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
 
------------------- "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe", World Politics, 18:3 
(April, 1966), 378-414. 
 
Iordachi, Constantin. “The Collapse of Communist Regimes: Civil vs. Uncivil 
Societies”, East Central Europe, 40 (2013), 141-149. 
 
Jiménez, Antonia M. Ruiz. "Women and Decision-Making Participation within 
Rightist Parties in Portugal and Spain", Análise Social, vol. XLIV:191 
(2009), 235-263. 
 
Jones, Gareth Stedman. Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between 
Classes in Victorian Society. (London, England: Oxford University Press, 
1971). 
 
Johnson, Pauline. Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere (London, UK: 
Routledge, 2006). 
 
Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. (New York, NY: Penguin, 
2005). 
 
 388 
Kayman, Martin, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Portugal. (Newport, 
Wales: Merlin Press, 1987). 
 
Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. “Modernity, Melancholy, Memory and Filth: New 
Perspectives on Russian and Soviet Cities”, Journal of Urban History, 39:5 
(2013), 997-1002. 
 
Kotsonis, Yanni. Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the 
Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861-1914. (London, Great Britain: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 1999). 
 
Lains, Pedro. Os Progressos do Atraso: Uma Nova História Económica de 
Portugal. (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2003). 
 
------------------- "New Wine in Old Bottles: Output and Productivity Trends in 
Portuguese Agriculture, 1850-1950", European Review of Economic 
History, 7:1 (April, 2003), 43-72. 
 
------------------- "O Estado e a Industrialização em Portugal, 1945-1990", Análise 
Social, xxix:128 (1994), 923-958. 
 
Lanaro, Paola. “Economic Space and Urban Policies: Fairs and Markets in the 
Italy of the Early Modern Age”, Journal of Urban History 30:1 (November 
2003), 37-49. 
 
Lepore, Jill. “Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and 
Biography,” The Journal of American History, 88:1 (June 2001) 129-144. 
 
Levi, Giovanni. “On Microhistory”, in Peter Burke, ed., New Perspectives on 
Historical Writing, 2nd ed. (Great Britain: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2001). 
 
Lewis, Jim and Allan M. Williams, “Portugal: Market Segmentation and Regional 
Specialization”, in A.M. Williams and G. Shaw eds., Tourism and Economic 
Development: Western European Experiences. (London, UK: Belhaven, 
1988). 
 
------------------- "Portugal: the Decade of Return", Geography, 70:2 (April 1985), 
178-182. 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Jason M. Lakin. The Democratic Century. 
(Oklahoma City, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2004). 
 
 
 389 
Lisi, Marco. “Rediscovering Civil Society? Renewal and Continuity in the 
Portuguese Radical Left”, South European Society and Politics, 18:1 
(2013), 21-39. 
 
Lourenço, Nelson, José António Cabrita and Ana Maria Ventura. “Imagens da 
Integração: Representações Socais Sobre a Integração da Agricultura 
Portuguesa na Communidade Europeia,” Análise Social, vol. xxvii, no. 4-5 
(1992), 955-971. 
 
Loures, Luis and Pat Crawford, "Democracy in Progress: Using Public 
Participation in Post-Industrial Landscape (re)-Development", WSEA 
Transactions on Environment and Development, 9:4 (Sept., 2008), 205-218.  
 
Lovett, Clara M. The Democratic Movement in Italy, 1830-1876. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1982). 
 
Lucas, Rui Afonso and Joao Francisco de Magalhaes Ilharco. “The Role of 
Public Administration in the Consolidation of Democracy in Portugal”, in R. 
Baker ed., Transitions from Authoritarianism: the Role of the Bureaucracy. 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 
 
Luria, Keith and Romulo Gandolfo. “Carlo Ginzburg: an Interview,” Radical 
History Review, 35 (1986) 89-111. 
 
Machado, Diamantino P. The Structure of Portuguese Society: the Failure of 
Fascism.  (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991). 
 
MacQueen, Norrie. The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan 
Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire. (New York, NY: Longman, 1997). 
 
Madureira, Nuno Luis. “Cartelization and Corporatism: Bureaucratic Rule in 
Authoritarian Portugal, 1926-1945”, The Journal of Contemporary History, 
42:1 (Jan., 2007), 79-96. 
 
Magone, José M. "Breaking with the Authoritarian Past in Portugal: Continuities 
and Discontinuities of International Linkages and their Impact on the 
Political System", Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 3:3 (2004), 157-
174. 
 
Manuel, Paul Christopher. Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese 
Transition to Democracy. (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 
1995). 
 
 
 390 
Marchi, Ricardo. Império, Nação, Revolução: As Direitas Radicais Portuguesas 
no Fim do Estado Novo (1959-1974). (Alfragide, PT: Texto, 2009).  
 
Marinetto, Michael. "Who Wants to be an Active Citizen? The Politics and 
Practice of Community Involvement", Sociology, 37 (February 2003), 103-
120. 
 
Martins, Rui Cunha, ed. Portugal, 1974: Transição Politíca em Perspectiva 
Histórica. (Coimbra, PT: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2011).   
 
Martins, J.P. Oliveira. História de Portugal, vol. 1-2. (Lisboa, PT: Parceria A.M 
Pereira, 1917). 
 
Marques, Alfredo. Política, Económica e Desenvolvimento Económica em 
Portugal (1926-1959). (Lisboa, PT: ICS, 1988). 
 
Marques, João Martins da Silva. Descobrimentos Portugueses: Documentos 
para a sua História Publicados e Prefeaciados, vol. 1-3. (Lisboa, PT: 
Instituto para a Alta Cultura, 1944-71). 
 
Marques, A.H. de Oliveira. Daily Life in Portugal in the Middle Ages, S.S. Wyatt, 
trans. (Madison, WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971). 
 
------------------- História de Portugal: Desde os Tempos Mais Antigos até ao 
Governo do Sr. Marcelo Caetano, vol. 1-3. (Lisboa, PT: Edições Agora, 
1972-73). 
 
------------------- História de Portugal. (Lisboa, PT: Comisariado para a Europália – 
Portugal, 1991). 
 
Maxwell, Kenneth. The Making of Portuguese Democracy. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
 
------------------- "The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Portugal: Some 
Unanswered Questions", Portuguese Studies, 5 (1989), 161-177. 
 
Melo, Daniel. Salazarismo e Cultura Popular (1933-58). (Lisbon, PT: ICS, 2001). 
 
Mendonsa, Eugene L. "Benefits of Migration as a Personal Strategy in Nazaré, 
Portugal", International Migration Review, 16:3 (Autumn, 1982), 635-645. 
 
Meneses, Filipe Ribeiro de. “Salazar, the Portuguese Army, and Great War 
Commemoration, 1936-45”, Contemporary European History, 20:4 (2011), 
405-418. 
 391 
 
------------------- União Sagrada e Sidonismo: Portugal em Guerra (1916-1918). 
(Lisboa, PT: Edições Cosmos, 2000).  
 
Milward, Alan S. “Review: The European Union as a Superstate,” The 
International History Review, 27:1 (March, 2005), 90-105. 
 
Moreno, Baquero, Aurélio de Oliveira, and Fernando de Sousa, História de 
Portugal, vol. 1-2. (Porto, PT: Porto Editora, 1983). 
 
Mosse, George. The Image of Man: the Creation of Modern Masculinity, (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
 
Nasaw, David. Going Out: the Rise and Fall of Public Amusements. (New York, 
NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993). 
 
Nelson, Scott. “Livestock, Boundaries, and Public Space in Spartanburg: African 
American Men, Elite White Women and the Spectacle of Conjugal 
Relations,” in M. Hodes, ed. Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North 
American History. (New York: NYU Press, 1999). 
 
Neves, João César das. As 10 Questões da Crise. (Lisbon, PT: D. Quixote, 
2011). 
 
Newton, M.T. “Tourism and Public Administration in Spain”, in M. Barke, J. 
Towner, and M.T. Newton eds., Tourism in Spain: Critical Issues 
(Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1996). 
 
Nogueira, Franco. História de Portugal, 1933-1974. (Porto, PT: Civilação, 1981). 
 
Nogueira, José Manuel Freire. As Guerras Liberais: Uma Reflexão Estratégica 
Sobre a História de Portugal. (Lisboa, PT: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 
2004). 
 
Nord, Philip. The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-
Century France. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
 
Noyes, P.H. Organization and Revolution: Working Class Associations in the 
German Revolutions of 1848-49. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1965). 
 
Nunes, João Arriscado and Nuno Serra. "'Decent Housing for the People': Urban 
Movements and Emancipation in Portugal," South European Society and 
Politics, 9:2 (2004), 46-76. 
 392 
 
Nye, David. Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-
1940 (Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press, 1991). 
 
O’Neill, Brian Juan. Social Inequality in a Portuguese Hamlet: Land, Late 
Marriage, and Bastardy, 1870-1978. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984). 
 
Opello, Jr., Walter C. Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy. (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1991).   
 
------------------- “The Continuing Impact of the Old Regime on Portuguese Political 
Culture”, in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, In Search of Modern Portugal: 
The Revolution and its Consequences. (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1983). 
 
Owensby, Brian. “Domesticating Modernity: Markets, Home, and Morality in the 
Middle Class in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 1930s and 1940s”, Journal 
of Urban History 24:3 (March 1998) pp. 337-363. 
 
Ozment, Steven. Three Behaim Boys: Growing up in Early Modern Germany. 
(New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1990). 
 
Pack, Sasha. Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s 
Spain. (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 
 
Parker, Martin. "Organizations and Citizenship", Organization, 4 (Feb, 1997), 75-
92. 
 
Patel, Kiran Klaus. “Provincializing European Union: Co-operation and 
Integration in Europe in a Historical Perspective”, Contemporary European 
History, 22:4 (2013), 649-673. 
 
Paxton, Robert O. “The Five Stages of Fascism”, The Journal of Modern History, 
70:1 (March 1998), 1-23. 
  
Peiss, Kathy. Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-
Century New York. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986). 
 
Pereira, Victor. “Emigração e Desenvolvimento da Previdência Social em 
Portugal”, Análise Social, vol. XLIV:192 (2009), 471-510. 
 
Pimental, Irene Flunser. A História de PIDE. (Lisbon, PT: Círculo de Leitores, 
2011). 
 393 
 
Platt, Harold L. The Electric City: Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 
1880-1930 (Chicago, IL; University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
 
Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Joshua Tucker. “Associated With the Past? 
Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-Communist Countries”, 
East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 27:1 (Feb., 2013), 45-
68. 
 
Porch, Douglas. The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution. (London, 
Great Britain: Croom Helm, 1977). 
 
Putnam, Laura. “To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic 
World,” Journal of Social History, 39:3 (Spring 2006) 615-630. 
 
Raby, D.L. Fascism and Resistance in Portugal: Communists, Liberals and 
Military Dissidents in the Opposition to Salazar, 1941-1974. (Manchester, 
UK: Manchester University Press, 1988).  
 
------------------- “The Portuguese Presidential Election of 1949: a Successful 
Governmental Maneuver?” Luso-Brazilian Review, 27:1 (Summer 1990), 
63-77. 
 
Radcliff, Pamela Beth. Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and 
the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78. (London, England: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2011).  
 
Rainey, Lawrence and Robert von Hallberg. “Editorial/Introduction”, 
Modernism/Modernity, 1:1 (1994), 1-3.   
 
Ramos Pinto, Pedro. “Housing and Citizenship: Building Social Rights in 
Twentieth Century Portugal”, Contemporary European History, 18:2 (May 
2009), 199-215. 
 
------------------- "Urban Social Movements and the Transition to Democracy in 
Portugal, 1974-76," The Historical Journal, 51:4 (Dec., 2008), 1025-1046. 
 
Rappaport, Erika Diane. Shopping For Pleasure: Women in the Making of 
London’s West End. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
 
Reis, António. "A Revolucão de 25 de Abril de 1974, o MFA e o Processo de 
Democratização," in António Reis, ed, Portugal Contemporâneo, vol. 6 
(Lisboa, PT: Publicações Alfa, 1993). 
 
 394 
Rezola, Maria Inácia. Os Militares no Revolução de Abril: O Conselho da 
Revolução e a Transição Para a Democracia em Portugal (1974-76). 
(Lisboa, PT: Campo da Comunicação, 2006). 
 
-------------------- Mitos de uma Revolução. (Lisboa, PT: A Esfera dos Livros, 
2007). 
 
Riegelhaupt, Joyce Firstenberg. “Introduction”, in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, 
In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences. 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). 
 
Riley, Dylan. “Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: 
Italy and Spain in Comparative Perspective”, American Sociological 
Review, 70:2 (Apr., 2005) 288-310.  
 
Ritter, Harry. Dictionary of Concepts in History. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1986).  
 
Rocha, Edgar. "Evolução do Défice Externo Agrícola, Particularmente no 
Domínio Alimentar, e Suas Causas", Análise Social, 15 (1979), 839-857. 
    
Rodrigues, Luis Nuno. “The Creation of the Portuguese Legion in 1936”, Luso-
Brazilian Review, 34:2 (Winter 1997), 91-107. 
 
Rogers, Francis M. “Portugal: European, Hispanic, or Sui Generis?” in R. Herr 
and J.H.R. Polt, eds. Iberian Identity: Essays on the Nature of Identity in 
Portugal and Spain. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Berkley, 
1989). 
 
Rose, Mark H. Cities of Light and Heat: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in 
Urban America (University Park, PENN: Pennsylvania State University, 
1995). 
 
Rosas, Fernando. "Rafael Duque e a Política Agrária do Estado Novo, 1934-44", 
Análise Social, xxvi:112-113 (1991), 771-790. 
 
Rose-Redwood, Reuben and Anton Tanter. 'Introduction: Governmentality, 
House Numbering and the Spatial History of the Modern-City,' Urban 
History, 39:4 (2012), 607-613. 
 
Rose, Richard and Don Chull Sin, "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of 
Third-Wave Democracies", British Journal of Political Science, 31:2 (April 
2001), 331-354. 
 
 395 
Rougemont, Denis de. The Idea of Europe, Norbert Guterman trans. (New York, 
NY: Meridian, 1966). 
 
Sá, Isabel Gumarães. "The Uses of Luxury: Some Examples from the 
Portuguese Courts from 1480 to 1580", Análise Social, vol. XLIV: 192 
(2009), 589-604. 
 
Sa, Victor de. Liberais e Republicanos. (Lisboa, PT: Horizontes, 1986). 
 
Sabean, David Warren. Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 
1700-1870. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
Sánchez Cervelló, Josep. A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua Influência na 
Transição Espanhola. (Lisbon, PT: Assírio & Alvim, 1993). 
 
Sapega, Ellen W. “Remembering Empire/Forgetting the Colonies: Accretions of 
Memory and the Limits of Commemoration in a Lisbon Neighborhood,” 
History & Memory, 20:2 (Fall/Winter 2008), 18-38. 
 
------------------- Consensus and Debate in Salazar's Portugal: Visual and Literary 
Negotiations of the National Text, 1933-48 (State College, PA; Penn State 
University Press, 2008). 
 
Sapelli, Giulio. Southern Europe Since 1945: Tradition and Modernity in Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey, A. Fuller, trans. (USA: Longman, 1995). 
 
Saraiva, José António. Política à Portuguesa: Ideias, Pessoas e Factos. (Cruz 
Quebrada, PT: Oficina do Livro, 2007).  
 
Secção de Propaganda e Recepção da Commisão Executiva dos Centenários, 
Portugal: Oitos Séculos da História. (Lisboa, PT: Sociedade Industrial de 
Tipografia, 1940). 
 
Serrão, Joel and A.H. de Oliveira Marques, eds. Nova História de Portugal, vol. 
1-13. (Lisboa, PT: Editorial Presença, 1990). 
 
Serrão, Joel. "Notas Sobre Emigração e Mudança Social no Portugal 
Contemporâneo", Análise Social, XXI: 87-89 (1985), 995-1004. 
 
Schmitter, Phillipe C.  “The ‘Régime d’Exception’ That Became the Rule: Forty-
Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal,” in L.S. Graham and 
H.M. Makler eds., Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and its 
Antecedents. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979). 
 
 396 
Schneer, Jonathan. London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis. (Ann Arbor, MI: Yale 
University Press, 1999). 
 
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1998). 
 
Sheridan Allen, William. The Nazi Seizure of Power: the Experience of a Single 
German Town, 1922-1945, revised ed. (Danbury, CT: Franklin Watts, 
1984). 
 
Shubert, Adrian and José Alvarez Junco, eds. Spanish History Since 1808. (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
Silva, Carlos Nunes and Stephen Syrett. “Governing Lisbon: Evolving Forms of 
City Governance”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
30:1 (March 2006) 98-119. 
 
Smith, Fiona M. "Discourses of Citizenship in Transition: Scale, Politics, and 
Urban Renewal", Urban Studies, 36 (January, 1999), 167-187. 
 
Soares, Mário and Teresa de Sousa. Portugal Tem Saida: Um Olhar Sobre a 
Crise. (Lisbon, PT: Objectiva, 2011). 
 
Sotiropolous, Dimitri A. “Southern European Public Democracies in Comparative 
Perspective”, West European Politics, 27:3 (2004), 405-422. 
 
Sousa Santos, Boaventura de. Portugal: Ensaio Contra a Autoflagelação 
(Coimbra, PT: Almedina, 2011). 
 
Sperber, Jonathon. The European Revolutions, 1848-51, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Swyngedouw, Eric. "'Not a Drop of Water': State, Modernity, and the Production 
of Nature in Spain, 1898-2010", Environment & History, 20:1 (Feb., 2014), 
67-92. 
 
Syrett, Stephen. Local Development: Restructuring, Locality and Economic 
Initiative in Portugal. (Great Britain: Avebury Ashgate, 1995). 
 
Telo, António José. História Contemporânea de Portugal, vol. 1 (Lisboa, PT: 
Editorial Presença, 2007). 
 
 
 397 
Tengwall, David L. The Portuguese Revolution, 1640-1668: A European War of 
Freedom and Independence. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010). 
 
Tobey, Ronald C. Technology as Freedom: the New Deal and the Electrical 
Modernization of the American Home. (Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press, 1996). 
 
Tsakatika, Myrto and Costas Eleftheriou. “The Radical Left’s Turn Towards Civil 
Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths”, South European Society and 
Politics, 18:1 (2013), 81-99. 
 
Turner, Bryan S. "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", Sociology, 24 (1990), 189-
217. 
 
Vaquinhas, Irene and Maria Alice Pinto Guimarães. “Economia Doméstica e 
Governo do Lar: os Saberes Domésticos e as Funções da Dona da Casa” 
in José Mattoso and Irene Vaquinhas, eds. História da Vida Privada em 
Portugal: A Época Contemporânea (Lisbon, PT: Circulo de Leitores, 2011). 
 
Varela, Raquel. A História do PCP na Revolução dos Cravos. (Lisbon, PT: 
Bertrand, 2011). 
 
Vieira, Patricia. Portuguese Film, 1930-60: the Staging of the New State Regime. 
(New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).  
 
Vincent, Mary. Spain: 1833-2002, People and State. (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University press, 2007). 
 
Walkowitz, Judith, R. City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in 
Late-Victorian London. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
 
Walser Smith, Helmut. The Butcher’s Tale: Murder and Anti-Semitism in a 
German Town. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002). 
 
Weeks, Samuel. "Cultural Dimensions, Lusophone Spaces", Análise Social, vol. 
XLVII:1 (2012), 2182-2199. 
 
Wheeler, Douglas L. “The Portuguese Revolution of 1910,” The Journal of 
Modern History, 44:2 (Jun., 1972), 172-194. 
 
---------------------- Republican Portugal: A Political History, 1910-1926. (Madison, 
WS: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 
 
 
 398 
---------------------- “The Revolution in Perspective: Revolution and 
Counterrevolution in Modern Portuguese History,” in in L.S. Graham and 
D.L. Wheeler eds., In Search of Modern Portugal. (Madison, Wisconsin: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). 
 
Whitehead, Laurence. "Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: a 
Comparative Policies Perspective", in G. Pridham ed., Encouraging 
Democracy: the International Context of Regime Transition in Southern 
Europe (London, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991). 
 
Whyte, R.O. The Spatial Geography of Rural Economies. (Delhi, India: Oxford 
University Press, 1982). 
 
Williams, Rosalind. Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-
Century France. (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1982). 
 
Wohl, Robert. “Heart of Darkness: Modernism and Its Historians”, The Journal of 
Modern History, 74:3 (September, 2002), 573-621. 
 
Yang, Anand. Bazaar India: Markets, Society, and the Colonial State in Gangetic 
Bihar. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). 
 
Zemon Davis, Natalie. The Return of Martin Guerre. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1983). 
 
---------------------- “AHR Forum: The Return of Martin Guerre ‘On the Lame’,” 
American Historical Review, 93:3 (June, 1988), 572-603. 
 
